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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE REPRODUCTION OF TEMPORAL INTERVALS 
SUMMARY 
1. MAIN AIMS 
(i) To determine the reliability of the reproduction of short time 
intervals by the method of linear ann movement* under conditions of 
free movement (in which the distance and speed of the linear movement 
was left to the subject's own preference) and controlled movement (in 
which the distance, and, indirectly, the speed of linear movement was 
experimentally varied) (Chapter 4). 
(ii) To investigate relations among time judgements by different methods 
of reproduction and by verbal estimation (Chapter 5). 
(iii) To investigate motor time-space relations under conditions of free 
movement (Chapter 6) and controlled linear ann movement (Chapter 7). 
(iv) To investigate the effects of short periods of delay on the repro-
duction of short time intervals (Chapter 8). 
(v) To investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
extraversion {measured by the Maudsley Personality Inventory) and 
individual differences in the reproduction of short time intervals 
by both free and controlled linear ann movement (Chapter 9). 
(vi) To investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
measures of unstructured motor speed, measures of secondary func-
tioning, and reproduction of short time intervals by free linear 
a:rm movements (Chapter 10). 
(vii) To investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety score and individual differences in the 
reproduction of short time intervals by both free and controlled 
linear a:rm movement (Chapter 11). 
(viii) To investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
time imagery {measured by the Metaphor Preference Scale) and indivi-
dual differences in the reproduction of short time intervals by both 
free and controlled linear ann movements (Chapter 12). 
(ix) To investigate the relationship between individual differences in 
n Achievement and individual differences in the reproduction of 
short time intervals by free linear ann movements {Chapter 12). 
*' I wish to record my gratitude to Prof eesor K. Danziger for suggesting the 
method of reproduction of time by linear ann movements. 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Experiments to Measure Time Judgement (Chapter 3) 
Apparatus. 
(i) The time interval to be judged was an auditory stimulus, 
timed by a Hunter Decade Interval Timer, presented to 
the subject through a pair of earphones. 
(ii) The apparatus for measuring the reproduction of time by 
free movement consisted of a handle, suspended by a cord 
which passed over pulleys, which could be moved horizon-
tally across a frame 42 inches wide. The duration of the 
movement was recorded by an electric stop clock. The 
distance could also be read py means of a measuring tape 
visible to the experimenter only. 
(iii) The apparatus for measuring the reproduction of time by 
controlled movement consisted of a handle through which 
passed a metal rod. The handle could be moved horizon-
tally across a frame of variable width (from 5 inches to 
60 inches). The duration of the movement was recorded 
by an electric stop clock. 
(iv) A key was connected in series with an electric stop clock 
so that time intervals could be r~produced by depression 
of the key for the judged duration of the interval. 
Procedure. 
Experiment 1. 
In the first session of Experiment 1, 43 subjects twice 
reproduced, by free linear arm movement, signals ranging 
from 0.9 sec. to 6.1 sec. immediately after hearing each 
signal. 
In the second session of Experiment 1, separated from 
the first by a median period of one month, 31 of the 
original subjects twice reproduced the same range of 
signals in the same way. 
Experiment 2/ ••• 
Experiment 2 
In the first session of Experiment 2, 77 subjects 
reproduced, by free linear arm movements, signals ranging 
from l to 16 seconds (a) immediately after hearing the 
signals, and (b) after delays of up to 60 seconds. Subjects 
made verbal estimates of each time signal after reproducing 
it. ~orty-three subjects also reproduced the time signals 
for a third time by pressing a key. 
In the second session, separated from the first by a median 
period of one month, 56 of the original subjects twice 
reproduced the same range of signals by free linear arm 
movement immediately after hearing each signal, and also 
made a verbal estimate of each signal immediately after 
reproducing it. Thirty-two of these subjects had repro-
duced the time signals by key-pressing in the first 
session and were asked to do so again. 
Experiment 3 
There were four sessions, spaced as close to a month 
apart as possible. 
In the first session, 40 subjects reproduced 8 seconds 
(a) by linear arm movements of experimentally controlled 
distance up to 60 inches; (b) by linear movements of 
preferred distance; and (c) by gripping the handle without 
moving it. Each subject verbally estimated the time 
signal as well. 
In the second session, these subjects repeated what they 
had done in the first session. 
In the third and fourth sessions, the procedure was kept 
the same as in the first, but the signal length was 
changed to 16 seconds. 
2.2 Measures of Personality, Temperament and Time Imager,y 
Extraversion (Chapter 9) 
Fifty-four subjects of Experiment 2 were asked to fill in 
the short fozm of the Maudsley Personality Inventory 
immediately / ••• 
immediately after they had completed their time repro-
duction trials in the second session. All the subjects of 
Experiment 3 were asked to fill in both the short and the 
long forms of the Maudsley Personality Inve~ntory, immediately 
after testing sessions, but on different days. 
Secondary Functioning. (Chapter 10) 
Subjects of Experiment 2 who returned for the second session 
were given a number of tests of tempo related to primary-
secondary functioning and unstructured motor speed. These 
tests were: preferred and maximum tapping speed, speed of 
making crosses on squared paper, and speed of handwriting. 
Manifest Anxiety (Chapter 11) 
Thi~-eight subjects of Experiment 2, and all subjects of 
Experiment 3, filled in the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. 
Time Imagery (Chapter 12) 
Forty of the subjects of Experiment 2 and the 40 subjects of 
Experiment 3 filled in the Metaphor Preference Scale of Knapp 
and Garbutt. 
n Achievement (Chapter 12) 
Forty of the subjects of Experiment 2 wrote imaginative 
stories in response to three pictures which were scored 
for n Achievement by two post-graduate research students, 
not connected with the experimental study of individual 
differences in time judgement. 
3. TREATMENT OF RESULTS 
(i) Reliability 
Inter-session reliability coefficients were calculated, 
using the first and second session scores of the 32 subjects 
who attended both sessions in Experiment 1, and of the 56 
subjects who attended both sessions in Experiment 2. 
{ii) Relations Among Different Methods of Time Jucigement 
The relationship between verbal estimatesof time and repro-
duction of time by free linear ann movement was calculated 
by I ..... . 
by correlating the free movement reproduction scores and 
the verbal estimates of the 77 subjects who attended the 
first session of Experiment 2. 
The relationships among stationary grip, free, and controlled 
movement reproductions of time intervals were investigated by 
correlating time judgements by these methods of the 40 sub-
jects who attended the first and third sessions of 
Experiment 3. The relations among different methods were 
also studied by correlating inter-session changes in per-
formance. It was argued that time judgements by different 
methods might be functionally related, even though raw scores 
might show little relationship. This functional relationship 
might be revealed by covariance of changes in judgement. 
(iii) Motor Time-Space Relations 
The relations among distance moved, speed of movement, and 
time of movement under conditions of free and controlled 
linear arm movement were studied with the data from the first 
session of Experiment 2 and the first and third sessions of · 
Experiment 3. 
(iv) The Effects of Short Delay on the Reproduction of Time. 
The effects of short periods of delay on the reproduction of 
time intervals were investigated, using the delayed reproduc-
tion data obtained in the first session of Experiment 2. Both 
inter- and intra-individual comparisons were made. 
( v) Extraversion and Time Judgement 
The relationship between extraversion and time judgement was 
investigated with the time judgements of the 54 subjects of 
Experiment 2 who completed the Maudsley Personality Inventory, 
(vi) Secondary Functioning and Time Judgement 
The relationships between unstructured motor speed, secondary 
functioning, and time judgement were investigated by correla-
ting the results of speed tests and time judgements obtained 
in Experiment 2 (54 subjects). 
(vii) Manifest/ ••• 
)(Ill 
(vii) Manifest Anxiety and Time Judgement 
The relationship between Manifest Anxiety and time judgement 
was investigated, using the time judgements of the 38 subjects 
of Experiment 2 who filled in the Manifest Anxiety Scale, and 
of the 40 subjects of Experiment 3, who all filled in the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale. 
(viii) Time I.magery and Time Judgement 
The relationship between time imagery and time judgement was 
studied, using the time judgements of the 40 subjects of 
Experiment 2 who filled in the Metaphor Preference Scale, 
and of the 40 subjects of Experiment 3, who all filled in the 
Metaphor Preference Scale. 
(ix) n Achievement and Time Judgement 
The relationship between fi Achievement and time judgement was 
studied, using the time judgements of the 40 subjects of 
Experiment 2 who were tested for n Achievement. 
4. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Reliability 
{a) The method of reproduction of time signals by either free or 
controlled linear movement is more reliable than the method of 
reproduction by key-pressing, and is of the same order of 
reliability as verbal estimation of time (average reliability 
coefficient +.71). The level of reliability is suitable for 
detecting individual differences. 
(ii) Relations of Different Methods of Time Judgement 
{a) Methods of reproduction of time by key-pressing and by linear 
movement are not more closely related to each other than they 
are to verbal estimates. The commonly accepted idea that the 
classification of methods of time judgement into verbal esti-
mates, reproductions and productions is psychologically signi-
ficant does not seem to be true. This is a logical, not a 
psychological division of methods. 
(b) I ...... . 
(b) Por all methods of time judgement, the relationship between 
time judged and length of signal may be satisfactorily fitted 
to Stevens' (1957) power law, 
sensation = kffi (where k is a constant; S is the 
stimulus; and n is the log. sensation 
ratio/log stimulus ratio). 
Different k values have to be substituted in the equation, but 
the power n is almost identical for all methods. 
(c) For all methods, error bears a linear relation to the length 
of signal reproduced, within the range observed. All the 
lines have different slopes and require the substitution of 
different values. 
(iii) Motor Time-Space Relationships. 
.. 
Free Linear Movement 
(a) Time reproduced by free linear movement, and speed of free linear 
movement, are not significantly related. This is found when 
either raw scores (average correlation, regardless of direction, 
•.18), or intra-subject changes in scores (average correlation +.03) 
are correlated. 
(b) Time reproduced and distance of free linear movement in 
reproducing time are significantly correlated. This applies 
both to raw scores and to changes in scores (average correlations 
are +.39 and +.46, respectively). This means that subjects who 
move further tend to move for a longer time (the alternative is 
that they might move faster and keep duration constant) and that, 
when a subject increases his distance of movement, he increases 
the time taken for the movement (the alternative is that he might 
increase his speed sufficiently to compensate). 
(c) Speed and distance of linear movement are positively related to 
each other, as might be expected. The alternative is that a 
subject might move faster, but for a shorter time, and so keep 
the distance constant. The positive correlation between distance 
and speed of movement is found among both raw scores (average 
correlation +.78) and intra-individual changes in scores 
(average correlation +.71). 
(d) / ••••• 
(d) The correlation between distance of free linear arm movement and 
verbal estimate of the length of signal is greater tban that 
between time reproduced by free linear arm movement and verbal 
estimate of the length of the signal (average coefficients are 
+.51 and +.33, respectively). This leads to the conclusion 
that time estimate and distance of movement are more closely 
associated than time estimate and duration of movement. 
Jaensch1s (1905) conclusion that estimates of the spatial 
extent of a limb movement are partly determined by the time 
taken.for that movement may be true in the reverse as well: 
estimates of the duration of a movement are partly determined 
by the spatial extent of that movement. 
Controlled Linear Movement Reproduction 
(a) When the distance of the linear arm movement by which the subject 
reproduces time signals is experimentally varied, no significant 
differences in time judgements occur. This means that the sub-
ject can reproduce the same time interval by movements of varying 
speed and distance. 
(b) All linear movement reproductions, whether free- or controlled-
distance, differ significantly from key-pressing reproductions, 
but free- and controlled-distance linear movement reproductions 
do not differ from each other. This suggests that the method 
of linear movement requ:Lresa different adaptive timing system 
from key-pressing. 
(iv) The Effect of Dela.y on Time Judgement. 
(a) Where the time interval to be judged is presented in the form of 
(v) 
(a) 
a continuous auditory signal, delay has no effect on time judgement. 
This may be understood in tenns of Broadbent's (1957) model: 
where the information stored is within the capacity of a recurrent 
system, no delay effects may be expected as long as the system is 
kept altife. 
Ertraversion and Time Judgement. 
Eysenck's conclusion that level of time judgement is negatively 
related to extraversion is contradicted by positive (though 
statistically I ..... . 
statistically insignificant) correlations between reproduction 
by controlled linear movement and extraversion. The results 
show that time judgements cannot be thought of as distinct from 
the method used to obtain them. On the whole, the results do 
not favour his Typological Postulate. 
(b} Extraverts tend to be less variable in their perfonnance than 
introverts. The correlation betweenatraversion and variability 
in speed of free linear movement is statistically significant 
(-.43; p<:.01). All other correlations between extraversion 
and variability scores are negative, though not statistically 
significant. 
(c) There is no difference between e:x:traverts and introverts in the 
speed of linear ann movement, nor in the distance moved. Both 
of these were expected of extraverts (rather tentatively) on the 
basis of the finding that extraverte tend to be rather more 
expansive than introverts in graphic expression (Wallach and 
Gahm, 1960}. 
(d) Extraverts are more accurate than introverts in their reproduction 
of time signals by both free- and controlled-distance linear ann 
movement. In Experiment 2 the correlations between extraversion 
and error are -.48 at 8 second signal and -.50 at 16 second signal 
(both significant at less than 1%}. In Experinent 3 the corre-
lations between extraversion and error are -.12 at 8 second 
signal and -.47 at 16 second signal. 
is significant at less than 1%. 
The latter correlation 
{vi) Secondary l1'unctioning and Time Judgement. 
(a) The view that secondary functioning is related to extraversion 
and to reproduction of time by linear movement is supported by 
the direction of the correlations. But none of the correlations 
is statistically significant. 
(vii} Manifest Anxiety and Time Judgement. 
(a} There is no relationship between Manifest Anxiety and Time 
Judgement by any of the methods in the experiments described. 
(b} .Manifest / ••• 
(b) Manifest Anxiety seems to be positively related to variability 
of response. All correlations between Manifest Anxiety and 
measures of variability are positive, and two of them are 
statistically significant. These are: (a) between Manifest 
Anxiety and variability in speed of free linear movement 
(r = +.39; p (..05); and (b) between Manifest Anxiety and 
variability in verbal estimate of 16 seconds (r = +.33; 
p ~.05). 
(viii) Metaphor Preference and Time Judgement. 
(a) Metaphor Preference is not related to time judgement by any 
of the methods described. 
(b) The relationship between a preference for swift, directional 
metaphors and speed of linear ann movement approaches statis-
tical significance (r = +.27) and may indicate that there is 
a general expressive preference guiding imagery and gesture. 
(ix) n Achievement and Time Judgement. 
(a) n Achievement is not related to the judgement of time by any 
of the methods described. 
(b) n Achievement is significantly related to speed of free linear 
ann movement in reproducing time signals. This confinns 
Aronson's (1958) discovery that n Achievement is related to 
spatial extension and mobility in graphic expression. 
(c) n Achievement is significantly related to variability in speed 
of movement. This may be expected in tenns of the prediction 




I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N. 
1.1 The Experience of Time 
1.1. 1 Change and the Idea of Change 
When one reads through the major books that have been written 
on the psychology of time in the last seventy years - those of Sturt (1925) 
and of Fra.isse (1957), one becomes ver:y much aware bow much they owe the 
spirit of their approach to William James. This is not to say that 
William James was the first psychologist to consider the problem of 
the awareness of time, or that he was a major experimenter in this 
field, but that, in Chapter XV of The Principles of Psycholog.y, he made 
condensed and penetrating statements of problems and solutions to 
problems in a language which has seldom been matched by any other writer 
on the subject. 
One of the problems which James had to consider - as had 
others before him - was the source of the awareness of time. One may 
take as a starting point bis statement that "we have no sense for empty 
time", (James, 1950, vol. i, p.619). "Awareness of change is thus the 
condition on which our perception of time's flow depends ••• " But are 
these changes directly responsible for the idea of time? This is the 
view which was apparently held by Helmholtz, who believed that the 
perception of time is the only case "in which our perception can 
correspond with outer reality", since "events, like our perception of 
them, take place in time, so that the time-relations of the latter can 
furnish a true copy of those of the former".(ibid., 628). But, James 
points out, this view of the idea of time overlooks the fact that 
there is a great difference "between the mind's own changes being 
successive, and knowing their succession ••• A succession of feelings, 
in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession" (ibid., 628). The 
idea of time is not a direct product of the changes in sensations or 
perceptions or sensations. We are retui:ned to the problem of the 
way in which these changes are acted upon by the mind to form the 
idea of time. 
1.1. 2 / ••• 
1.1. 2 A Receptor for Time 
The view has been held (by E. Ma.ch) that time is directly 
perceived by a sense distinct from the other major senses. Ma.ch 
(quoted by Fraisse, 1963, p.p. 80 - 81) took the expression "Time-sense", 
then current, literally. "It is probable that this feeling is 
connected with that organic consumption which is necessarily linked 
with the production of consciousness, and that the time which we feel 
is probably due to the work of attention ••• The fatigue of the 
organ of consciousness, as long as we wake, continually increases, and 
the work of attention augments as continually. Those impressions which 
are conjoined with a greater amount of work appear to us as later" 
(quoted by James, ibid., p. 635). Mach attempted to find a special 
receptor for time, and surmised that there might be an accommodation 
mechanism in the ear which would act as one. This receptor, he thought, 
would enable us to perceive the temporal position of stimuli, just as the 
accommodation of the eye enables us to perceive spatial positions. 
Attention would, by causing fatigue in this receptor, assist us in 
temporal location. 
The choice of the ear as the structure in which there might be 
a special time receptor was not capricious. The ear is particularly 
adapted to detect temporal succession, as Fraisse (1963, p. 83) points 
out. When one compares the various senses, one notes that they display 
various degrees of temporal inertia. It is impossible, for example, 
to present exactly demarcated time intervals to the sense of smell or 
the sense of taste. Nor can we detect a rapid succession of different 
stimuli with these receptors. Vision is also unsuitable for the 
detection of patterns of rapidly succeeding stimuli of different 
intensities or colours. The tactile and the auditory modalities have 
the lowest temporal inertia, but the auditory modality is obviously the 
more important. It has greater cortical representation and greater 
association value, and it can detect stimuli in a greater spatial area. 
"Hearing only locates stimuli very vaguely in apace, but it locates them 
with admirable precision in time. It is par excellence the sense which 
appreciates time, succession, rhythm and tempo" (Guyau, quoted by Fraisse, 
1963, p. s3). 
But time / ••• 
But time is a property of perceptions in all modalities, though 
there are differences in organisation. It has been shown that the visual, 
auditory and tactile seconds differ in length (Goldstone and others, 1959; 
Lhamon and others, 1962); and that visual and auditory time signals 
cannot be matched with accuracy (Fraisse, 1963). The time properties 
of perception in each modality depend on the org4Uisation of perception 
in that modality. As Pavlov stated (quoted by Dnitriev and Kochigina, 
1959), there is no special cortical analyser for time. 
analyse time is found in all cortical analysers. 
1.1. 3 Time as an Attribute. 
The power to 
A solution which has often been proposed is that time is an 
attribute, rather than a sensation with a special receptor. Wundt 
fozmulated a doctrine of attributes, putting forward the view that the 
two essential attributes of sensation are quality and intensity. 
Titchener extended the list to five: quality, intensity, protensity 
(duration), extensity, and attensity (clearness). But the atomistic 
view that perceptions were organised out of sensations suffered at the 
hands of many psychologists, especially of the gestalt school, and the 
doctrine of attributes underwent a corresponding eclipse. If percep-
tions are not built of sensations, then they cannot be built of the 
attributes of sensations. A further logical objection to the doctrine 
of attributes is that they do not have the independence which they 
ought to have. One example is that loudness (intensity) of a sound 
is not independent of pitch (quality). The same relations of different 
dimensions may also be shown in the perception of colour. 
But it is clear that the mind must have the power to abstract 
time from experience, from all perceptions. It also seems clear that time 
is not directly perceived through the agency of any particular receptor. 
Therefore, though we may not wish to resuscitate the doctrine of attri-
butes in its original form, we must conclude that time is an attribute of 
all perceptions, though it may not be a pure attribute independent of all 
other dimensions. Pieron (1951) has remarked: "For the psycho-physiolo-
gical organism there are in fact several times as there are several spaces, 
and their intellectual unification, which is mainly a social achievement, 
makes one forget this fundamental heterogeneity". 
1.1. 4 / •••• 
1.1. 4 The Specious Present. 
We have still not dealt with the way in which the idea of time 
may come into existence. It has been shown that a succession of mental 
events is not enough to give rise to the idea of time. James (ibid., p.629), 
points out that "if events A and B are to be represented as occurring in 
succession they must be simultaneously represented; if we are to think 
of them as one after the other, we must think of them both at once". 
This idea was developed still further. "The cause of the intuition 
which we have cannot be the duration of our brain-processes or of our 
mental changes. That duration is rather the object of the intuition 
which, being realised at every moment of such duration, must be due to a 
permanently present cause. This cause - probably the simultaneous 
presence of brain-processes of different phase - fluctuates, and hence a 
certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its 
subdivisibility, accrues". 
If we are to attribute the intuition of time to the "simultaneous 
presence of brain processes of different phase", then it is important to 
know how long these brain processes are likely to persist. James emphasises 
that they are asymptotic; that there is no moment at which the process 
suddenly ceases to exist. On the basis of experiments by Wundt and others, 
James concluded that the maximum direct intuition of duration covers about 
12 seconds, and we may take this to correspond to the supra-liminal 
duration of the brain-processes. This interval of time which is directly 
perceived has been variously named the conscious present, the specious 
present, the sensible present, the psychic present, the mentally present, 
and the actually present (Fraisse, 1963, P• 85). Fraisse prefers to 
call it "the perceived present". It was this period, directly and who+ly 
grasped, that James believed was the datum for the idea of time. "The 
original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious 
present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly 
sensible". (ibid., p. 631). Longer time intervals are conceived as 
multiples of the specious present; shorter time intervals are conceived as 
fractions of the specious present. 
Since I ..... 
Since a succession of present events (as in Helmholtz' theory) 
would merely fozm an eternal present, theorists examining the question of 
the cause of our awareness of time have had to rely on one or other form 
of the specious present. But most have made it rather shorter than James 
did. Boring (1936) has used the indifference interval as the unit of 
perceived time, which means that he places it at less than one second. 
Fraisse (1963), also believes that the perceived present is shorter than 
James had it. His evidence is drawn from several kinds of observation. 
Firstly, there is the limit of successive organisation. If the interval 
between sounds is greater than about 2 seconds, the impression of rhythm 
is no longer possible. Secondly, there is tlr:! number of successive 
elements which can be clearly perceived as a unit. This varies with 
the kind of element and the rate of presentation, but the maximum appears 
to be 5 or 6 elements separated by a maximum of 0.63 seconds. 
less than four seconds. 
That is, 
E'ra.isse (1963) rejects James' view that the present consists 
of different evenly fading processes. The present is not composed merely 
of the last elements presented. It should rather be thought of as a 
discontinuous process. The subject perceives, successively, groups of 
elements. Each successive grouping has .a certain span - the span of 
apprehension - consisting of a certain limited number of units, but it 
is related to the remembered past. While writing a certain sentence, 
to take an example, one may be aware of a certain number of limited 
elements composing that sentence, bl.ft this does not mean that it is 
unrelated to what has preceded it. That sentence, that present, 
exists in the context of the past. This is rather reminiscent of the 
Heymans-Wiersma theory that each mental event has a primary and a secondary 
effect. The duration of the primary effect may be taken to correspond 
to the conscious present, but the secondary effect gives continuity. It 
is important to realise that the perceived present is not inelastic. It 
"depends on the possibilities for the organisation of successive elements 
into one unit" (Fraisse, 1963, p.88). When the organisation of the 
elements is complete, the present may be a sentence, but when the 
organisation is difficult, the present may contract to a single phrase 
or a word. In the same way, in listening to music, a phrase occupying 
several / ••• 
several seconds may be easily grasped; but a sudden change will focus 
attention on a brief moment in the music. This may be the surprising 
entr,y of an instrument, or the abrupt interruption of percussion. This 
extension and contraction of the listener's direct experience of time is 
a vital technique in music and in peetr,y. At one moment the listener is 
carried along on an even stream; at the next he is poised, held at a 
single narrow point of time. 
But the way in which we apprehend the present remains as much 
of a problem as ever. Fraisse relates the alternations in time to 
alternations in perception, as in inspecting reversible figures. These 
alternations occur at about 5 - 10 seconds. The analogy is interesting, 
but, he admits, the cause of these alternations is not known. Therefore, 
even if the two processes are related, we know as little about their 
causation as before. 
Our conclusion is that the idea of time is the result of an 
unknown relation between the mind and the perceived present. Phenomenal 
time depends on the span and flow of this perceived present, but social 
time is a construct based upon it. 
The next question we shall consider is the major conclusions which 
may be drawn about the relationship between judged time and the time 
signal presented. 
1.2 The Judgement of Time. 
Two themes dominated the older studies of the judgement of time, 
The first was the exact detennination of the indifference interval and the 
second was the application of the Weber-Fechner law to time judgements. 
The indifference interval of Vierordt is that interval which is 
judged with the minimum error. Below this interval, time signals are 
over-estimated. Above this interval, time signals are underestimated. 
These are average trends, but there may be vast individual differences 
which go completely contrary to this rule. The indifference interval 
appears to average about 0.70 seconds (Fraisse, 1963) but there are con-
siderable differences among authors. The indifference interval has been 
shown to vary with a large number of factors, such as the attitude of the 
subject I ... 
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subject and time order (Woodrow, 1951). This probably accounts for its 
occasional elusiveness and for the great differences in its determination. 
The explanation of the indifference point has been a matter of interest for 
many years. Wundt re~ated it to the optimum association time - an 
explanation which has been further developed by Fraisse (1963). Fraisse 
comments: "Walking, heartbeats, movements effected at a spontaneous 
tempo, and perceptions all follow on at intervals of about 0.70 second, 
which we consider to be the optimum. interval for the functioning of the 
nervous centres ••• " (ibid., P• 128}. 
The other theme, that of application of the Weber-Fechner law, 
was developed by various authors without much success. Recently, 
Woodrow (1951) concluded that the results do not support the law. 
In studies of time judgements since 1951, results have been 
found which follow a power law formulated by Stevens (1957). 
sensation = kffl 
(k = a constant; S = the actual stimulus-length; n = log ratio of 
increase in sensation/ log ratio of increase of stimulus). 
The power law is held to cover judgements in a large number of 
fields, such as perceived intensity of sounds, weight, taste, pain, and 
luminosity. The law may be stated as: Equal stimulus ratios produce 
equal sensation ratios. In each case the stimulus ratio must be 
experimentally determined. But once found, it applies to a large range 
of lengths of signal and does not diminish, as the Weber-Fechner law 
would make it do. 
If we examine the equation of the power law, we may see that the 
closer n is to unit in value, the more the curve of the relationship 
between judgement and stimulus will approximate a straight line. Values 
of 1.06 (Gregg, 1951); 1.1 (Stevens and Galanter, 1956); and 1.11 
(Bjorkman and Holmkvist, 1960) have been obtained, for a range of signals 
from 0.4 to 1.0 seconds. Ross and Katchmar (1952) have obtained an 
exponent of 1.16 for a range from 5.38 to 60.12 seconds. For these 
ranges of signals, the relationship would be almost linear. 
In Chapter ~ the application of the power law to data obtained 
by experiments with various methods of time judgement will be considered. 
1.3 I ..... 
1.3 Time Judgements by Various Methods. 
At this stage the various methods of conveying judgements of time 
will not be discussed in detail. That is left to the following chapter. 
Here, the methods and their relations to one another will merely be indi-
cated. The main methods are the method of comparison, in which the sub-
ject merely reports whether a given signal is longer or shorter than a 
given standard; the method of reproduction, in which the subject is 
required to perform some action lasting as long as a given standard time 
signal; the method of verbal estimation, in which the subject makes clock 
time estimates of a given period; and the method of production, in which 
the subject is asked to perfoim some action lasting a given number of units 
of time. 
These methods do not generally give results which are 
significantly correlated (Clausen, 1950; Kruup, 1961; Siegman, 1962; 
and Praisse and others, 1962). Only the methods of verbal estimation 
and production may correlate significantly and negatively (E'raisse and 
others, 1962). Only the methods of verbal estimation and production may 
correlate significantly and negatively (E'raisse and others, 1962). The 
negative correlation indicates that a shorter production corresponds to an 
overestimation of time judgement. 
A shortcoming of most methods of time judgement is that they 
show ver-y low inter-session reliability (Kruup, 1961; Siegman, 1962), 
with the exception of the method of verbal estimation. 
It is obvious that the methods measure rather different aspects 
of time judgement. The method of comparison does not require any activity 
from the subject beyond his attention and his verbal report that a given 
signal is longer, shorter, or equal to a given standard. But the method 
of reproduction requires an action of some kind, and the nature of that 
action must play some part in the subject's ability to equate its duration 
and that of the given standard signal. The action may interest the subject, 
may call for special skills which absorb his attention, or may be so simple 
that the subject pays attention almost exclusively to the duration of his 
response. The method of verbal estimation, unlike the two methods 
mentioned I ..... 
mentioned previously, tests the accuracy of a subject's knowledge of 
conventional time units. The same applies to the method of production, 
but there is the additional factor of the nature of the action by which 
he produces the given duration. This introduces the same problems as 
are found in the method of reproduction. There is no way of overcoming 
these difficulties. The judgement of time expressed by the subject is 
bound up with the method of expression. 
The terminology best adapted to describing judgements of time 
bas been studied by Bindra and Waksberg (1956). Consider the example 
of what we mean when we say that a subject is overestimating. When we 
are dealing with results obtained by the method of reproduction, this 
may mean either that the subject is overestimating the duration of the 
signal, or that he is overestimating the duration of bis reproductive 
action. Presumably, if both the signal and the reproductive action 
are equally overestimated, the effects will cancel out. The most 
sensible usage, since we. are referring our results to the standard, is 
to say that a subject is overestimating when the objective time reproduced 
by him is greater than the objective time of the signal. One may also say 
that the subject is over- or under-reproducing the given time signal. 
When overestimation refers to the results obtained with the 
method of verbal estimation, it may mean that the subject experiences the 
signal as longer than it objectively is, and indicates this by making a 
high verbal estimate, or it may mean that the subject overestimates the 
length of time corresponding to the clock time units used (which would 
result in a low numerical estimate), or it may mean that the subject 
overestimates the number of clock time units which refer to a given time 
interval (which would result in a high numerical estimate). If we 
ignore the subject's private reference, then the term overestimation refers 
to the fact that a subject assigns a higher number of conventional time 
units to a given period than should be assigned to it. Ignoring the 
subject's private system of reference is, of course, unjustifiable if 
we wish to get at his experience of a particular time interval. For 
this reason, unless we ascertain what that system of reference is, verbal 
estimates are not useful in revealing individual differences in the 
experience of given time intervals. 
The same / ••• 
The same ambiguity in the use of the term overestimation (and 
in the use of the term underestimation) applies to the methods of com-
parison and production. 
In the present account, the first eight chapters will be found 
to deal very largely with the relationships of time judgements obtained 
by various methods. One method will be examined insspecial detail. 
This is the method of reproduction of time by means of linear horizontal 
movements of the arm. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 the choice of a method for measuring time 
judgements, as well as individual differences in temperament and personality, 
and the details of that method will be described. 
Reliability and distribution of scores obtained by various 
methods are examined in Chapter 4. 
The relations among judgements obtained by different methods 
are discussed in Chapter 5. The possibility of detecting relations by 
correlating ratios of intraaubject changes in judgement is also dealt with. 
Some of the relationships of space and time when the method of 
linear arm movement is used to judge time intervals are analysed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
The effects of delay on time judgement, suggested by the 
findings of Prankenhaeuser, (1959), are studied in Chapter 8. 
The last four chapters describe attempts to define consistent 
individual differences in time judgement. 
1.4 Individual Differences in Time Judgement. 
Studies of individual differences in time judgement are dis-
cussed in some detail in Chapters 9 - 12, and are only mentioned briefly 
here to give some idea of their scope. 
Very few of the studies in this field rest on any systematic 
theoretical basis. For this reason, Eysenck's typological postulate 
(1957, p. 114) with its clear perceptual corollaries, is of particular 
interest. It is a prediction from his theory that extraverts under-
1 
reproduce a time signal as compared to introverts, since extraverts 
generate / ••• 
It 
generate a lower excitatory potential in response to a stimulus than 
introverts, but develop reactive inhibition more strongly and quickly. 
Eysenck (1959), and Claridge (1960), using hysterics (= extraverts) and 
dysthym.ics (= introverts} appear to have confirmed the predictions 
about time judgement from the postulate. Some criticisms of their use 
of neurotics as criterion groups will be detailed in Chapter 9. Lynn 
(1961), use/, normal university students tested according to the technique 
of positive feedback (whereby subjects start with the same stimulus in 
the first trial, but in subsequent trials they are asked to reproduce 
their reproduction of the previous signal). 
The studies which follow were largely fact-finding studies, 
guided by more or less well-supported hypotheses, but they do not test 
any theory. 
Orme (1962) bas studied verbal judgements of longer periods of 
20 and 30 minutes, and has found that hysterics and psychopaths make 
longer estimates than neurotic and psychotic depressives. He found no 
relationship between extraversion and time estimation in a normal sample. 
The difficulty in interpreting verbal estimates of time without determining 
the personal frame of reference of each subject has already been pointed 
out (1.3). 
Dobson (1954) studied the problem of whether patients who are 
disoriented in time (by usual psychiatric criteria) also show distortion 
in their judgement of short durations; and he also investigated the hypo-
thesis that greater anxiety would be associated with longer estimates of 
time. In his study, 16 normal, 16 neurotic, 16 time~oriented 
schizophrenics, and 8 time-disoriented schizophrenics were used as subjects. 
The subjects were asked to estimate a variety of filled and non-filled 
periods of time ranging from 17 seconds to 2 minutes under conditions of 
.!!!! (expecting to be asked to judge the time) and non-set (unprepared to 
estimate the time). He found that schizophrenic patients who are dis-
oriented for time are not significantly different from time-oriented 
schizophrenics, neurotics, or nonnal subjects in their estimates of 
time, but they seem to show greater variation. Since the samples are 
so small this cannot be taken as established. If the neurotics are used 
as the / ••••• 
as the criterion group for anxiety, then the hypothesis that anxiety is 
related to longer time estimate does not hold. The neurotics were found 
to be more accurate and consistent than the other groups. Since the 
neurotics are not classified, it is important to note that .Angyal (1948) 
found that obsessives tend to be more accurate in their perception of 
visual stimuli than other neurotics. Mental set was also found to 
affect judgement. 
and less variable. 
Subjects set to make an estimate were more accurate 
Also using psychiatric patients, Lbamon and Goldstone (1956) 
have shown that schizophrenics judge a longer interval of time to be 
equal to one clock second than normals do. This is interpreted as an 
effect of the acceleration of the mental world of the patient, but this 
conclusion seems to be based on insufficient evidence. Since the same 
effect is found under conditions of sensory deprivation, it would be rash 
to attribute it to acceleration of the mental world. 
Guertin and Rabin (1960), also investigating the verbal time 
judgements of schizophrenics, found they tended to be very variable. 
They conclude that there is a functional disability in their time judgements, 
but it may simply be that institutionalised patients become less accurate 
in their use of clock time • 
.Another study, unrelated to the previous studies discussed, has 
been made of the relationship between time perspective, time estimation, 
and impulse control (Siegman, 1961). The subjects used were 30 delinquents 
and 22 non-delinquent army inductees, who were selected in an effort to 
control the effects of institutionalisation. In both groups, a positive 
correlation between future time perspective (given by the average distance 
from the present of 10 future events named by the subject) and higher 
estimation of time wa s found. The author refers to the higher estimation 
of time as the speeding up of the subject's internal clock. Intervals of 
5, 25, and 15 seconds were used. It is interesting to note that in the 
Lhamon and Goldstone study a low estimate of a given interval of time is 
referred to as a speeding up of the internal world of the patient (since 
more time passes before the subject feels that one clock second has elapsed), 
whereas in the Siegman study a high estimate of time is referred to as 
speeding I .... 
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speeding up the internal clock. This demonstrates the need for an agreed 
terminology. Bindra and Wak:sberg (1956) have concluded that a verbal 
estimation which is larger than the standard indicates an internal clock 
which is faster than the external; a produced time which is larger than 
the standard indicates a slower internal clock; and a reproduced time 
which is larger than the standard indicates that the internal clock is 
faster than the external during reproduction only. Siegman also found 
significant negative correlations between motor impulse control (measured 
by how slowly the subject could trace a 2i inch circle on onion skin paper) 
and time estimation. 
A tendency to think of events as close to the present has been 
found to be associated with low estimate of time (Knapp and Green, 1959). 
Both are, in t"1'n, associated with high n Achievement. This tendency to 
underestimate the time which separates past events from the present, and 
to underestimate the time taken by a moving point to reach a mark, is not 
incongruent with the Siegma.n finding that long future perspective is 
positively associated with high time estimate. 
A study by Young and Sumner (1954) has shown that subjects tend 
to remain in the same rank order, whether their judgements of a given 
time interval are made immediately, after a delay of 15 days, or after a 
delay of 22 days. The intervals used were 30 seconds and 5 minutes in 
which the subject did arithmetic problems, and 30 seconds and 5 minutes in 
which the subjects attended passively. Another finding in this study is 
that reproductions on the 15th and the 22nd days tended to resemble each 
other more closely than they did immediate reproductions. 
The most extensive study of individual differa:ices in time 
judgement, in terms of length, is that of Loehlin (1959). Loehlin asked 
subjects to estimate sixteen 2 minute intervals spent in a variety of ways. 
Among the occupations in these periods were anagrams, arithmetic, repeated 
writing, pleasant thoughts, concentration on time, and counting the 
incidence of ~ in a prose paragraph. Other intervals were also estimated. 
Two short periods of 1 second and 4 seconds were estimated four times to 
the nearest 10th of a second. One 20 minute period was also estimated. 
Short / ••••• 
Short time intervals were compared, and a period filled with an accelerating 
pulse was compared to a period filled with a decelerating pulse. Subjects 
were also asked to fill in a questionnaire on attitudes to time. Fluency 
scores were computed for each subject from the number of l's written by 
the subject in two minutes, the number of solutions of an easy anagram in 
two minutes, and the number of questionnaire it.ems completed in two minutes. 
Analytic perception was measured by detection of figures in the 
Gottschaldt test and by the number of the's counted in the prose passage. 
Finally, MMPI's were completed voluntarily several months later by 7o% of 
the subjects. 
The data were correlated and factor analysed. Several factors 
were extracted. Factor l.was found to be general to the 2 minute estimates, 
and appeared to reflect characteristic individual differences in the length 
of the time estimate of 2 minutes. Two determinants appeared to contribute 
to these individual differences. The first was personal differences in the 
conception of one minute, and the second was the degree of interest in the 
tasks. Bored subjects had higher estimates. Factor II had variance 
specific to short intervals and also reflected overestimation of empty 
intervals of time. Factor III appeared to be identical with factor I, 
but to reflect serial position. Factor IV reflected a tendency to estimate 
the second of two periods of a repeated activity as relatively long. There 
were positive loadings on the perceptual ability measures (Gottschaldt figure 
test and difficult anagrams). It is suggested that this factor is 
intellectual. Factor V loadings suggest an activity-passivity dimension. 
Subjects with high scores on this factor tended to write a large number of 
l's and to overestimate periods spent passively. The MMPI differences 
were not all as expected. Passive subjects were, as expected, high of 
the Pt, Hy, and D scales but active subjects were not higher on the Pd 
and Es scales. 
Questionnaire items which correlated with factor I seem to 
relate to differences in time perspective. EJCamples of such items are:-
I have a poor memory for the past events of my life. 
Often, though the days go slowly, the weeks and months seem to 
fly by. 
The future / ••••• 
The future is too uncertain for a person to plan very 
far ahead. 
,, 
Questionnaire items also correlated with Factor II, and seemed 
to reflect differences in the development of a sense of the conventional 
scale of time. Persons high on Factor II agreed with an item such as:-
A period of a few minutes often seems like hours to me. 
Persons low on factor II agreed with items such as :-
My' father isa rather dominant person. 
I sometimes feel we would have been better off if clocks 
has never been invented. 
The low S's say that they have an accurate idea of time, but 
the psychological distance of childhood, the dominant father, and the 
resentment of clocks lead Loehlin to suggest that this was achieved at 
some cost. 
Subjects with high scores on factor V - those who seemed to be 
less subject to time illusions, also agreed with certain items in the 
questionnaire more often than with others. These items were:-
I have a pretty definite idea what I will be doing next summer. 
I usually have a pretty accurate idea what time it is. 
The high items reflect a feeling of control of time which seems 
to be con.$istent with the active-passive interpretation of this factor. 
As was remarked at the beginning of the section, most of the 
studies of the individual differences in time judgement are fact-finding. 
Very few of them are guided by what one can regard as an articulate theory, 
and very few of them test crucial hypotheses. 
indicat~o- of the state of the subject. 
This is, unfortunately, an 
PART I 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MEASURING TIME JUDGE:MENT 
There is no way of getting an absolute measure of the time exper-
ience of the individual. Each method yields different results. 
But not all methods are equally reliable, and if we wish to measure 
individual differences in time judgement it is essential to find a 
reliable method (Chapter 2). 
The method of reproduction of time by linear arm movements is 
described (Chapter 3). The judgements of time intervals obtained 
by this method are more reliable than those obtained by other methods 
of reproduction, and are of the order of reliability associated with 
verbal estimates of time (Chapter 4). 
Though different methods of time judgement yield different results, 
it seems likely that they all refer to the same core experience of 
time. Attempts were made to discover what relations exist between 
judgements conveyed by various methods by correlating the raw scores 
and by correlating intra-individual changes in scores from one 
session to the next (Chapter 5). 
CHAPTER 2 
A METHOD FOR STUDYING TIME JUDGEMENTS 
2.1. Introduction 
A method which is at once sensitive and reliable is necessary 
for the investigation of time judgements. 
Sensitivity may be of two kinds. Firstly, the method should 
be sensitive to small changes in the length of the interval to be judged.. 
Secondly, the method should. be sensitive to inter-subject differences in 
time judgement. 
Reliability should not be achieved at the expense of inter-
subject variation, particularly if we are interested. in individual dif-
ferences in time judgement. A test capable of wid.e inter-subject dis-
crimination and low intra-subject variability is needed. 
The role of the kind of time standard as it affects reliability 
and sensitivity will be discussed. If there is motivational engagement 
of the subject during the standara interval, and if there are changes in 
motivation, time judgement will be affected.· There seems to be a delicate 
balance between awareness of 'time and the degree to which a task absorbs the 
motivation present. As Fraisse (1957, p 205) writes: "Satisfaction et 
non-conscience de la duree sont deux effects concomitants d'une activite' 
exactement adequate a la motivation presente." It may be that a slight 
disproportion between motivation and task is most favourable for accurate 
judgement. If the motivation is entirely absorbed by the task, or if 
there is disproportionately high or low motivation, judgement of time is 
likely to be inaccurate. Then, it will be shown that the sensory mode 
in which the interval is presented, the position of the interval in a 
series (anchor effects), the rate of stimulation, and. the spatial properties 
of tbe time interval, affect judgement of duration and often affect 
reliability. 
The role/ ••••••••••• 2. 
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The role of the method of judgement will be discussed. In 
general, verbal estimates are more reliable than judgements obtained. by 
other methods (e.g., Clausen, 1950), and they show wide inter-subject 
spread, but they tend to be stereotyped. and crude. This is shown by the 
fact that judgements ending in 0 and 5 predominate (Weber, 1933). 
Different subjects change categories with different degrees of ease as the 
stinrulus duration is altered, and there tend to be wide differences in the 
minuteness of the scale adopted by the subject in expressing his judgement. 
Klein's (1951) distinction between levellers and sharpeners is relevant in 
this context. But the greatest objection to the method of verbal estima-
tion is that it tells us relatively little about the subject's perception 
of time, unless special methods of analysis.are adopted.. In order to 
deliver a verbal judgement of time the subject must translate a non-verbal 
activity (his :i.nnnediate perception of the duration of the standard) into 
a symbol, the accuracy of which will vary greatly from individual to in-
dividual. The verbal judgement may not reflect the particular experience 
of time which the subject has; it may reflect largely the accuracy with 
which he has learnt in the past to apply symbols of time. Furthermore, 
the process of translating the non-verbal into a verbal activity may also 
involve individual differences. The only satisfactory wa:y of using verbal 
estimates might be to separately establish a scale for each individual and. 
to treat all experimental scores as quotients of the individual's private 
scale. In Chapter 7 the use of this method is shown. It·might also be 
possible to train all subjects to estimate according to the same standard 
before commencing the experiment proper. Since these precautions are 
seldom taken, the method. of verbal estimation seldom yields useful infor-
mation about the perception of time. The method. of production reverses 
the process of verbal estimation. Instead of being asked to give a verbal 
estimate of some non-verbal duration, the subject is given a verbal duration 
to reproduce by some non-verbal action. 
to engage in some action for 20 seconds. 
The subject is asked, for example, 
Obviously,/ ••••••••••• 
If 
Obviously, we do not know whether the verbal instruction means the same 
thing~to all the subjects; nor that all are equally able to translate 
the verbal instruction tnto a non-verbal action; nor that during this 
action the perception of time is in all cases identical. The problems 
are the same as in verbal estimation. Reproduction of time signals 
gives us the best information about non-verbal experience of time. The 
subject translates a non-verbal perception into a non-verbal reproduction. 
It is possible that in some cases there is symbOlic intervention, but it 
is not deliberately introduced into the experiment as a complication. 
The method of reproduction, as might be expected, is more accurate (e.g., 
Clausen, 19.50) than the other methods, but it is also less reliable 
(Clausen, 19.50; Kruup, 1961; Siegman, 1962). 
Each of these methods has some defect. The problem is to 
find a method of time judgement which discriminates between.individuals, 
is sensitive to changes in signal length, is reliable, and does not in-
troduce the complication of translation from asymbolic to symbolic process. 
2.2. Methods of Presenting the Time Signal 
Problems which confront us here are: (a) what are the effects 
on time judgement of various methods of presenting the interval; and 
( b) what kind of signal, 
under comparable conditions of judgement, is likely to enable the subject 
to be most consistent? 
We have already mentioned that if the interval is presented in 
such a way that the subject is motivationally engaged, his judgement of the 
duration of that interval is likely to be affected. An ingenious experiment 
by Schonbach (1959) illuminates this problem. Schonbach tested. the 
hypothesis that in a barrier situation, the greater the force acting on the 
subject to reach a goal (within unspecified limits) the greater will be his 
estimation of time spent in that situation. He also argued. that the force 
acting on the subject would be an increasing function of the subject's need 
for the goal-object and of ideation relevant to the goal-object. 
One/ • •...••...•••.••.... 
One of the ways in which need was increased. in a barrier situation was to 
deprive subjects of food. Ideation was increased. by allowing the subjects 
to page through illustrated food books. Both of Schonbach's hypotheses 
were confirmed. Loehlin, in an extensive study of time judgements, 
found. that (as might be expected) one of the factors determining the 
magnitude of the time judgement is interest-bored.om. Interest in the 
task led to low time judgements, but boredom led to high estimates of the 
time taken by the activity. A terminal shock (Falk and Bindra, 1954), or 
movement towards a fall (Langer and others, 1961), both lead to a high 
estimation. In both these instances, attention is focussed. on the time 
interval separating the subject from' the unpleasant future. 
A generalisation to be drawn from the work attempting to 
relate motivation to time judgement appears to be that an increase in 
motivation generally causes a rise in the time judgement where the attention 
of the subject is focussed on the time interval (as in the barrier situation 
of Schonbach, or as in a separation situation in a 1949 experiment by 
Filer and Meals in which the subjects showed greater tendency to over-
estimate as they approached an attractive goal), and. a decrease in time 
judgement when the subject is absorbed._: in the task (as in the task-comple-
tion tests of Hindle, 1950, or of Meade, 1959). 
Where a continuous stimulus is presented for a certain duration 
as the time standard, the sensory modality in which it is presented seems 
to be important. Gold.stone and others (1959) asked subjects to estimate 
when a given signal, presented. in an ascending and a descending order of 
duration, was one second. in length. No standard of comparison was given. 
They found that, on the average, a visual stimulus had to be longer than 
an auditory stimulus to be judged equal to a second. Lhamon and. others 
(1962) have found that auditory stirrruli are phenomenologically shorter 
than tactile stirrruli. An auditory signal of 0.45 sec is judged to be 
a second, on the average, whereas a tactile signal lasting 0.35 sec is 
judged. equal to a second. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. 
A direct intermodal comparison of perceived. duration of successive stimuli 
shows that auditory stirrruli are perceived. as 20% longer than visual stimuli 
(Behar and Bevan, 1961). 




It is interesting to note that the order, from the longest to the shortest, 
of the actual length of the signals which would be judged equal in duration 
is: visual, auditory, and tactile. A possible explanation of this order is 
that the sensory mode which is most prominent in a subject's task engagement 
in his environm.ent is the mode in which signals seem subjectively shortest. 
It is a fair assumption that we are visually mi:>re than auditorily or tactually 
occupied with our environment. If we are forced to attend to a duration in 
a less prominent mode, it is almost as though we are in a barrier situation. 
An interesting check on this hypothesis would. be to compare the time 
judgements in different sensory modes of musicians and painters, or of 
visualisers and verbalisers, to see whether the order is altered. 
Another, rather expected. finding, is that a stressful, noisy 
interval is judged longer than an equal, quiet period (Jerison, 1959). 
This may be partly a function of the rate of stimulation, which has been 
shown to affect time judgement (Frankenhauser, 1959).She varied the rate 
of stimulation by varying the rate of a metronome presented intermittenti'Y 
on tape. She found that an increase in the rate of the metronome led to 
an increase in the estimate of the duration of the interval. Her hypothesis, 
which tends to be confirmed by this finding, is that an increase in the 
rate of flow of mental events causes an objective second to seem longer. 
A problem is whether the sound of the metronome may not have a special 
significance in time judgements. Changes in intensity of stimulation did 
not affect judgement of duration, in Frankenhauser1 s experiments. But 
Oleron (1952) found, especially in the judgement of short intervals, that 
an increase in intensity of a sound 1I4d.e it subjectively longer. This effect 
was not so marked with longer intervals. The failure of changes in 
intensity to affect judgement of longer periods probably explains the fact 
that when intervals of 5 seconds to 15 seconds are presented., it makes no·: 
difference whether they are periods of continuous stimulation or periods 
demarcated by disparate stimuli. 
But where/ •••••••••••••••••• 
But where the interval is an empty one / demarcated by terminal 
stimuli, variations in the length of the terminals are significant in 
determining the phenomenal length of the interval. Long initial sounds 
cause overestimation, probably as a consequence of the anchoring effect 
(Woodrow, 1928). Long terminal sounds do not have as great an effect. 
Anchoring effects are important influences on time judgement. 
It has been shown that anchoring effects may be both heteromodal and. 
homomodal (Behar and Bevan, 1961). Further, it has been sho'W?l that visual 
anchor effects are more easily obtained than auditory anchor effects (Gold-
stone and others, 1959). For this reason, an auditory stimulus appears 
to be preferable to visual stimulus where reliable time judgements are 
required. 
The spatial properties of the stimulus are also an important 
influence on judgement of its duration - just as the temporal properties 
of a stimulus are an important determinant of judgements of spatial extension. 
Jaensch (1906, cited by Helson and King, 1931), found. that judgement of 
the extent of an arm movement depended. partly on the time taken to carry 
out the movement. The effect of time relations on space judgement has 
also been shown on the skin. The tau effect, as it is called, may be 
defind as follows: "If the time between the first and second. stimuli is 
shorter (or longer) than that between the second and third stimuli, the 
distances undergo a corresponding change, for the first appears shorter 
(or longer) than the second" (Helson and King, 1931). When the interval 
is very short, a movement is felt. The tau effect is compared. by the authors 
to the Muller-Lyer illusion, but in this case the space is enclosed in 
time as well as space. The reverse of the tau effect has been demonstrated. 
Suto (1955) has sho"Wll that the greater the distance between two stimulations 
on the forearm, the greater the estimation of the temporal interval between 
the stimuli. Suto believes that this effedt is dependent on the visual 
experience of the subject, for two reasons. Firstly, subjects with their 
eyes closed tended to visualise the distance between the two stimuli; and, 
secondly, subjects who had been blind from infancy and did not visualise 
the distances, were not susceptible to the effect. 
An attempt/ •••••••••••••••• 
An attempt to express the space-time relations of stimuli 
applied to the skin in exact mathematical terms has been made. It was 
found that a constant level at '!/Jhich the individual began to distinguish 
two cutaneous stimuli as distinct is a product of the time interval between 
the stimuli and an exponential function of the distance between the stimuli 
(Wieland, 1900). The minimum discriminable interval of time between two 
stimuli applied to the skin could be found by the formula; 
log T = a - bD 
illlhere T is time, D is distance, and a and b are constants. 
Some evidence that an interval experienced as enclosed is 
likely to seem short has been produced by Abe (1933), who ~sked subjects 
to portray their experience of a time interval. Those subjects whose 
figures included prominent terminals apparently experienced the time interval 
as relatively short. Those subjects illlho experienced the time interval as 
long portrayed their experience in flowing, heterogeneous figures. Perhaps, 
as Helson and King suggested in their study of the tau effect, the terminals 
become more prominent 1.lllhen they are close together in time, and this 
prominence makes them seem closer together in space. And, in reverse, 
terminals 1.lllhich are closer in space may form more prominent boundaries to 
the time experience. 
An extremely important experiment on the perceived relations 
between space and time properties of a field was conducted by Brown (1931 
a,b). In his experiment the subject had to match the duration of a figure 
moving across a field and the duration of an empty interval bounded by 
two stimuli. The subject was presented with the empty interval and was 
asked to regulate the speed of the moving figufe in such a way that the 
time it took to cross the field was equal to the time-interval of the 
standard. The reverse procedure was unfortunately not attempted as a 
check on his results, 1.lllhich were extremely interesting. 
He found. that the subject ad.justed. the speed. of movement in such a way 
that the objective time taken by the figure to cross the field was longer 
than the time signal. Brown (1931 b) proposed. the equation 
phenomenal velocity = phenomenal space 
phenomenal time 
It can be seen from this equation that phenomenal time decreases 
as phenomenal velocity increases. Therefore, anything which contributes 
to a rise in the subject's impression of velocity should also lead to a 
decrease in subjective time and an increase in the objective time allowed 
the figure to move across the field. Brown (1931 a) found that a large 
number of factors contribute to an increase in phenomenal speed. A 
decrease in distance between the subject and the field, a decrease in the 
homogeneity of the field surrounding the figure, a decrease in the width 
and length of the field. across which the figure moves, a decrease in the 
size of the moving object, orienting the figure in the direction of its 
movement (e.g., an arrow pointing in the direction of movement), decreasing 
illumination, tilting from the horizontal, and fixation of the eyes on a 
stationary point are the major contributors to a rise in phenomenal speed. 
and should, therefore, be associated with a fall in phenomenal time. Brown 
did not, unfortunately, undertake an extensive investigation of the effect 
of all these variables on time judgement. Nor did he ask subjects to 
reproduce the duration of moving stimuli by, say, key-pressing, to check 
whether the greater phenomenal time of the moving stimulus would be trans-
lated into a greater objective time reproduction when no movement was involved. 
Brown held that changes in phenomenal time occur more frequently 
than changes in phenomenal space. It is interesting to note that in the 
very year in which he made this statement, Helson and King were reporting 
their discovery of a phenomenal change in space. 
Abe (1935) appears to have been the first to demonstrate an 
effect which Cohen and others (1955) later called the kappa effect. In 
Abe's experiment the subject was faced with three light-flashes among which 
the spatial and the temporal intervals could be independently ad.justed. 
Abe found/ •••••••••••••••• 
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Abe found that when the spatial intervals were equal, time judgement 
depended. only on the actual length of time between the flashes. Unequal 
time intervals could be made to appear equal by ad.justing the distances so 
that the shorter time interval was coupled with the longer distance. Abe 
also found. that the above illusion was rather unstable, and could be 
destroyed. by the subject's adopting a critical attitude. This e.tlfect 
discovered. by Abe was rediscovered. by Cohen, Hansel and Sylvester (1955), 
who presented. a subject with a flash sequence ab and. asked the subject to 
control the timing of a third flash, c, in such a way that the time interval 
ab = be. The distance b and c could be varied so as to equal, be greater 
than, or less than the distance between a and. b. They found that the 
greater the distance of be relative to ab (within certain limits), the 
shorter the time interval before theSJ.bject switches once. This is, the 
subjective interval between two flashes further apart is extended, and the 
objective interval is correspondingly abbreviated. The authors maintain 
that the effect is produced by the everyday experience of intermittently 
seen objects moving along a path at a constant speed. It is established 
by experience that a greater distance covered takes a longer time. But 
when we turn to the vertical kappa effect also found by these authors, an 
appeal to experience does not appear to produce a satisfactory explanation. 
They found that the kappa effect is greater when the flashes are arranged 
in vertically descending order, than when the flashes are arranged in 
vertically ascending order. Now, an appeal to experience of falling and 
ascending bodies would result in reversing this. Since our experience of 
falling bodies is that they accelerate, and of ascending bodies is that 
they decelerate, a greater distance between the second two fl.ashes than 
the first two should be subjectively compensated for on the descent but 
not on the ascent. And the finding that vertically descending kappa 
is gEeater than horizontal kappa is just as puzzling if we wish to appeal 
to experience, unless acceleration effects in falling are not part of our 
common experience. There seems to be no reason why they could not be. 
Apparently, the authors do not consider the greater descent kappa effect 
a contradiction to their explanation, since they do not discuss it. 
After this/ •••••••••••• 
After this fairly extensive review of the afferent or sensory 
effects on time judgement, we should consider the precautions, some of them 
rather obvious, to be taken in presenting a signal. 
(a) Care must be taken to avoid anchor effects - or to keep 
them constant in all trials. A modality in which anchor 
effects are at a minimum is to be pref erred. For this 
·reason, auditory signals are pref erred to visual. 
(b) Uncontrolled movement in any part of the field must be 
avoided during presentation of the standard signal. 
(c) A comparison of the results of Kruup (1961) and Siegman 
(1962) who used, respectively, auditory and visual 
stimulation, indicates that auditory stimuli are more 
reliably judged. This may be an effect of the greater 
distractibility of the subject during visual inspection 
of a signal, whereas auditory signals may easily be 
presented so as to block out other auditory stimuli. 
(d) A continuous sound is to be preferred to an empty 
demarcated interval because it is difficult to take 
into account the effects of the intensity and duration 
of the terminal signals. 
(e) The frequency of the sound must be kept constant, since 
rate of stimulation affects time judgement. 
(f) Intensity appears to effect judgements, especially of 
short durations, and should be kept constant. 
It will be seen in subsequent discussion that I have been 
content to stimulate the subject with a constant type of stimulus, varied 
only in length, and to devote most of my attention to the efferent or motor 
aspects of time judgement. For the reasons outlined above,a continuous 
auditory signal of-constant intensity and frequency, varied only in length 
I 
to produce different time intervals for judgement, was selected. 
We turn now to an examination of the efferent aspect of the 
time judgement. 
2.3 Methods of/ ••••••••••••• 
2.3 Methods of Judging Time Intervals. 
Methods may be grouped under the headings of production, 
verbal estimate, reproduction and comparison. 
When making time judgements by the method of production the 
subject is given verbal information and asked to produce a response of 
duration equal to the objective time to which the verbal information refers. 
No standard is given in the experiment. A subject is asked to make a 
response lasting, say, 10 seconds without being given a 10 second stimulus 
for comparison. Such a method may measure the accuracy of a subject's 
concept of various time intervals. It may also be useful in measuring 
fluctuations in a subject's experience of time under the influence of drugs, 
as when subjects are asked to tap at a rate of once per second under the 
influence of quinine (Frankenhauser, 1959). This method depends on the 
stability of the concept of time involved, but assumes fluctuations in the 
non-verbal experience of time. If we think of the verbal, instruction as 
' 
activation a spatial structure in the brain - perhaps cyclic, if we adopt 
F.H. Allport's 1955 mod.el - which is probabilistic in nature and subject 
to the influence of level of arousal, satiation or inhibition, and possibly 
metabolic rate of specific nerve centres, then provision is made for an 
analyser of the duration of the production which is itself subject to the 
cortical factors which influence time perception. In other words, neither 
a constant nor a single analyser is postulated. The analyser is as variable 
as the time experience analysed. This reminds us of Pavlov's statement. 
that the power to reckon time is inherent in the cortical cells of all 
analysers, and. that it is not necessary to postulate a special time 
analyser (cited by Dmitriev and Kochigina, 1959). 
The importance of this conceptimn of the verbal instruction as 
arousing a spatial structure in the brain which will be similar in each 
case but not identical. is that it provides for the relative constancy of 
verbal concepts of time intervals without removing them from the influence 
of other cortical variables. 
The second/ ••••••••••• 
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The second method of time judgement is verbal estimation of 
the duration of a signal. This is the reverse of the mehhod of production. 
Instead. of a verbal instruction being required. to activate a non-verbal 
process, a non-verbal process is required to activate a verbal process. 
Sie@Ilan (1962) has found. that production and verbal estimation produce 
more reliable results than the method. of reproduction. This conf irm.s a 
rather obvious point - that verbal concepts of time have a rather reliable 
relationship with the nQn-verbaJ.. processes which they initiate or which 
intiate them. The finding by Kruup (1961) that there is a negative 
correlation between results obtained. by the method. of verbal estimation 
and the method. of production confirms our view that they are to a certain 
extent reversals of each other. The subject who attaches a high verbal 
estimate to a short objective time is likely to produce a response which 
lasts a short time when given a high verbal cue. 
The difficulty of comparing inter-indiv1.dual scores obtained 
by the method of production or the method. of verbal estimate was dealt 
with in the introduction. It appears that the only way to study inter-
ind.ividual d.iff erences in time experience by this method. is to establish 
intra-individual quotients or standards. 
The method of repreduction has the advantage that the level 
of time-function need not be changed. A non-verbal comparison of the 
signal and the response is possible. The same applies to the method. of 
comparison, in which the individual is presented. with two signals and asked. 
merely to state what the relationship is between them (longer, shorter, 
indentical). The method of comparison has been used in establishing 
subjective time scales (e.g., Gregg, 1951; Stevens and Galanter, 1957) 
which show that equal ratios of stimulus change lead to equal ratios of 
sensation change. The method of comparison has been used to establish 
this revision of the psychophysical law of Weber and Fechner.as applied 
to many types of judgement (Stevens, 1957). Generally, when the method. 
of reproduction is used, the signal is discontinued while the response is 
made. 
The subject/ •••••••••••••• 
The subject has, therefore, either to retain some nerve process directly 
activated by the signal, or he has to convert his impression of the duration 
of the signal into symbols and reconvert these symbols into non-verbal 
action during the process of reproduction. There may be very interesting 
differences in the degree to which subjects use symbolic aid in reproducing 
signals, but the'prob~em is unexplored. Another interesting problem, 
also unexplored, is the rate of counting where the subject does use counting 
to assist him in accurately reproducing the signal. Would. the rate of 
counting (since many subjects attempt to count at a rate of once per second) 
be affected by the sensory mode of the stinrulus, as was found by Goldstone 
and others (1959) in a different problem? It is also tempting to think 
that the rate of counting might be an approximation of the indifference 
interval of Vierordt, but this is hardly likely. At one time this interval 
appeared with fair regularity in investigations (see James, 1890, p 633), 
)( but more recently it seems to have become rather elusive (Woodrow, 19~. 
Fraisse (1959) has attempted to relate the indifference interval to the 
psychological refractory period, and it is interesting to note that this 
revives an old idea of Wundt (cited in James, 1890, p.634) 1 that the indif-
ference interval of about i second. is related. to association time of about 
the same duration. The indifference interval is. the interval judged. with 
the mini.mum of error and the association time is the time required. for the 
succession of distinctly apperceived objects before the mind.. "This 
n association-time he regards as a sort of interftal standard of duration 
to which we involuntarily assimilate all intervals which we try to reproduce, 
bringing shorter ones up to it and. longer ones down". (James, 1890, p. 634) • 
104 It is curious to compare this with Welford' s (1959 p. 3.tlf.9) comment on 
the indifference interval. "Professor Fraisse's theory would presumably 
imply that the overestimation of short intervals was due to the second 
signal being referred to the point in time at which it began to be dealt 
with in single-channel mechanisms. Why longer intervals are underestimated 
is less clear, but might be due to the second signal tending to be referred. 
back to the point of time at which the mechanisms became free". 
It seems/ ••••••••••••• 
It seems that Wundt's argument is still, with slight modifications, viable -
provided that the indifference point makes its appearance. Woodrow (1934) 
cautions that the indifference interval varies from subject to subject as 
well as with experimental technique. Nevertheless, the rate of counting 
which subjects employ as assistance in reproduction of time would be worth 
studying to see if it approximates these figures. 
Studies of the accuracy and consistency of different methods 
of reproduction are not common. Doehring (1961) asked 8 subjects to tap 
a telegraph key in four different ways to reproduce the length of an 
auditory signal. but found no differences among the methods. The method 
of reproduction has been found to be less reliable than the methods of 
production and verbal estimation (Siegman, 1962; Kruup, 1961; and Clausen, . 
195J) but it is more accurate. The low reliability generally found 
associated with the method of reproduction is a serious disadvantage in any 
extensive study of individual differences or in studies of variables which 
might be associated with time experience. Too much of the variance will 
be chance variance, beyond the control of the experimenter. Key-pressing 
is an unsatisfactory method of reproduction of time signals. 
In the next section another method of reproduction, possibly 
more reliable, will be considered. 
2.4 The Method of Linear Movement 
The body exists in space-time. Rhythmic movements of the body 1 
which connnence even before birth, involve both voluntary and involuntary 
muscles. The repertoire of involuntary rhythmic movements includes such 
basic activities as breathing, alimentary movements, and the beat of the 
heart. The repertoire of voluntary rhythmic movements includes such 
activities as performing nmsic, dancing and counting. But rhythmic 
movements of the voluntary muscles are repetitions of single movements 
which we also learn to make with rather precise timing. Obviously, in· 
interception movements, as in catching a ball, a hand, or catching a moving 
bus, rather predisely timed movements through space are required. 
There are/ ..•..........•..•... 
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There are no doubt very considerable differences between individuals in the 
ability to co-ordinate space-time relations, but each individual receives 
from his earliest years a continuous training in such co-ordination. 
Some forms of this training are directed specifically to maintaining tempo 
(tapping a drum, dancing, marching in step) and other forms of this 
training are directed to converting exteroceptive stimulation into precisely 
timed movements (as in grasping a moving object). It is not our purpose 
to present here a detailed. or even an introductory account of what is 
known about tracking behavioux, and we cite the above evidence purely to show 
that it is quite reasonable that the conversion of an exteroceptive stimulus 
into a movement might be rather reliably done by the individual. 
· There is some evidence to bear out this point. Allport and 
Vernon (1933) found that each of 14 measures of speed studied was extremely 
reliable. They found three broad speed factors - verbal, drawing, and 
rhythmic - the second and third of which might be relevant to the tempo of 
reproduction of time intervals by extensive linear arm movements. Adams 
(1935) also found a high reliability for various speed measures, such as 
tapping, speed of writing and cancellation} In general, those tests which 
required the greatest attention also yielded the most variable results. 
From this it would appear that the tempo of reproduction of time by linear 
movements might be less reliable than unstructured motor speed. Rimoldi 
(1951) tested subjects on 59 measures of tempo and isolated 8 factors, one 
of which is identified as large movements of the trunk and limbs. He also 
found that measures of tempo are highly reliable. A later study (Rimoldi 
and Cabanski, 1961) is even more pertinent. It was found that the tempo 
of tapping in response to visually presented patterns is extremely resistant 
to change. Even fatigue had to be considerable to disrupt the tempo. 
Now, here is direct evidence that not only are measures of speed reliable, 
but that exteroceptive stimuli are converted into motor activity in a 
reliable way. 
The evidence so far dealt with is not conclusive. We have 
shown the reliability of each measure of speed, but we have not shown that 
the actual duration of the movement is constant. 
What has/ ••••••••••••••••• 
What has been shown is that the same time over distance relationship will 
be preserved in each trial. In a situation in which the individual can 
keep his distance fairly constant, though, the time score should also be 
reliable. This was found by Weber (1927), who asked subjects to reproduce 
durations by moving loaded carriages. Some subjects in his experiment 
appeared to pay particular attention to the distance moved, and reproduced 
the time interval reliably by attempting to move the same distance on each 
occasion. Other subjects appeared to pay more attention to duration, and 
to achieve consistency of distance as a consequence of consistency of 
tempo. 
When one considers these experimental results, a method of 
reproducing time by extensive arm movements seems to be a likely way of 
enhancing reliability. Weber, though he used very small samples, found. 
results which at least encourage us to hope that this may be so. The 
method of reproduction of time intervals by extensive linear arm movements 
was, therefore, adopted for trial as a possibly reliable method which might 
also reveal further facts about space-time interrelationships in judgement. 
With the exception of Weber's (1927) work, all the studies of spatial 
effects on time judgement have dealt with the influence of exteroceptive 
stimulation. Would anything like the same effects appear where the 
external stimulu~ is given no properties of extension or movement, buttthe 
~ response is? ' . In other words, will spatial signals received from propriocepto?31 
have the same effect on time judgement as spatial signals from exteroceptors? 
What, then, is the method of reproduction of time by linear 
arm movement? Essentially, the subject is asked to move a handle horizon-
tally across a frame in such a way that the duration of his movement 
equals, in his judgement, the duration of a time signal. He makes the 
movement after the time signal has ceased. The duration and. distance of 
the subject's movement, mal::le at his own speed, are then recorded and. 
analysed. In the next chapter both the apparatus and the procedure will 
be described. in detail. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TIME JUDG:EMENT, 
. TEMPERAIVJENT AND PERSONALITY , 
In Chapter 2 are outlined some of the reasons for attempting 
to measure time judgements by means of a linear movement lasting (in the 
judgement of the subject) as long as the time signal. Briefly, it was 
hoped that (a) the method would be reliable and that it would be suitable 
for measuring individual differences in time judgement; and that (b) the 
method would advance our knowledge of motor space-time relations. 
In this chapter, only the main aim of each experiment, the 
apparatus used in the experiment, and the procedure in the experiment will 
be described. Most of the hypotheses tested, the results, discussion of 
the results, and conclusions will be found. in subsequent chapters. 
3.1 Experiment I 
This experiment was conducted. as a pilot experiment to discover 
whether the assumption, that the reproduction of time intervals by linear 
movement is reliable, can be verified. 
3.1.1 Subjects 
Forty-three subjects of both sexes, ranging from first year 
undergraduates to seniors drawn from several different courses, were tested 
in the first session. All were students at the University of Cape Town. 
Only 31 of these subjects returned. for a second session; unfortunately,'1.Jtt~ 
reliability co-efficients were calculated using their results only. The 
implication is that the 31 subjects whose'resu1ts were used for the calcula-
tion of reliability co-efficients were the most co-operative and highly 
motivated for the experiment. But this should certainly not be regarded) 
as an objection. A test can only be reliable if the subjects are co-
operative and motivated to do well. 
3.1.2 Apparatus/ ••••••••••• 
3.1.2 Apparatus 
The standard stinrulus which had. to be reproduced. was provided 
through earphones by an audio-oscillator set at 210 c.s. The duration 
of the auditory stinrulus was controlled by a Hunter decade interval timer. 
• The subject was seated in front of an ordinary table on which was placed. 
a black wood.en screen 20 inches high and 42 inches long. A thin cord 
ran along the bottom of this screen and over pulleys at either end.. A 
handle was attached to the cord, and this could be moved. horizontally 
by the subject for the whole length of the screen. The distance over 
which the handle was moved on each trial could be read off on a measuring 
tape which ran along the experimenter's side of the screen, out of sight 
~f the subject. On this side of the screen was also placed an electric 
stop-clock which was used to read off the time taken by the subject's 
movement. The clock was started and stopped by a relay operated. by the 
amplified output of a gramophone pickup, the stylus of which rested on 
a disc turned by the motion of the cord.when the handle was moved. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The subject was seated facing the middle of the screen with t~e 
handle at the left. He was instructed. to move the handle for a period 
of time which he judged to be equal to the duration of the auditory 
stimulus. The distance over 'Which he moved was left to his discretion, 
provided only that the direction of movement (left or right) was not 
changed until the edge of the frame had been reached. Thus, the subject 
could move at the speed he pref ered. On successive trials the starting 
position of the handle was placed alternately to the right and to the left 
of the subject. 30 seconds elapsed between the end of one trial and the 
beginning of the next. 
The durations presented for reproduction were 4.3 sec., 2.0 sec. 
3. 7 sec., 6.1 sec., and o. 9sec., :ll.n that order. 
Each stimulus/ ••••••••••• 
Each stimulus was presented. and. reproduced three times during each session, 
the average reproduction time being the score used. to calculate reliabili-
ties. In all cases a second experimental. session, identical. with the 
first, was given at an interval of between one week and two months. For 
the great majority of the subjects the interval between experimental 
sessions was about one month. 
3.1.4 Results 
The scores are to be found tabled in Appendix B and are discussed 
in Chapter 4. At this stage we may say that satisfactory levels of 
reliability were found. 
second experiment. 
3.2 Experiment 2 
It was, therefore, decided to proceed. with a 
Since the hypothesis of reliability was confirmed, a larger 
i~vestigation was conducted into (a) motor space-time relations (Chapters . 
. 6 and 'Ii.), ( b) relationships among different methods of judging time (Chapter 
S), (c) the effects of delay on time judgement (Chapter 8), and (d) various 
individual differences in time judgement (Chapters 9, 10, 11 and. 12). 
3.2.1 Subjects 
The subjects for this experiment were 77 men and women first-
year students of psychology attending the University of Cape Town. The 
reason for choosing first-year psychology students was that a certain. 
amount of data from other tests to which they had been subjected was 
available on many of the subjects. Some of thf~data ~&analysed 
in the investigation of individual differences. The difficulty of obtaining 
comprehensive data on unpaid subjects is obvious, and this was the main 
reason for choosing this group for our experiment. The subjects were 
persuaded to participate in the experiment out of normal class or laboratory 
hours, so that only the most co-operative and interested. were used. This 
ensured a reasonably high level of motivation. Of the 77 who attended the 
first session, 5:».returned for a second session, between two weeks and two 
months after the first. 
For the/ •••••••••••••••• 
For the majority of the subjects the interval between the sessions was 
about one month. The fact that such a high proportion of the subjects 
attended a second session shows that motivation to perform well was at a 
reasonable level. 
3.2.2 Apparatus 
The apparatus for producing the auditory time signal and for 
reproduction 6£ the duration of the signal by linear movement were the 
same as that used in experiment I. 
In addition, a key wired in series with an electric clock 
was used. Depression of the key started the clock, release stopped 
the clock. 
3.2.3 Experimental Design 
The experiment was a.esigned to measure inter-session reliability / 
the effects of delay on reproduction, and to measure immediate reproduction 
of time signals. Several immediate reproduction scores were desired so 
that averages could be calculated for correlation with other measures. 
Two sessionswere held. In the first session, attended by 
all the the subjects (77), auditory time signals were reproduced by linear 
movement both immediately after hearing the.m and after various intervals 
of delay. In the second session, attended by 5tJ.subjects, all signals 
were twice reproduced immediately after hearing the signals. 
In addition, all subjects made verbal estimates of each signal 
and some subjects (43) reproduced each time signal a thli:rd time by key-
pressing. 
3.2.4 Procedure 
The 77 subjects used in the first session were allocated to 
seven groups of eleven each. The group into which a subject fell was 
determined by his serial position in the whole sample tested. 
That is,/ •••••••••••••••••• 
That is, the first subject tested fell into group I, the second subject 
tested fell into group II and so on until the seventh subject tested. fell 
into group VII. 
group. 
This was repeated until there were eleven testees in each 
For the rest, the testing procedure was to a great extent the 
same as in Experiment I, with the exception that different time intervals 
were used. The signals were 1, 2, 4, S and 16 seconds and were presented 
to alternate subjects in an ascending or in a descending order. In the 
first session, each set of five time signals was reproduced twice by, ·linear 
movement under two different conditions. Firstly, each subject produced. 
each signal immediately after hearing it. Irrnnediate reproduction scores 
were, therefore, available for all subjects. Secondly, each group of eleven 
subjects produced. the second set under a different condition of delay. 
Group I reproduced each signal of the second. set without delay. Group II 
delayed. for 5 seconds before reproducing the signals. Group III delayed 
for 10 seconds; group IV for 15 seconds; group V for 20 seconds; group VI 
for 30 seconds; and group VII for 60 seconds. In each case the experi-
menter gave the signal for the subject to corrnnence reproduction, and in each 
case the signals of the first and second. set were presented in the same 
order. 
Two additional time judgements were obtained. Firstly, each 
subject gave a verbal estimate of the length of the signal immediately 
after reproducing the signal by lin_ear movement. Secondly, 43 subjects 
were asked to reproduce the whole set of signals a third time, by the method 
of key-pressing. That is, they had to depress a key for a period. of time 
which they judged equal to the duration of the signal. 
In the second session the 56 subjects who returned were tested, 
using the whole set of signals in the same ord.er·for each subject as in the 
first session. No delay was imposed. Each subject, therefore, reproduced. 
the whole range of signals twice, immediately after. hearing each signal, by 
the method of linear movement, Verbal estimates were asked for as before, 
after each reproduction. Of the 5~ subjects returning for the second 
session, 32 had reproduced the whole set for a third time by key-pressing 
in the/ ••••••••••••••• 
3f 
in the first session. These 32 were asked to do so a.gain. 
3.2. 5 Results 
The full results of this experiment may be found in various 
Tables in Appendix B. They will be referred to in various chapters, as 
hypotheses are tested against them. (a) The reliability of these data 
is discussed in Chapter 4; (b) the relations among various methods are 
discussed in Chapter 5~ (c) motor space-time relations are dealt with 
in Chapters 6 and 7; and (d) individual differences in time judgement 
are studied in Chapters 9 - 12. 
3 • 3. Experiment 3 
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 the subject was allowed 
to move any distance he wished. This condition will be called "free 
movement". The question arises whether the same individual differences 
will occur when the distance moved is controlled. This will have the 
effect of altering the tempo of movement, and could conceivably reduce 
the reliability of time judgements. This condition will be called 
"controlled movement". An experiment was conducted in which the 
distance moved as well as the length of the signal were controlled. 
3.3. 1 Subjects 
The subjects tested in this experiment were 40 men and women 
students at Rhodes University. They were drawn from a variety of courses 
of study as well as a variety of levels, and ranged in age from 17 to 27 
years. The majority of them were about 19 years of age. Subjects were 
approached on the campus and· an attempt was made to interest them in the 
experiment. All subjects were volunteers. There were very few refusals. 
All experimental sessions were conducted at times to suit the subjects, 
out of normal class hours. 
3.3. 2 Experimental Design 
The experiment was designed to directly compare free linear 
movement reproduction, controlled linear movement reproduction, and 
key-pressing. 
Each Subject/ •••••••••• 
' 
\ 
Each subject attended four sessions, spaced. about a month apart, in which 
his judgement of two intervals of time was tested and retested by three 
methods. The methods were (a) linear movement reproduction under conditions 
of free movement, in which distance was not controlled; (b) linear 
movement reproduction under conditions of controlled movement, in which 
the distance to be moved in reproducing the time interval was determined 
by the experimenter; and (c) reproduction of the signal by key-pressing 
without linear movement. 
In the first session each subject moved an ascending and 
descending order of distances ranging from 0 to (:fJ inches in reproducing 
8 seconds. Half the subjects started with an ascending order and the other 
half with a descending order of distances, but both groups went right up 
and down the scale. This was followed by a break in which the Maudsley 
Personality Inventory was filled in. Then, after filling in the question-
naire, the subject was asked to reproduce 8 seconds twice by free movement, 
in which the distance moved was left to his discretion. 
In the second session, about a month later, reproduction of 
8 seconds was tested in precisely the same way. This time, the break 
between controlled and free movement reproduction was occupied with filling 
in the Taylor M4nif est Anxiety Scale. · 
In the third session, the time interval was changed to 16 seconds, 
but the procedure in reproduction was the same. The break between controlled 
and free movement reproduction was occupied with filling in a Metaphor 
Preference Scale. 
In the fourth session, again about a month later than the third, 
each subject reproduced 16 seconds in the same way as in the third session. 
The break between the controlled and free movement reproduction was 
occupied with filling in the shorter version of the Maudsley Extraversion 
Scale. 
3.3.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus for delivering the time signal was the same as 
that described in Experiments I and 2. The apparatus for reproducing 
the time/ •••••••••••••• 
the time signal was slightly modified and must be described again in full. 
The handle, instead. of moving on cords as before, now moved on 
a metal rod. which passed through its centre. At one end a fixed wooden 
support he~d the rod, but at the other end the wooden support was movable, 
so that the length of the metal rod could be varied from 5 inches to f:fJ 
inches. The movable and the fixed support were placed on a wooden frame 
and held the rod firmly. Three switches in series with an electric stop-
watch were used to measure the time taken by the movement. Switch A was 
placed on the handle, and. consisted of a thin long metal spring which made 
contact when the subject gripped the handle. Switch B was a lever switch 
attached to the fixed wooden support of the rod, and was switched. on when 
the subject commenced his movement. Switch C was a contact switch attached 
to the movable support and was switched off when the handle made contact 
with it at the completion of the movement. A surrnnary of the positions of 
the switches during reproduction can now be made. 




When the subject grips the handle but has not 
yet moved.: A on; B off; C on. 'Ihe clock is 
not running. 
The subject commences the movement: A on; 
B on; C on. The clock is functioning. 
A on; B on; C off. The pressure of the 
handle switches off C and the clock stops. 
This describes the way in which movement of controlled distances 
was timed. When it was desired to time free movement, the movable support 
was placed at a maximum distance from the fixed support (f:IJ inches) and 
switch C was switched on and guarded, so that the contact of the handle 
could not switch it off. This was done so that the subject could move 
more than one length in reproducing the time interval, if he wished. 
The subject started the clock as before, by gripping the handle, making 
the spring contact A, and then moving, thus switching on the ];ever-switch 
B. But to stop the clock at the end of his movement he had to release A 
instead of coming into contact with C, as in timing controlled movements. 
Thus, the/ ••••••••••••••••••• 
Thus, the positions of the switches for (i) readiness, (ii) grip, and 
(iii) move were the same as those outlined above. The only difference 
was in the finish position, when the switches were: A off; B on; C on. 
3.3.4 Procedure 
The subject was seated facing the apparatus which had already 
been adjusted to1·a 5" or a f:IJ" length. He was then instructed.. "Through 
this pair of earphones you will hear a sound. When the sound has ceased 
I want you to reproduce the duration of that sound by making a movement 
lasting an equal time. You are to move from the one support to the other / 
once only, at such a speed that you cover the distance in the time of the 
signal. The clock timing your movement will start only after you have 
started your actual movement, not from the time you grip the handle. Grip 
the handle firmly while moving it. The clock will stop men you press 
gently against the terminal support. 
the sound has stopped. " 
In each case, move immediately after 
This instruction was repeated, if necessary, when the distance 
was changed. Distances used were 0 1 5" 1 20 11 , 40" and f:IJ 11 • Each subject 
reproduced over the distance series twice, once in ascending and once in 
descending order. When the distance was 0 the handle was placed at the 
centre of the rod with switches B and C on. The subject started and 
stopped the clock by gripping the handle for the appropriate time without 
moving the handle. 
After the controlled movement reproduction trials, the subject 
was asked to fill in a questionnaire. , There were four questionnaires 
which will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. A 
different one was completed in each of the four sessions which the subject 
attended. 
Then, the subject was asked to reproduce the time interval 
twice by the method of free linear movement. The instruction this time 
was: "I want you to reproduce the duration of the sound., as before, by 
making a movement. But this time you may move any distance you like at 
a tempo which seems natural to you. You may move more than one length, 
provided only/ ••••••••••••• 
provided only that you do not change the direction of your movement until 
you have covered the whole length of the rod. You may move less than a 
complete length, stopping anywhere you like. The main point to remember 
is that you are to attend purely to the duration of your movement. The 
distance is irrelevant. While you are moving the handle, keep a firm 
grip on it, but when you feel that your time of movement equals the time 
of the signal, let go the handle and keep your arm moving. Do not stop 
first and then let go. As before, the duration of your movement will be 
timed by a clock which will be started only when you commence your 
movement. It is not important how long you grip the handle before moving, 
because the clock will not be started, until you move the handle. The 
clock will stop the moment you release your grip on the handle". 
These instructions were repeated until there was full under-
standing of the procedure. The reason for asking the subject to release 
the spring while still in motion was to eliminate, as far as possible 
differences in reaction time which might be expected to show up if the 
subject stopped first and then released the spring. 
After each reproduction, the subject was asked to verbally 
estimate the duration of the signal. 
3.3. 5 Results 
The results of this experiment are to be found in Tables in 
appendix B. They will be referred to in various chapters, as hypotheses 
are tested against them. In Chapters 7 and 8 space-time and method 
relations will be discussed; and in chapters 9 - 12 individual differences 
in reproduction will be discussed. 
3.4 Measures of Individual Differences in Personality, Temperament and 
Time !magery. 
Hypotheses concerning the individual differences associated 
with differences in time judgement are to be found in Chapters 9 - 12. 
In this chapter the various tests will be mentioned, but not discussed. 
Detailed discussion of the rationale of the tests and their application 
will be found in the appropriate chapters. 
3.4. 1 Extraversion / ••• 
3.4. 1 Extraversion 
Pi.tty-four subjects of Experiment 2 were asked to fill in the 
short M.P.I. (Eysenck, 1957) immediately after they had completed their 
time reproduction trials in the second session. All the subjects of 
Experiment 3 were asked to fill in both the short and the long forms of 
the M.P.I. (Eysenck, 1959). Testing is described in detail in Chapter 9. 
The results are tabled in Appendix B and are discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
3.4.2 Tests of Tempo 
Subjects of Experiment 2 ·who retuined for the second session were 
given a number of tests of tempo related to primary-secondary functioning 
and unstructured motor speed (Biesheuvel and Pitt, 1955). These tests 
were: preferred and maximum tapping speed, speed of making crosses, and 
speed of handwriting. Testing is detailed in Chapter 10. 
The results are tabled in Appendix B and are discussed in Chapter 10. 
3.4. 3 Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale 
Thirty-eight subjects of Experiment 2, and all subjects of 
Experiment 3, filled in the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953). Testing 
is described in detail in Chapter 11. 
The results are tabled in Appendix B and discussed in Chapter 11. 
3.4. 4 Need Achievement 
Forty of the subjects of Experiment 2 wrote imaginative stories 
which were scored for n Achievement. Testing is described in detail in 
Chapter 12. 
The results are tabled in Appendix B and discussed in Chapter 12. 
3.4. 5 Time Imagery 
Forty of the subjects of Experiment 2 and the 40 subjects of 
Experiment 3 filled in the Metaphor Preference Scale of Knapp and Garbutt 
(1958). Details of the testing are given in Chapter 12. 
The results are tabled in Appendix B and discussed in Chapter 12. 
3.5 General Remarks. 
In this, as in almost all psychological experiments, the 
experimenter is extremely dependent on the good faith of his subjects. 
For this I ........ . 
I 
For this reason, though an attempt was made to persuade the subjects to 
co-operate by interesting them in the experiment, no attempt was made to 
be over-persuasive. Most of the subjects who came were interested, 
though results had to be withheld from them because of the danger that 
~ they might reveal to others whclt'the durations of the various signals 
were. They were not told before the experiment that they would not be 
infonned about their accuracy. 
employed by the experimenter. 
Thie was one of the deceptions 
But after the whole series bad been 
completed a small number did come to inquire how accurate they had 
been. 
Only two results were discarded because the subjects were 
obviously not attempting to be accurate. There may have been a few 
others who were not adequately motivated, but there could not have 
been many. Undoubtedly the motivation varied considerably. 
Most of the subjects appeared to try their best. That 
is, unfortunately, all that can be said. Because they were individually 
tested, a better check on this was possible than in many experiments • 
.And any one of the subjects tested could easily have avoided the 
experiment. 
CHAPTER 4 
INTER-SUBJECT AND INTRA-SUBJECT VARIATIONS 
IN TIME JUDGEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
For the detection of individual differences, a test with a 
wide inter-subject spread of scores and a low intra-subject variability 
in response to a constant signal, is desirable. 
Obviously, a test in which there is little spread. of the 
scores cannot reveal individual differences in the testees. And a 
test iri which the score obtained. by each subject varies greatly between 
test and retest is telling us about the subject as he is at the time of 
each test only., Momentary factors or combinations of factors might explain 
the fluctuation in score, but it would be useless to look for relatively 
permanent determinants of each particular score taken separately. There 
might, of course, be individual differences in the extent of intra-subject 
variability. 
no value. 
A low reliability does not necessarily mean that a test is of 
Such a test might be used. to measure differences in intra-
subject variability. But if we wish to deal meaningfully with particular 
scores obtained by means of such a test we have to specify the conditions 
which bring about fluctuations in score. To take a simple, pure and 
unfortunately hypothetical ex.ample: If we can specify that the.cause of 
low test-retest reliability in production of time is a change in body 
temperature only, then we can correct for this and still deal successfully 
with individual differences in sc.ore. The implication of this is that, 
if we control the conditions of change, test reliability should be high. 
It is by means of intra-subject studies that we are most 
likely to arrive at the conditions of change of score. Our custom, in 
x psychology, of concentrati!\g our attention on inter-individual group 
studies, makes conclusions about intra-individual, systematic relations 
difficult to attain. 
Since we/ ••••••••.•.••••••.• 
Since we are unable to specify the contributors to change 
in the large number of systems (subjects) studied and treated statistically, 
we pref er tests which give reliable scores with wide inter-system (inter-
subject) differences. Our hope is that these may lead. to the detection 
of common relatively stable factors or combinations of factors entering 
into them. 
4.2 Different Methods of Time Judgement and Inter-Subject Distribution 
of Scores 
The reproduction of time intervals by linear movement results 
in a larger inter-subject standard deviation of scores than does reproduction 
~ x by key-pressing. In ~eriment 2 key-pressing reproduction of 8 seconds 
yielded an inter-subject standard deviation of l.18 seconds, and free 
,iinear movement reproduction yielded one of 1.93 seconds. 'l'he null hypothesis 
that these standard deviations are not significantly different is rejected 
x at the 5% level of confidence. Also in ~eriment 2, key-pressing re-
production of 16 seconds is performed with an inter-subject standard 
deviation of 2.07 seconds, and free linear movement reproduction with one 
of 3.96 seconds. The null hypothesis that these standard deviations are 
not significantly different is rejected at the 1% level of confidence. 
These scores are tabled below. 
TABLE l 
Inter-subject standard deviations of key-pressing and free linear 










x. In'&xperiment 3, significant differences are found between the inter-subject 
standard deviations of scores when the stationary handle is grlpped and 
when it is moved under either controlled or free conditions. In Table 2 
below in the text are all the standard deviations obtained in Experiment 3. 
Table 2/ •••••••••••••••••..• 
TABLE 2 
Inter-subject standard deviations of grip, free linear movement, 
and controlled linear movement reproductions of time in Eucperi-
ment 3. 
Signal Free linear movement Controlled l.m., Stationary grip. 
8 sec. 2.71 sec. 2.99 sec. 1. 51 sec. 
16 sec. 5.68 sec. 4.05 sec. 2.40 sec. 
The inter-subject standard. deviation for reproduction of both 
8 seconds and 16 seconds by free linear movement is greater than the inter-
subject standard deviation for the reproduction of these time intervals by 
stationary grip. In both cases, we may reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% level of confidence. The standard deviation of controlled linear 
movement reproduction of both 8 seconds and 16 seconds is significantly 
greater than the standard. deviation of reproduction of these intervals 
by gripping the stationary handle. In both cases we may reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level of confidence. 
It is clear, therefore, that the introduction of extensive 
movement into the method of reproduction raises the level of inter-subject 
variability. This should be useful in the detection of individual 
differences, provided that intra-subject variability is not correspondingly 
raised. Before we examine the experimental evidence on this issue, it is 
worth turning to the subject variables which might affect reliability. 
4.3 Subject Variables Affecting Reliability 
Weber (1927) found that, at a critical point, further increases 
in the load which subjects had. to move no longer affected. judgement of 
duration or distance. In his study of "the properties of space and time 
in kinesthetic fields of force" he asked subjects (a) to move a constant 
distance while the load moved. was varied, and. (b) to move for a constant 
duration while the load. moved was varied. He found. that both the distance 
and duration of movement tended to vary with the load, but that both were 
reliable under identical conditions. 
In his/ ..••••••••••••••• 
In his own words "a given time interval under load. is phenomenally equivalent 
to a smaller time interval (as measured by clock time) under less load" 
and 11 a given distnace under load. is phenomenally equivalent to a greater 
distance under less load". In addition, both these load effects were 
directly proportional to the amount of load. His finding that at a 
critical point there is a reversal of effect is not an isolated. one. The 
x... kappa effect, for example, applies up to a distance ratio}'!' of about 4:1 X 
(Cohen and. others, 1955). Abe (1937) has also found. that a critical 
attitude destroys the space effect on time judgement. 
From this it appears that one of the major subject _variables 
)(_ which may reduce reliability in testing is a sudden shift in a-Al:.t~JA. 
Any new information, or change in attitude (not necessarily produced. in 
the testing situation) can result in a completely new perceptual configura-
tion which radically reduces reliability of the test. One finds this, 
especially, in verbal estimates, because a subject can check on the accuracy 
of his concepts of clock time between sessions. There may well be subject 
differences in the degree to which either consistency or accuracy are made 
the prime goals. Some subjects, after a few trials, may attempt ;tro 
x achieve inte~ consistency rather than attempt to improve their accuracy. 
We should. expect such subjects, as trials proceed., to show fewer and fewer 
alterations of judgement. Others may remain dependent on the actual 
stimulus and more open to shifts in judgement. Witkin (1954) has made 
a distinction between field-dependent and field-independent subjects, 
which refers to the kind of cue which the subject uses in judgement. The 
field-dependent subjects ref er more to the characteristics of the external 
field in making their judgement; the field-independent subjects are 
capable of a greater degree of detachment from the external field. 
subject distinction which is relevant is Klein's (1954) dichotomy of 
Another 
levellers and sharpeners. This dichotomy has been shown to be useful 
in the study of time order errors. In an experiment, levellers and 
sharpenws were selected by size judgements, and their time-order errors 
with visual, auditory, and. kinesthetic stimuli were measured (Holzman, 1954). 
Subjects/ ••••••••••••••••••• 
Subjects were required to judge the intensity of a comparison stimulus 
which equalled. that of a standard. stimulus, but with interpolated. stimuli 
(between the standard and. comparison) of various intensities. Norma1ly1 
when no stimulus is interpolated, time error is positive up to 3 seconds 
and negative thereafter. Kohler's explanation of this is that the first 
stimulus sets up a trace which increases up to about 3 l?econds and. then 
begins to decrease. Up to 3 seconds, therefore, a succeeding stimulus 
seems to be less intense than an equal preceding stimulus, and. after 3 
seconds, more intense. But Holzman argued. that the interpolation of a 
stimulus more intense than either the standard. or the comparison stimulus 
would produce positive time error even after 3 seconds because of the 
assimilation of neighbouring brain traces (of the standard stimulus and. 
the interpolated stimulus), and. that levellers would show greater assimila-
tion effects than sharpeners. The hfpothesis that levellers would show 
greater positive time order effects with a more intense interpolated 
stimulus was confirmed, and it was concluded that cognitive attitudes are 
general dispositions of personality which affect responses in a wide 
variety of behavioural situations. No explanation is offered for the 
assimilation of the standard and interpolated. stimulus-trace rather than 
the assimilation of the comparison and interpolated stimulus-trace. There 
seems to be no reason why assimilation should. not occur as easily in the 
latter direction as in the former. But the fact that there may be difference 
in the assimilation of neighbouring processes is of great importance in 
considering reliability. A question of importance is the remoteness of 
the traces which can affect each other. According to Helson's (1947) 
theory, these effects may be quite persistent, in the form of an adaptation 
level. In his formulation, judgement of any stimulus depends upon the 
ratio-1of the physical value of that stimulus and. the physical value of the 
subject's current adaptation value. And the adaptation level, which is 
the physical value of the stimulus mi ch is judged neutral (equal to the 
standard.) is a weighted geometric mean of the various stimuli to which 
the subject has been exposed. More recent stimuli carry a greater weight 
than more remote stimuli, but they are effective. 
There may/ •••••••••••••• ~··~·· 
There may be a difference with procedure and the kind of scale which is 
used. For example, Parducci (1959) found that when subjects classified 
lengths in categories, an increase in the number of categories used 
reduced the effect of adaptation level. Possibly, when the method 
allows for very fine discriminations, adaptation level is at a minimum. 
This appears to be probable in view of the study by Weiss, Coleman and 
Green (1955) of 130 successive bisections of an angle. They found that 
the best prediction of a setting could be made with knowledge of only the 
preceding setting. From this they conclude that the effect on judgement 
of remote past experience is less potent than is assumed by adaptation 
level theory. 
But even if this is so, there are still important antecedent 
effects on judgement, and there are, possibly, differences between 
levellers and sharpeners in the extent to which antecedent effects may 
operate. We certainly do know from the study of Goldstone and others 
(1957) that both cross-modal and intra-modal anchoring effects on time 
judgement are possible. 
Relevant to this is the finding that obsessives are more 
accurate in their judgements, and more stimulus-bound than normal 
subjects (Angyaa, 1948). They might be expected, therefore, to show 
less anchoring effect, as is the case with schizophrenics, and test 
reliability might be expected to be higher in studies of obsessive sub-
jects than in studies of normal subjects. On the other hand, studies 
of anxious and hysterical patients might be expected to yield lower 
reliability (Davis and Cullen, 1958). 
Reliability in a perceptual-motor task is probably influenced 
by an interaction of several test and subject variables. 
4.4 Reliability of Motor Speed 
The high reliability of motor speed is well established and 
has already been mentioned. Briefly, there is the finding of Allport 
and Vernon that the average of the uncorrected repeat reliabilities in 
their measurement / ••• 
f / 
their measurement of speed was +.684. Since the median time devoted 
to each separate test was 30 seconds, the authors conclude that very 
much higher reliabilities might have been attained with more protracted 
testing. They state that "single habits of gesture, as we have measured 
them, are stable characteristics of the individuals in our experimental 
group" (p. 98). Rimoldi and Cabanski (1961) also showed the high 
reliability of tempo in an interpretive task in which the subject was 
required to transform visual patterns into patterns of motor activity, 
by tapping on a telegraph key. They found tempo to be constant over 
repeated sessions and estremely resi~tant to modification by fatigue. 
Q.lre_ 
But there :i.& a number of factors which affect the consistency 
of motor tempo. One of the best known of these is body temperature. 
It has been shown that subjects attempting to tap at a rate of once per 
second accelerate tapping speed when body temperature is artificially 
raised (Francois,1952). An extrapolation of the available experimental 
data shows that the unit equal to one subjective second is shortened 2.8 
times for every 10° C rise in temperature. Hoagland (1933) and Hoagland 
and Perkins (1935) found a straight line curve of negative slope when the 
logarithm of the relative speed of counting seconds is plotted against the 
reciprocal of the absolute temperature. Tempo preference when listening 
to a metronome is also correlated with body temperature (Raslikes and 
Raslikes, 1962). If tapping speed and tempo preference are a fundtion 
of the speed of chemical equations in the body, the results could be 
explained by means of an Arrhenius equation. Hoagland has suggested 
that enzyme systems involved in central nervous system respiratory 
processes are involved. This view is strengthened by the fact that 
central nervous stimulants (such as caffeine) produce acceleration of 
subjective time (a lengthening of subjective judgement of a constant 
objective unit), but sedatives (such as quinal barbitone) have the 
opposite effect (e.g. Goldstone, Boardman and Lahman, 1958). 
The effedts of temperature, barometric pressure (Raslikes and 
Raslikes, 1962) and several drugs could reduce reliability of speed 
preference in motor activity. But they are special instances which 
do hot affect the main conclusion that motor speed is very reliable. 
4.5 Reliability/ ••• 
4.5 Reliability of Time Judgements 
The reliability of time judgements by the method of repro-
duction is known to be low. Siegman (1962), whose subjects reproduced 
auditory signals by depression of a key, found a reliability coefficient 
of .59 for a 5 second interval and .40 for a 20 second interval. Clausen 
(1950) obtained reproduction reliabilities of approximately the same order. 
Kruup (1961) obtained no significant intersession reliability coefficients, 
but this may have been - at least partly - because he used a visual signal. 
The reliability of time judgements by the method of verbal 
estimation is higher. This has been noted by both Clausen (1950) and 
Siegman (1962). - Siegman obtained reliability coefficients of .82 (5 
second interval) and .84 (20 second interval). On the other hand, much 
lower coefficients have been obtained by Bakan and Kleba (1957) who asked 
subjects to judge intervals ranging from 15 seconds to 240 seconds in two 
sessions separated by one week • They report coefficients ranging from 
• 00 to .51, corresponding to the longest and the shortest _intervals. The 
verbal estimates of young children are extremely variable (Gilliland and 
Humphreys, 1943; Smythe and Goldstone, 1957), but it is not so certain 
,.~lt4.'i /ilie s x- that their reproduction score:l\are lower than those of adults. This is 
partly, of course, because the reproduction scores of adults seem to show 
such high intra-subject variability that comparisons are not very fruitful. 
It would be an interesting problem to investigate with.a reliable method 
of measurement, because it might shed some light on the question of the 
extent to which concepts of time enter into reproduction of time. In a 
subsequent chapter ($.4) it will be shown that verbal estimates of time 
are more closely related to reproduction estimates when the natural tempo 
of the subject's linear movement is disturbed. This suggests that tech-
nique of measurement may play an important part, even when the method of 
reproduction is used, in determining the extent to which the subject 
verbalises his experience of time. There are two problems to be con-
sidered, therefore. One is the possible increase in verbalisation of the 
time experience with increase in age, and a possibly closer relationship 
between verbal estimates and reproductions of time; and the other is the 
relationship between type of reproduction technique and degree of 
verbalisation at/ ••• 
verbalisation at any given age. There may also be individual 
differences in the degree of verbal penetration into perceptual 
motor activities. 
The relative reliability of the method of verbal estimation 
is probably partly a function of the crudeness of the categories used. 
It has already been noted that estimates ending in 0 and 5 tend to 
predominate (Weber, 1933). Strong cognitive controls are also 
exercised over verbal activities. Cohen and Mezey (1961) have shown 
that subjective changes in the rate of flow of time do not necessarily 
result in changes in verbal estimate. In their experiment, the scores 
of doctors about to make speeches were compared with their own scores 
under normal working circumstances. Though they reported a distortion 
in their experience of time, this was not reflected in their estimates. 
They were able to make allowances for the state of their excitement. 
This would lead us to suppose that measures of intellectual performance 
might be related to time judgement. This has been confirmed (Spivack, 
Levine and Sprigle, 1959). 
What are the factors which probably contribute to a low 
reliability coefficient when the method of reproduction is used? The 
first is that the subject is usually prevented from making use of those 
rhythmic cues, such as counting, tapping, and nodding, which be might 
normally use in measuring out a period of time. The longer the period 
of time, the more dependent a subject probably is on breaking it down 
into rhythmic activities. When the subject is specifically instructed 
not to use rhythm he is unable to be consistent. A second possible 
factor is that a subject may not always pay attention to the same cue. 
Usually, this effect is experimentally demonstrated by comparing judgements 
under changed instructions, but it is quite likely that such a change in 
attention can occur without the experimenter being aware of it. For 
example, subjects may be instructed to pay attention to either the 
initial or the terminal stimulus, where an empty interval is used. In 
the first case reproductions are significantly shorter than in the second 
(Woodrow, 1933). Even time order error may be reversed by instructing 
subijects to attend maximally to the second of two comparison intervals 
(Quasebarth, 1924) / ••• 
(Quasebarth, 1924). The direction of the subject's attention is 
probably only approximately the same in each trial, when no special. 
instructions are given. 
There are, of course, numerous momentary factors sub.h as 
changes in motivation, serial position of the trial, fatigue, mental 
activity, level of arousal and adaptation level which affect time 
judgement. B:1t these apply to . other activities, such as motor tempo, 
as well. If we have to isolate the main factor responsible for low 
reproduction reliability, we might hazard the guess that it is the 
absence of kinesthetic cues from rhythmic motor activity. 
Now, let us turn to the evidence concerning the reliability 
of reproduction by linear movement. 
4.6 Reliability of the Method of Free Linear Movement and of other Methods 
Experiments 1 and 2 have provided most of the evidence on which 
we shall base our argument. In Experiment I, 31 subjects reproduced 
signals ranging from 0.9 to 6.3 seconds in two different sessions 
separated by a median period of one month. In Experiment 2, 56 subjects 
reproduced signals ranging up to 16 seconds in two sessions separated by 
a median period of gne month. In addition, subjects made verbal estimates, 
and key-pressing reproductions of the time intervals in Experiment 2 were 
obtained from 32 subjects on both occasions. 
A full account of Sxperiments 1 and 2 may be found in 
x. ~pter 3.1 and 3.2. 
4.6. I Results 
Only the results which have a bearing on reliability will be 
considered here. In Appendix B, Table I, may be found the average 
first and second session linear movement reproduction scores of 
Experiment I. In Appendix B, Table III, may be found thearerage first 
and second session linear movement reproductions of 8 and 16 seconds 
obtained in Experiment 2. In Appendix B, Table V, may be found the first 
and second session verbal estimate and key-pressing reproductions of 8 
and 16 seconds obtained in Experiment 2. Average speed of linear movement 
reproduction in/ ••• 
reproduction in the first and second session of Experiment I are found 
in Table II, of Appendix B. Average speed of linear movement reproduc-
tion in the first and second session of Experiment 2 are found in 
Appendix B, Table IV. 
Inter-session reliability co-efficients for time judgements 
and speed were calculated. In Table 3 in the text below are the 
coefficients of reliability of linear movement reproduction times and 
speeds. 
TABLE 3 
Inter-session reliability of linear movement reproduction of time, and 
speed of linear movement 
SIGNAL RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 
Time Speed 
0.9 '.10 .74 
2.0 .50 .67 
3.7 .77 e?O 
4.3 .71 .76 
6.1 .65 .73 
8.0 .57 .92 
16.0 .69 .10 
MEAN COEFFICIENT .66 • 75 ' 
The average coefficient of reliability for speed is slightly 
higher than that for reproduction of time, but both are satisfactory. 
Certainly, the coefficient for reproduction of time is higher than that 
reported anywhere else in the literature. Distance moved is also 
highly reliab~e as might be expected. The coefficients of reliability 
of distance moved in reproducing 8 seconds and 16 seconds are .76 and 
.84 respectively. 
Verbal estimates tend to be slightly more reliable than 
reproduction estimates, as is the general finding. The coefficients 
of reliability of verbal estimates of 8 seconds and 16 seconds are .79 
and .64 respectively. 
The reliability of key-pressing reproductions in our 
experiments tend also to be higher than those reported elsewhere. The 
coefficients of / 
coefficients of reliability of reproduction of 8 seconds and 16 seconds 
by key-pressing are .59 and .49 respectively. Only at the 16 seconds 
interval does there appear to be a dro~ in reliability below that 
obtained by linear movement. 
These results appear to show that the reliability of the method 
of reproduction may be raised to the level of reliability obtained by the 
method of v~rbal estimation. It is tentatively suggested that additional 
kinesthetic cues obtained by subjects from movements of the ann are 
important in maintaining a consistent level of reproduction. 
that the experience which every individual has in converting auditory 
time int9 bodily time (as in dancing, singing, and clapping hands) can 
contribute to high reliability in time judgements expressed by extensive 
bodily movement, is to some extent supported by these findings. 
But another ppoblem remains. If the tempo of the movement is 
disturbed by forcing the subject to move a certain prescribed distance, 
x will inter-session reliability be maintained? One cannot p~dict with 
any degree of assurance, but the fact that individuals may adjust the 
distances of rhythmic movements without apparent difficulty, suggests 
that no difference in reliability should be found. On the other hand, 
if we regard the reliability of the natural tempo of the subject's 
movement as a determinant of reliability of time scores obtained by 
lower movement, then any disturbance of that tempo might be expected 
to reduce reliability. 
There seem to be two possible views. One is that muscular 
cues in movement help to maintain consistency in time, irrespective of 
the speed of movement. The other is that consistency in time is dependent 
on the consistency of preferred speed of movement. According to the 
former view, rates of movement may be reliably adjusted to changes in both 
time signal and distance. Since subjects are continually adjusting 
their rates of movement according to circumstances, this is not implausible. 
But according to the latter view, the reliability of the time, distance, 
speed relationship can be maintained only where the subject is allowed to 
move freely at natural.tempo. 
The data of/ ••• 
The data of Experiment 3 are of value in enabling us to 
answer this question. 
4.7 Reliability of the Met~od of Controlled Line~r Movement and 
of Other Methods 
4.7.I Experiment 
The experiment tests the hypothesis that kinesthetic cues 
derived from controlled-distance movements are as effective in contri-
buting to reliability of time judgements as those derived from free-
distance linear movements. The data used here are obtained from 
Experiment 3, in which 40 subjects reproduced 8 seconds in two separate 
sessions separated by a median period of one month, and 16 seconds in 
two separate sessions separated by a median period of one month, making 
a total of 4 sessions. The methods of reproduction used were free and 
controlled linear movements, so that they could be directly compared. 
Since only one length of signal was used in each session, reliability 
might be expected to be slightly higher than in Experiments I and 2. 
x· Experiment 3 is fully reported in Chapter 3.3. 
Results 
In Appendix B, Table VI, may be found the average test and 
retest reproduction times obtained by the method of controlled linear 
movement. In Appendix B, Table VII, may be found the average test 
and retest times obtained with the method of free linear movement. 
Inter-sessionc reliability coefficients were calculated, and are shown 
below in the text Table 4, 
TABLE 4 
Inter-session Reliability of Free and Controlled Linear Movement 














These coefficients/ ••• 
{8 
These coefficients show very clearly that the reliability 
of time judgements by controlled linear movement is as high as the 
reliability by free linear movement. We should notethat the controlled 
movement reliabilities are calculated with the averages of eight trials 
in each session, whereas the free movement reliabilities are calculated 
using the average of two trials in each session. Small fluctuations 
are more likely to upset reliability when a small number of trials is 
averaged • Another possible cause of the .relatively low reliability of 
. free movement reproductions as compared to controlled reproductions is 
that they were made after the eight controlled movement tDials. 
Possibly, a considerable readjustment was required of the subject. 
But even allowing for this we cannot fail to be impressed with the 
fact that reliability is as high when distance is prescribed t!-4$. when 
it is left to the discretion of the subject. The mean free movement 
coefficient of .66 obtained with the subjects of Experiments 1 and 2 
and the mean controlled movement coefficient of .76 obtained in 
Experiment 3 probably represent the same order of reliability, if we 
take into consideration the fact that subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 
reproduced several intervals in each session, whereas subjects in 
Experiment 3 reproduced only one interval. 
Anchoring effects where more than one signal is used may lower 
reliability, and the range of adjustment demanded of the subject is 
corisiderably greater. On the other hand, the subjects of Experiment 3, 
though they may not have had to adjust to changes in signal length, did 
have to adjust to changes in distance. 
4.8 Conclusions 
The first conclusion which seems justified is that reproduction 
of time by extensive linear ann movements raises reliability to the level 
of reliability obtained with verbal estimates. 
A second conclusion which seems to be strongly supported is 
that this enhanced reliability is not dependent on the subject's 
.,, 
~ natural speed of movement. The implications of tl_'..ic cannot be fumly 
explained, but / 
explained, but some attempt should be made to suggest explanations. 
Firstly, it is suggested that the kinesthetic cues of movement, 
regardless of the speed of movement, are important in detennining 
reliability. This explanation seems to be necessary in view of the 
fact that the subjects perfonned more reliably under the rather 
difficult circumstances in Experiment 3, when they were deprived of 
the cues of a constant preferred speed in reproducing durations, than 
when they were allowed to reproduce the signal.by key-pressing or 
gripping the handle. The second suggestion is that perception of space 
and movement is much clearer than perception of time. Spatial boundaries 
of action, for example, may be clearly perceived by the subject, whereas 
the temporal boundaries of action are to a large extent abstractions, 
which the subject is not able to perceive clearly before him in the way 
that he can s~y, a door frame through which he must pass. He cannot 
perceive at once the beginning and the end of a period of time. He may 
experience illusions of space, but its structure is rather definite. 
When a person is acting, or moving in relation to the spatial world, he 
is not so much aware of the time properties as such of his movements, as 
of the rates at which various changes are achieved. He is aware of the 
rate at which he approaches the door; of the rate at which bodies change 
location relative to him and to each other, but he is not aware of the 
time properties of these changes as distinct from the changes themselves, 
unless by a process of abstraction. He is equipped to achieve and to 
reliably repeat, under identical conditions, certain rate'S of movement. 
The skeletal musculature deals in movements, and movements have time 
properties which may be abstracted, but which are secondary. What the 
subject achieves is, essentially, a reliable rate of performing a certain 
task. The motor system of the skeletal musculature, subjected to extensive 
training throughout life, is probably able to analyse rates of movement. 
The reliability of natural tempo appears merely to reflect one aspect of 
this ability. That the duration of the movement is an abstraction, 
imperfectly achieved, from the movement, is shown by the fact that, though 
reproduction by linear arm movements is more reliable than by key-pressing, 
it is far less accurate. The subject achieves a reliable speed of 
performance which / ••• 
;,, 
~ performance which has an
4
accurate duration. The accuracy of 
reproduction by different methods will be dealt with in Chapter.,i', 
but for convenience differences in proportion of error obtained in 
Experiment 2 are shown below. 
TABLE 5 
Differences in proportion of error* obtained with different methods 
of judging 16 seconds in Experiment 2. 
METHOD PROPORTION STANDARD OF ERROR DEVIATION 
Reproduction by arm movement .276 .208 (N77) 
Reproduction by key pressing .096 .083 (N43) 
Verbal estimate .353 -348 (N77) 
*prop. error= error, irrespective of sign/signal length 
All these differences in errors between methods are 
significant at the 1% level, except for the difference between 
reproduction py arm movement and verbal estimate, which is not 
significant. 
The curious fact emerges that the two most reliable methods 
of time judgement (linear arm movement and verbal estimation) are also 
the least accurate. But the correlation between the two is low, 
(.31 at 8 seconds, .29 at 16 seconds), so that we cannot suspect them 
of being merely alternative.forms of .the same process. 
SUMMARY 
The reliability of time reproductions by free and controlled 
~ linear movements 4-s; of approximately the same order (the mean 
coefficients obtained are .66 and .76, respectively). There are 
differences in procedure between Experiments 1 and 2, and Experiment 3, 
which probably account for the slightly higher reliability of reproduc-
tion by controlled linear movement. Reproduction by key-pressing is 
slightly less reliable (.54), but verbal estimates are of the same 
order of reliability as linear movement reproductions (.72). The 
reliability of/ ••• 
reliability of the verbal estimates is in agreement with that generally 
reported, but our key-pressing reliability is higher: A tentative 
explanation advanced for the high reliability obtained by linear 
movement reproduction of time is that the motor system of the skeletal 
musculature is well adapted to analysing speed of movement. This 
resul~s in consistent rates of movement under identical conditions. 
The reliability of voluntary, preferred tempo is taken to be only one 
instance of this. The achievement of consistent rates of movement 
under identical conditions means, naturally, that consistent durations 
of movement are achieved where the distance is held constant. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, subjects moved practically identical distances in 
each trial;' and in Experiment 3, the distances were controlled by the 
experimenter. 
CHAPTER 5 I ... 
•/ 
C H A P T E R 5 
RELATIONS AMONG DIFFERENT METHODS OF JUDGING TIME 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the problem of the relations among 
different methods of judging time was touched on, but not analysed in 
detail, using the data at our disposal. It was noted that linear 
movement reproductions tended to have different means and distributions 
from stationary reproductions by key-pressing or by gripping the handle. 
And results obtained by both of these methods differ from verbal esti-
mates, though the distribution of scores by linear arm movement tends 
to be rather similar to the distribution of verbal estimates. (See 
Tables 26, 27). Also, it was noted in Chapter 4 that the reliability 
of verbal estimates and linear movement reproductions tend to be rather 
similar, of the order .66 to .76 for linear movements, and of the order 
.72 for verbal estimates. The reliability of key-pressing was rather 
lower. The general picture is that the two methods which are least 
accurate and which yield the greatest inter-subject distribution of 
scores are also the most reliable. 
We should like to lrnow how these various methods are 
correlated. Would we find that verbal estimates are more highly 
correlated with linear movement reproductions than with key-pressing? 
Would the scores obtained by the methods of reproduction relate more 
significantly to each other than to verbal estimates? 
In general, the reported evidence shows that verbal and 
reproduction times are not very closely related. Siegman (1962) 
found correlations of -.169 and -.184 between reproduction and verbal 
estimate of a 5 sec. and a 16 sec. interval, respectively. This low 
correlation has been confirmed by Kruup (1961); and Clausen (1950) has 
concluded that the low correlations observed between verbal estimates 
and reproductions show that different underlying processes are involved. 
Of course, as we have already pointed out, when a subject makes a 
verbal estimate he is trying to relate the time signal to clock time, 
whereas when he reproduces a signal the subject is not at all concerned 
clock time I . .. 
with i 
clock time. The added complication in verbal estimation is that the 
subjects do not all have the same clock time standard, so that 
differences in verbal estimate may refer to differences in perceived 
time, to differences in notions of clock time, or to di~ferences in 
the ability to relate perceived time to clock time standard. A way 
of overcoming some of these difficulties would be to give each subject 
a standard of comparison before the experiment. This would be 
similar to the method of fractionation. But, although it is clear 
that verbal estimates taken without preparation are not closely 
related to reproductions of time, there is no evidence that even 
reproductions - without the complication of reference to a time 
standard - are closely related. There is no reason to believe that 
they necessarily are, when one considers the differences in the means 
and the standard deviations obtained by the methods used in our 
experiments. It is quite possible that each method of reproduction 
has rather special factors entering into it. But do not all methods 
refer to the same perceived time interval? Ought not there to be 
some common core in all these methods of judging time? This problem 
will be attacked in two ways. The first is by simply correlating the 
raw scores obtained by each method. The second is by correlating the 
changes in score obtained by each method. If the methods are related, 
it is possible that, though raw scores might not correlate because of 
special determinants entering into each method, the changes in scores 
will correlate because the scores by different methods are functionally 
related within the individual, and depend on the same perception of 
time, in each case. 
'5. 2 Relations of Judgements of Time by Different Methods. 
Judgements of time by free linear movement, by controlled 
linear movement, by key-pressing, by gripping the stationary handle 
(which gave the same results as key-pressing, as has been shown), and 
by verbal estimate were obtained in Experiments2 and 3. 
Correlations of these judgements were calculated. The raw 
scores on which the correlations in Table 6 are based may be found 
in Appendix B, / ••• 
in Appendix B, Table XXXIX. 
TABLE 6 · 













++ significant at 1% 
Correlation 1 - 2 is based on 43 subjects, correlation 
2 - 3 is based on 43 subjects, and correlation 1 - 3 is based on 77 
subjects. This is because only 43 subjects reproduced the time 
signal by key-pressing but all 77 subjects judged the time interval 
by linear movement and verbal estimate. 
Raw data for the next table may be found in Appendix B, 
Table XXXVI. 
TABLE 7 .. 
Correlations of judgements of 16 seconds by different methods in 
Experiment 2. 
1. Free linear movement reproduction 
2. Key-pressing reproduction 






+ significant at 5% 
Both of these tablE;S show that the method of linear movement 
is more closely related to the method of verbal estimation than to the 
method of key-pressing. This confirms a suspicion formed when con-
sidering the standard deviations and the reliabilities. Another 
point of some importance is that the two methods of reproduction 
are hardly related. The very low correlations among methods tend 
to support Clausen's contention that there are distinct underlying 
functions. 
But, before considering the matter further, the results of 
Experiment 3 should be examined. The raw scores for Table 8 below 
may be consulted in Appendix B, Table XXX. 
Table 8 _/ ••• 
Correlations of judgements of 8 seconds by different methods in 
Experiment 3 (N=40) 
1. Free Linear movement 
2. Controlled linear movement 
3. Grip 








++ significant at 1% 
3 
+.21 
The raw data for the following Table 9~ are to be seen in 
Appendix B, Table XXI. 
TABLE 9> 
Correlation of judgements of 16 seconds by different methods in 
Experiment 3 (N • 40) 
1 2 3 
l. Free linear movement 
2. Controlled linear movement +.53++ 
3. Grip 
4. Verbal estimate 
+.15' +.09 
+.31 + + +.37 ·t.21 
, + significant at 5% 
++ significant at 1% 
Let us examine firstly the elements common to the results of 
Experiments 2 and 3. We may take reproduction of time by gripping 
the stationary handle to represent the same method of reproduction. 
as key-pressing. At 8 seconds, free linear movement correlates 
positively and significantly with verbal estimate in Experiment 2 
(+.31), but negatively, though not significantly, with verbal estL~ate 
in Experiment 3 (-.20). At 16 seconds, reproduction by free linear 
movement correlates significantly and positively with verbal estimate 
in both Experiment 1 (+.29) and Experiment 2 (+.31). We are probably 
justified in assuming that there is generally a significant positive 
correlation between linear movement reproduction and verbal estimate. 
When we turn to key-pressing (or grip) and verbal estimate we find, 
at 8 seconds, a low positive correlati~n in both Experiment 2 (+.23) 
and Experiment 3 (+.21). At 16 seconds, the correlation between these 
two methods is virtually zero in Experiment 2 (-.04) and is positive 
but low/ ••• 
but low in Experiment 3 (+.21). On the whole, therefore, we may conclude 
that the relationship between key-pressing and verbal estimate tends to be 
positive, but slight. I~ is certainly not as strong as the positive 
relationship between linear movement reproduction and verbal estimate. 
Lastly, when we examine the relationship between linear movement repro-
I 
duction and key-pressing (or grip) we find, at 8 seconds, an insignifi-
cant negative correlation in both Experiment 2 (-.07) and Experiment 3 
(-.20). At 16 seconds, the correlations are +.11 in Experiment 2 and 
+.15 in Experiment 3. In both experiments there is a change from a 
negative to a positive correlation between these methods as the signal 
is lengthened. 
To summarise: the only statistically significant correlation 
between methods of time judgement is the positive correlation between 
linear movement reproduction and verbal estimate. 
In Experiment 3, the additional method of controlled linear 
movement reproduction is used, and seems to have almost the same correlates 
as the method of free linear movement reproduction. At eight seconds, only 
controlled linear movement correlates significantly with grip (+.49), but 
at 16 seconds both correlate significantly with verbal estimate (+.37 and 
+.31 respectively). In addition, controlled and free linear movement 
correlate more significantly with each other than with any other method 
(+.45 at 8 seconds and +.53 at 16 seconds). 
5.3 Relations of Errors in Time Judgement by Different Methods. 
Additional evidence for the inter-relationship of various methods 
was sought in correlations of variability and error. If variability in 
score by one method is related to variability in score by another method, 
and if error in score by one method is related to error in score by another 
method, then we have additional evidence that the methods are related. 
No direct causal relationship from one to the.other is claimed. But if 
reproductions by various methods depend on a common core of time 
experience, then fluctuations in that experience, should affect all 
methods. In all cases, error was calculated, disregarding sign, and 
variability in score was calculated by using the formula for variance. 
In Experiment 2, four scores obtained in two sessions were/ 
/ ... 
sessions were used to calculate variance of verbal estimate and free 
linear movement, and in Experiment 3, scores from all four sessions 
(two for each length of signal) were used in calculating variance. 
In Table 10 below, the correlations obtained from the data 
in Experiment 2 at 8 seconds are shown. The scores may be consulted 
in Appendix B, Table XLI. 
TABLE '1,Q 
Correlations 6f variability and error in judging 8 seconds in Experiment 2. 
1 2 3 
l. Free l.m. variability 
2. Free l.m error -.18 
3. Verbal estimate variability +.16 +.21 
4. Verbal estimate error -.07 -.05 +.58++ 
++ ~ignificant at 1% 
In Table 11 below correlations of data obtained at 16 seconds 
in Experiment 2 are shown. The full scores are listed in Appendix B, 
Table XLII. 
TABLE ii: 
Correlations of variability and error in judging 16 seconds in Experiment 2. 
l. Free l.m. variability 
2. Free l.m. error 
3. Verbal variability 









++ significant at 1% level of confidence 
In Table 12 below c.orrelations of data obtained at 8 seconds 
in Experiment 3 are shown. The full scores are listed in Appendix B, 
Table XLIII. 
TABLE ·J?2 
Correlations of variability and error in judging 8 seconds in Experiment 3. 
l. Controlled l.m. variability 
2. Controlled l.m. error 
3. Verbal variability 
4. Verbal error 
1 2 3 
+.52++ 
+.07 -.19 
+.31 + +.01 +.29 
+ significant at 5% 
++ significant at 1% 
In Table 13' / ••• 
In Table :13 below correlations of data obtained at 16 
seconds in Experiment 3 are shown. The full scores are listed ., 
in Appendix B, Table XLIV. 
Correlations of variability and error in judging 16 seconds in 
Experiment 3. 
1 2 3 
1. Controlled l.m. variability 
2. Controlled l.m. error +.56++ 
3. Verbal variability +.28 +.43++ 
4. Verbal error +.51++ +.03 +.42++ 
++ significant at 1% 
What is common to all these Tables? The most striking 
common feature is the high positive correlation between verbal error 
and verbal variability in both Experiment 2 and 3, at both 8 seconds 
(+.58 and +.29 respectively) and 16 seconds (+.50 and +.42 respectively). 
This suggests that subjects who change their verbal estimates of a time 
interval also make the greatest error. In this case, uncertainty 
appears to be justified. 
Variability in controlled linear movement is significantly 
related to error in controlled linear movement at both 8 seconds and 
16 seconds (+.52 and +.56, respectively). But significant correlation 
between variability and error is not found where the method of free 
linear movement is used c~.18 at 8 seconds; -.01 at 16 seconds). 
The only other oon~istently significant relationship is that 
between error in verbal estimate and variability in controlled linear 
movement reproduction (+.31 at 8 seconds; +.51 at 16 seconds). The 
·relation between free linear movement variability and verbal error is, 
on the other hiµid, consistentiy close to zero (-.07 at both 16 and 8 
seconds). This does suggest that the more difficult the task is made, 
the greater the use which the subject makes of verbal, or symbolic aid, 
in reproducing the time interval. At the 16 second interval there is 
also a significant positive correlation (+.43) between verbal variability 
and error in controlled linear movement reproduction. Error in free 
linear movement/ .•• 
linear movement reproduction is also positively related to verbal 
variability, but the correlations are not significant at either 8 
seconds (+.21) or 16 seconds (+.17). 
There appears to be an increasing relationship between verbal 
estimate and reproduction of time as the method is changed from key-
pressing to free linear movement to controlled linear movement. The 
correlation between verbal estimate and key-pressing in Experiment 2 
is +.11 at 16 seconds; between verbal estimate and free linear movement 
it is +.29. In Experiment 3 the correlation between verbal estimate 
and grip is +.21;= between verbal estimate and free linear movement it 
is +.31; and between verbal estimate and controlled linear movement 
it is +.37. 
Not only is there an increasing correlation of reproduction 
and verbal estimate as movement is introduced, and the conditions of 
movement are made more demanding, but, as we shall observe (Tables 26, 
27), there is a marked similarity between the standard deviations of 
verbal estimates and linear movement reproductions, though both of 
them differ significantly from key-pressing. Another similarity is 
the high reliability found with both linear movement and verbal esti-
mate. And also, it may be noted (Chapter 6.1.3) that the ratio of 
increase in both verbal estimate and linear movement reproduction 
when the time interval is doubled, is 1.8, whereas the ratio: of· 
increase for key-pressing is 1.9. Key-pressing reproduction 
follows the signal more closely than the other two methods. 
Here, it is not amiss to examine the average error in 
judgement by the various methods as the signal is increased, in 
order to detennine whether they reinforce our impression of the 
similarity of linear movement reproductions and verbal estimates. 
TABLE 14 
Average error, irrespective of sign, by different methods in 
Experiment 2. 
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Verbal Estimate Free Linear Movement Key Press 
Error Proportion E,rror Proportion Error Proportior 
1 sec. 0.7s 0.70 o.3s 0.30 o.3s 0.30 
2 sec. 1.3 0.65 0.5 0.25 0.4 0.20 
4 sec. 1.9 0.48 1.0 0.25 0.7 0.18 
8 sec. 3.5 0.44 2.2 0.28 0.9 0.11 
16 sec. 6.5 0.41 4.4 0.28 1.5 0.10 
The graphs of the data on the previous pages show clearly that 
the relationship between error and length of signal may be treated as 
a linear function in each case. The equation for the graph of verbal 
error in relation to length of signal is 
y = .4x + .3 sec. (y = error in seconds; x = signal in seconds) 
The equation for the graph of linear movement error in 
relationship to length of signal is 
y = .28 x 
The equation for the graph of key-pressing error in relation 
to length of signal is 
y = .lx + .2 sec. 
To show how well these equations fit, the calculated values 
may be compared to the actual errors as shown in Table 15. 
TABLE l~ 
Calculated error, irrespective of sign, according to the equations 
for different methods used in Experiment 2. 
SIGNAL METHOD 
Verbal Estimate Free Linear Movement Key PressiD.€ 
1 sec. 0.7 0.3 0.3 
2 sec. 1.1 0.6 0.5 
4 sec. 1.9 1.1 0.6 
8 sec. 3.5 2.2 1.0 
16 sec. 6.7 4.5 1.8 
Though the / ••• 
Though the graphs make it clear that the relationship 
between error and signal length is linear in each case, a test for 
linearity, of regression was performed, using a formula which has 
as its basis the difference between the correlation ratio, eta, and 
the product-moment correlation coeffici~nt (Guilford, 1954, p.294). 
If there is any departure from linearity of regression, then the 
correlation ratio, which does not depend on linearity, will be signi-
ficantly greater than the product-moment correlation, which does. 
When the correlation ratio of error by free linear movement and 
length of signal is calculated, a figure of 0.916 is arrived at. 
The product-moment correlation of these two variables is 0.915. 
Application of the formula in Guilford yields an F value of o, which 
means that we can accept that regression is linear. For verbal 
estimate and key-pressing the F values are also O, taken to one 
decimal place. In all cases, therefore, we may accept that regres-
sion of error on signal length is linear. 
These results do not separate verbal estimate and free 
linear movement reproduction from key-pressing. All methods have 
different equations. 
Our conclusion, from the evidence presented so far, is that 
· though verbal estimate and linear movement reproduction have more in 
common with each other than with key-pressing, the relationship is 
71 
still fairly low. But this does point to the inaccuracy of separating 
methods of reproduction from verbal estimates as though they are distinct 
methods, the assumption being that the methods of reproduction must 
necessarily be more closely related to each other than to verbal estimates. 
Now that we have examined the evidence to be obtained from 
levels of performance, we may turn to the evidence of changes in levels 
of performance. 
5.4 The Relationships Among Methods of Time Judgement as Shown 
by Intra-Individual Changes in Performance. 
The possible value of correlating changes in performance 
as well as levels of performance has already been mentioned. Extreme 
scores are minimised and functional relations within the individual may 
be revealed. A sample / ••• 
A sample of scores from one subject may be used instead of 
' scores from a sample of subjects, but there are certain problems in 
this. Firstly, one does not know that the relations found in one 
subject hold for another. Secondly, even if one has a subject who 
is highly motivated, cooperative, willihg to do his best, and able to 
spare the time. for a large number of testing sessions, it is possible 
that afte~ number of sessions the subject 1S; scores become stereotyped. 
He comes to recognise the signals being used in the sessions as being 
identical, and tries to make identical responses.· Verbal estimates, 
especially, would be subject to rapid ste~typing. 
We have compromised by taking observations at different 
sessions from a number of subjects, calculating the ratios of change 
between sessions·, and correlating these. Provided that all responses 
change at the same rate in the different subjects, functional or system 
relations of time judgements by different methods should be revealed 
in this way. There is, of course, the possibility that the ratios of 
change ma.Y be individually different. 
The procedure outlined here seems to compine the virtues of 
Allport's (1937, 1963) personological approach, which stresses systems 
within the individual, and the nomothetic approach, which attempts to 
represent the individual as the point of intersection of a number of 
dimensions. 
Intra-individual changes in judgement of 8 seconds by different 
methods in Experiment 2 were calculated and correlated. The raw scores 
may be seen in Appendix B, Table XL. The correlations are shown below 
in the text. 
TABLE J,.6 
Correlations of intra-individual changes in judgement of 8 seconds by 
various methods in Experiment 2. 
l.Linear movement chagge 
2. Key pressing change 







Intra-individual changes in judgement of 16 seconds by 
different methods in Experiment 2 were calculated and are listed in 
Appendix B, Tables XXVIII and XXXVIII. The correlations of these 
data are shown below. 
TABLE 17 
Correlations of intra-individual changes in judgement of 16 seconds 
by different methods in Experiment 2. 
1 2 
1. Change in linear movement 
Change 
+ 
2. in key pressi.ng +.36 
3. Change in verbal estimate +.38++ 
Intra-individual changes in judgement of 8 and 16 seconds 
by linear movement and by verbal estimate were also calculated for the 
subjects of Experiment 3, and are listed in Tables XXXIV and XXXV, 
Appendix B. The correlations between change in free linear movement 
and change in verbal estimate are +.16 at 8 seconds and +.64 at 16 seconds. 
If we firstly examine what is common to all the correlations, 
then we see that at 16 seconds, for the subjects of both Experiment 2 and 
3, correlation between a change in free linear movement reproduction and 
change in verbal estimate is significant (+.38 and +.64). In neither 
Experiment 2 nor 3 is the corresponding correlation significant at 8 
seconds. Table 17 shows us that changes in all time judgements are 
significantly related at 16 seconds, and Table 16' shows that no changes 
in time judgements are significantly related at 8 seconds. Any 
hypothesis that there is a systematic relationship of time judgements 
by various methods at all lengths of signal may, therefore, have to be 
modified. It appears that systematic or intra-individual relationship 
of time judgements is found when longer time intervals are judged, but 
not when shorter time intervals are judged. At first sight this 
appears inexplicable, but it is possible that shorter time intervals 
are perceived by the subject independently of symbolic aid, whereas 
·longer time intervals have to be conceived by him, with the assistance 
of symbols of relationship. The common denominator of systematic 
covariation may/ ••• 
covariation may be conception of time intervals above a certain.flengtn, 
by use of symbols. Shorter time intervals, being independently 
perceived, are more capable of unrelated variation. This fits rather 
well with Pavlov's view that there is no separ~te analyser for time, 
since all cortical analysers are capable of analysing time separately. 
Thle view that there is a space of time which may be perceived 
as a unit is an old one, as reference to William James (1890, pp. 609 - 613) 
shows. According to James, this directly perceived unit of time was 
placed between 3.6 and 6 seconds (by Wundt), up to 12 seconds (Dietze), 
and up to 6 or 12 seconds, depending on conditions of the experiment 
(Estel and Mehner). James, following Ward, attached great importance 
to this directly perceived unit of time (the "specious present") which 
he held to be "the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times" 
(p. 631). Boring (1933) has proposed that a much sh©rter interval of 
time, the indifference interval, should serve as a measure of the 
conscious present. 
If our tentative explanation of systematic covariation is 
correct, then we should have to assume that the longer periods assigned 
to the conscious present by the older writers are correct. 
There is a final possibility to be noticed, which may account 
for the low correlations of changes in scores by different methods. It 
is possible that there are large differences in the degree to which 
individuals functionally integrate all their time judgements. . As we 
have remarked earlier, some subjects may attempt to judge consistently, 
others may be more concerned with judging each signal freshly, as it 
comes. And there may be different individual rates of change by 
different methods. 
5.4 General Cohclusions 
Taken as a whole, correlations of time judgements by different 
methods are rather low. Some of the correlations are significant, but 
several are not. There is no evidence that time judgements by the 
methods of reproduction are more closely related to each other than to 
verbal estimates of time. Correlation of reproduction of time with 
verbal estimate/ ••• 
verbal estimate appears to rise as the method of reproduction is made 
more difficult - if we can fairly rank key-pressing, free linear 
movement, and linear movements of prescribed distance in order of 
ascending difficulty (the rise in average error makes this plausible). 
'7-'J 
Since intra-individual changes in time judgements by different 
methods correlate significantly at 16 seconds, but not at 8 seconds, we 
may tentatively conclude that a change in the method of judgement takes 
place as the signal is lengthened. The unifying factor proposed is an 
increased relia.nce on symbolic aid as perception of time turns to con-
ception of length of time. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
Time judgements obtained by various methods in Experiment 2 
and 3 were correlated. Verbal estimations appear to correlate more 
with linear movement reproductions than with key-pressing or grip. 
The correlation among different methods of reproduction is not higher 
than correlations of these methods with verbal estimation. The 
exception is that controlled and free linear movement reproductions 
correlate highly with each other. Correlations of intra-individual 
changes in score from one session to another are significant only at 
16 seconds. It is suggested that intra-individual, systematic relationship 
of time judgement by different methods becomes greater as the time interval 
judged lengthens, because of an increase dependence on symbolic activity. 
In addition, the suggestion that increasing the difficulty of the task 
increases the symbolic content of the performance in that task, is born 
out by the increase in correlation between verbal estimate and 
reproduction as the method is changed from key-pressing to free linear 
movement to controlled linear movement. This assumption is strengthened 
by the fact that verbal error does not correlate with free linear 
movement variability or error, but does with controlled linear movement 
variability (+.31 at 8 seoonds; +.51 at 16 seconds). 
PART II 
TIME-SPACE RELATIONS IN LINEAR ARM MOVEMENTS 
According to Brown, a moving stimulus produces an impression of 
less time than a stationary stimulus presented for an objectively 
equal interval. Other experimenters have demonstrated the intimate 
connexion between time and space, when the subject is judging ex-
teroceptively received stimuli. The relationship is such that a 
greater spatial interval produces the impression of a greater time 
interval, and a greater time interval produces ,the impression of a 
greater spatial interval. 
It is an interesting problem whether these relations are found in 
movements produced by the subject. When the subject moves at a 
preferred speed, is the time reproduced related to the speed of 
his movement (Chapter 6)? When the subject is made to move a 
prescribed distance, is the time reproduced influenced by the dis-
tance which he is made to move? (Chapter 7) ? 
C H A P T E R 6 
TilaE-SPACE RELATIONSHIPS IN REPRODUCING 
AUDITORY TIME SIGNALS BY FREE LINEAR MOVEMENT 
6.1 Exteroceptive Time-Space Relationships 
6.1.1 Brown's Treatment of the Relationship between Psychological 
Time and Space. 
The fundamental equation for exteroceptive time-space 
relations appears to be Brown's (1931) 
phenomenal yelocity = 
phenomenal space 
phenomenal time 
From this equation may be derived the fact that phenomenal 
time increases as phenomenal space increases, provided that phenomenal 
velocity is kept constant. It is possible to explain both the suto 
and kappa effects in this way. It will be recalled that the suto 
effect is produced when three successive unequally spaced stimuli' a,re 
applied to the skin (Suto, 1952) and the kappa effect (Abbe, 1936, 1937i 
Cohen and others, 1955) is produced when three successive unequally spaced 
visual stimuli are presented. In both cases, the two stimuli between 
which there is the greater distance in space also appear to the subject 
to be separated by the greater interval in time, when the time intervals 
are equal. If the subject is asked to adjust the time interval between 
the second and third stimuli so as to equal the interval between the 
first and second stimuli, he makes it shorter when the distance 2 - 3 is 
greater than the distance 1 - 2, and longer when the distance 2 3 is 
shorter than 1 - 2. If the presentation of three successive stimuli 
produces an impression of movement, as is not unreasonably claimed by 
Cohen and others (1955), then this spatial effect on time may easily be 
explained by the Bro'Wll equation. The kappa effect is produced by ,the 
subject's impression of the time taken by an object moving at a constant 
velocity to cover unequal distances. Where the distance is greater, 
the impression of time taken to cover that distance is greater. Provided 
that the subject perceives the velocity as constant this effect is bound 
to occur. The same effect occurs in vertical descent, so that even a 
falling body must appear to 
the subject / ••• 
'" 
the subject to be moving at a constant speed. If this explanation is 
to apply to movements in all directions, then the tendency to perceive 
velocity as constant must be very strong. 
Brown's equation holds not only for the spatial effect on 
time judgement, but also for the time effect on judgement of space, as 
is shown by Helson and King's (1931) study. When three successive 
tactile stimuli are presented at uneven intervals of time, the two 
stimuli between which there is the greater time interval also appear to 
be more widely separated in space. Again, if we assume that the subject 
perceives a movement at a constant velocity, it is understandable that as 
perceived time interval is increased, perceived spatial interval should 
also increase. 
6. 1. 2 Piaget's Treatment of the Relationship between Psychological 
and Space. 
The work of Piaget leads to the same conclusions about the 
relations between the experience of time and speed as Brown's .work. It is 
worth digressing a little to see how his thought on this relationship is 
developed. 
The young child's judgement of the time taken by actions is 
determined by the result; it depends on the work accomplished and the 
space covered by these actions. In one task, the child generally judges 
that more time has elapsed because.he has been asked to transfer heavier 
blocks (Piaget, 1946, pp. 253 - 256), and in another, he generally judges 
that a toy figure which moves further moves for a longer time (ibid., p. 272). 
The child of about five is unable to distinguish between the spatial and 
the temporal extension of an action. But, as he develops, he introspec-
tively judges duration during an action. He becomes less dependent on the 
results of the action in forming his judgement of its duration, and more 
dependent on an intuition of the relations of speed and time. "While it 
is being experienced, a rapid or accelerated action brings about a con-
traction of time (by virtue of the inverse relation of time to speed) ••• 
(ibid., p.266). The speed and the distance of an action appear to 
remain fundamenta~ throughout life in determining the immediate impression 
of a temporal interval, as is shown by the work of Brov~1 (1931) on 
phenomenal time/ •.• 
phenomenal time in relation to phenomenal velocity, and by the work of 
Abbe (1936) and Suto (1952) on phenomenal time in relation to visual 
11 
and tactile distance. Piaget has stated of the relation of phenomenal 
time to distance and speed that "the fundamental intuitions are those 
of distance and speed; time is gradually distinguished from these ••• 
(ibid., p. 42). 
This statement of the origin of the concept of time is important 
to any work dealing with the judgement of the duration of movements. We 
shall therefore, briefly examine the development of Piaget's ideas about 
the origin of the concept of time. 
The first, sensori-motor, stage in the development of the 
infant's responses to time is that of acting out a sequence of movements. 
The chain of these movements is gradually extended. A good example of 
this is the infant's gradually extended co-operation in such an activity 
as being dressed. 
In the secbnd stage, these activities are transferred to the 
intuitive plane as egocentric or local time. At this stage, the child 
does not distinguish between inner and outer time. His judgement of 
time is finalistic, since it depends entirely on the results accomplished 
during the period to be judged. It is only at a later stage, according 
to Piaget, that the quantity of activity felt during a period of time 
becomes important in assessing duration. Several examples which show 
that the child's judgement of time at the age of about 5, depends almost 
exclusively on results accomplished, are given by Piaget. All the 
experiments are organised on the same principle. The child is set the 
task of comparing two periods of time during which the work accomplished 
differs. 
In one of the tasks which Piaget uses, the child is asked to 
compare an interval in which he transfers wood from one box to another 
with another (objectively identical) interval in which he transfers lead 
from one box to another. Most of the children thought they had spent 
more time in transferring the lead from one box to another, because the 
lead gave the impression of more work (ibid., pp. 253 - 256). Yet, most 
of the / ••• 
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of the children tr~nsferred more of the wooden blocks. It is not 
clear why they did not believe that they had accomplished more in this 
task, and conclude that they had spent more time at it. The criterion 
of "work accomplished" is, on its own, ambiguous. 
Another experiment by which Piaget demonstrates the finalistic 
judgement of children at the.egocentric stage of development is performed 
with a Y-shaped tube, regulated by a single cock, down which water flows 
into two flasks of unequal size. The flow of water into both flasks 
commences simultaneously as the cock is opened; . the flow is stopped 
simultaneously by closing the cock when the smaller flask is full. Even 
though the child may agree that the flow of water into both flasks stopped 
at the same time, he may still believe that the total time of flow into 
the smaller flask was greater. Again, Piaget explains this as a 
judgement based on the child's belief that more work is accomplished by 
the filling of the smaller flask. The child confuses greater speed with 
greater duration. The more rapid filling of the one flask must have 
taken a greater time, in his judgement, because he is unable at this 
stage to relate speed to space (ibid., p. 130). 
A third experiment, which illustrates the child's inability to 
distinguish between "further" and "longer", is performed with two toys, 
which move along parallel lines in the same direction on a table. 
They start simultaneously, but move at different speeds. A yellow 
figure moves faster and further than a blue figure, but stops a little 
.before it. The 6-year old recognises that the yellow figure stops 
first, but when questioned states that the yellow figure moved for a 
longer time. Piaget concludes that the error is not a verbal one, 
but reveals a logical confusion of space and time (ibid., p. 92). 
This is shown also by an experiment in which the two figures, moving 
at unequal speeds, s\;art and stop simultaneously. The average 6-year 
judges that the figure which moves further moves longer. (ibid. ~· 106). 
A fourth experiment also illustrates the link between 
accomplisbment and duration, in the child's judgement. In this 
experiment the child is asked to compare two objectively equal intervals 
spent drawing/ ••• 
spent drawing lines. In the first interval, he is asked to draw as 
carefully as possible. In the second interval, he is asked to draw 
as fast as possible. Young children agree that the time spent drawing 
lines as fast as possible was longer (ibid., pp. 241 - 250). A third 
of the children aged between 10 and 13 make the same error as the 
younger children, but gradually the abstract idea that when we go 
faster we do more things in the same time is acquired and enables the 
child to correct his judgement. 
At this stage of his development, the child is unable to 
accomplish decentration from the end state, and therefore bases his 
judgement of duration exclusively on this state even though he may see 
that two events started and ended simultaneously. The fact that they 
start and end simultaneously does not mean that they occupied the same 
time. Time is local, and belongs separately to each experience of 
each event. It is only when the child becomes capable of operational 
or rational time, characterised by homogeneity, continuity and uniformity, 
that the simultaneous starting and stopping of two events means that 
they occupied the same time. Homogeneous time refers to time which 
flows at a fixed rate; continuous time refers to the uninterrupted flow 
of time; and uniform time is common to all phenomena. But this is an 
abstract conception. For both the child and the adult, 15. seconds 
spent looking at an amusing picture are not the same as 15 seconds 
standing with folded arms (ibid., p. 257). To realise their 
equivalence takes an intellectual effort. Even where it is possible 
to see that change is occurring at an even rate, as in watching sand 
trickling through a timer, the homogeneity of time is still an intel-
lectual construction (ibid., p. 188). This is especially evident when 
we are"Waiting for something important. The homogeneity, continuity, 
and uniformity of time are apprehended gradually as the child realises 
that his intuitive impressions contradict each other and are contradicted 
by estimations based on other cues. This is especially so when he learns 
to use clocks. "This homogeneity is born of the discordance between 
various modalities of his appreciations, or between his personal appre-
ciation and that of older people" (Fraisse, 1963, p. 265). 
The stage / ••• 
The stage of operational thought which develops 
gradually as the child's actions in the world are internalised, is 
characterised by decentration and reversibility. The transition to 
the reversibility and decentration of operational thought from the 
irreversibility and centration of egocentric thought enables the child 
to choose the criteria by which he judges an interval of time. 
Egocentric thought is characterised by immediacy and by an inability 
to perform mental operations which have no representation in immediate 
experience. Operational thought is characterised by operations which 
may be simultaneously present and which enable the child not merely to 
recapitulate events, but also to set up hypotheses about them. 
When the child becomes capable of introspection he is no 
longer bound to judge duration by the results of an action. He 
develops an intuition of relations (articulate intuition) and makes 
the introspective discovery that phenomenal time shrinks as a function 
of speed (ibid., p. 266). Speed is dissociated from space, and the 
durations of movements of different speeds and distances may be compared. 
Now that we have given a brief account of Piaget's conclu-
sions, it is important to consider some objections which have been 
raised to them. Piaget believes that the dominant criterion used by 
the child in judging duration (at the egocentric stage of development) 
is external. He judges by results. Fraisse, who has repeated some 
of Piaget's experiments, has reached another conclusion. He interprets 
his findings as showing that both the work accomplished and the changes 
experienced by the child during the judged interval are significant in 
fanning an estimate of duration (Fraisse, 1963, pp. 273 - 274). He 
suggests that work accomplished may be equated with external change; 
but internal change is also significant to the child. In reaching 
this conclusion, Fraisse uses children',s judgements of the durations 
of the movements of two toy figures, obtained in a number of experiments 
similar to those described.above. He agrees that when the durations of 
the movements are objectively equal children generally judge that the 
figure which has moved further has moved longer. But a substantial majority 
believe that the figure which moves more slowly moves for a longer time. 
They reach/ ••• 
They reach this conclusion by identification with the slow one, and 
their experience that, under difficult conditions such as might be 
associated with slow movement, ~ery movement costs effort makes them 
more aware of each change (Fraisse, 1963, p.p. 241 - 242). Here we 
see the basis of Fraisse 1s observation that both internal and external 
change may be important in fanning judgement of duration. 
The same comment is also applicable to Piaget's interpre-
tation of the fact that the majority of young children believe that 
they have spent more time transferring lead than wodden blocks, in 
spite of the fact that they are able to transfer many more wooden 
blocks. If the child is judging purely by the external criterion of 
work accomplished, then surely he ought to believe that he has spent 
more time transferring wooden blocks? 
who come to that conclusion. 
And there are some children 
It seems that there are at least three criteria. These 
are, external change (finalistic), internal change (during action), 
and effort (during action). Fraisse expresses the relationship of 
these criteria in the following way (Fraisse, 1963, p. 274)~ 
"Thus, everything depends on the resistance to be overcome and this 
may arise from the effort to go as fast as possible, or from fatigue, 
or in general from the difficulty of·. the task. The immediate 
intuition of duration is that of an interval whose length depends on 
what·happens in it. As in Oppel's illusion, this seems longer the 
more there is in it to attract our attention11 • 
Another important disagreement between Fraisse and Piaget 
refers to the origin of the intuition of duration. Piaget, as we 
have shown above, believes that the origin of this intuition is found 
in a progressive differentiation of speed and distance. 
believes that the intuition of duration is not derived. 
Fraisse 
The child 
experiences duration "in the elementary form of an interval which 
stands between him and the fulfilment of his desires" (Fraisse, 1963, 
p. 277). 
There are several pieces of evidence which support Piaget in 
his association of time and space. Firstly, even at the adult level, 
judgements of/ ••• 
judgements of duration are affected by the distance between stimulis, 
as in the kappa and suto effects. The importance of this is that it 
shows that children and adults are susceptible to the same errors. 
But the adult is able, by adopting a critical attitude, to overcome 
the illusion (Abbe, 1936)~ The basic perception is the same, but 
the adult is able to rationally correct his judgement. The work of 
Brown (1931) also shows the close association between judgement of 
duration and speed, even at the adult level. He does not indicate 
whether or not th~ adult is able to overcome the illusion, but it 
seems likely. 
Another fact which is relevant to the view that the 
intuition of time is derived, is the low reliability of repro-
ductions of time where these are not associated with movemente. 
This is something to which particular attention is paid in Chapter 4, 
The low reliability of reproduced time contrasts sharply with the 
high reliability of speed of bodily movement. It has also been shown, 
in Chapter 4, that the reproduction of time intervals by an extensive 
ann movement raises the .reliability of reproduced time to a high level, 
comparable to that for speed of movement. 
These facts suggest that children and adults are subject 
to the. same immediate illusions in the judgement of time intervals, 
but that adults are more capable of using a variety of cues 
(decentration) than children are. 
Piaget's statement that "rapid or accelerated action 
brings about a contraction of time ••••• " (ibid., p. 266) 
leads to the same conclusions as Brown's equation. In the 
next section we shall see what testable hypotheses may be 
derived from both Brown's and Piaget's work. 
6. 1. 3 Hypotheses derived from Brown and Piaget. 
In most studies, the subject judges the tline~space 
relationships of stimuli entirely outside of himself. Would 
the same / ••• 
the same perceptual relations hold when the subject produces 
the movement with his own limbs? Jaensch (1905) apparently 
offers e.vidence that this is so. He found that judgements of 
the distance of an arm movement are at least partly determined 
by the time taken to complete that movement. But there has 
. 
been no comprehensive study of the subject. Furthermore, 
a set of hypotheses derived by strict application of Brown's 
equation to limb movements shows signs of absurdity, which 
suggest that the relationships ara different. It is worth 
examining some of the predictions which would be made in 
terms of Brown's equation, if applied to reproduction of 
time by arm movements. 
a) The speed of the linear movement made by the subject 
in reproducing the tL~e interval is positively corre-
lated with the duration of the movement. In terms 
of Brown's equation, phenomenal time is reduced by 
an increase in speed. Therefore, a subj~ct who 
moves faster might be expected to move for a longer 
time to attain subjective equality between the dura-
tion of the signal and the duration of his movement. 
b) The extent of the movement is negatively correlated 
with the duration of the movement. That is, 
since phenomenal time increases with 
phenomenal space/ ••. 
If 
phenomenal space when speed is constant, an increase in phenomenal 
space ought to result in an increase in phenomenal time, and the 
subject will reduce the objective duration of his movement to 
achieve subjective equality between the time taken by his movement 
and the signal. 
But, even as one states these hypotheses, one cannot help 
feeling that they are entirely inapplicable to the case. The relations 
found when the subject is a spectator of external stimuli and when he 
moves himself are not identical. According to hypothesis (b), an 
increase in the distance moved by the subject must be associated with 
a shorter time for the movement. Now, if a subject is maintaining a 
constant velocity, this is impossible. It means, therefore, that the 
velocity of the movement must be increased. Such an increase would 
be entirely in agreement with the prediction of hypothesis (a) that an 
increase in speed is associated with a decline in duration of the 
movement, but it would also mean that we should have to regard the 
reliability of speed as rather low, which it is not. Speed tends to 
be an extremely reliable feature, as we have seen. But the next 
consequence of hypothesis (h) is even more difficult to concede. If 
the time signal is lengthened, the subject might be expected to move 
further, at a constant velocity, to express his perception of a longer 
time interval. But the further he moves, the greater the ratio of 
phenomenal time / objective time becomes. Therefore, the longer the 
signal and the further the subject has to move, the greater the disparity 
between the time signal and the time reproduced. A curve of sharply 
diminishing returns should be set up. The alternative to this is that 
the subject move a shorter distance at a slower rate as the signal is 
increased. Both of these possibilities may easily be tested. The 
second possibility may be summarily dismissed: subjects increase the 
distance moved as the signal is increased, but move at a constant speed. 
The figures are shown below, in Table ]8. 
Table 18 / ••• 
TABLE 18 
Average distance and speed of linear arm movement in reproducing time 
intervals in Experiment 2. (N=77). Distance scores are inches, and 
speed scores are inches/second. 
Signal D' istance an ar evia ion St d d D . t' s >pee an ar evia d St d d D . t ion 
l second 6.67 ins. 7.24 ins. 8.05 ins/sec 5.35 ins/sec. 
2 16.31 11.18 8.44 5.43 
4 26.13 17.47 8.48 5.47 
8 46.64 30.58 8.31 5.07 
16 99.58 67.48 8.41 5.23 
All the speed data may be found in Appendix B, Tables XXII 
to XXVI. The distance data may be consulted in Appendix B, Tables XIX 
to xxr. 
It can be seen from this table that the speed is virtually 
constant for all lengths of signal. The null hypothesis that there 
is no significant difference among any of the speed scores is accepted, 
since the highest t value for differences among them is 0.49. The 
distance is seen to increase at an allilost constant rate as the signal is 
doubled. The mean ratio of increase is 1.8. That is, as the time 
interval to be reproduced is doubled, the distance moved in reproducing 
the time interval is, on the average, increased 1•8 times. The 
separate ratios are: 2/1=1.9; 4/2 = 1.6; 8/4 = 1.8 and 16~= 2.1./~ 
This even increase in the distance moved as the signal to be 
reproduced is increased does not suit the predicti:on that an increase 
in distance moved ought to result in an increase in phenomenal time 
relative to objective time, and therefore, a decline in the distance 
which the subject moves to achieve subjective equality between the 
duration of his movement and the duration of the signal. Or, accepting 
the even increase in distance, we should expect an increase in speed of 
movement since the subject has to cover the increased distance in a 
shorter time to preserve phenomenal equality of the time signal and the 
reproduced time. 
The possibility that there is a @ifilinishing return in time as 
score distance/ ••• 
distance is increased in reproducing increased time intervals may also 
be rejected. In text Table 19 below are set out the various time 
judgements as the signal is lengthened. It will be seen that they 
show a linear increase which is in entire accord with Stevens' (1957) 
revision of the psychophysical law of Fechner. According to Stevens, 
after a review of an extensive body of data obtained from a large 
number of experiments, eq~l sensation ratios are produced by equal 
stimulus ratios. An examination of our results shows that they very 
closely approximate this condition. 
TABLE 19 
Relation between the duration of the signal and the mean judgement of 
duration obtained by various methods in Experiment 2. Scores are seconds. 
SIGNAL METHOD 
1 2 3 
Key-Pressing (N=43) Verbal Estimate (N=77) Linear Movement (N=77) 
Delayed Immediate 
J* r J I J I J I 
1 sec. 1.14 1.73 sec. 1.07 sec. 1.08 sec. 
2 2.20 1.9 3.25 1.9 1.96 1.8 2.04 1.9 
4 4.29 1.9 5.62 1.7 3.19 1.6 3.47 1.7 
8 7.81 1.8 10.51 1.9 5.98 1.9 6.60 1.9 
16 15.61 2.0 20.45 1.9 12.13 2.0 11.92 1.8 
Mean Ratio ot Increase 1.9 i.e 1.8 1.8 
J* = judged time 
Ix = Increase, or ratio of increase in judgement ~hen time 
signal is doubled. 
Key-pressing scores in Appendix B, Table XXVII; 
verbal estimates in Appendix B, Tables XIII - XVII; and 
linear movement reproductions in Appendix B, Tables VIII - XII. 
This Table shows clearly that as the signal length is 
doubled the judgement increases by a fixed ratio. There is no sign 
whatever of a drop in the ratio of increase, as would be expected in 
tenns of the Fechner law or in tenns of an increased phenomenal time 
corresponding to I ... 
Kx.1~iment 2 t\o. ~; 
VerbAl eotimote of time in rellition t,u length of ~ignal 
~cale: Icm = I ~econd 
I I 
· S°Jj"111flj l Se~e>it<h ) ---===~. 
Experiment 2 No.~ 
Time reproduced by li.ne11r lllOveme11t in relation to length of 1:dgnal 
;scale: Icm = I i:.econd 
,, 
I 
Ti.ae reprouttceu by key-pre.s~ing iu rt.Jlatiou to length of signal 
~cale: I Cill = I ~econd 
'1·81 • 
I -- ·--- ~-- -~--.4 
l? 
ft7t:1·rt/ { .fecc~J~ ) 
corresponding to an increase in distance. Furthermore, the ratio 
of increase is very nearly the same for each method of time judgement. 
We can apply Stevens' formula for the prediction of 
. judgement from the stimulus value (once the stimulus-ratio has been 
established) • A good fit is obtained. 
Th¢'ormula is:- Sensation = k Sn 
(Where S = stimulus-level; k is a constant; 
and n is log sensation ratio/log stimulus ratio). 
TABLE 20 
Predicted judgements according to the Stevens formula. Scores are seconds. 
SIGNAL METHOD 
Key-pressing Verbal Estimate Linear Movement 
(k = 1.17) (k = 1.8) Delayed (k=l) Inunediate (k=l.12) 
l sec 1.17 1.8 1.0 1.12 
2 2.22 3.2 1.8 2.02 
4 4.21 5.8 3.2 3.64 
8 s.07 10.6 5.9 6.56 
16 15.14 19.1 12.66 11.82 
These data leave no doubt that, whatever the method, the same 
psychophysical law applies. Different k values have to be substituted, 
but the ratios of increase are highly similar. And the ratio of 
increase in judgement is the same for all distances moved and signal 
lengths employed. 
The evidence clearly suggests that we reject both hypotheses 
(a) and (b). On the average, a longer movement in time is associated 
with a longer movement in space, whereas the speed is not associated 
with the time reproduced. Of course, this still has to be demonstrated 
by further evidence, before we can finally accept it as established. 
It might still be argued that, though average time and distance of 
movement are both increased when the signal length is increased, time 
might still be negatively associated with distance moved within any 
·Stimulus-length. That is, there might be subjects who move further 
distances so much faster that in fact their movements actually take less 
time than do those of subjects who move a shorter distance. 
Furthermore, it/ ••• 
ff 
Furthennore, it might still be maintained that when a subject 
increases his own speed of movement in response to the same signal, 
he may move further, but actually diminish the duration of his 
movement, in accordance with the Brown equation. The first of these 
possibilities concerns the inter-subject relations among duration, 
distance and speed of movement.. The second of these possibilities 
concerns the intra-subject relations of duration, distance and speed 
of ~overnent. Both possibilities may be subjected to further test, 
the former by inter-subject correlations of raw speed, duration and 
distance scores, and the latter by inter-subject correlation of 
intra-subject ratios of speed, duration and distance scores, obtained 
in different sessions. 
6 .. 4 Proprioceptive Time-Space Relationships 
It seems probable that, to a very large extent, visual 
experience of movement and subjective experience of personal, 
bodily movement underli19 the kappa, suto and tau effects. The kappa 
effect may be seen as a consequence of the everyday observation that 
(to a large extent) an increase in distance moved at a constant speed 
requires an increased time. But this effect can, as Abbe (1936, 1937) 
has shown, be destroyed by a critical attitude. The effect is 
secondary. It depends on experience of movement, but it cannot affect 
the actual timing of a limb movement, for example, if our view is 
correct. The suto effect, as has been mentioned, depends on visual 
experience. The tau effect, is merely.the reverse. 
The organism moving in the world cannot be subject to severe 
spatial distortion of the timing of its movements. If we regard all 
the exteroceptive spatial effects on time as derived from the organisms 
daily locomotory activity and visual experience of locomotion, then it 
appears as if we can accommodate all the facts. 
In order to subject these observations to more exact 
scrutiny, a number of hypotheses is set up for testing. 
a) Speed and duration of reproduction by a time interval by linear 
movement are not related. 
The argument / ••• 
The argument here is that speed of arm movement is a highly 
reliable individual characteristic of expression. If this is so, 
then the subject is likely to have adjusted to his own speed of 
movement in such a way that it is neutral in his perception of time. 
b) Distance and duration of reproduction of time intervals by linear 
arm movement are positively related. 
stated. 
Many of the reasons for believing this have already been 
Firstly, if speed is a stable characteristic, then a longer 
duration of movement must be achieved by moving a greater,distance. 
Secondly, the evidence that there is a constant ratio of increase in 
judged duration to match a fixed ratio of increase in objective 
duration, and that this increase is associated with an equivalent 
increase in distance (since the speed remains constant) shows rather 
strongly that phenomenal time is not affected by distance. 
c) Verbal estimation, and reproduction by linear movement of a time 
interval are positively related. 
It has been shown that, on the average, verbal estimate and 
reproduction ratios of increase are identical in response to equal 
ratios of increase of the objective time interval. It is possible, 
of course, that when inter-subject correlations are computed, it will 
be found that verbal estimates and reproduction time bear a random 
relationship to each other because of great indivi~ual differences in 
the accuracy with which verbal time references are learnt. The inter-subject 
differences in accuracy are shown by the large standard deviations 
of verbal estimates (.86 sec. at 1 sec. interval; 2.07 sec. at 2 sec. 
interval; 4.43 seconds at 4 sec. interval; 6.94 sec. at 8 sec. 
interval and 10.4 secon& at 16 sec. interval). Such large standard 
deviations can only occur when there are very considerable differences 
in accuracy. 
d) Speed and distance of reproduction by linear movement of a time 
interval are positively related. 
This is a rather obvious relationship. If time is constant, 
the faster the subject moves, the further he will move. If 
hypothesis (a) / ••• 
hypothesis (a) is correct, then this will follow. According to 
(a), the duration of the movement is not affected by speed. 
These hypotheses must be established by inter-subject 
correlations of raw scores and inter-subject correlations of intra-
subject ratios or quotients. The first correlations will tell us 
whether in the population as a whole those who move fast or slow, 
for example, tend to high or low time reproduction scores. The 
second correlations will tell us whether, when a subject increases 
or decreases·his own speed of movement, for example;this is 
generally associated with an increase or decrease in the duration 
of his reproduction. The former indicates relations of the 
distributions of a population of system characteristics; the 
latter indicates the relations of the distributions of a population 
of intra-system changes in these characteristics. 
6,5 Relations of Raw Scores of Space and Time in Reproduction 
by Linear Movement. 
The data for these correlations were obtained in 
Experiment 2, and are Tabled in Appendix B. All the reproduction times 
by linear arm movement are to be fo~d in Tables VIII to XII. The 
verbal estimates of the time intervals are in Tables XIII to XVII. 
The distances moved are given in Tables XIX to XXI, and the speeds 
of movements are in Tables XXII to XXVI. 
Product-moment correlations were computed and are shown 
below in the text Table 21 
TABLE 2J' 
Correlations of time, distance and speed of free linear movement 
reproduction of 8 seconds, in Experiment 2. (N=77). 
1. Distance moved 
2. Time reproduced 
3. Speed moved 







++ +.31 .. +.03 
+ significant at 5% level 
++ significant at i% level 
TABLE .1Q. I ... 
TABLE £2 
Correlations of time, distance and speed of free linear movement 









1 2 3 
+.46++ 
+. 79++ -.08 
+.56++ +.29 - -.04 
+ significant at 5% level 
++ significant at 1% level 
It will be seen that these data support our hypotheses. 
Our first hypothesis is that speed and duration of linear movement 
f I 
reproduction of a time interval are not related. When correlations 
are computed for the reproduction of the 8 second interval (Table 21), 
there is a significant negative correlation of -.25 which does contra-
diet the hypothesis; but the correlation computed for the reproduction 
of the 16 second interval, though still negative, is extremely low. 
TABLE 23 
Correlation of speed and time in reproduction of 5 lengths of signal 
by linear arm movement in Experiment 2. (N=77). 
SIGNAL TIME-SPEED CORRELATION 
1 sec. +.12 
2 sec. +.19 
4 sec. -.25+ 
8 sec. -.25+ 
16 sec. -.08 
+ significant at 5% level of confidence 
Examination of all the time-speed correlations in Table 23 shows that 
there is a change from positive to negative, as the signal is lengthened. 
Only at 4 sec. and 8 sec. do the correlations attain significance. 
Both of these are negative. This negative relationship is the reverse 
of what we should expect in terms of Brown's discovery that phenomenal 
time decreases as a function of phenomenal velocity. For, if the 
phenomenal time of those subjects who move faster has been reduced, then 
the objective/ ••• 
the objective duration of their movements should be longer for them to 
achieve subjective equality between the duration of the reproduction 
movement and the signal. On the other hand; one might argue that the 
natural tempo of the subject, even if faster than that of another sub-
ject, represents the same phenomenal speed to him. In either case, 
whether the natural speed of movement of the subject is high or low, 
it is phenomenally neutral, and another explanation must be sought for 
the data. The only explanation which seems plausible is that, if we 
accept the negative correlations as valid, distance does to some extent 
affect the impression of time received by the subject. The increased 
speed is achieved by the subject's shortening the duration of his 
movement relative to its distance. But this effect must be very 
slight, because we find a positive correlation between distance and 
duration of movement, as predicted by the second hypothesis. In 
reproducing both 8 seconds and 16 seconds the correlation between 
distance of linear movement and duration of linear movement is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that those subjects 
who move further tend to take a longer time for their movement, instead 
of covering the increased distance at a sufficiently greater speed to keep 
.the duration constant. Of course, as the very high positive 
correlations between speed and distance show, subjects who move further 
do move faster, but they do not sufficiently compensate for the 
increase in distance to maintain the same time as those who move less 
far. Or one might reverse this statement to the effect that those who 
move a shorter distance do not sufficiently slow down their movement to 
maintain the duration of those who move further. The fourth hypothesis 
is very substantially supported by these high ~orrelations (+.76 and +.79). 
The third hypothesis, that verbal estimate and reproduction 
time are positively correlated, is significantly supported by positive 
correlations of +.31 obtained in judging 8 seconds (significant at 1%) 
and +.29 in judging 16· seconds (significant at 5%). It is interesting 
to note, therefore, that subjects who have a high verbal reference to a 
time interval also tend to protract their reproduction of it. But the 
correlations are not very high, and account for only 9.6% and 8.4% ar' tge 
variance, respectively/ ••• 
/ 
variance, respectively. To a very large extent, the rest of the 
variance must be accounted for by the vast differences in accuracy of 
verbal reference. It is noteworthy that verbal estimate correlates 
very much more highly with distance moved in reproducing both 8 seconds 
(r=+. 52; p < .01) and 16 seconds (r= +. 56;. p<.01) than with time 
reproduced. In the first casek 27% of the variance is accounted for 1 
and in the second, 31.4% of the variance is accounted for. "When one 
considers the very large standard deviation of the verbal estimates of 
time, and the large differences in accuracy which this implies, then 
these correlations must arouse our interest. It will be remembered that 
verbal estimates were made after reproduction by linear movememt. These 
results suggest that verbal estimates were ,influenced. not so much by the 
duration of the linear movement reproduction, as by the distance moved. 
Speed seems not to have affected the verbal estimat~s, since the correlations 
are very low indeed ( +.03; -~04). Now, we have seen from the extensive 
reView of the flappa effect that distance positively influences subjective 
time. The effect obtained. is, therefore, precisely the effect which we 
should expect to obtain if we accept that verbal estimate reflects the 
subject's impression of time. And the fact that verbal estimate is so 
intimately linked with the distance rather than the duration of the move-
ment is accounted. for by the fact that distance is very much more clearly 
perceived by the supject than time. 
So far we have dealt with relations as they hold among the raw 
scores of different subjects. We should like to extend our inquiry to 
find whether the same relations hold. for changes within subjects. In 
our next section we deal with intra-subject changes, and the relationships 
which these changes have to each other. 
6.6 Relations of Intra-Subject Changes in Space and Time in 
Reproduction by Linear Movement. 
Quotients may be calculated. of scores in the second session over 
scores in the first, and these help us to ascertain, within the individual, 
whether there is covariance of distance, speed, time 
reproduced, and VJerbal/ ••••• 
reproduced, and verbal estimate. There are great advantages to this 
procedure. In the first instance, large individual variations in distance, 
speed and time judgement' are reduced. Each individual, by this method, 
provides his OYm: standard. To take concrete examples: (a) the 
distance moved in reproducing 16 seconds ranges from 387 inches 
(roughly 32 feet) to 8 inches, with a standard deviation of 67.5 inches 
and a mean of 99.6 inches; (b) the speed of movement in reproducing 
16 seconds varies from 28.25 inches per second to 1.63 inches per 
second, with a mean 8.41 inches per second and a standard deviation 
of 5.23 inches per second; (c) the time reproduced by linear movement 
r~ges from 21.1 .. seconds to 2 .1 s~9onds, with a mean of 11. 9 seconds and 
a standard deviation of 3.6 f~"" when the standard is held constant 
at 16 seconds; and (d) the verbal estimate of 16 seconds ranges from 
80 seconds to 9 seconds, with a mean of 20.4 seconds and a standard 
deviation of 9.1 seconds. Obviously, the range is very great, and 
there is a probability that extreme deviations reduce some correla-
tions which might exist to levels below significance. But, since 
the reliability of all these scores is high (see Chapter 4), inter-
session quotients can be calculated which may reflect meaningful and 
not simply chance changes in the level of the score, and the great 
extremes will be eliminated. A subject who estimates the time 
signal as 80 seconds in the first session and 70 seconds in the second 
session will get the same quotient as a subject who estimates it as 8 
seconds in the first session and 7 seconds in the second. 
Proportionately, the same degree of change has 0.ccurred in both cases. 
·The relations of intra-individual changes may be investigated 
in two ways. Firstly, one may sample the scores of a single individual. 
That is, one subject is taken and tested, say thirty or forty times. 
Though this poses certain difficulties, it is in some ways an ideal 
method. In arriving at conclusions about relations within the system 
one need not make any assumptions about inter-system regularities. One 
can say that, within this particular system, space and time covary in a 
certain way, but then one cannot extend one's conclusions to other 
systems without further experiment. The second method is to sample 
the changes / ••• 
the changes which occur in a population of individuals. That is, 
each subject is subjected to at least two identie.al tests, quotients 
of the changes in each variable are calculated, and the quotients of 
the changes in each variable are calculated, and the quotients of 
change are then correlated. Now, such a procedure can tell us about 
the w~ys in which changes in different systems covary. We have to 
make certain assumptions, such as that proportionate changes occur 
in the same way in different systems. For example, when verbal 
estimate is reduced by a tenth, does reproduction time reduce by x 
in all cases (excluding unknown sources of variance), as is required 
for our method? In other words, for this method to work, inter-
variable changes have to be related in the same way in all systems. 
This assumption does not have to be made when we are examining one 
subject only. 
There is, of course, some reason to believe that the systems 
are fairly similar, when an effort is made to obtain roughly homo-
geneous populations, ,.:,~~ produced by the same educational system. 
Their experience is very largely concerned with the relations between 
various things. It seems reasonable to assume that in all cases a 
change in perception of objective time will be accompanied by a change 
in reproduction and verbal estimate of that time interval. 
What we cannot be sure of, as we have remarked above, is 
that in all cases the proportions of change bear the same relationship 
to one another. 
The chief advantage of sampling the changes which occur 
within a population of individuals is that any relationships found 
can be assumed to be fairly widespread. There may be, of course, 
relationships peculiar to certain individuals which are not uncovered 
· by this method. 
Quotients were calculated for reproduction variables when 
the standard was 16 seconds in length. Verbal estimate quotients 
were also calculated for the same length of time signal. In each 
case, the quotient was found by dividing the score obtained in the 
first session I ... 
first session into the score obtained in the second session. These 
ratios are shown in Appendix B, Table XXVII. Product-moment 
correlations of these ratios or quotients of change were calculated, 
and are shown below in the text Table"~4. 
TABLE 24. 
Correlations of intra-individual changes in time, speed, and distance 





Change in distance 
Change in tim~'. ·reprod. 
Change in speed 










++ significant at 1% level,of confidence 
There is only one correlation in this Table which is 
strikingly different from those obtained with raw scores. This is 
the significant positive correlation of +.42 between a change in speed 
and a change in verbal estimate. Since Brown found that an increase 
in phenomenal speed was associated with a decr¢ase in phenomenal time, 
this result is particularly interesting. Additional ratios of change, 
in response to a signal of 8 seconds, were calculated, to discover 
whether they would affirm this result. These are shown in full in 
Appendix B, Table XXIX. The correlations of these ratios of change 
were computed and are shown below in the text Table 25-
TABLE :?~.· 
Correlations of intra-individual changes in time, speed, and distance 






Change in time rep rod. 
Change in speed 










++ significant at 1% kevel of confidence 
In Table 2B we see that the correlation between change in 
verbal estimate and change in spped, though still positive, is so 
close to / ••. 
close to zero that it can lend no support to any interpretation based 
on the significant positive correlation in Table 24 .. 
All the differences between Tables 24 and 25 concern the 
relationship between changes in verbal estimate and other variables. 
It is quite possible that the reason for this is that verbal aids to 
reproduction play an increasing role as the time interval is lengthened, 
so that a closer relationship between time reproduction and verbal 
estimation is found above a certain length of time signal than below. 
It is noteworthy that in both Tables the correlation 
between change in verbal estimate and change in distance moved in 
reproduction is higher than the correlation between change in verbal 
estimate and change in time reproduced. This parallels the relation-
ships found with the raw scores, and affirms the possibility that verbal 
estimate is affected by the distance which the subject moves. This 
would be entirely in accord with the effect on phenomenal time of 
increased distance. 
If the hypotheses are examined individually in the light of 
these correlations, we see that they are largely confiIIDed. This 
means that the same relations hold in the raw scores of a population of 
subjects and in the intra-individual changes which occur in a population 
of subjects. The hypotheses have an added validity since they appear 
to hold both across a number of subjects and within a number of subjects. 
Hypothesis (a), that speed and duration of reproduction by linear 
movement are not related, is supported by the very low correlations 
obtained at both 8 and 16 seconds (+.02 and -.04 respectively). 
Hypothesis (b), that distance and duration of reproduction of time by 
free linear movement are positively related, is confirmed by the sig-
nificant positive correlations at both 8 seconds and 16 seconds 
(+.34 and +.59 respectively). This means that an increase in distance 
moved is associated with an increase in time of i:n:mvernent both across 
the population of subjects and within eahh subject. Hypothesis (c), 
that verbal estimation and reproduction of time are positively related 
is not confirmed by the correlation at 8 second interval (-.06), but 
is supported / ••• 
/l>f 
is supported by the correlation at 16 second interval (+.38). 
This hypothesis is, therefore, subject to doubt as it applies to 
intra-individual changes. Hypothesis (d), that speed and distance 
of movement are positively related is very strongly supported at 
both 8 seconds and 16 seconds ( r's of +.77 arld +.65, respectively). 
The method of intra-individual changes, though it has not 
supplied us with any radically new information about the relations 
hypothesised, has extended our range of certainty as to the applica-
tion of these hypotheses. They can now be safely assumed to apply 
to the covariance of changes in different systems as well as the 
covariance of level of performance in different systems. 
At the end of the next chapter, in which the effects of 
imposing certain spatial restrictions on the linear movements of 
the subject are considered, some attempt will be made to draw further 
conclusions about the differences between exteroceptive and propriocep-
tive space-time relations 
6,7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
An attempt was made to consider the differences between 
exteroceptive space-time relations and proprioceptive space~time 
relations, by analysing the correlations between distance moved, 
duration of movement, speed of movement, and verbal estimate of time 
interval, when subjects were asked to reproduce time signals by free 
linear movement. The data used were derived from Experiment 2. 
Four hypotheses were set up: (a) that time reproduced and speed 
of movement are not related; (b) that time and distance of linear 
movement are positively related; (c) that verbal estimate and time 
reproduced are positively related; and (d) that speed and distance 
of linear reproduction movement are positively related. The hypo-
theses were largely confirmed, both by correlation of individual 
levels of performance and by correlations of intra-individual changes 
in performance. It was also found that verbal estimate was more 
closely related to the distance of the linear-movement of reproduc-
tion than to the time reproduced. This could be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the phenomenological effect of space on time, as in the 
kappa effect. Chapter 6 / ••• 
C H A P T E R 7 
TIME-SPACE RELATIONS IN REPRODUCING AUDITORY 
TIME SIGNALS BY CONTROLLED LINEAR MOVEMENT. 
7.1 Introduction 
It has already been remarked that one of the reasons for 
there not being any negative spatial effect on the duration of the 
ann movement may be that the preferred speed of movement is phenome-
nologically neutral to the subject. But it is possible that, should 
the subject be compelled by the conditions of the experiment to alter 
the speed of his movement, the phenomenological variations in time 
observed by Brown might occur. 
To test this possibility, the data found in Experiment 3 were 
analysed. In Experiment 3, subjects reproduced time intervals by free 
movement, by movements of controlled distances, and by gripping the 
stationary handle. Before proceding to a study of the results, it 
is worth examining the relationships which might be expected, if we 
are to apply Brown's hypotheses to our data. What relations would 
the controlled movements of various distances bear to each other? 
What relations would the controlled and free movements bear to each 
other? And what relations would the stationary grip bear to the 
movements? 
(a) An increase in speed might result in a decrease in phenomenal 
time. On the average, therefore, subjects could be expected 
to take a longer objective time for the reproduction movement 
when the distance is increased. 
(b) When subjects do not move linearly (reproduce by gripping the 
stationary handle) they might be expected to have lower time 
. reproduction scores than when they reproduce by linear arm 
movements. 
(c) Where the speed of movement is phenomenally neutral, as we 
hypothesised that it.might be in the case of free movements, 
reproduction times might be expected to be higher than when 
speed is / ••• 
speed is greatly decreased (since that would increase phenome-
nological time), and lower than when speed is greatly increased 
(since that would decrease phenomenological time). In each 
case there is a negative relationship between phenomenal time and 
reproduced time. 
As in the previous chapter, these hypotheses do not appear to 
be sat,isfactory. To take a point of fact first; it was found, in the 
analysis of data derived fr~m Experiment 2, that reproduction scores 
were higher when the method was key-pressing than when it was linear 
arm movement (see Table 19). This discredits hypothesis (b) and casts 
doubt on the whole set of hypotheses. Once more we emphasise that, 
when the subject is making the movement, spatial effect on time judge-
ment need not occur because the subject produces all the relationships 
involved in the judgement. He is;not deceived by an unexpectedly 
greater distance in one part of the field, which he has to 'account 
for' by the impression that a greater time interval must separate this 
part of the field. Our contention is that exteroceptive spatial effects 
on time judgement depend on the stability of speed which is one of the 
characteristics of individual expression. But where, in the termin-
ology of Osgood (1963, p.263), the subject is at once the 11destination-
source 11 of the information which has to be analysed, it cannot be -expected that the subject should be subject to the same spacqtime errors. 
If this were the case, then we should have to conclude that the sources 
for the information about time and for the information about space are 
not in communication, whereas it seems likely that both of these 
features are abstracted from the comrnon experien.ce of movement. 
But if we accept this argument, that the position of the sub-
ject as 11destination-source 11 places him in a different position from 
that of the subject who is destination only, then we have to set up the 
hypothesis that variations in the distance moved by the subject in 
reproducing time intervals by linear arm movement should have no signi-
ficant effect on the durations reproduced. 
To test this hypothesis, we shall proceed to an analysis of 
the data in Experiment J. 
7.2 The/ •••••• 
l.?8 
7.2 The SJ?,ace-Time Relations of Controlled Movement 
The full scores for reproduction of 8 seconds by free and 
controlled linear movements, by stationary grip and by verbal estimate 
are found in Table XXX in Appendix B. Similar data for 16 seconds are 
in Table XXXI, Appendix B. 
These scores enable us to compare the means and standard 
deviations obtained by these methods. In Table 26 these data are 
summarised. 
Mean judgement, in seconds, of 8 seconds by free and controlled 
linear ann movements, by gripping the stationary handle, and by 
verbal estimate in Experiment 3 (N=40). 











20" 4on 60" 
9.4s. 9.3s. 9.1s 10.77 
3.55 3.13 3~20 5.85 
Reproduction of time by stationary grip is significantly lower 
than by all other methods. The level of confidence at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected i.s, for the differences verbal-stationary grip, 
free movement-stationary grip, and 511 controlled movement - stationary 
grip, the 1% level (t values are, respectively, 2.9, 4.9 and 5.1). 
Differences between controlled movements of 60", 2011 and 40", and 
stationary grip reproduction are such that the null hypothesis is 
s. 
rejected at the 5% level (t values are 1.95, 2.26 and 2.34, respectively). 
No other differences are significant. 
The data obtained in judging 16 seconds are summarised below, 
in 'fhe text Table 'zr.,. 
TABLE aq 
Mean judgement, in seconds, of 16 seconds by free and controlled linear 
ann movements, by gripping the stationary handle, and by verbal estimation 
in Exi)eriment 3. (N=40). 
Ta:ble 27 / ••• 
Free Distance Stationary Controlled Distance Verbal Est. 




18.7 s 14.8.s 17.ls 16.8s 17.2s 17.5s 15.4s 
' 
n 5.68 2.40 3.93 3.82 3.91 4.56 7.05 
Again, reproduction of the time interval· by stationary grip 
yields a lower figure than by any other method. The only method which 
does not differ significantly from it is verbal estimation. All other 
. 
methods yield differences subh that the null hypothesis must in all 
cases be rejected at the 1% level of confidence. The t values are: 
free distance - stationary 3.9; 511 controlled movement - stationary 3.1; 
2011 controlled movement - stationary 2.8; 40" controlled movement -
stationary 3.3; and 60" controlled movement - stationary 3.3. 
In no instance do free and controlled distance reproduction 
s.cores differ from each other. Further evidence that identical 
processes are at work in both these methods is found in the fact that 
their standard deviations _do not differ significantly from each other, 
though they do differ significantly from the standard deviation of 
scores obtained by stationary grip. For example, in reproducing 8 
seconds, all the linear movement standard deviations, except for the 
5" controlled distance reproduction, differ significantly from the 
stationary standard deviation. The t values are: free movement -
stationary 2. 5 (p(. 02); and 20'1 , 40", 60" controlled movement t' s are 
3.3, 2.9 and 3.0 respectively, all of which lead us to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1% lev~l of confidence. In reproducing 16 seconds, 
we may also reject the null hypothesis that the standard deviation of 
movement reproduction is not different from that of stationary repro-
duct ion. For the difference between free movement qnd stationary 
grip we may reject the null hypot~esis at the 1% level of confidence. 
For all the controlled movement - stationary grip reproductions the 
differences lead us to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
The t values at 5", 20", 4011 and 60" are, respectively, 2.1, 2.0, 
2.1 and 2.6. 
It is clear/ ••• 
//() 
It is clear from these figures that .the reproductions by 
movements of various distances fulfil the prediction that there would 
be no differences of significance. But one surprising fact does emerge. 
Whereas, in Experiment 2, key-pressing results tended to be very similar 
to the stationary grip results obtained in Experiment 3 (Means are 7.8 
and 15.6, standard deviations are 1.18 and 2.07), the free linear 
movement results tend to be very different.(Means are 6.6, and 11.9, 
standard deviations are 3.4 and 4.0). The null h~pothesis that there 
is no difference between key-pressing in Experiment 2 and stationary 
grip in Experiment 3 must be accepted since the t values at the 8 and 
16 second intervals are 0.7 and 1.6, respectively. The standard devia-
tions are also, in both cases, not different, and the null hypothesis is 
• 
accepted for them, too (t values at 8 and 16 seconds are 1.1 and 0.66, 
respectively~·. But the free linear movement scores differ very signifi-
cantly, between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. At 8 seconds the null 
hypothesis is rejected at less than the 1% level of confidence (t=6.4) 
and at 16 seconds the same occurs (t=6.7). The standard deviations are 
not significantly different (t=l.2 at 8 seconds and 1.64 at 16 seconds). 
Therefore, the distribution of scores is the same in Experiment 2 and 3, 
but something has happened to move the whole distribution to different 
levels in the two experiments. The most obvious suggestion is that 
when the subjects have to reproduce time by moving diffe~ent distances 
they suspect that there is some 'trick' involved and are determined not 
to be caught. The result is that they over-compensate. When free 
movement is allowed from the start, subjects do not adopt this critical 
attitude. The effect of a critical attitude on results has been noted 
in experiments of this kind by both Abbe and Cohen and his associates. 
But if this is so, what conclusions can we draw? The only 
safe ones appear to be that reproduction by means of linear movement is 
more subject to inaccuracy than stationary reproduction, and that free 
and controlled linear movement yield the same reproduction scores. 
But this is enough to bear out the main hypothesis guiding this inquiry: 
that the distance of the movement has no bearing (within the limits of 
our experiment) on the reproduction score. The subjects are on the 
whole able to adjust speed to the distance which has to be covered, 
for _a / ••• 
for a given time interval. 
In addition to this direct comparison of time scores under 
various conditions, the scores of Experiment 3 were also used to 
further substantiate the relations among speed, time, distance and 
verbal estimate which were found in Experiment 2. Product-moment 
correlationS were calculated and are shown below in Tables 28 and 29. 
TABLE 28. 
Correlations of time, distance and speed of free linear movement 
reproduction of 8 seconds in Experiment 3 (N=40) 
1 2 3 
1. Distance moved 
2. Time reproduced +.61++ 
3. Speed moved +.70++ -.28 
Verbal estimate +.38++ 
+ +.04 4. +.31 
+ significant at 5% 
++ significant at 1% 
TABLE 29 
Correlations of time, distance and speed of free linear movement 
reproduction of 16 seconds 
1. Distance moved 
2. Time reproduced 
3. Speed moved 










+ significant at 5% 
3 
+.08 
It is interesting to note that these relations agree 
completely with those found in Experiment 2. The most important 
Ill 
confirmations are the negative correlations between speed and duration 
of movement, which are not significant statistically but confirm the 
trend. There seems definitely to be aslight tendency, observed in 
two samples of subjects, for those who move faster to reproduce a 
lower level of time. Another important confinnation is that verbal 
estimate is more closely related to distance of movement than to time 
reproduced by the movement. This may be because the subject can 
decide with / ••• 
/IJ, 
decide with more reliability how far he is going to move in response 
to a signal than how long he is going to move. In Experiment 3 sub-
jects were presented with only one time interval in a session, and 
judged it verbally several times before the free movement trials, so 
that it is more likely that verbal reference affected distance moved 
than the other way round. But in the previous experiment, verbal 
judgements were made after movement, so that there the relationship 
might have been reversed. It is quite possible that the effect works 
both ways. 
Ratios of change were also calculated, as in Chapter 5. 
These intra-individual changes were correlated to discover whether 
' 
they would confinn the results of Experiment 2, which indicated that 
largely the same relations held when either levels of performance or 
changes in levels of performance are correlated. 
TABLE ~30 
Correlations of intra-individual changes in time, speed and distance 
in reproducing 8 seconds by free linear movement in Experiment 3 (N=40) 
1. Change in Distance 
2. Change in time reproduced 
3. Change in speed 










++ significant at 1% level 
The main differences between these correlations and those 
found with raw scores are in verbal estimate relations. 1.Phe correlation 
between change in vet'bal estimate and change in distance moved, though 
still positive, is not significant, and the correlation between change 
in verbal estimate arid change in time reproduced has also lost 
statistical significance. 
TABLE 3:1,' 
Correlations between intra-individual changes in time, speed and 
distance in reproducing 16 seconds by free linear movement in Experiment 
3 (N = 40) 
Table J]. / ••• 
L. Change in distance 
2. Change in time reproduced 
3. Change in speed 











In this Table the relations are almost precisely those found 
with raw scores. The same correlates of verbal estimate changes are 
significant: verbal estimate - distance and verbal estimate - time 
reproduced. 
7.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
The first general conclusion to be drawn from the results 
of Experiments 2 and 3 is that the same effects are not found in the 
observation and judgement of externally produced space-time relation-
ships and in the production of these relationships by movement of the 
arm. It is suggested that when the subject is the "destination-source" 
of the infonnation relevant to his judgement, he has, in fact, more 
info:rmation than when he is merely the "destination". In judging the 
exteroceptively received impression, the subject is liable to the 
error of an asstunption of constant velocity, but in producing the 
movement, he knows. very well whether velocity is being kept constant 
or not. 
The one relationship which is similar to that found with 
exteroceptive stimulation, is the positive correlation between verbal 
estimate and distance moved, which is generally higher than that found 
between verbal estimate and time reproduced by movement. In Experiment 
2 the verbal estimate succeeds the movement of reproduction, and there 
seem to be three possible ways in which the verbal estimate could be 
formed. One possibility is that the verbal judgement subjectively 
precedes the movement. The second is that the verbal judgement 
succeeds the movement, but is not affected by it. The third is that 
the verbal judgement succeeds the movement and is affected by it. The 
evidence does not allow us to decide conclusively among these possibilities, 
which may vary from individual to individual. The fact that the verbal 
estimates associated with key-pressing do not differ significantly from 
those associated/ ••• 
those associated with movement is not useful, because key-pressing 
reproduction comes after linear movement reproduction, and by that 
time the verbal estimates are generally deterrnined. We cannot, 
therefore, on the basis of Experiment 2, say that verbal estimates 
ll'f-
are definitely affected by the distance moved~ rather than that the 
distance moved is affected by the verbal estimate. But, it is more 
than possible that the relationship can be effective either way. The 
data of Experiment 3 in which verbal estimates of the time interval 
were made before the free movement trials, make it probable that this 
is so. A comparison of the mean correlation coefficients can easily 
be made. The mean correlation between distance and verbal estimate 
is +.51, which accounts for 26% of the variance. The mean correlation 
between reproduced time and verbal estimate is .33, accounting for 11% 
of the variance. The mean correlation of the change in verbal estimate 
and the change in distance is .38, accounting for 14% of the variance. 
The mean correlation between change in verbal estimate and the change 
in time reproduced is .28, accounting for 8% of the variance. It is 
probable that the higher relationship between verbal estimate and 
distance than between verbal estimate and duration may be interpreted 
as a consequence of the relative accuracy of space perception as compared 
to time conception. If .. the subject fonns his verbal estimate before his 
movement, he can also form a clear idea, in terms of distance to be 
moved, how one signal compares to another. Such a comparison, in terms 
of distance, is a much more vivid and easily grasped comparison than 
one of time intervals, grasped as durations. On the other hand, if 
the subject forms his verbal estimate after the movement, the distance 
which he has moved is a clear indication of the degree to which the 
signal is longer or shorter than other signals. It was observed, in 
the course of the experiment, that the two most popular ways of 
assessing the duration of the signal were by counting and by fixing 
in the mind the distance to be moved in reproducing the signal. 
Allowing for small fluctuations in the speed of movement, it may be 
seen that time will deviate relatively more from the verbal decision 
than distance, under such circumstances. 
Another general/ ••• 
Another general conclusion which may be drawn is that the 
distance moved by the subject may be altered experimentally without 
affecting his time judgement, but where he alters the distance himself, 
between sessions, moving at his own tempo, there is a change in the time 
reproduced. In all cases, in both Experiments 2 and 3, the positive 
correlations between change in distance moved and change in time 
reproduced are statistically significant. This means that the indivi-
dual may adjust his speed. of movement to cover various distances in the 
same time, but that the reliability of his preferred tempo is such 
that an increase in the distance moved, even in sessions widely separated 
in time, brings about an increase in time reproduced. 
The finding that a change in speed between sessions is 
associated very strongly with a change in distance, but not with a 
change in time reproduced by free linear movement, is congruent with· 
the finding that when the distance is controlled, ~he subject may alter 
his speed of movement so as to maintain constant time. 
Another general conclusion which may be drawn is that the 
methods of controlled and free linear movement produce the same time 
reproduction results and the same distribution of scores, but that both 
of these methods differ from the method of reproduction by key-pressing, 
which tends to approximate the standard time signal more closely and to 
have a very narrow distribution of scores. The similarity of the 
methods of controlled and free linear movement is born out not only by 
the fact that their means do not differ (in Experiment 3) and that their 
standard deviations are practically identical, but also by the fact that 
bo~h have high reliability as compared to key-pressing. 
Some attempt will be made in the next section to draw up a 
model of the relations involved in time reproduction. 
7.4 A Model of the Relations in Time-Space Judgements 
An attempt will be made to present a model of the relations 
involved in space-time judgements in which the subject is the destination-
source, and judgements in which he is only the destination of information. 
In the former case the subject has available proprioceptive infonnation as 
well as / ••• 
well as exteroceptive information. He feels the movement of his 
muscles and he sees the movement of his arm. In the latter case, 
the subject has only exteroceptive information. He sees the 
succession of, let us say, visual stimuli, 
Let us try to set up a model for the reproduction of an 
exteroceptive signal which has no properties of spatial extension. 
The time signal may be, for example, a light which is switched on for 
a certain interval of time. Now, let the subject reproduce this 
duration and the relations of his actions are represented in Model 
I. It is important to note that this is a diagram of relations, 
not a physiological model. 
Model 1. 
Reproduction of a time signal without spatial extension (e.g. 
a point of light). 
R 
Extero = exteroceptive information about duration. 
D = decoder of information. 
tr = cortical time process, initiating response, acting as acceptor. 
R = kinesthetic response of movement. 
t2 = cortical time process resulting from response, acting as the 
accepted process. 
Intero = interoc~ptive information about duration of the response. 
The important/ ••• 
The important features of this model are that the 
exteroceptively received information produces a time process, tI, 
probably in the cortex,. which then acts as an internal source of 
information for the response, R, of linear movement. Infonnation 
from the movement and the process tI are then fed back into the 
decoder, and the accepted process, t2, is produced. Thus, informa-
tion about the rate of movement, the distance of movement, and the 
process tI all enter into the final accepted process t2. The 
accepted process, t2, need not represent the same time interval as 
the acceptor, tl. The time reproduced is rarely identical with the 
signals. 
Now, let us consider what happens when the duration of 
exteroceptively received movement is judged. We shall take this 
111 
to include judgements of the intervals between successive stimuli. 
This assumption appears to be fully justified by the readiness with 
which motion is ascribed to a body occupying a succession of places. 
The work of Michotte (1963) amply illustrates this tendency. We 
refer here not to the phi phenomenon, when points of light separated 
in space flash in such rapid alternation that the subject experiences 
the illusion of movement, but to the ascription of movement to a 
stimulus presented in separate locations at such interyals of time 
that the stimulus may easily be seen to be stationary. Nevertheless 
continuous motion is readily ascribed to the stimulus. There is only 
one extra assumption in the second model. It is the assumption that 
when the subject perceives motion he makes a tonic response of the 
kind which Hull described as a "pure stimulus act". There is, in 
the work of Werner and Wapner (1952), a considerable body of evidence 
that such tonic responses may occur and that they do affect judgement. 
This response would be a subliminal motor response, perhaps of the 
eyes, the neck, the trunk and even of the limbs. 
Though this seems to be a plausible assumption there is not, 
of course, any direct evidence that such a "pure stimulus act" occurs 
when the subject is judging the time intervals taken by motions through 
space. Evidence could be procured with a simple experiment, though, 
to show / ••• 
,,, 
to show whether or not tonic effects of the kind demonstrated by Werner 
and Wapner do affect time judgement. If equidistant signals are 
presented at equal intervals of time, unilateral stimulation (by light, 
or faint shock, for example, or by body tilt) should produce a kappa 
effect, if this assumption is correct. The spatial equivalent of 
various kinds of stimulation could be found by this method. 
But for the moment, let us accept that the tonic effect of 
observed movement does occur. Then, we can draw up a model of the 
relations .of the processes entering into the perception and judgement 
of the time reiations. 
Model 2 
Reproduction of a spatially extended time signal. 
l3' 
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Extero = exteroceptively received movement-duration 
D = decoder of infonnation 
tI = cortical time process which initiates pure stimulus act, Rs. 
Rs = pure stimulus act which leads to illusion 
t2 = acceptor cortical time process, result of pure stimulus act. 
t3 = accepted cortical time process, produced by R. 
R = supraliminal response (pressing key, adjusting time interval, etc.) 
Intero = interoceptive information about duration of the response. 
The main / ••• 
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The main way in which this model differs from the previous 
one is ·:that the acceptor cortical time process is assumed to be altered 
by the pure stimulus act of the subject in response to his perception 
of motion. The acceptor process is t2 instead of tr, as in the previous 
model, because there are in fact two responses instead of one. One of 
the responses (Rs) occurs .~.subliminally, and is not allowed for by the 
subject. 
These models are intended to serve as vehicles of communication 
for the relations involved in abstracting time interval from motion 
under two conditions. They merely help to define these relations and 
prevent ambiguity. If they do that much, they serve their function. 
To summarise: in Model I the subject is the destination of 
information leading to process tI and the destination-source of the 
information leading to t2, the process accepted by t!; and in Model 2 
the subject is the destination of the information leading to processes 
tI and t2, and the destination-source of the information for t3, the 
process accepted by t2. We may treat the subject as the destination 
for information leading to t2 until he becomes aware of the illusion 
and adopts a critical attitude, as Abbe remarked. Until that happens, 
the interoceptive information from the pure stimulus act, Rs, and the 
exteroceptive information from the sight of the stimuli, are both 
external to the judging subject. Once the subject adopts a critical 
attitude, something like a gating or inhibition of the interoceptive 
input may occur. By now, the ability of the central nervous system 
to shut out e~~e~He~ stimulation is well established. 
7.5 SUMil'IARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
.~!!'~ Controlled-movement, free-movement, and stationary reproduction 
by key-pressing and grip are compared, using data from Experiments 2 and 
3. It is found that the linear movement reproductions do not differ from 
each other, but that both differ from reproduction by key-pressing and 
gripping a stationary handle. Reproductions by linear movement are 
less accurate and have a wider distribution than reproductions which 
do not / ••• 
do not require linear movement. The exteroceptive spatial effects 
on time judgement (kappa effect, suto effect) are reversed when the 
subject makes the movement himself. This is explained by the 
hypothesis that the exteroceptive effects are secondary, and depend 
on the assumption of a constant rate of movement. When the subject 
is able to maintain a constant rate of movement, or to analyse any 
changes which occur, as in making the motion himself, these spatial 
effects on time judgement do not occur. Two models of the 
relations involved are presented to clarify the assumptions involved. 
PART III 
DELAYED REPRODUCTION OF TD1E 
If the hypothesis is advanced that time reproduced reflects the 
strength of a cortical trace produced by a time signal, then 
delayed reproduction of time might be expected to indicate what 
changes occur in that trace. Various trace theories, and the 
validity of the hypothesis, are considered in Chapter 8. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE EFFECT OF DELAY ON 
THE REPRODUCTION OF SHORT TIME INTERVALS 
8.1 Introduction 
In the study of memory, one of the main problems is the 
way in which brief neural processes are converted into structures 
of greater persistence. The distinction between primary, elementary, 
or immediate memory, as it has variously been called, and secondary 
memory is an old one. Jam.es (1890) distinguishes between "elementary 
habit" - the phase before the initiating processes in the nerve tissue 
have died away - and "memory" - a revival of the initiating processes, 
or of some representative. There are a number of theories of memory. 
In the course of the next few pages some of them will be reviewed 
before we proceed to examine the effect of brief periods of delay on 
the reproduction of short time intervals. 
8.2 The Gestalt Theory of Memory 
Koffka (1935) distinguishes between the stimulus-excitation 
process and the trace, or residue. The trace, which is conceived of 
as a neurophysiological change, stores the remembered information. 
The trace theory, as a reference to Gomulicki's (1953) monograph shows, 
is an extremely old one in Psychology, and has, broadly speaking, two 
forms: the "wax tablet" and the "pathway". The "wax tablet" form 
conceived of the brain (or memory substance, in versions which precede 
the establishment of the brain as the locus of memory) as a material 
upon which experience makes its marks, writing as with a stylus upon 
the plastic material. This view has been adopted from Plato through 
Locke to William James. The "pathway" model of the memory trace 
views memory as a facilitation of existing neural pathways. This 
model depended on the development of neuro-anatomy in the 19th century 
and finds distinguished modern exponents, such as Hebb and Penfield. 
The Gestalt theorists have, in general, not been specific about the 
kind of / ••• 
kind of memory model to which they adhere. But they have advanced 
the important theory that the memory process is subject to the same 
dynamic influences as perception. The trace, according to Gestalt 
theorists, gradually becomes more symmetrical - it obeys the laws of 
pregnancy, closure and significance. 
The information whichtthe stimulus-excitation process makes 
available to the individual is then stored, according to Koffka, in a 
different place. The reason for separating the stimulus-excitation 
and the retention process in space is to explain the difference between 
remembering an object and recognising it, or comparing an object with 
something previously seen and remembered. A spatial interval in the 
x cortex represents a temporal interval. Comparisons of p~rsently 
perceived objects with remembered objects must be by means of selective 
communication between the stimulus-excitation process and the trace. 
The form which this selective communication takes is more explicitly 
stated than the manner in which it functions. It takes the form of a 
field-excitation which covers the spatial interval between the process 
and the trace, but the way in which this field selectively communicates 
is not clear. 
We may. interpolate some evidence which will be fitted more 
exactly into the account in a later section . evidence from neuro-. 
surgery supports the view that immediate processes and traces of more 
distant memories are spatially s~parated in the brain (e.g. Penfield, 1959). 
Kohler (1923), on the basis of experimental work on ~egative 
and positive time order, proposed that the immed~ate stimulus-excitation 
process increases up to about three seconds, and then declines. Fraisse 
(1959), on the evidence that EEG traces of cortical excitement persist 
for 60c.s. after stimulation with light, believes that the initial 
excitation of perception lasts a much shorter time. The evidence of 
the psychophysical refractory period also supports a time interval of 
this length. It may be that there are at least three phases to be 
distinguished in memory perception, j_mmediate memory, and long-term 
memory. Information may be lost during each of these stages, but 
probably the greatest loss occurs during perception. 
The main / ••• 
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The main causes of the loss of information which occurs 
during retention are, according to Koffka, the dynamic processes which 
improve the "goodness" of the trace. Since the original percept is 
very rarely perfectly organised, these dynamic processes cause a loss 
in detail to occur. 
No particular curve of forgetting can be deduced from the 
Gestalt theory of memory. Traces may be confirmed or consolidated; 
they may be available with varying degrees of readiness, and they may 
alter according to the dynamic field laws mentioned above, We may 
deduce from the theory the fact that a trace may alter, but not that 
it can disappear. This seems to be substantially correct. 
8.3 The Effect of Satiation on the Trace. 
Satiation effects last a fairly short time, so that it is 
possible that they affect the stimulus-excitation process of the 
original percept rather than the long-term trace, or residue of 
that percept. The .time-relations of the various processes are not 
very clear. Vernon (1934) found that visual after-effects lasted up 
to 5 minutes after an inspection period of 10 minutes. Hammer (1949) 
found that satiation was at a maximum after 1 minvte inspection, and 
declined to zero with 90 seconds' delay. The exact time which satia-
tion effects last is clearly a matter of minutes. Satiation effects 
are, therefore, only important in immediate comparison,. 
Auditory after-effects as well as visual after-effects have 
been demonstrated. Deutsch (1951) has shown that listening to a 
prolonged tone increases the tonal interval between neighbouring tones. 
~. Christma~ (1954) found the same effect. Satiation with a standard 
pure tone lasting one minute could shift the pitch of test tones away 
from the standard. He found that the magnitude of the effect varied 
positively with the duration of the tone and inversely with the time 
between satiation and test. Krauskopf (1954) comes to the conclusion 
that figural after-effects represent a general characteristic of place-
systems, since Kohler and Wallach have demonstrated displacement in 
vision, Kohler/ ••• 
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vision, Kohler and Dinnerstein in kinesthesis, Deutsch and Christman 
in pitch localisation, and Krauskopf in auditory place localisation. 
Kohler's (1940) primary postulate is that a percept is a 
dynamic process which tends more and more to block its own way. The 
word "satiation" was used (Kohler and Wallach, 1944) to describe the 
alteration in the brain medium brought about by the prolonged presence 
of a given figure in a particular cortical area. Figural after-effect 
is a result of this alteration in the brain medium. Continued presence 
of figural currents creates an area of impedance which makes the contours 
of subsequently inspected figures recede. Changes may occur in size, 
luminosity, depth, and displacement of test figures. Cross-modal 
satiation effects have been found (Jaffe, 1956). Large and SID?-11 
strips of paper were presented for visual inspection before kinaesthetic 
judgement of a standard bar of aluminium. The kinaesthetic standard 
appears to increase in width after visual fixation of the narrow strip, 
and to decrease after inspection of a wide strip. These res.ults 
cannot be explained by a theory, such as that of Kohler, which posits 
a spatial relationship between the inspection and test figure as the 
basis of figural after-effect. 
An attempt to test the field ·theory was made by laying strips 
of gold foil under the dura mater of the visual area, and by inserting 
pins of gold foi~o~chi'nfs ,the pia mater. The experimental subjects ? 
were two rhesus monkeys (Lashley and others, 1951). The pins and the 
gold foil were intended to short-circuit the field, The animals were 
then tested on visual discrimination problems which they had mastered 
before the operation. Both animals performed normally. The con-
x clusion,.is that a corl:ical field process cannot account for perception 
of visual figures. That means also, of course, that a cortical field 
theory cannot account for figural after-effects. In the same paper, 
Lashley, Chow and Semmes make a further criticism of the cortical 
field theory which is difficult to refute. Kohler and Wallach 
dealt with the discrepancies between retinal distribution and cortical 
representation in their theory of permanent satiation by positlilng that 
the distance between contours of fields will be smaller in cortical 
regions which/ ••• 
regions which represent related portions of the retina on a smaller 
scale than in those which represent relate~ portions of the retina on 
a larger scale. Consequently, given a uniform density of contour on 
the retina, satiation will be greater as the scale of representation 
decreases. But the evidence suggests that 11 the number of excitations 
JU 
per unit time and cortical area is uniformn. Satiation must be evenly 
distributed in Area 17. In addition, there is the problem of the way 
in which currents spread selectively in both hemispheres. Kohler and 
Wallach suggested, tentatively, the possibility that the corpus 
callosum might form a highly conductive connexion, but Lashley points 
out that there is normal sensory integration in cases of congenital 
absence of the callosum. 
Furthermore, it has been generally assumed that a central 
process is responsible for after-effects, and this has been shown by 
the fact that they may be monocularly induced. But, McEwan (1958) 
shows that when the unused eye is covered with a black cup during the 
inspection period the after-image transferred to that eyt/D.ay be abs~nt. 
He concludes that peripheral effects may be more important than allowed 
for in the theory. 
Th~s review, though it shows that the explanation of after-
effects i.s not clear, does show that after-effects do occur, and may 
effect judgements following soon after stimulation. For this reason, 
a knowledge of after-effects is relevant. A nwnber of further theories 
to account for after-effects will be dealt with in the section below (8.4) 
and in the next chapter. 
8.4 Excitation-Inhibition and After Effects 
The view that inhibition (subsuming the processes of reactive 
inhibition, basal cortical inhibition and satiation) may explain after-
effects has been adopted and developed by Eysenck (e.g. Eysenck 1956, 
1957). The concept of inhibition was used by Pavlov (1955) first to 
explain reductions in conditioned response, and later to explain indivi-
dual differences between dogs. Pavlov distinguished between ex~ernal 
and internal inhibition. It is with the latter that we are concerned. 
He did 
He did not think that the loss of the conditioned response could be 
explained as merely the decline of a single process (excitation), 
because it would then be difficult to account for spontaneous recovery, 
or disinhibition. It seemed to him that the extinction of a response 
could only be described as an active process. He postulated that every 
stimulus produces both an excitatory process and an inhibitory process, 
but that the inhibitory process decays faster than the excitatory. 
If this were not so, no learning could occur. Later, Pavlov used 
this balance of excitation and inhibition to account for individual 
differences in dogs and in humans. He noticed that some dogs are easy 
to condition, but extinguish slowly. Others condition slowly and 
extinguish rapidly. Again, others condition and extinguish rapidly; 
or they might condition slowly and extinguish slowly. Differences in 
the ratios of the strengths of excitation and inhibition might explain 
these observations. 
Hull (1943) elaborated on Pavlov's construct of inhibition 
by distinguishing conditioned inhibition (sir) and reactive inhibition 
(Ir). The former might be characterised as the habit of ceasing to 
respond (Reid, 1960), and the latter is the decrement in performance 
which follows repeated exercise, generally of a motor activity. 
Eysenck (1955) has related different concepts of inhibition. In his 
view reactive inhibition (generally motor) and satiation (perceptual) 
are the result of the same central nervous process. Conditioned 
inhibition remains a habit, distinct from those inhibitory processes, 
such as reactive inhibitions and satiation, which decline rapidly during 
rest. But subjects who develop reactive inhibi]ion more strongly 
will, since it functions as a drive, also develop conditioned inhibition 
more rapidly. Duncan (1956) who supports Eysenck's view that reactive 
inhibition and satiation are identical, has listed six similarities 
between the two processes. These are that (i) both result from 
afferent stimulation; (ii) the locus of both is central; 
(iii) both distort behaviour away from some standard; 
(iv) such information as there is suggests that both appear after 
as little as 5 to 10 seconds; 
( v) with / ••• 
(v) with continuous stimulation both seem to develop quickly to a 
maximum beyond which additional stimulation does not produce further 
distortion; and (vi) both decrease rapidly after stimulation ceases. 
All that remained to be done was to show that satiation and 
reactive inhibition are the same process, by means of experiment. 
The first question is whether individuals who develop satiation rapidly 
in one sensory modality necessarily satiate rapidly in another modality, 
as is implied. Before we can link two processes, we need to be sure 
that each of these two processes is in fact one process. The work of 
Rodger and McEwan (1960) suggests that there is no single process of 
satiation to cover kinaesthetic after-effects and visual after-effects. 
The work of Becker (1960) shows that satiation and reactive inhibition 
cannot be attributed to the same central process. Both of these 
experiments will be described in more detail in Chapter 9. 
From this we may conclude that inhibitory (satiation) effects 
may occur in perceptual tasks in various sensory modalities, but that 
the theoretical attempts to explain these effects are not sufficient. 
The possibility of a satiation effect in short-delay perceptual tasks 
must still be taken into account. 
8.5 Piaget's Theory of Transports 
Another attempt to explain the effects of a short period of 
delay on jydgements is Piaget's Theory of Transports. When the length 
or the height of some visually presented stimulus has to be compared to 
a previously inspected equal standard, it is thought to be less than the 
standard when distance separating the two is large, and more than the 
standard when the distance separating the two is small (Vurpillot, 1959). 
There are great individual variations, but the data are not statistically 
treated. When two elements are to be compared which are separated too 
far to be seen in a single fixation, it is necessary to transport the 
one element to the other. The element transported enjoys a privileged 
centration. It is usually the standard and not the comparison which is 
transported, and which is, therefore, seen as larger. When the distance 
between the standard and the comparison is small, the two are seen in a 
single centration/ ••• 
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single centration, but the comparison will be more fixated, because 
it is the unknown. The further the distance between the initial and 
the terminal fixation, the stronger the effect of enlargement of the 
standard, initially fixated. One explanation which has been advanced 
is that the focussing of attention leads to an increase in the intensity 
of excitation and an extension of the area involved. 
If the most general explanation of the law of relative 
centrations is accepted, as stated in the last sentence above, then 
it is clear th9.t it could apply to the judgement of time at short 
intervals of delay. As the delay is increased, the fixation of the 
original signal leads to an increase in the intensity of excitation 
corresponding to it. 
of time reproduced. 
This should lead to an increase in the amount 
The theory may be criticised for the lack of statistical 
treatment of the data, which makes it impossible to assess how con-
sistently the effects of transport on judgement occur. 
8.6 Circuit Theories of Memo;:ry 
Lorente de No's (1938) discovery that internuncial neurons 
are arranged in multiple or in closed chains which are capable of 
maintaining activity independently of stimulus-input for an indefinite 
period is' of great importance to any theory of memory. These 
circuits have been used by Hebb (1949) as carriers of brief memory 
traces until neurophysiological growth changes can occur which fonn 
permanent memory paths. The length of time for which traces can be 
carried in closed reverberatory circuits and the time which it m:Lght 
take for growth changes responsible for permanent memory are unknown. 
It may be that we should distinguish three and not two memory processes. 
The first may correspond to the indifference interval (possibly given 
by the length which the perceptual process is supposed to last, 
according to Fraisse, 1959). The second may correspond to the 
X ·11 sp~cious present 11 (possibly given by the length of time which the 
perceived data reverberates in the circuits unless reinforced). The 
third may correspond to the past (given by the commencement of the 
process of permanent recording, either by molecular change or by pathway 
change). 
. The view / ••• 
The view that memory traces might be recorded by protein 
molecular changes in the neurones of the brain was apparently first 
''" 
put forward by Manne (1949). Gaito (1961) suggests that nerve activity 
results in the rearrangement of monomers of high molecular weight 
polymers in the brain cells, or in the synthesis of additional, novel 
polymers, and that these code memory traces. Briggs and Kitto (1962) 
vigorously criticise this hypothesis on the grounds that DNA molecules 
are very stable and replicate only during cell division, when they are 
formed on the template of other DNA molecules. There is no known way 
in which nerve action co~ld affect DNA production. Only by the 
production of mutagens in the brain (which would be disastrous) could 
nerve action affect brain nucleic acid. Briggs and Kitto propose that 
memory is basically dependent on neuron •. pathways maintained by high 
levels of transmitter substances due to induced biosynthetic enzymes. 
They argue that all somatic cells contain the same genes, but do not 
produce the sam~ enzymes. One of the factors is probably the presense 
or absence of the enzyme substrate. Repeated nerve action could 
produce a concentration of transmitter (acetylcholine) substrate in 
an axon at a synapse, and a rise in the level of transmitter substance 
produced. The greater concentration of choline esterase (which 
removes acetylcholine) with age, strain, learning and increased 
stimulation could be the result of this. 
This view tallies well with the operation of. frequency in 
building up pathways and also accounts for the decline of a trace with 
disuse (since the concentration of transmitter substrate could be 
expected to diminish), but it does not account for sudden, vividly 
retained memories. One might use it in conjunction with 
Gomulicki 1 s (1953) theory that there is a thalamocortical system which 
sustains certain privileged traces (more 11interesting" traces) by 
boosting their activity. This repetition of the pathway by a boosted 
recurrent circuit until it is consolidated might ensure that 
exceptional events are remembered without external repetition. 
Alternatively, I should like to propose, it might equally well be 
supposed that recurrent circuits will automatically carry perceived 
stimuli until/ ••• 
stimuli until they are cleared by the thalamocortical.system. But 
either of these views would account for the repeated firing of a nerve 
pathway by a stimulus which occurs only once. 
Though the discovery of recurrent circuits in nerve action 
has enabled the psychologist to form many hypotheses not possible with 
the linear connexion model, there is still considerable doubt about 
the extent of the role which they play in memory. As the immediately 
preceding paragraph has shown, one doubt is the extent to which 
recurrent circuits are autonomous, and the extent to which they have 
to be boosted to maintain memory. But, as Northrop (1948) has shown, 
111 
a circuit theory of neural action enables the psychologist to see how 
the form of an event may be retained without referring to the particular 
manner or moment of arousal. Memory as a whole may be visualised as a 
system of "cycles and subcycles at various orders of elaboration" 
(F.H. Allport, 1955, p. 647). These cycles and subcycles are 
thought by Allport to be dynamically tending towards closure in a 
manner biased by the behavioural situation of external and internal 
conditions. Certain cycles of this system could be thought of as 
having a higher concentration of transmitter substrate and being, 
therefore, more easily aroused. 
Long-term forgetting might be a result of a gradual decline 
in the concentration of transmitter substrate; short-term forgetting 
might be a decrease in the firing of a recurrent circuit. There is 
no certainty at all on this point. We cannot know how we forget 
until we know how we remember. 
8.7 Perseveration Theories 
The discussion of perseveration theories of memory follows 
naturally after the discussion of reverberating circuits, which may 
be the mechanism of perseveration. Perseveration theories are 
historically older than circuit theories, since one of the first 
X dates from 1900, when MUller and Pilzecker, propounded their theory. 
The view that reverberating circuits play an important part in the 
consolidation of memory traces has been advanced by Hebb (1949), 
Yo1mg (1953) and Gerard (1955), who propose that these circuits 
maintain the / ••• 
maintain the memory until permanent recording has occurred. Support 
for this view is found in the work of Burns (1954, 1958), who has 
shown that isolated areas of cortex, as long as the blood supply is 
maintained, can continue with electrical activity, initiated by a 
single train of impulses, for 30 minutes or more. The activity seems 
to become easier to evoke with repeated stimulation. Burns (1958) 
rejects the activity of these preparations as a general model for 
memory because the activity is too susceptible to external interference. 
Yet, as Glickman (1961) pointed ou~, it is this very susceptibility that 
has formed one of the main bodies of evidence for perseveration theory. 
It. has been found that electrical shock, or trauma, or the 
~ initiation of other activity immediately after learning~causes a complete 
or considerable loss of learning. It has been proposed that this is 
because perseverative traces have been eliminated before they can be 
transferred to a more persistent record. As an example of this inter-
ference, we may quote the evidence of retroactive amnesia. Russell and 
Nathan (1946) have found that among 1,029 cases of head injury, only 
133 experienced no retroactive amnesia. .Amnesia for events up to 30 
minutes before injury was reported by 707 cases; amnesia for more 
than thirty minutes was reported by 133 cases; and for 56 cases there 
were no data. Barbiturate hJFlnosis reduced the period of amnesia ip. 
only 6 out of 40 cases studied. Therefore, hysterical repression 
does not appear to account for the results. The authors suggest 
interference with a perseverative process as a possible explanation. 
There is also a fairly large amount of evidence to show that 
ECS after learning a response produces a loss of that response. The 
study by Duncan (1949) in which shock was administered between 20 seconds 
x and 14 hours .. after learning, shows that the amount of loss in performance 
decreases as the ECS is more delayed after the learning trial. Decrement 
plotted against delay of ECS yields a negatively accelerated curve. 
This finding has been confirmed (Thompson, 1958). It may be objected 
that decrement is a result of avoidance conditioning, but it would be 
difficult to explain the effect of long-delayed shock in this way. 
Thompson has reported single-trial attenuation effects even with ECS 
delayed up to 60 minutes. Gerard (1955) has found that lowering body 
temperature / ••• 
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temperature increases the period during which ECS may produce decrement. 
Cool hamsters, according to Gerard, show asgreat a disruption of a learnt 
response when ECS is delayed one hour as warm hamsters do when ECS is 
delayed only 15 minutes. EEG records show that brain processes are 
slowed down when body temperature is lowered. 
There is evidence that separate parts of the brain act in 
long-term and short-term memory. The hippocampal zone of the brain 
underlying the temporal cortex is essential in recent memories, but 
not in distant memories (Penfield, 1955). The locus of permanent 
memories is not known. 
From this review, it appears that the perseverative theory 
of memory has some evidence to support it. The physiological 
hypothesis that reverberatory circuits may carry perseverating 
processes is not implausible. 
8.8 Summary of the Effects of Delay 
Various theories do not agree on what happens to the trace 
with the passage of time. Some theories hold that the trace is permanent, 
and some that it decays. If we examine the various views outlined above 
to discover what sort of effect delay might have on a trace, we see that 
there are differences. 
According to Kohler, the stimulus-excitation process increases 
for about three seconds and then declines. With an increasing length of 
stimulation, there would be an increasing satiation, impeding the process 
aroused by stimulation. We could, therefore, expect a decline in the 
strength of the trace with increased stimulation. For all signal 
lengths above three seconds (to be on the safe side) we should expect 
level of reproduction to be lower when response is immediate than when 
it is delayed. The longer the signal, the more persistent the satiation 
effect might be expected to be. Obviously, if we preferred to use the 
term "inhibition" instead of 11 ~atiation", it would not change our 
account of the immediate effects. 
According to Piaget's Theory of Transports, the greater the 
length of / ••• 
length of time separating the standard from the comparison, the 
more it should increase subjectively. It is possible that this 
increase would be reflected in a higher reproduction score, where 
the subject has to judge a time interval. Therefore, the same 
prediction may be made from this theory as from the Gestalt theory. 
~ By a circuit theory we should expect either a constant 
level of reproduction or a decline, depending on the time it takes 
for the circuit to reduce activity. But, according to perseveration 
theory there should be an increase in response as the memory trace is 
consolidated (Muller and Pilzecker, 1900). This is difficult to 
explain purely by circuit theory, unless one assumes that a circuit 
will involve more and more neurones as it continues to act, or that 
traces carried by the circuits are not as readily available as traces 
' 
x permanently stored, or that continued action facilitates transmission 
>< across synaPses and enlarges the trace. 
With the exception of pure circuit theory, therefore, all 
the theories predict a rise in the level of response with short 
periods of delay. It would be important to add evidence in support 
of one or other of these groups of theories by experiment. 
8.9 Reproduction of Time and Memory 
Reproduction of time signals of various lengths under 
various conditions of delay might be an accurate way of studying 
immediate memory. 
Marianne Frankenhaeuser (1959) has conducted a number of 
experiments linking judgement of time and memory. She has shown 
that the retention quotient of estimate of past time over present-
time estimate is less than unity, which would be expected in terms 
of a fading trace theory. In her experiments, subjects were asked 
to move a strip with randomised digits at a rate of one per second, 
reading the numbers aloud to prevent counting. The number of digits 
read within a given time gave the present-time estimate. Subjects 
were then asked to estimate the length of time elapsed. This gave 
the past-time estimate. An obvious flaw in this experiment is that 
two different/ ••• 
two different methods of judgement are used. We have shown at 
length that different methods of time judgement do not yield results 
which can be readily converted into each other. 
Another fact which has to be remembered is that, generally, 
in memory experiments, content has to be correctly remembered. In 
time judgements, it is quantity that has to be remembered. The 
accuracy of reproduction may give a better index of the strength of 
the trace than the length of the estimate. 
Frankenhaeuser has also shown that time judgements shortened 
under barbiturates and lengthened under metamphetamine and caffeine, 
which affect memory in opposite ways. Barbiturates decrease memory 
and metamphetamine and caffeine increase memory. Her prediction 
/If 
that decreased memory is associated with a lower time judgement is met. 
A reason for using reproduction of time as a measure of the 
strength of the stimulus-interval trace is that very fine distinctions 
may be recorded by the subject. The method seems suited to reflect 
rather sensitively any changes in the trace. 
For this reason it was decided to essay a measurement of 
the strength of the trace by reproduction of time signals of various 
length after various intervals of delay. By using one method only -
the method of reproduction - a more accurate check on Frankenhaeuser's 
hypothesis could be made. It will be noticed that FrankenB.aeuser's 
results show that the trace fades - if we can accept her result as 
being an accurate reflection of trace strength. This is contrary to 
what we should expect in tenns of satiation theory, the transport 
theory, and perseveration theory. In terms of recurrent circuit 
theory we should expect a constant level of activity to be maintained 
for a long period. The interesting results obtained by Frankenhaeuser 
seem to be contrary to what most theories predict, at least for short 
periods. In tenns of gestalt theory, circuit theory, and perseveration 
theory, there may be a decline in the long-tenn strength or 
availability of the trace, but this should not occur in measurements 
of immediate recall. 
8.10 Experimental / ••• 
8. 10 Experimental Measurement of Reproduction of Time After Delay 
The experiment was undertaken to ascertain whether the trace 
left by the stimulus-interval does, in fact, decline with very short 
periods of delay. One method, the method of reproduction, was used 
throughout because of the difficulty of converting one form of time 
judgement into another. 
8. 10. 1 Experiment 
The first-session data of Experiment 2, described in detail 
in Chapter 3, were used. Briefly, 77 men and women reproduced each 
signal twice by the method of linear movement in the first session. 
The signals were 1 sec., 2 sec., 4 sec., 8 sec. and 16 sec., and were 
presented to alternate subjects in ascending or in descending order. 
Firstly, each subject reproduced all the signals immediately. 
Secondly, each subject reproduced each signal after a short delay, 
according to the delay group into which he fell. There were 7 delay 
groups (o sec., 5 sec., 10 sec., 15 sec., 20 sec., 30 sec., and 60 sec.), 
each consisting of 11 subjects. Each subject fell into one delay group 
only, and did not reproduce the time interval at other periods of delay. 
The average score of each delay group could therefore be compared with 
the average scores of all the other groups under delay, as well as with 
its own immediate reproduction average. In all cases, it could be 
assumed that the serial position effects would be the same. 
For reproduction of time interval after delay, the experimenter 
gave a vocal signal that the period of delay had elapsed and that the 
subject should commence his reproduction. 
To make absolutely sure that the grouping of the subjects 
is clear, a table of allocation is given below. 
Table 32 / ••• 
TABLE 32 
Allocation of subjects in the first session of Experiment 2. All 
groups consist of 11 subjects. 
Group Delay of first set Delay of second set of reproductions of reproductions 
I 0 sec 0 sec. 
II 0 sec. 5 sec. 
III 0 sec. 10 sec. 
IV 0 sec. 15 sec. 
v 0 sec. 20 sec. 
VI 0 sec. 30 sec. 
VII 0 sec. 60 sec. 
e. lo. 2 Results:- Effects of Delay on Reproduction 
The full reproduction scores in seconds are listed in 
Appendix B, Tables VIII to XII. Intra-individual ratios of delayed 
reproduction score over immediate reproduction score were also calculated 
and are listed in Tables XLV to XLIX. By means of the raw scores, one 
delay group could be compared to another without taking into account very 
I large deviations in reproduction time. But,since 1 the groups were small, 
it was felt advisable to eliminate very large individual differences. 
This was done by the ratio scores. . Both sets of scores were used in 
comparing different delay groups. 
The mean reproduction time at each length of si&nal against 
each interval of delay is shown below in the text Table 33. 
TABLE 33 
Mean time (in seconds) reproduced at each interval of delay 
and length of signal in Experiment 2 
Signal 
Delay (seconds) 
(in seconds) 0 5 10 15 20 30 60 
1.0 0.99 0.90 1.04 0.96 1.19 1.20 1.24 
2.0 1.86 1.52 1.77 1.78 2.43 2.05 2.28 
4.0 3.32 2.63 3.11 3.24 3.82 3.25 3.32 
s.o 6.46 4.67 5.75 5. 72 '1.09 5.89 6.30 
16.0 13.05 s.90 12.12 12.23 13.66 12.24 12.74 









An inspection of this table does not show any trend, but an 
analysis of variance was made to eliminate all doubt. The method for 
discovering any significant trend is that of Lindquist (1947). The 
results of this analysis are shown below. 
TABLE 34 








Sum of squares 
among groups 1.15 
within groups 1.38 
among groups 6.71 
within groups 25.70 
among groups 8.11 
within groups 67.91 
among groups 37.46 
within groups 255.04 
among groups 154.29 
within groups 1051.82 
+ significant at 5% level 











The only significant trend is at 2 seconds. If we examine 
the scores in Table 33 we see that there is a bowed curve, reaching a 
minimum at 5 sec. delay and a maximum at 60 seconds' delay. This 
appears to be a common trend among the scores, though reproduction of 
2 seconds is the only one with an overall significant trend. But we 
are interested in the details of the curve as well as in the overall 
trend. It is possible that there might be parts of the retention 
curve which are significantly different from other parts without there 
being an overall trend of significance. For·ithis reason, t tests of 
the significance of the differences among all the means at each signal 
length in Table 33 were calculated. By inspection of the means in 
Table 33 we can see that in every instance the mean reproduction time 
at 5 seconds delay is lower than at any other delay. The results of 
the t tests show that reproduction of time at 5 sec. delay is less 
than at 60 sec. delay for all signal lengths except 4 sec. (1 sec., 
p(.05; 2 sec. p(.01; 8 sec. p(.05; 16 sec. p<.05) and less than at 
20 sec. delay for all signal lengths except 1 sec. (2 sec. p(.01; 
4 sec. p(.05; 8 sec. p(.01; 16 sec. p(.01). Reproduction of time 
intervals at / .•• 
111 
11? 
intervals at the trough, which occurs at 5 seconds' delay, is generally 
significantly different from reproduction of time at the peak, which 
occurs at 20 or 60 seconds' delay. 
A convenient way of showing up the bowed curve is to express 
all the means as quotients of the mean at zero delay. That is, all 
the means in Table 36 a.re simply expressed as quotients of the first 
(0 delay) column in the same Table. The results of this are shown 
below. 
TABLE 35 
Means of reproduced time expressed as ratios of the mean reproduction 
time at zero delay. 
Signal Delay in Seconds 
0 5 10 15 20 30 60 
1 sec. 1.00 0.91 1.05 0.97 1.20 1.21 1.25 
2 sec. 1.00 0.82 0.95 0.96 1.31 1.10 1.23 
4 sec. 1.00 0.79 0.94 0.98 1.05 0.96 1.00 
8 sec. 1.00 0.72 0.89 0.89 1.10 0.91 0.98 
16 sec. 1.00 0.68 0.93 0.94 1.05 0.94 0.98 
Means 1.00 0.78 0.95 0.95 1.14 1.02 1.09 
This brings out very clearly the minimum reproduction at 
5 sec. delay rising to a maximum at about 20 seconds. 
But though these figures suggest a bowed curve with a 
minimum at 5 seconds' delay rising to a maximum at 20-60 seconds' 
delay, they do not establish that there is such a curve. All the 
differences may be due to the presence in these groups of high or 
low reproducers of time intervals. One or two such individuals might, 
where such small groups are used, shift the mean significantly, 
" regardless of the delay effect. For this reason, the individual 
delay scores were divided by the immediate reproduction scores. 
These were then totalled, and the means are shown below. It must 




Means of delayed reproduction scores expressed as quotients of 
immediate reproduction scores at each interval of delay and length of signal. 
Signal Delay in seconds 
0 5 10 15 20 30 60 
1 sec. 1.08 l.25 1.15 .. 0.98 l.22 l.20 1.38 
2 sec. 0.93 0.86 0.98 0.99 l.07 0.95 1.40 
4 sec. 0.92 0.93 0.99. 0.95 0.95 0.93 1.03 
8 sec. 1.01 0.79 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.94 1.15 
16 sec. 1.16 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.08 1.24 
Average. 1.02 1.96 1.00 0.95 1.02 1.00 1.24 
An inspection of these results does not appear to add much 
weight to our hypothesis that there is a bowed curve in the delayed 
reproduction scores. They were, nevertheless, subjected to analysis 
of variance to see whether any overall trends of significance could 
be found. The results of the analysis are shown below. 
TABLE 37 
Analysis of variance of delay quotients in Experiment 2. 
Signal Sum of squares d.f •. F ratio 
1 sec. among groups 0.94 6 
within groups 17.45 70 0.63 
2 sec. among groups 2.1 6 
within groups 14.7 70 1.67 
4 sec. among groups .04 6 
within groups 5.27 70 o.oo 
8 sec. among groups 1.02 6 
within groups 6.05 70 1.97 
16 sec. among groups 1.00 6 
within groups 7.23 70 1.62 
None of the trends is significant. Furthermore, examination 
of Table 36 shows that the maxima and the minima are hot consistently 
placed, though on the average the minimum is still at 5 seconds' 
delay and the maximllin is at 60 seconds~ delay. Calculation of t tests 
of the significance of the differences among all the means at each 
length of signal shows that at a delay of 5 seconds reproduction is 
significantly less than at a delay of 60 seconds when the length of 
signal is 2 seconds, 8 seconds and 16 seconds (p<.05). 
The evidence/ ••• 
The evidence favours the view that reproduction of time 
remains at a constant level with delays up to the limits of those 
studied in this experiment. The few significant differences would 
be a very slender foundation for the hypothesis that there is a bowed 
curve in the reproduction time, reaching a minimum at 5 - 15 seconds' 
delay. But acceptance of either of these possibilities means that 
our results are not in agreement with those of Frankenhaeuser. 
Possible explanations will be considered later in the present chapter. 
8. 10. 3 Results:- Effects of Delay on Accuracy. 
The amount of error in the reproduction score was taken as 
an index of accuracy. All errors were converted to proportions of 
the total time signal, so that they would be easily comparable, 
irrespective of signal length. The full scores for proportion of 
error in linear movement reproduction are listed in Appendix B, 
Tables L to LIV. The mean proportion of error at each length of 
signal and interval of delay is shown in the test below. 
TABLE 38 
The mean proportion of error at each length of signal and interval 
of delay in Experiment 2. 
Signal Delay in Seconds 
0 5 10 15 ~o 30 60 
1 sec. .26 .23 .23 .29 .48 .42 .33 
2 sec. .17 .25 .17 .29 .32 .34 .26 
4 sec. .18 .33 .24 .22 .17 .29 .28 
8 sec. .21 .42 .28 .31 .20 .30 .23 
16 sec. .18 .45 .28 .26 .22 .34 .20 
Mean .20 .33 .24 .27 .28 .34 .26 
The maxima and minima of error are not to be found with 
great regularity at any particular delay interval. The maximum 
error in reproducing 1 second occurs at 20 seconds' delay; 2 seconds 
occurs at 30 seconds' delay; and 4 seconds occurs at 5 seconds' delay; 
8 seconds occurs at 5 seconds' delay; and 16 seconds at 5 seconds' delay. 
The minimum error in reproducing 1 second occurs at 5-10 seconds' delay; 
2 seconds / ••• 
2 seconds at 0 seconds' delay; 4 seconds at 0 seconds' delay; 
8 seconds at 20 seconds' delay and 16 seconds at 0 seconds' delay. 
If one has to generalise, one should say that the minimum error 
appears to occur when reproduction is immediate, and maximum error 
when reproduction occurs after 5 seconds' delay. This is reflected 
in the means of the means, with the exception that at 3~ seconds' 
delay the proportion of error is as high as at 5 seconds' delay. 
An analysis of variance was conducted to discover whether there are 
any significant overall trends. The results are shown in Table 39. 
TABLE 39 
Variance of error in delayed reproduction of time intervals in 
Experiment 2. 
Simial s um of squares d f . . F ratio 
1 sec. among groups Q.47 6 
within groups 4.81 70 1.13 
2 sec. among groups 0.32 6 
within groups 2.73 70 1.36 
4 sec. among groups 0.23 6 
within groups 2.78 70 0.96 
8 sec. among groups 0.36' 6 
2.4+ within groups 1.77 70 
16 sec. among groups 0.542 6 
within groups 2.784 70 2.27+ 
+ significant at 5% 
There is a significant overall trend of error against delay 
K ir/reproducing both 8 and 16 seconds, both of which exhibit the hypothetical 
trend of minimum error at 0 delay and maximum error at 5 delay very 
strongly. If t tests of the significance of differences between 
particular delay groups are calculated, then the proportion of error 
in reproducing 8 seconds may be shown to be greater at 5 sec. than 
that at 0 sec. delay; 20 sec. delay; and 60 sec. delay (all at the 
5% level of confidence). The proportion of error in reproducing 16 
seconds may be shown to be greater at 5 sec. delay than at 0 sec., 
20 sec., 60 sec. delay (at the 5% level of confidence), and than at 
15 sec. delay (at the 1% level of confidence). 
The finding that error is minimal at 0 sec. delay is 
understandable. / ••• 
understandable. The finding that error is maximal at 5 seconds' delay 
agrees with satiation theory. A more complete discussion of all results 
will be conducted later in this chapter. 
8. 10. 4 .;...R...;..e...;..s..-u-.1...;..t_s_: - _ Ef_f_e_c __ t_s;.....;;o_f_D-'e_l""'a.,_y.......;;;.on=-S_p.._e.;..e.;..d"'"--'o""'f;;__;;,M.;..;o;..;v;..;em=e;.;:;n;....:..t 
All the scores for speed of linear ann reproductions are 
listed in Appendix B, Tables XXII to XXVI. The means were calculated 
for each length of signal and interval of delay and are shown below. 
TABLE 40 
Mean speed of linear arm movement in reproducing each length of signal 
at each interval of delay in Experiment 2 (scores in inches/second). 
Signal Delay in seconds 
0 5 10 15 20 30 60 
1 sec. 7.7 6.7 10.6 8.5 7.6 9.5 5.7 
2 sec. 8.4 7.4 10.5 8.7 7.5 9.7 7.0 
4 sec. 7.6 8.0 11.0 9.5 7.5 8.9 1.0 
' 
8 sec. 7.2 8.5 10.1 8.8 7.7 8.9 7.0 
16 sec. 7.6 8.1 11.1 9.3 6.7 8.4 7.7 
Mean 7.7 7.7 10.7 8.9 7.4 9.1 6.8 
The maximum speed in this table occurs consistently at 10 
seconds' delay and the minimum occurs consistently at 60 seconds' delay. 
An analysis of variance was computed to see whether any overall differences 
are significant. The source of variance in the table below, which 
summarises the results of the analysis, can only very rashly be said 
to be delay. A glance up each of the columns reminds us of the 
stability of speed, and of its resistance to extraneous influence. The 
t tests of the significance of differences among means show that only one 
difference (60 seconds' delay and 10 seconds' delay in reproducing 1 




Variance of speed in delayed reproduction of time intervals in 
Experiment 2. 
Signal Sum of squares d.f. F ratio 
1 sec. among groups 177.2 6 
within groups 2030.6 70 1.02 
2 sec. among groups 108.5 6 
within groups 2163.8 70 0.59 
4 sec. among groups 132.0 6 
within groups 2175.7 70 0.71 
8 sec. among groups 78.9 6 
within groups 1900.0 70 0.48 
16 sec. among groups 133.0 6 
within groups 1971. 0 70 0.79 
No significant overall tr~nds are found. 
A further 94alysis of the possible effect of delay on speed 
was attempted by calculating intra-subject quotients of delayed 
reproduction over immediate reproduction. These subject:quotients 
were calculated individually for each subject, using only his own 
scores. It was argued, as with the reproduction scores, that large 
individual differences might obscure any trends which might occur. 
A full list of the calculated ratios may be found in Appendix B, 
Tables LV to LIX. 
These quotients were summed and averaged for each length 
of signal against each interval of delay. The results are summarised 
in Table 42 below. 
TABLE 42 
Means of delayed speed scores expressed as ratios of immediate speed 
scores at each interval of delay and length of signal in Experiment 2. 
Signal Delay in seconds 
0 5 10 15 20 30 60 
1 sec. .91 .89 .99 .89 1.15 .77 171 
2 sec. 1.14 .97 1.05 1.05 1.01 1.00 0.80 
4 sec. 1.10 1.16 1.08 .94 1.08 .98 .98 
8 sec. 196 l.13 1.05 1.11 1.23 1.02 .82 
16 sec. 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.04 1.34 .93 .91 
Mean 1.04 
' 
1.04 1.05 1.01 1.16 0.94 0.84 These/ ••• 
These quotients show that maximum increase in speed with 
delay occurs three times at 20 seconds (signal lengths 1 sec., 8 sec., 
and 16 sec.), once at 0 delay (signal length 2 sec.) and once at 5 
seconds (signal length 4 seconds). The highest mean is at 20 seconds' 
delay. The lowest quotient is consistently at 60 seconds' delay. 
If t tests are calculated to see whether any of the . 
differences between groups are significant, then the groups showing 
the maximum quotient (the 20 seconds' delay group) may be shown to 
differ significantly from the minimum quotient group (the 60 seconds' 
delay group) when signal lengths are 1 second (p <·01), 8 seconds (p(' .01), 
and 16 seconds (p ~. 05). The only other significant differences are 
between the 20 seconds' delay group and the 30 seconds' delay group for 
signal lengths 1 sec (p<:' .05) and 16 sec. (p< .05). 
An analysis of variance was also calculated, to see if there 
were any overall trends, even though after the t tests there did not 
appear to be any possibility that significant overall trends could 
exist. The results of the analysis are shown below. 
TABLE 43 
Variance of speed quotients in Experiment 2. 
Signal Sum of squares d.f. F ratio 
1 sec. among groups 1.40 6 
within groups 9.17 70 1.78 
2 sec. among groups 0.74 6 
within groups 14.81 70 0.88 
4 sec. among groups· 1.47. 6 
within groups 10.33 70 1.66 
8 sec. among groups 1.16 6 
within groups 8.06 70 1.68 
16 sec. among groups 1.32 6 
within groups 15.43 70 1.00 
These calculations show that, as expected, there are no 
overall differences of statisticai s~gnificance among the groups. 
On the basis of our analysis of the speed data, it may be 
tentatively accepted that there is a slight decline in speed at 30 
to 60 I ... 
to 60 seconds' delay. Up to that stage, the quotients are almost 
identical. If one were to suppose that the speed of movement reflects, 
at least partially, the strength of the trace, then this would support 
a fading trace theory. But this is contradicted by both the error 
trend, which appears to be minimal at 60 seconds' delay and maximal at 
5 seconds' delay, and the trend of the actual level of reproduction, 
which is maximal at 60 seconds' delay and minimal at 5 seconds' delay. 
If one takes the error trend to be inversely related to the strength 
of the trace, and the reproduction level to be positively related to 
the strength of the trace, then both these trends point to the same 
thing. The trace is weakest at 5 seconds' delay, but then grows 
stronger. This is con~rary to the speed finding. We must conclude 
that the effect of delay on the speed of movement is not congruent with 
the effect of delay on reproduction of time signals and error in 
reproduction of time signals. Since there is considerable difficulty 
in interpreting the decline in speed at 30 seconds' and 60 seconds' 
delay, it will not be considered further. 
8. 10. 5 Discussion 
Whether we accept that there is a bowed curve in the 
reproduction scores, or whether we believe that the evidence for the 
curve is unsatisfactory and prefer to accept merely that there is no 
k decline,the results are not in agreement with those obtained by 
Frankenhaeuser and do not support a fading trace theory of immediate 
memory. 
The evidence that there is a bowed curve with a minimum at 
from 5 to 15 seconds' delay consists of both the raw scores and the 
quotients of delayed reproduction scores over immediate reproduction 
scores. The objection that might be raised against the raw scores -
that the groups are small and that differences might be accounted for 
by sampling errors - can hardly be raised against the quotients, 
considered as evidence for the curve. But in both cases the tendency 
is slight only, and no statistically significant overall trends are 
discovered, except in the raw scores for reproduction of 2 seconds, 
where the / ••• 
11/.'7 
where the F ratio of 3.05 is significant at the 5% level. 
The evidence of error in delayed reproduction is congruent 
with the other evidence for a bowed curve. Maximum error is found 
to occur rather consistently at 5 seconds and minimum error at 0 
seconds. The error at the terminal delay periods studied is less 
than the error at 5 seconds' delay which would be expected if the 
trace is, for some reason, weakest at 5 seconds' delay. The overall 
trend for error is found to be statistically significant at 8 seconds' 
and 16 seconds' signal length. 
Nevertheless, both time reproduction and error in time 
reproduction do not show smooth curves when plotted against delay. 
The curves are so irregular that it is difficult to interpret them in 
a psychologically significant way. For this reason it seems best to 
accept that the figures provide us with evidence that reproduction of 
time and error do not decline within the short period of delay studied, 
but to avoid the hypothesis that there is a bowed curve until more 
satisfactory evidence can be produced. 
In tenns of theory, the bowed curve is also difficult to 
explain. This is not to say that data should be adapted to the con-
venience of existing theory, ·but that data ought to be fairly definite 
before we use them to contradict theory. Satiation effects cannot, 
for example, be used to explain the bowed curve. Satiation effects 
could be invoked as an explanation only if there were a constant rise 
l 
~ in the level of reproduction ~t a constant decline in the level of error, 
within the period of delay in our observation. Then, we should be able 
to maintain that the original trace was impeded immediately after 
stimulation' but that it recovered as time elapsed after the stimulus 
was removed. The same sort of explanation might be made in terms of 
the constructs of excitation and inhibition (this goes back to Pavlov 
and has been maintained in detail by Eysenck (1956, 1957)). It is 
also expected that the inhibi~ory effect will be greatest immediately 
after stimulation. Therefore, the sort of curve expected would be a 
steady rise in the strength of the response. The Theory of Transports, 
if applicable, / •.• 
if applicable, would lead us to expect a steady rise as well. The 
perseveration theory, if maintained in the original manner of Muller 
and Pilzecker, who postulated an initial growth in the strength of the 
trace, would also be compatible with a steady rise in the strength of 
response and an increase in accuracy, but not with a bowed curve. In 
this theory, and in its later developments as reviewed in section 8.8, 
reminiscence effects were explained by a gradual consolidation of the 
trace, possibly in a self -facilitating neural circuit. As the 
111-t 
recurrent circuit of the trace persists, facilitation across synapses 
might increase. But this theory has been criticised by McGeogh and Irion 
(1952) on several grounds, one of them being that it cannot account for 
the lack of difference b~tween spaced and unspaced practice when recall 
is soon after the last practice. The argument here is that differences 
should be immediately apparent because perseveration should occur between 
spaced trials. But, whatever the status of the theory, it does not 
fully explain our results. 
The only way in which our results may easily be explained, 
in terms of trace theory, is that the trace is carried by a recurrent 
circuit of constant strength. On this assumption, there is no difference 
between the initial and the final strength of the trace, and, therefore, 
no difference between the initial and the final response. 
There is still another possibility. It is simply that the 
subject does not depend on a trace of the original signal in reproducing 
time intervals, especially when they are above a certain length. The 
subject may simply convert the signal into some symbolic form which is 
retained until the moment of reproduction. 
But this brings us to an important criticism of Ekman and 
Frankenha.euser 1 s original (1958) experiment. In their comments on 
the data they assume that the trace representing the actual present-time 
interval is fading. In other words, it is not the number of times which 
the subject has called out a radomised digit which is being forgotten, 
but the actual period of time is gradually forgotten, as the trace 
representing it fades. When one examines the experiment reported by 
them, and / ••• 
i 
i 
them, and the various experiments reported by Frankenhaetj.ser (1959), 
one is struck by the fact that there can be no simple trcj.ce for the 
time interval. What the subject has to retain is, in f~ct, a very 
large amount of information which can enable him to form :an accurate 
estimate. The process is really an extremely intellectual one. He 
' I 
/fi.f 
reads out a certain number (up to 72) of randomised digits at a supposed 
. / 
~ rate of 1 sec. so that he is unable to 
asses how many seconds have elapsed. 
' 
' 
count, and then hais to attempt to 
I 
This requires the !retention of a 
I 
large number of separate responses, without the subject'~ being able to 
i 
reduce them to code. The model which is appropriate to :this experiment 
appears to be different from the model appropriate to the present 
I 
experiment. For Frankenhaeuser's experiment, Broadbent''.s (1957) 
model of immediate memory appears to be appropriate. Brjoadbent 
represents immediate memory as a recurrent circuit of a c:ertain capacity 
I 
to carry information between input and rehearsal. If t~e circuit is 
i 
loaded above a certain limit, some or all information is jlost. On the 
: 
other hand, if the information is within the limits of tb!e circuit, 
there may· be no loss at all, for long periods. 
i 
Now, the suggestion which I should like to make! may be a 
rather obvious one, but it seems important. It is that !retention of 
I 
' 




Where the subject has to base his estimate o:ni a large 
I 
I 
number of events presented in such a way that rehearsal o'f the events 
is delayed beyond the capacity of the system of immediat~ memory, then 
I 
his judgement is likely to be extremely inaccurate since :it will be made 
without a certain amount of the information necessary fo~ 




trace, but of 
loss of certain elements of that trace. One is not to p!icture a uniform 
I 
' interval contracting or attenuating, but a string losing peads - if one 
I 
wishes for a concrete model. A question which arises is! why the subject 
I 
does not reach a maximum estimate of, say 15 seconds, andi then go no 
further, no matter how much the period is increased. This is indeed 
the position one would find one's self in, if one adopted! the position 
that the estimate of the time interval is based purely onl the fading 
trace of / ••• 
If O 
trace of the stimulus (it may be interpolated that Frankknhaeuser is 
I 
not quite clear as to whether it is the interval or the ~timulus which 






know that he sat for, say, thirty seconds rather than He 
has felt fatigue, strain, and he has a vague impression pf a larger or 
I 
I 
smaller number of events occurring. But exact infonnation of the 
I 
! 
number of events (which presumably could only be based o~ an actual 
I 
I 
memory of all the randomised digits read aloud) has beenj lost. 
I 
It is clear from this that the subject will belless accurate 
in his estimate as the number of digits read is increase~. It is not 
clear that the subject will necessarily make a lower estimate, though 
! 
this is what Frankenhaeuser has found, unless one assumes that the 
i 
only cue used is the number of events. As we have seen~ this lands 
I 
I 
us in difficulties. There seems to be some ob~curity h~re which has 
not been cleared up. 
Where the subject is judging the duration of a continuous 








on any trace of the original. This would, of course, make reproductions 
of such time intervals extremely stable, even where dela} is considerable. 
I 
Furthennore, where the subject is able to remember the t:J.rne interval in 
! 
terms of distance to be moved, as in our experiment, the: stability of 
I 
speed should ensure a constant duration. 
I 
From this we conclude that different explanations apply to 
!" 
retention of time judgements based· on different informatton. It does 
not seem that a fading trace theory, if that trace is co~ceived of as 
i 
uniform, can give a satisfactory account of either Franktnhaeuser's 
results or the results reported in this experiment. 
8. 11 Memory and Reproduction of Time 
As a further test of Frankenhaeuser's (1959) 






t:pne are related, 
' 
a brief experiment was undertaken in which judgements ofltime were 
i 
correlated with memory for nonsense syllables, audially wresented. 
I 




8. 11. 1 Experiment 
The subjects of this experiment were those who took part in 
Experiment 3, describ~d in detail in Chapter 3. At the end of the 
second session in which they reproduced 8 seconds, they tistened to a 
' 
list of 15 nonsense· syllables, presented at a rate of on~ per second. 
i 
They were instructed to write down immediately, in theirlcorrect order 
e. 11. 2 Results 
I 
I 
Correct serial position and total number of sy~lables correct 
were separately scored, and are listed in Appendix B, Table XLIII. 
i 
' 
Correlations between both serial position seer~ and total 
i 
number of syllables correctly reproduced, and time judgedents of 8 
seconds by verbal estimate and controlled linear movements were calculated. 
The correlations are shown in Table 44 below. 
TABLE 44 
Correlations of memory for audially presented nonsense syllables and 
judgement of 8 seconds in Experiment 3. 
Reproduction time 
Verbal estimate 
Error in reproduction 

















The negative correlations between error in time! judgement and 
serial position memory may be regarded as meaningful, ever though 
' 
statistically insignificant. These correlations support: the hypothesis 
I 
that memory may be related to accuracy of time judgement.; But on the 
! 




structural katerial / ••• 
I 
If Z-
K structurfd material and time judgements based on unstructured signals. 
I 
! 
In estimating time, the individual merely changes the qu~tity of his 
• I 
response. In remembering nonsense syllables, the subje4t m~st 
' 
reproduce the details of the original. In judging timeJ the subject 
I 




remembering detail correctly, the subject cannot use these cues. 
I 
r 
8. 11. 3 Conclusion 
The differences between past-time judgements arid memory for 
detail are too great for the two to be usefully compared~ especially 
on a small scale. It is possible, though not well esta~lished, that 
' I 
in remembering longer periods of past-time, the amount o~ detail which 
I 
I 
can be recalled influences the judge~ent of the durationiof these periods. 
i 
8. 12 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
After the discussion of various theories of men;iory, an 
experiment to measure reproduction of time at various intervals of 
i 
delay is described. The results appear to show that a tjonstant level 
I 
of reproduction is maintained, within the limits of our dbservation. 
This contradicts Frankenhaeuser's (1959) view that estim4tes of past-
time are based on a fading trace and ought to decline with lapse of 
I 
time. There are differences between her experiment andjthat described 
here which may account for the differences in result, bu~ it is con-
i 
eluded that a fading trace model is unsatisfactory to account for the 
! 
decline in time judgement. Some subjects 
after delay, nor is it clear how long the 
to reduce as the original trace declines. 
increase thei~ time judgement 
I 
I 
time estimate:will continue 
I 
Broadbent's {1957) model of 
' 
I 
immediate memory is preferred as an explanation of her r~sults. The 
I 
results of the present experiment appear to be best expl~ined by a 
i 
recurrent circuit theory, maintaining the trace at a constant level, 
I 
or by the assumption that reproduction of the time inteijal is not 
based on retention of the signal at all, but upon the coJversion of 
I 









9 I ... 
PART IV 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE JUDGEMENT OF TIME 
There are very large and consistent differences in the 
I 
tion of time by linear arm movements which must have their ~xpla-
nation in the organisation of the individual. Differences!in 
j 
personality are the most complex psychological product of these 
organisational differences between individuals, but they mat be 
I 
I 
related to even relatively simple forms of behaviour, such ~s the 
i 
adaptation of a response to an unambiguously presented timeiinter-·: 
val. 
i 
A dimension which apparently has many perceptual correlates is 
I 
that of introversion-extraversion. 
I 
The relationship of this dimen-
1 
I 
sion to time jµdgement is considered in Chapter 9. j' 
Primary- secondary functioning, which is associated with · , ertia 
I 
in the functioning of the nervous system, may also be relat~d to 
time judgement (Chapter 10). I i 
I 
I 
The role of motivation in time judgement has often been stressed. 
I 
Manifest Anxiety, which has been treated as a arive variabll with 
I 
some success, might be found to be related to time judgement (Chap-
1 
I 
ter 11),. i 
A motivational variable which appears to be associated withla dis-
1 
This attitude to 
I 
n Achievement. tinctive attitude to time is 
I 
time and the use of time may have effects on the judgement of $hort 
i 
intervals (Chapter 12). 
CHAPTER 9 
EXTRAVERSION AND TIME· JUDGEMENTS 
9.I Introduction 
I 
A number of recent studies has shown that di~f erences in 
personality are related to differences in time judgement~ There is a 
i 
number of these studies devoted to personality differences 
into other aspects of the experience of time, such as tile 
I 
as they enter 
perspective, 
but they will not .be dealt with or discussed, except in passing. 
' ' 
Only 
those personality differences which have been shown to be related to the 
i 
judgement of short, accurately timed intervals will be considered. 
9. 2 Time Judgements of Mentally Ill Patients 
1/fuen Loehlin1 s (1959) tasks were used to tes~ the time judge-
, 
ments of schizophrenics, high variability in their ver~ estimates of 
I 
the time taken by the tasks was found (Guertin and Rabin) 1960). This 
' I 
suggests a functional disability in time estimation. Btlt the question 
of sampling is a difficult one, in such an experiment. 
I 
;The 11normal" 
subjects may have much more accurate concepts of time sir(lply because they 
; 
have to pay a great deal more attention to time in theiridaily lives than 
i 
the institutionalised schizophrenics. If comparisons cµ-e to be made, 
it seems best to use non-verbal judgements. 
' I 
The hypothesis has been set up that schizophJenics do not 
i 
I 
incorporate past experience in making time judgements to!the same extent 
as do normals, and should therefore show less anchor effect (Weinstein 
i 
I 
and alia, 1958). Though it is not very clear what the $I'Ounds for the 
hypothesis are, it has been experimentally confirmed by the authors. 
I 
The observation that the schizophrenic lives in an autistic world with 
; 
i 
relatively little reference to experience, and the fact that in sorting 
tests schizophrenics show themselves unable to form categories based on 
I 
abstract relations, may be used as evidence for the abov¢ view. Using 
the method of ascending and descending limits, Lhamon ani Goldstone (1956) 
sh9wed that/ ••••••• 
,;; 
showed that schizophrenics overestimate a clock second more than normal 
subjects do. They reason that schizophrenics, who live in an autistic 
world, experience time with relative freedom from external restraint. 
The fact that they over-estimate the clock second (refer it to objectively 
longer stimulus) indicates, to the authors, that schizophrenics live in 
accelerated mental seclusion. But it seems that the a~thors are basing 
their conclusion on a very imperfect study. It is quite possible that 
the effects of institutionalisation rather than of schizophrenia are 
revealed. It has been shown that, 1=und.er conditions of: sensory depriva-
tion, verbal estimates of a given time interval tend to be low (Vernon 
and McGill 1963). Institutionalisation may function in'rather the same 
way. One would hardly describe it as accelerating the mental world of 
the patient. 
The use of verbal estimates has a limited value in studying 
experience of time. It te11s us more about the accuracy with the subject 
uses time concepts that about his actual time experience~ The eiperimei:its 
with mentally ill patients do not add very greatly to our understanding 
of the experience of time. 
9.3 Personality Differences Among Normal Subjects and. Time Judgements 
The hypothesis has been advanced that a person who verbally 
• overestimates time may exhibit low inhibition generally (Thompson et alia, 
19&>). These authors find a low but consistent correlation between time 
estimation and motor inhibition. Relative underestimation of time (delay 
in telling the experimenter when a period of 15 sec., 30 sec., or&> sec. 
has elapsed) is positively related to intelligence (Spivack et alia, 1959). 
They advance as an e~lanation of this the possibility that delay in 
gratification in childhood. may be responsible for the development of cogni-
tive processes which support inhibition or delay in the expression of an 
impulse. The assumption appears to be that intelligent subjects experience 
greater delay of gratification in childhood, or carry the results of delay 
in childhood gratification over into adult life to a greater extent than 
less intelligent subjects. This seems to be a new theory of intelligence. 
It is far/ •••••••••••• 
--~----
compared to the sharpener-leveller dichotomy, nothing in the experimental 
)( work actually demonstrates that there is anything more than surface. r:"";/.,;4. 
No items/ ••••••••••• 
No items corrnnon to both dichotomies have been included. in an experiment. 
But the study of cognitive style in relation to time judgement may be 
I 
well worth while. The work of Gardner and. others (1960). on four methods 
of cognitive control related. to perceptual tasks might b~ profitably 
applied to studies of time judgement, especially of short intervals which 
may come under the heading of perception (Fraisse, 1957).: The four 
methods of cognitive control which appear to have been e~tablished. are 
given below. The first is levelling versus sharpening, iwhich may be 
defined as the readiness of the subject to accurately judge a change in 
stimulus. Levellers are more passive and dependent, tending to drift, 
or to retreat inwards; but sharpeners are active, agressive, and competitive. 
I 
Levellers appear to use repression as a pref erred. method. iof ego-defense. 
I 
Th~ second cognitive style is field. articulation, or the id.egree of field. 
dependence versus independence (Witkin, 1954). It may tie def ineCl as the 
' selectiveness of the subject in actively directing his attention to 
' 
significant features of the field.. The field-dependent !subject, compared 
- : M ,
X to the field-dependent subject, shows little selectivl;ty.: .. . ' ' 
I 
The third 
method of cognitive control is scanning control, or the 4egree of deployment 
I 
of attention of which the subject is CEU>ahle. It is th~ught to relate 
to the ability to isolate thought from emotional influence. The fourth 
cognitive control is the ability to tolerate unrealistic ;experiences, 
which is thought to relate to the ability to harmonise subjective motiva-
>( tions (ideas) and objective reality. These various coJ!~tive controls 
may be found to relate to time perception under various ~onditions. For 
example, in emotion-provoking situations, the time judg~ents of subjects 
who are higher on scanning control may show less alterat~on. Subjects 
who are higher in levelling should show greater anchor e*f ects in time 
judgements. Subjects who are more field-independent might be expected. 
! 
to show less spatial. effect on time judgement. If a fm;ther step can 
be taken, and reliable personality correlates of cognitiye styles are 
i 
found, the study of personality differences in perceptio* will certainly 
: 
enter a more fruitful era. 
Perceptual/ ••• ~··••••••• 
: 
' I 
Perceptual tendencies which have been establi~hed in other 
tasks might also be investigated in the judgement of time~ For example 1 
i 
Angyal (1948) has shown that obsessive patients tend to b~ very accurate 
I 
in visual perceptual tasks, but anxious and hysterical pa~ients tend to 
be variable and inaccurate. It might be possible to establish the same 
relations in time judgements by various methods. 
i 
Unfortunately, this whole area of cognitive cbntrol as related. 
to time judgement has not been explored.. 
i 
Another study of personality differences entering into verbal 
I 
I 
estimates of longer periods of time has been conducted byj Orme (1962) 
I 
I 
Unprepared verbal estimates of 30 minute and 20 minute fih.led. intervals 
i 
' 
were made by patients and. normal controls. He found tha~ hysteric and 
1 
' 
psychopathic patients made longer estimates than normal controls, but 
neurotic and psychotic depressives gave shorter estimates
1
• The normal 
groups completed. the Maud.sley Personality Inventory of ~raversion and 
: 
neuroticism but no relation was found between neuroticis~ or extraversion 
and time estimation. 
i 
This indicates, prima facie, that !the mental or 
!--
subjective time of hysterics and psychopaths proceeds mo~e rapidly in 
I 
relation to clock time than the subjective world of neur9tic or psychotic 
depressives. But, as we have already remarked. repeatedly, there may 
1 
be large differences in the accuracy with which subjects luse verbal 
I 
concepts of time. If the argument is tendered that the~e is no reason 
I 
to suppose that one or other of these groups paid, on th~ average, 
I 
I 
more attention to clock time than any other, then the rejoinder is: that 
I 
being the case, all should be equally capable of matchirtg individual 
i 
rate of flow and clock rate. It is never satisfactorily cleared up in 
I 
these studies whether concepts of clock time or experienqe of time are 
being studied.. 
In the present/ •••• ····-··· 
1>1 
In the present chapter, one further personal~ty factor which 
' 
seems to enter into time judgement will be discussed. Tb.is is the 
personality dimension of extraversion-introversion. 
In subsequent chapters, other personality fa~tors will be 
discussed. 
9.4 The Concept of Extraversion- Introversion 
i 
i 
Jung (1923) postulated two major attitudes of the libido: an 
! 
introverted attitude, in v.hich the libido turns inward tc> the self, and 
an extraverted attitude, in which the libido turns outward to the external 
. world. The extravert and the introvert are further defined, according 
to Jung, by reference to four styles: thinking, feeling, sensation and 
intuition. The thinking extravert is governed by practicality and 
necessity, the thinking introvert by absolute principles., The feeling 
extravert tends to have a powerful but rather coarse emo~ional expressive-
ness, but the feeling introvert is characterised by a delicacy, restraint, 
and distinction of feeling. The sensational extravert searches for new 
contacts with the environment via exteroceptors and the skeletal muscula-
ture, but the sensational introvert may resort to drugs or drink, obtaining 
his sensation by alterations of the internal environment.: The intuitive 
I 
extravert may take to games of chance or indulge in risky undertakings 
to obtain success, but the intuitive introvert tends to mysticism. This 
is, of course, a very condensed and crude account of Jung's typology, 
which he develops at some length with many niceties. 
Jung's typology has lead to many scales purp9rting to measure 
I 
the dimension of ex.traversion-introversion. An early s~ale based on this 
I 
dichotomy classed all introverts and all extraverts together, without 
' . 
paying attention to the styles v.hich Jung had carefully described (Heidbreder, 
1926). A factor analysis of the Heidbreder scale yielded five factors -
social introversion, thinking introversion, depression, dycioid tendencies, 
and rhathymia (Guilford, 19li0). 
A still later) ••••••••••• 
I 
I A still laier version reintroduces Jung's original distinction of thinking, 
I 
feeling, sensation and intuition (Myers and Briggs, 1961}. 
9.5 Eysenck's Theory of Extraversion-Introversion 
In a large number of books and articles Eysenck has studied 
the perceptual, learning, and motor corollaries of the d~ension of 
extraversion-introversion. He has developed a test ( whi:ch will be 
described in more detail shortly) based on the Guilford factor of rhathyrnia 
(
11happy-go-lucky"). Most of his studies have involved the classification 
~ of subjects according to Guilford' s Rhathymia Scale, whicp is part% of 
the Inventory of Factors S. T.D. C.R. (1940), or according ~o the Maudsley 
Personality Inventory, to a great extent based on the Gui;lford. R Scale, 
or according to diagnosis as hysterics and dysthymics 1 wh~ere neurotics 
are used as subjects. This is in accordance with his hypothesis (so 
firmly held that it is the groundwork of mu.ch of his expe~imental work) 
I 
that hysterics are extraverted neurotics and dysthyrnics are introverted 
- I 
' 
neurotics .. Generally, the M.P.I. is also administered to the neurotic 
groups, to demonstrate that they do diff~r in extraversio~. The possi-
bility,that neuroticism and extraversion might interact i~ ignored, but 
more will be said of his use of neurotics as criter.ton groups. 
Eysenck's theory of the perceptual correlates of extraversion-
introversion is of interest to us for the clear predictiops which it 
makes. He has stated his Typological Postulate so clearly .that there 
can be no doubt (Eysenck, p.ll4 1957), and in so doing h~ has performed 
a service to our thought. One of the methods of scienc~ is to limit 
the possibilities until one has a certainty which can be :disproved (or, 
more rarely, proved! ) • The Typological Postulate states that extraverts 
generate excitatory potential weakly and slowly, and re~ctive inhibition 
strongly and quickly; but introverts generate excitator~ potential 
strongly and quickly and reactive inhibition weakly and slowly. In a 
recent revision of these hypotheses (E~senck, 1962), two :are retained, 
but a third is dismissed. The two maintained are that (a) extraverts 
generate re~ctive/ ••••••• 
/~/ 
generate reactive inhibition more rapidly and (b) extraverts dissipate 
reactive inhibition more slowly. The third, rejected hyPothesis, is 
that extraverts generate a greater amount of inhibition. ! It will be 
noticed that nothing further is said about the generation! of excitation. 
i 
But, even assuming that equal. amounts of excitation are g¢nerated. by 
i 




It has been shown that extraversion is relateo to judgement 
I 
of time. Eysenck, (1957), following his practice of usi~g hysterics 
' 
and dysthymics as criterion groups representing, respectively, extraverts 
and introverts, has shown that extraverts under-reproduce! a time signal. as 
! 
compared to introverts. This was original.ly explained a~ a consequence 
of both weaker excitation and stronger inhibition more ra~idly generated. 
' among extraverts, but the revised explanation would not doubt be that 
' 
extraverts develop inhibition more rapidly and dissipate ~t more slowly 
' 
than introverts. The possibility that neuroticism and eic'traversion 
might interact is not considered, al.though this possibiliiy is illustrated 
I 
! 
by the results of Wal.lach and Gahm (196o), who found that! extraverts tend 
' ' 
to produce larger drawing than introverts, but that the r~sult is reversed 
! 
when anxious introverts and. anxious extraverts are tested~ Data from 
the manual. of the M.P.I. and from articles about the M.P.I. (Eysenck, 1959) 
show that the conditions for such an interaction are favonrable. It is 
found that neuroticism and extraversion are not significantly correlated. 
i 
among normals (-.I), as is required if the two are to be used as orthogonal. 
I 
I 
dimensions, but that they are significantly correlated in: neurotic popu-
1 
I 
lations (-.3 to -.4). The latter correlations are very ~igh, and. 
I 
seriously point to possible reversal. effects such as thos~ in the Wal.lach 
and Gahm experiment. 
I 
I 
It is quite possible that, where n?rmaJ.. subjects 
I 
are used, the results obtained. by Eysenck might be reversed. 
There is another experiment which tends to be&r out Eysenck's 
result, though, and it was obtained with normal. subjects.! Lynn (1961) 
i 
obtained 10 time judgements from 20 extraverted and 20 introverted. 
I 
! 
students, using the method. of positive feedback (Llewell~, 1959). 
By this/ ••••••• ~ •••• 
! 
By this method, each subject starts with the same standJ.d time signal, 
I 
: 
but in the next trial the response to the first trial is:used as the 
time signal. In each successive trial, the response of 1the previous 
trial is used as the signal. In this way, any trends wnich may exist 
are emphasised.. It was found that significant differences between 
extraver.ts and. introverts began to emerge after the 6th ~rial, whereas 
' 
Claridge (1960) and. Eysenck (1957), using neurotic crite~ion groups, had. 
I 
' 
found significant differences after the first trial. 'I'lie differences 
' 
: 
found. by Lynn were in the direction predicted by Eysenck.! These findings 
I 
I 





There is also a considerable amount of suppotjt for Eysenck's 
I 
views to be found in other perceptual experience. Extraverts have been 
! 
found. to exhibit greater tolerance for pain than introve~ts (Lynn and 
Eysenck, 1961). In judging intensities of sound by the bethod of 
comparison, extrave:bts tend to adjust the second sound to a lower level 
of intensity than introverts (Eysenck, 1957). Hysteric$, show greater 
' 
kinaesthetic after-effects than dysthymics(Eysenck, 1957) 1 • Kinesthetic 
after-effect is explained as an i$ibition (satiation) effect. In their 
study of 12 brain-injured. patients, Klein and. Krech (195~) found that 
: 
brain-injured. patients showed. greater kinaesthetic after-effects. The 
authors attributed this to.their reaching satiation more !quickly and 
i 
more intensely, and to the greater persistence of satiat~on effects among 
brain-injured. patients. Jaffe (1954) repeated the stud~ without being 
i 
able to find the same effects. This tends to throw. somj doubt on the 
concept of basal cortical inhibition of Klein and Kresch,: and on the 
identification of this doubtful concept with Eysenck's cobcept of a central 
process of inhibition. 
I 
In a replication of some of Eysenck's work, u!sing normal 
i 
subjects classified. on the Guilford R Scale, Rechtschaff1n (1958 and 19&J) 
I 
was unable to find some of the results obtained by Eysenc~. In 
• I 
Rechtschaffen' s 1958 study, he was unable to find any dif:ferences between 
ex:triaverts and/ ••••• 
I 
,,, 
extraverts and introverts on reactive inhibition or visuai after-effects. 
j 
In the 1960 study by Rechtschaffen, he was unable to find 1 differences in 
kinaesthetic after-effects. Broadbent (1961) used hyste~ics and dysthymic 




There is some ambiguity about the role which!inhibition might 
be expected to play in kinaesthetic after-effects. One 6ould easily 
argue that extrave:Vts, in whom the original excitation is!most rapidly 
reduced by inhibition, should show less after-effects th~ introverts, in 
whom the original excitation persists longer. It is onl;Y" the attempt i.o 
' 
identify satiation and inhibition that leads to this prob+em. But now 
we begin to see that there is some doubt about what is actually meant by 
inhibition. For this reason, we should specially consid~r the matter in 
some detail. 
9.6 Eysenck's Concept of Inhibition 
Eysenck (1955) subsumes three distinct concepts in his concept 
of cortical inhibition: satiation, reactive inhibition, and basal cortical 
inhibition. 
The concept of satiation was developed to ex~lain the effect 
of perception on subsequent perception (Ko11ler, 1940; Km;iler and Wallach, 
1944). The concept of satiation is similar to that of eiectrotonus: an 
electro-current flowing in a medium alters the state of that medium in such 
a way as to impede the current flo~.ring through the medium~ It is postu-
1 
lated that an electrochemical current is set up in the cottex during 
I 
stimulation which has a topological relation to the object-pattern giving 
I 
I 
rise to the stimulation. This topological pattern, whic~ preserves the 
relationships of the object-paths, is altered by polarisation effects 
i 
during stimulation. It is this impedance, or alterationfof the cortical 
I 
medium, which leads to satiation. Now, if we were to attempt to explain 
. I 
Eysenck 1 s concept of inhibition on the same model, we sho~ld arrive at a 
I 
conclusion which contradicts his Typological Postulate. irt should follow 
from this model that the more intense the excitation, the stronger the 
current. The stronge~/ ••••••••• 
/{df 
The stronger the current, the more rapidly alteration of the medium~n 
i 
which the current fldlws would occur. If we assumed thatiintroverts 
developed excitation more rapidly or strongly, then it wo~d follow that 
they would satiate more rapidly. This is, of course, th~ opposite of 
I 
Eysenck's prediction. In his revised (1962) version of the Typological 
i 
Postulate, the process of excitation is omitted altogether, so that it 
I 
is not clear whether it is still to be included in his th~ory. But, in 
I 
the Kohler theory,satiation is pictured as a consequence ~f excitation. 
I 
The one is quite specifically the consequence of the othei. This is 
I 
I 
the sense in which the term satiation is used. Satiatio~ is a consequence 
I 
of excitation. It is the sense in which the term is used in experiments 
I 
on kinaesthetic after-effects, which are used as evidence] for the 
I 
Typological Postulate. Yet it is clear, in the Typological Postulate, 
I 
I 








The second inhibition construct subsltmed by Eysenck is that 
! 
of reactive inhibition, adopted from Hull (1940). Reactive inhibition 
I 
I 
is measured by the effect which a muscular response has oh a subsequent 
I 




in an organism, there remains a condition (IR) which acts!in a manner 
I 
I 
similar to primary negative drive, reducing the activity ihich produces 
. I 
the state. Eysenck (1956 and 1962) has produced evidenc~ that extraverts 
x show greater reminiscence effect_s on pursuit rotor tasks, I and attributes 
this to the dissipation of inhibition. Extraverts develtp inhibition 
more rapidly during performance, level of performance risks more slowly 
. I 
I 
because practice effects are obscured by reactive inhibition, and remini-
accj umulated to sence effects are stronger because more inhibition has 
I 
I 
dissipate during the rest period. It is obvious that thk more intense the 
I 
activity, the greater the amount of reactive inhibition. I Is this purely 
I 
because greater intensity of activity leads to greater co~tical excitation? 
If so, why do introverts not show more inhibition, since lhey develop 









The third concept of inhibition 




subsumed by tysenck is that 
to account rlr differences 
i 
in rate of conditioning (Franks, 1956; 1957). 
I 
It shoul1 be distinguished 
from the concept of basal cortical conductivity, which iJ measured by 
I 
satiation effect (Klein and Krech, 1952). In Franks' (1956) experiment, 
I 
i 
20 hysterics (extraver.ts), 20 normal subjects, and 20 dysthymics (introverts) 
I 
I 
were subjected to eyelid response conditioning. DysthYTI4cs conditioned 
I 
more rapidly than hysterics, as predicted by Eysenck's th~ory. The 
' 
normals were intermediate. In Franks' subsequent (1957)jexperiment, 
I 
' 
55 normal, paid, male, undergraduate volunteers were grad+d on the M.P.I. 
scale of extraversion. Significant negative correlation~ were found 
I 
I 
between the speed of acquiring the defensive eyeblink res~onse, speed of 
extinction of the response, and extraversion. Franks ab~oned his 
concept of basal cortical inhibition and adopted Eysenck'~ unified construct 
I 
of inhibition as an explanation. But, if it is true thai introverts 
I 
condition more easily, why do they not tend to learn everYthing more 
l 
quickly? There is nothing in the Typological Postulate to limit the 
I 
I 
field within which introverts will not be superior to extraverts in 
I 
learning. But it is an extremely unlikely prediction that extraverted 
persons are necessarily more ignora/nt than introverted p~rsons. It 
i 
may also be added that Field and Brengelman (1956) found ~either extraver-
' 
sion nor neuroticism to be significantly correlated with ¢yelid conditioning. 
I 





All the above forms of inhibition are measur~d in Mfferent 
! 
I 




forms of inhibition are linked. There is no evidence that each of these 
i 
I 
concepts of inhibition in fact describes a unitary proces~. Finally, 
1 
the relationship between each of these forms of inhibitiohand extraversion 
has as much evidence to oppose it as to support it. Th•I only relationship 
on which there seems to be an encouraging degree of unanimity is that 





A very careful experimental study by Becker ~1960) 
I 
illustrates the need to distinguish different types of in~ibition. He/ •• 
I 
He tested the hypotheses that (a) individual differences in satiation and 
reactive inhibition are correlated; (b) individual diffe ences in basal 
cortical inhibition are related to reactive cortical inhi ition; and 
(c) individual differences in satiation, reactive inhibit'on, or basal 
cortical inhibition are related to individual differences in introversion-
extraversion. Basal cortical inhibition was assessed byjmeasuring GSR 
conditioning, aniseikonic distortion (with the hypothesisj that extraverts 
should be less bound to past perceptual habits because ofltheir greater 
cortical inhibition and therefore shift more rapidly), an critical fusion 
I 
frequency. Satiation was measured by Archimedes spiral 1fter-effect, 
I 
and by kinaesthetic figural after-effect. Reactive inhi6ition was 
I 
assessed by pursuit rotor reminiscence and speed of altertation of behaviour. 
The conclusion of this study is that satiation and reactite inhibition do 
I 
~ot form unitary traits related to each other or internaiiy consistent. 
I 
Nor are they significantly related to extraversion, with ~he exception 
)<. of purs~t rotor reminiscence, which correlates ~ +.21 to l+.22 with 
extraversion. One unitary factor, basal cortical inhibi~ion, was identi-
fied, but it was not related to extraversion. 
The study by McEwan and Rodger (1960), which confirmed that 
there is no unitary process of satiation to cover both Vi ual and 
x kinaesbAetic after-effects has already been mentioned. 
In a subsequent study, Eysenck and Claridge (]962) reaffirmed 
I 
that hysterics and psychopaths are characterised by high Jeuroticism-
extraversion, and ~hat obsessives, depressives, compulsivJs and phobic 
. l 
patients are characterised by neuroticism-introversion. [using these 
criterion groups, tests. of sedation-threshold, reaction s1eed, and spiral 
after-effects were conducted~ Single-task analysis did dot separate 
)( extraverts and introverts, but inultiple drJscriminant funcJion did. It 
is difficult to see why Eysenck continues to use neurotic \subjects for his 
studies, since ~e wishes to generalise his results to cove~ non-neurotics. 






He deliberately introduces the factor of neuroticism, app::U-ently satisfied 
that, because e.xtraversion and neuroticism are orthogonal factors, they do 
' not modify each other. The high correlation between neuroticism and 
extraversion in extreme populations is also ignored. 
! 
I 
I At this st.age, the instrument which Eysenck uses in his 
I 
classification of extraverts and introverts in normal andlneurotic popula-
1 
I 
tions should be described. It is the Maudsley Personality Inventory. 
! 
i 
9.7 The Maudsley'Personality Inventory 
There are two forms of the Maudsley PersonaJ.ity Inventory. 
These are, a short form (Eysenck, 1958} and a long form (~ysenck, 1956). 
Both have been used in the present experiments. 
I 
The short form consists of the first twelve items of thellong 
form. It has been standardised with a sample of 1,600 ndrmals, equally 
' divided as to age, sex, and class. The long form has be~n standardised 
' 
with English and American normal subjects, hospitalised djfsthymics, 
I 
I 
hospitalised hysterics, recidivists, hospitalised psycho~ths, and 
hospitalised psychopaths. 
i 
According to Eysenck 1 s theory, hysterics andjpsychopaths 
ought to be more extrave!ted than dysthymics. His stand~rdisation tables 
I 
show that this is so, by the M.P.I. Hysterics and psychdpaths ought also, 
according to his theory, to be more extraverted than no~l subjects, but 
the M.P.I. does not show this satisfactorily. Psychopattjs are more 
I 
I 
extraverted than normals, but hysterics are not. Dysthynµ.cs are more 
I 
• I introverted than normals, as demanded by his theory. Sigal, Star and 
I 
I 
Franks (1958} have argued that the failure to find a sign~ficant difference 
between hysterics and normals on extraversion means that ~ysterics cannot 
I 
be used as a criterion group in studies of extraversion. 
I 
Since hysterics/ ••••• •.: •••••••• 
/II 
Since hysterics were also used as a criterion group in the construction 
; 
of the scale, but are nevertheless not more extraverted t~an normals, this 
means that the whole scale is biassed in the direction of;introversion. 
It may also mean that Eysenck's theory that hysteria is an extraverted 
neurotic condition is incorrect. 
' For this reason, as well as for the reason that neuroticism 
and extraversion may interact, hysterics and dysthymics c~not be accepted 
as criterion groups in experimental studies of inhibition;if the results 
are going to used in formulating general laws to apply to:the population as 
a whole. 
For this reason, too, it is worth repeating Eysenck's work, 
using normal subjects. 
9. 8 Hypotheses 
Following Eysenck, two hypotheses may be set,up which can 
be tested with our e~periment. 
The first hypoth~sis is that extraversion and time reproduced 
! 
are negatively related. This would 'be a satiation effect. This has been 
. ' 
demonstrated by Eysenck (1957) and Claridge (1960), usingjhysterics and 
dysthymics as c~iterion groups. I\Ynn (1961), using the ~ethod of positive 
feedback, has shown the relationship with university stud~nts. A 
replication of this would be of v~lue, if only because v~ious experimenters 
testing Eysenck's hypoth,eses have arrived .at contradictori results. 
The second hypothesis set up for testing is that extraverts 
are more variable in their reproduction of time because of a more rapidly 
I 
aroused inhibitory process. The evidence that this hypo~hesis is based 
X on is rather A~msy. Canestrari (1957) found that percep~ual rigidity is 
high in introversion, low in extraversion, but Becker (19q0) failed to 
confirm this. On the other hand, perceptual constancy h~s been found 
low among introverts and high among extraverts (Ardis and :Fraser, 1957). 
! 
I 
Eysenck (1947)/ •••••••••• 
IV/ 
Eysenck (1947) reports more intra-subject variability amopg extraverts. 
Extraverts have also been found more inconsistent in such! motor activities 
I 
as car driving (Venables, 1956). 
1 
We have shown that inhibition as a general fkctor related to 
I 
I 
·extraversion cannot be maintained in view of the failure ~o find evidence 
for a unitary process of inhibition. It remains importaht to test whether 
I 
I 
there are any particular processes of inhibition which ca.h be related to 
. I 
extraversion. It is possible that Eysenck's theory may have no validity 
I 
at all, or that its validity may be confined to the field! of reminiscence 
I 
effects in motor activity. Careful experimentation must! establish the 
I 






A third hypothesis, not related to Eysenck's: work, was also 
tested. It is the hypothesis that extraverts move further than introverts 
in reproducing time by linear arm movements. This 









introverts in their drawings. There is also the generaljpicture of the 
extravert as more outgoing, more inclined to 11 let himself: go", more 









A fourth hypothesis, that extraverts move more quickly than 
I 
introverts in reproducing time intervals by linear arm moyements, is 
I 
justified by such items in the M.P.I. as I 
I 
(5) Are you inclined to be quick and sure in your actions? 
I 
If the 11 quick and sure 11 picture of the extraverts is tnue, then he ought 
to move further and £aster in reproducing time signals, 
9. 9 Experiment 




The data of 54 aubjects who filled in the shprt form of the 
I 
M.P.I. in Experiment 2, and of the 40 supjects who filledlin both the short 
I 
I 
and the long forms of the M.P.I. in Experiment 3 were anajl.Ysed. 
I 
The description/ •••••••••• 
I 
I 
The description of the 54 fonner subjects is contained in Chapter 3, 
Experiment 2. The description of the 40 latter subjects is contained 
in Chapter 3, Experiment 3. 
The 54 subjects of Experiment 2 were tested on the short 
M.P.I. after they had completed their second session of time judgements. 
By this time they had judged each length of signal four times by linear 
arm movements - twice in each session. The short form of the M.P.I. 
was filled in by each subject in the presence of the experimenter. 
The 40 subjects of Experiment 3 were tested on the short form 
of the M.P.I. after judging 8 seconds in their second session, and on 
the long fonn of the M.P.I. after judging 16 seconds in their fourth 
session. Both fonns were filled in by each subject in the presence 
of the experimenter. 
9.9.2 Results 
The full results are listed in various Tables in Appendix B • 
In Table LX and LXI are the linear movement and verbal estimate 
correlates of extraversion, as measured in Experiment 2. Variability 
of verbal estimate and linear movement reproduction were also calcula-
ted with the results of Experiment 2, and these are listed in Tables XL! 
and XLII. Controlled linear movement reproduction time, verbal estimate, 
variability in time judgement by controlled movement and verbal estimate, 
and error in time judgement by both methods were calculated with the 
results of Experiment 3 and are listed in Tables XLIII and XLIV. 
Product-moment correlations of extraversion and reproduction 
and verbal estimate variables obtained in Experiment 2 were calculated. 
This may be designated the correlation of extraversion and time 
judgements, obtained by free linear arm movements. 





The correlations are listed. below. 
TAB L E 45 
Time judgement correlates of extraversion in Experiment i 
Reproduced Verbal Reproduction Verbal Reproduction Verbal 
time estimate error error variability variability 
+.2D? .ooo -.483++ -.ll? +.079 +.032 
+.102 +.009 -.500++ -.015 -.225 +.029 
++ significant at 5% level 
I 
The only significant correlations are the two between errbr in reproduction 
and extraversion. Both of these show that extraverts male significantly 
I 
less errors than introverts. It should also be noticed rhat the corre-
lation between time reproduced. and extraversion reverses rysenck's 
prediction. The correlation is not statistically secure~ but it reverses 
the direction of the results obt~ined. by Eysenck (1957)Jbia,.;_dge (i960) 
and Lynn (1961). Verbal estimate, error in verbal est· te, and the 
variability scores correlate at such a low levei with ext~aversion that 
we cannot advance them as support for any except the null hypothesis. 
The correlations between extraversion and disl ance, speed of 
movement and variability in speed of movement were calculated. and are 
sho-wn below. Variability in speed. is calculated by usink the set of 
speed scores in the first session, irrespective of the si~al length. 
This is done because speed doe;; not, on the average, vary with signal 
(.length. Reference to Table If, p ti._ in the text will show this. The 
distance score is the distance moved in reproducing 16 selonds. 
TABLE 4,6 
Extraversion and distance, speed., and variability of speetl in reproducing 
time signals in Experiment 2 
Distance Speed Variability 
in speed 
-.062 -.161 -.4.34 ++ 
++ significant at 5% This t ble/ •••••••• 
--·--L~~--
'"'' 
It is noticeable that the correlation between, extraversion 
and reproduction of ti.~e by free linear movement is positive (though 
statistically insignificant) in both Experiment 2 and 3. 
1 
But the sign 
I 
of the correlation between extraversion and reproduction pf time by 
controlled. linear movement is negative. The correlation! between 
: 
reproduction by grip in Experiment 3 and extraversion is positive (+.021 
.001 +.21 and +.22), resembling the correlation between e:ktraversion and 
' i 
free linear movement. . In Experiment 2, the correlation between key-
pressing and extraversion is +.225 at a signa:J. length of +6 seconds. 
From this we can conclude that free linear movement resembles key-pressing 
and grip more closely than it does controlled linear mov~ent, in its corre-
lation with extraversion. In spite of the fact that free and controlled. 
linear movement reproduction scores correlate more highly: than the scores 
obtained by any other methods of time judgement studied (see tables 20 to 
23), the same personality factors may contribUte to scores in opposite 
ways, if our data are significant of anything. 
On the other hand, error in controlled linear!movement and. in 
: 
free~linear movement correlate negatively with extraversi9n in Experiment 2 
Ii 
(-.4$3; -.500) and Experiment 3 (-.27; -.12; -.35; -.47). Under 
conditions of both free and controlled. linear movement extraverts appear 
to be more accurate in time reproduction than introverts. 
The results of Experiment 2 and 3 confirm eacr other in the 
' correlation of reproduction variability wi.th extraversion! as well. In 
I 
both experiments, the correlation is negative, for both free and controlled 
linear movement. 
Verbal extimate, verbal estimate error, and v~riability of 
verbal estimate do not correlate significantly or reliably with extraversion 
I 
in the two experiments. This confirms our view that verpal estimates 
are not informative about time experience unless speciaJ. precautions are 










Another point of importance is that, as expeqted of two 
I 
l?'I 
scales which correlate so highly (+.87), the long and th~ short M.P.I. 
I 




Our first hypothesis, based on the work of E~senck, -was that 
I 
I 
reproduction time and extraversion are ~egatively related. In our 
I 
experiments, none of the correlations between time scoreJ and extraversion 
is significant, statistically. This makes it dangerous !to base any 
i 
argument firmly on them. Yet we may note that the free 0-inear::movement 
I 
reproduction times of both Experiment I and Experiment 2 !correlate 
positively with extraversion. This could quite possibl~ be held to be 
I 
a result of the particular method of time judgement whic~ is adopted. 
I 
But.,the time reproductions by key-pressing in Experiment !2 and by gripping 
I 
I 
the stationary handle in Experiment 3 are also positive. ! These positive 
I 
I 
correlations do not only fail to support the Eysenck the~ry by being too 
I 
I 
low, they contradict it by being in an opposite directiort to that expected. 
But the reproduction of 8 seconds and 16 secdnds by linear 
I 
I 
movements of controlled distance does agree with predictiJon. The 
I 
correlations with extraversion are negative, but again stktistically 
! 
insignificant. If we take the sign of the correlations ias being a true 
I 
reflection of a tendency among extraverts to reproduce l~ss time than 
! 
I 
introverts, then we rrru.st conclude that controlled and fr~e linear movement 
! 
draw upon the personality factors of extraversion opposite ways. One is 
reminded of how, in the Wallach and Gahln experiment, ajous extraverts 
and non-anxious extraverts behaved in opposite ways. I~ it possible 
that, Wlen the scope of the movement is restricted, the ttravert behaves 
in a way which is the opposite of his normal manner? rrttis depends on 
I 
I 




When we/• •••• f .•....••••• 
When we examine the data pertinent to the third. hypothesis 
that extraverts move further in reproducing time signals than introverts -
the conclusion which we must reach is that only the null pypothesis is 
supported. In Experiment 2, the correlation between distance moved and. 
extraversion is -.06 at 16 seconds. In Experiment 3, the correlation 
between extraversion and. distance of movement is -.08 an~ -.03. In all 
cases, less than 1% of the variance is accounted. for. If we conclude 
that hypothesis number three is not proven, then we must 9.lso abandon it 
as a possible explanation of the re~ersal effect on the r~ationship 
between extraversion and. linear movement. 
Another possibility is that there is an appreciable amount of 
I 
reactive inhibition when the subject has to control the natural tempo of 
his movement. If one assumes that, in moving at natural tempo, over 
any distance chosen by the subject, the muscular adaptation is easiest 
and the least amount of reactive inhibition is generated.,; then it would 
follow from the Typological Postulate that, in a task in Which reactive 
inhibition is made appreciable, there would be a negative relationship 
between extraversion and performance. But this explanation is only of 
' 
the most tentative kind. Though the link between reactive inhibition 
I 
and extraversion is the best es:tablished of the facets of the Typological 
i 
Postulate, it is usually detected in a very special way - by motor 
reminiscence effects. It is probably dangerous to extedd reactive 
inhibition to a perceptual or judgemental task as an exp]janation. 
Inhibition may easily become an overworked, overgeneralis'ed concept. We 
I 
I 
shall have to abandon the reversal effect with an acknow:"liedgement that we 
are unable to explain it. 
The second hypothesis, that variability of response is greater 
among extraverts than among int~overts, is contradicted. by the consistent 
negative correlation between variability in reproduction of 8 seconds and. 
16 seconds and. extraversion, in both Experiment 2 and 3. Variability in 
speed of movement is significantly and negatively associqted with extra-
r version (-.43, p(.01) and. variability of controlled linear movement 
reproduction of 8 seconds is significantly and negativel~ correlated with 
the short} •••••••••••• 
! 
the short extraversion score ( -.35; p<.05), though not bignificantly 
: 
with long extraversion score (-.21). Our findings agreej very well with 
general descriptive portraits of the extravert as sure, cpnfident, inclined 
to be casual about his work. The correlation between verbal variability 
i 
and extraversion is so low that, again, only the null hypbthesis is sup-
ported. It is only in his motor performance that the lravert is less 
I 
variable than the introvert. 
I 
The fourth hypothesis - that extraversion andl speed of movement 
~ are positively 'telated - is also contradicted. In Exped.ment 2 a corre-
lation of -.16 was found between speed. and extraversion. I Whether one 
' ' 
accepts the null hypothesis or whether one attaches importance to the 
I 
negative sign of the correlation, the hypothesis must be ~bandoned.. When 





Are you happiest when you get involve in 
project that calls for rapid action? 






But they do not predict to the testing situatlon. 
I 
The most significant correlations of the wholb set are those 
between extraversion and error in reproduction of time, ih both Experiment 
2 and 3. The correlation between free linear movement r~production error 
and extraversion in Experiment 2 is -.48 (p< .01) at 8 seponds and -. 50 
I 
I 
(p<.01) at 16 seconds. The correlation between controliled linear movement 
error and extraversion in Experiment 3 is -.27 (short foJn) and -.12 (long 
form) at signal 8 seconds, and -.35 (p ~ .05j short form) lnd -.47 (p< .01, 
long form) at· signal 16 seconds. No other relationships! in the present 
study are as consistent or as significant. This d.iscovely, that extraverts 
I 
are more accurate in reproductions by both controlled andi free linear 
movement, may be interpreted as a consequence of the Jungian distinction 
between the extrovert as a person who explores the world by using his 
exteroceptors and skeletal muscles, whereas the introver~ explores the 
I 
world by use of interoceptors and autonomic effectors. I 
This very/ ••••••• 
j 
9.10. Summary and. Conclusions 
Four hypotheses were set ttP for testing:-
' 'V 
(a) Extraverts under-reproduce time signals as compared. to 
introverts. 
(b) Extraverts are mor~ variable in their respons~s than 
introverts. 
(c) Extraverts move further than introverts in 







(d.) Extraverts move faster than introverts in reptoducing 
: 





All of the hypotheses had to be rejected.. P~rtial, but 
statistically insignificant support was found for hypothe~is (a) in the 
! 
I 
negative correlation between extraversion and time reproduced by linear 
I 
I 
arm movements of controlled. distance. But all other correlations 
between ti.me reproduced (by free linear arm movement, by hipping the 
i 






Correlation· between error in reproduction and.I extraversion 
were significant and negative, indicating that extravertsltendto be more 
accurate than introverts in the reproduction of time sign~s. 
I 
i 
It was concluded. that the results as a whole \:lid not favour 
' I 
the hypothesis that extraverts develop inhibition more rapidly than 
introverts 6r that extraverts develop less excitation. 
CHAPTER 10 
SECONDARY FUNCTIONING AND TIME JUDGEMENT I 
I 
10.1 Introduction I 
. I 
The reason for studying primary-secondary functioning in rela-
tion to time judgement is that Eysenck (1957, pp 197-1991) has suggested 
I 
that the introversion-extraversion dimension and the prilnary-secondary 
I 
I 
functioning dimension are largely identical. One of his arguments in 
I 
I 
doing so is that Mundy-Castle (1955) has associated pr~ry-secondary 
. I 
functioning with a 11&:entral nervous excitability characteristic 11 (largely 
I 
on the basis of EEG readings). We have seen that Eysenbk's Typological 
I 
Postulate (1957) advances the view that one of the main ~istinctions . I 
I 
between extraverts and introverts is the strength of thel processes of 
excitation aroused by s.tim.ulation. Another reason for I Eysenck's iden-
tification (tentative it must be said, in fairness to Eykenck) is that 
secondary functioning effects may be described as inhibilory effects 
(Wiersma, 1932). If, then, primary functioners may be laid to display 
higher excitability than secondary functioners, and if ~hibitory processes 
I 
are stronger among secondary functioners than among primary functioners, 
I 
there is a clear parallel between the dimensions. Biesheuvel and Pitt 
I 
(1955) describe one of the factors experimentally isolat~d by them in a 
I 
study of primary-secondary functioning as 11mobility and ~lasticity of 
I 
behaviour at a more discriminative level11 (p.395). Theyl also describe 
I 
the factor in terms of flexibility and state that inerti~ is the 11 essence 
of the concept of secondary function 11 (p.391). 
Eysenck's suggestion that extraversion and secbndary function-
ing are identical or closely related :i.Inmediately leads tb two testable 
hypotheses. l 
(a) Measures of secondary function correlate with easures of 
I 
extra version. l 
(b) Measures of secondary functioning correlate wi h time judge-
1 
ments. 
The latter hypothesis is in tenns of Eysenck's finding, dis-
d · th · ha t that xt · · I t · 1 cusse 1!l e previous c p er, e raversion is nega ive y cor-







The concept of primary-secondary functioning, ias 
! 
used in the 
' 
present chapter, is based largely on Biesheuvel's (1949 ): account of this 
I 
dimension and on his (1955) experimental analysis of th~ concept into 
I 
the factors of flexibility and unstructured motor speed.! 
I 
According to the Heymans-Wiersma. theory of tem'.Perament, each 
conscious event has a primary- function of :ilmnediate exp~ience, and a 
secondary function in mental life which is exerted even t ft er the event 
has receded from consciousness. As a result of secondacy function, a 
I 
I 
conscious event can inhibit or modify a succeeding consdious event. 
I 
I 




Individuals who are characterised by a low degree of secondary 
I 
I 
function are dominated by immediate stimulation, and hav~ an extensive 
i 
I 
but shallow conscious field. Individuals who are chara1cterised by a 
! 
high degree of secondary function have a deeper and poss~bly narrower 
I 
conscious field, and show lower flexibility of response,! but have richer 
evocations of past experience. l 
But if we e:xa.mine the portraits which emerge, ! hen it seems 
as though the primary functioner ought to be described ab the extravert 
I 
and the secondary functioner as the introvert. Examina~ion of an 
I 
! 
earlier publication by Eysenck (1953) shows that he alsoi regarded the 
I 
matter in this light. He writes that "primary and secondary function 
I 
I 
denote extraversion and introversion respectively. To lu.1ustrate this 
I 
I 
correspondence we may set do~m some of the traits found by Heymans and 
I 
Wiersma to be characteristic of persons in whom primary fid secondary 
functioning predominated. Those with predominantly prJnary functioning 
I 
are impulsive, give up easily, are always on the move, jpcose, super-
ficial, vain, demonstrative, tending to exaggerate, giveh to public 
I 
speaking, to teD.ing jokes and to laghing a lot. On thb other hand, 
the person with predominant secondary function is quiet,lpersistent, 
grave, shut-in, reliable, given to introspective th~, laughs little, 
has depressive tendencies, and is not given to indulge Ji pleasures of 
I 
the body11 (p.39). Yet Eysenck (1957) claims that 11it will be rem.em-
! 
bered that the term 11 secondary function11 is equivalent t~ 11 extraversion11 
in our/ •••••• 
!fl 
' i 
in our terminology" (p.198). J 
Clearly, Eysenck is in two minds about the eJG ct equivalence 
I 
of the sets of terms. The difficulty arises partly rrcln the fact that 
in Eysenck's system there is a clear distinction betwee1 e:x;prOssive 
activity and neurone excitability. Thus / in the M.P. ~· the extra vert 
is the person who agrees with statements that he is actile, quick, 
sociable, and so on, while in terms of neurone excitabil~ty he is at a 
lower level than the introvert. There is, thus, an inJrd and an out-
i 
ward face to Eysenck's description of introversion and ejxtroversion, and 
I 
It is not clear horr the external these two have to be kept distinct. 
I 
behaviour or actions of the individual come to be the rererse of the 
. I • in 
'X degree of neurone.excitation. Eysenck essays an explanation terms of 
learning theory. The introvert acquires, by condition~, the mores of 
the society in which he lives more strongly than the ext~vert. He is, 
in the social sense, more inhibited. But this view sugkests that the 
I 
prime function of ac~lturation is inhibition of socialli expressive 
I . 
behaviour. Is not the contrary equally true? We shall not enter into 
this question at this stage, because we wish merely to piint out the source 
of the confusion about the equivalence of the two sets o} terms. In 
the Wiersma-Heymans theory of temperament, on the other iand, the person 
. I 
who is most excitable in expressive behaviour is the person whose neurones 
I 
are most excitable, too. 
nal faces. 
I 
There is no reversal of the e±ternal and inter-
I 
I 
In spite of the confusion, we shall accept Eysenck's most 
(1957) solution, rather than his older (1953) soluiion. The recent 
primary functioner will be1 for us, the introvert. The secondary func-
tioner will be, for this chapter, the extravert. These are the hypo-
theses which we shall test~ 
The tests which we shall use are some of thoselfound by 
Biesheuvel and Pitt (1955) to be highly saturated with f exibility and 
I 
unstructured motor speed. These two experimenters had their subjects 
(all of whom were members of the N.I.P.R.) rated in ordel of primariness 
by 25 assessors. The total number of subjects was only slightly over 
501 but the fact that they were all well known to EB.ch other was though to 
coltribute/ ••••••• 
I 
L-------------------------------- -- L 
lf1 
contribute to the validity of the ratings. Subjects' were asked to 
complete a battery of psychomotor tests. These were: voluntary and 
maximum tapping speed; drawing crosses; walking speed; talking speed; 
sorting (of discs into compartments according to symbol); formboard; 
pursuit (of weaving intersecting lines); repeated letters (subjects had 
to ring every letter which was the same as its predecess~r); and identi-
cal pictures (subjects had to recognise one of a set off ight pictures). 
Two factors were identified: unstructured motor speed d flexibility 
of "behaviour at a more discriminative level". The fi 
1
st factor, 
unstructured motor speed, had high loadings on alpha ryt1hm, maximum and 
voluntary tapping speed, speed of crosses, and ratings o~ primariness. 
The seconds factor, flexibility, had high loadings on repeated letters, 
crosses, pursuit, sorting, and ratings on prjmariness. I 
Mundy-8astle (1955) suggests that beha~iour chkracterised by 
I 
the first factor, unstructured motor speed, originates a~ a thalamic 
level; but behaviour character ised by the second facto~, flexibility, 
involves high level discriminatory processes and originabes at a cortical 
I 
level. h Behaviour characterised by factor one is associlted witp maximal 
alpha cythm, whereas behaviour cha~acterised by factor rwo is associated 
with minimal alpha rhythm. Alpha rhythm is known to blbck when a tten-
tion and readiness to discriminate are high. Mundy-Cashle is extra-
polating from known intra-individual changes with changek of set to 
explain inter-individual differences in discriminative a ility. 
In our experiment, since several other tests re already 
being taken by the subjects in addition to the rather e ensive time 
judgement tests, the psychomotor battery had to be pared to a bare mini-
mum. This is unfortunate. No doubt a much more exten ive study than 
the one about to be reported is necessary to settle the lssue. But the 
results obtained here may be taken as indications. 
10.2 ttvpotheses 
The hypotheses set up were as follows:-
(a) Extraversion is positively correlated with secondary function-
ing. That is, it is negatively correlated wi h speed of per-
or.ma.nee/ ••••••• 
performance in tasks involving flexibility. 
(b) Speed in perfomance of tasks involving "mobility and plasticity 
of behaviour at a more discriminative level" is positively 
related to time reproduced. 
(c) Speed (in tasks saturated with both flexibility and unstructured 
motor speed) i~ related to the speed of linear ann movement in 
reproducing time. This prediction is made on the basis of 
Biesheuvel and Pitt's (1955) demonstration of a general speed 
factor for unstructured motor activity involving (among other 
things) speed of limb movements (as in gestures and in wallJ:ing). 
The flexibility measures are included in the hypothesis because 
of the possibility that speed of movement in reproducing time by 
linear movement is a discriminative function and not merely an 
unstructured motor speed characteristic. 
10.3 Experiment 
l0.3. 1 Subjects and Method 
,,, 
The subjects used in this experiment are those who completed two 
sessions of testing in Experiment 2. The subjects, and the method of testing 
their time judgements by free linear arm movements are described in detail in 
Chapter 3. Results of both sessions were used. Immediately after completing 
the reproduction series, and after filling in the Maudsley Extraversion Scale, 
each subject was given two tests of unstructured motor speed and two tests of 
secondary functioning (flexibility}. 
Preferred rate of tapping and maximum rate of tapping were used as 
tests of unstructured motor speed. The subject was asked to tap a key (which 
was in series with a counter which recorded the number of taps) at a preferred 
rate. "When I give you the signal, tap the key at any rate which seems 
natural to you. Continue tapping until I give you the signal to stop". 
:Each subject tapped the key for one minute. After this, the subject was 
asked to tap the key as fast as possible. "When I give you the signal, tap 
the key as fast as you possibly can until I tell you to stop". Again, 
each subject tapped the key for a minute. 
S~eed of handwriting and rate of making crosses were the two tests 
of secondary functioning used. Speed of handwriting was measured by 
asking the subject to take down a passage of 50 words of prose at speed, 
"as in taking notes from a rapid lecturer". The time taken to write down 
the passage was recorded. Speed of crossing wa~ measured by asking the 
subject to make as many crosses as possible in a given period of one 
minute on a paper divided into 5 mm squares. 
l0.3. 2 Results 
The full results of all the tests of speed are listed in 
Appendix B, Table LXII. 
The first step taken was to correlate all the speed scores 
with/ •....•.... 
i 
with extraversion scores, listed in Table LX. 














pref erred speed 
Tapping 
maxi.mum speed 
-.13 -.07 -.dl -.14 
I 
I 
Though the correlations are all in the expect~d negative direc-
tion, not one of them is significant. It is possible ~hat each task 
would have to be continued for a longer period before s:ilgnificant correla-
tion could be obtained, : 
The measures of speed were then correlated wi~h free linear 
movement reproduction of time and with verbal estimates.I The product-
moment correlations arre shown below in Table 49. l 
I 
TABLE 49 
Correlations of secondary functioning (speed of handwrit
1
ing and making 
I 
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The correlations are all in the expected dire,tion, positive, 
but none of them is significant. They all indicate th~t subjects who 
I 
tend to be fast in discriminative tasks also tend to reJroduce time at a 
higher level. The positive correlations between speed lor flexibility 
measures here and the negative correlations bet"""n spe+ of fiexibiJity 
measures and extraversion are consistent with our hypotHeses. 
The next step was to correlate speed of linea~ arm mo-.-nt in 
reproducing the time signals and the various measures oJ unstructured 
motor speed and of flexibility. These correlations arej shown in Table 
50 below. 
TABLE 50 
















.oo I .oo 
' I 
i 
These correlations are very low indeed. Thelonly course one 
! 
can take is to accept the null hypothesis that there is [no relationship 
between speed of arm movement and the other measures of lspeed used in 
this experiment. In the discussion it will be shown trlat this finding 
I 
is in agreement with the results of many other e.x:perimeJters. Indeed, 
Biesheuvel and Pitt are among the very few recent researchers to obtain 
I 
general speed factors. Their work is exceptional. It was decided to 
! 
I 
correlate the tempo tests of unstructured motor speed arid flexibility to 
I 
' ' 
see whether, in our results, correlations of the same o!fder as those 
' 
I 
obtained by Biesheuvel and Pitts would obtain. In Tab~e 51 are the 
! 
results of the correlations of the data obtained in the [present e.x:peri-
! 
ment. Below that, in Table 52, are the results obtained by Biesheuvel 
and Pitt. 
TABLE 51 
Correlations of unstructured motor speed and flexibility in the present 
experiment (Experiment 2) 
1. Pref erred tapping speed 
2. Maximum. tapping speed 
3. Crosses 
4. Handwriting speed 






Correlations of unstructured motor speed and 
ment of Biesheuvel and Pitt. 
1 
1. Pref erred tapping speed 
2. Maxim.um. tapping speed 
3. Crosses 

















The correlations obtained by Biesheuvel and P~tt are, on the 
I 
whole, a little higher than those obtained in the preseni't experiment, 
but not ve:grmuch so. Their factors are drawn from corr~lations which 
are in many instances not statistically significant. I 
l0.3.3 Discussion 1 
! 
The first hypothesis set up is that extraversi~n is negatively 
correlated with primariness, as measured by speed of, e s~ecially, func-
tions involving discrimination and attention. This hyp~thesis is sup~ 
i 
ported to the extent that the signs of the correlations ~etween speed of 
. I 
crossing and speed of handwriting on the one hand ahd e~raversion on the 
I 
I 
other hand are negative. The corr.elations between ext~jversion and 
unstructured motor speed are also negative but not stat~stically signi-
ficant. Rechtscha:ffen (1958) has also shown that the c!orrelation between 
I 
I 
extraversion and performance of a speed task involving discrimination 
(reversed alphabet writing), is negative but not signifJcant. But it 
is possible that reactive inhibition takes a longer tim~ to produce 
significant differences in the expected direction. Th~ tasks which we 
have used may be far too brief to show up real differenJes. Eysenck 
I 
(1962) produces a considerable amount of evidence to shqw that reactive 
I 
I 
inhibition generates more rapidly and dissipates more s~owly among extra-
i 
verts, and even Becker (1960) in a series of experiment~ giving results 
I 
very unfavourable to Eysenck's views, found significant :differences 




Though our results do not confirm the first lJpothesis, they 
do not appear to be extensive enough to lead to a rejecJion of it. 
The second hypothesis was that prima.riness (a~ measured by 
flexibility) correlates positively with reproduction of ltime. The 
i 
reason for this hypothesis is that Eysenck has identified pr:imariness 
I 
I 
with introversion. According to his theory, introverts develop stronger 
excitatory processes and generate inhibition more slow~. In the Heymans-
Wiersma. theory, primariness is also associated with grelter excitability, 
and Mundy-Castle (1955) advances the view that the pr~-secondary 







characteristic 11 • As with the first hypothesis, the co~relations are 
I 
in the e.xpected .. direction but are not significant. AgPjin, it is pos-
1 
sible that significant positive correlations would be fdund if the 
; 
testing had been more protracted. 
; 
It is po~sible that !testing must 
! 
last for a certain time before the reactive inhibition generated is 
! 
sufficient to disctiminate between ex:traverts ~nd intro~erts. 
i 
The third hypothesis was that speed of linear ~ovement in 
' 
reproducing time is related to primariness (either as m~sured by 
I 
' 
flexibility or as measured by unstructured motor speed).j The reason 
for the doubt was that it is not certain whether speed of linear arm 
! 
movement during reproduction of time reflects speed at ~ "more dis-
: 
criminative level11 or whether it reflects only habitual !lower level 
tempo. Again, the correlations were in the expected dijrection, but 
statistically not significant. Again, we can only reit;erate our 
point that more protracted testing might reveal differences in time 
I 
I 
judgement related to differences in primariness. All t:he speed 
I 
' 
variables in our e.xperiment, except speed of handwriting and preferred 
I 
ti? 
tapping speed, were positively related. The correlati~n between speed 
I 
of handwriting and preferred tapping speed was close to !zero (-.01). 
I 
When the correlations obtained in the present e.xperiment were compared 
I 
I 
with those obtained by Biesheuvel and Pitt, they were fqund to be 
I 
slightly lower. 
It may be pointed out here that the isolation !of two general 
speed factors by Biesheuveland Pitt is rather exceptional, as a review 
I 
of the literature shows. Most authors have found rath~r limited speed 
i 
factors, confined to certain classes of activity. I 
I 
I ' One of the most thorough studies of speed of ~xpressive move-
i 
ment was conducted by All port and Vernon (1933). The~ studies 45 
original measures of speed, but reduced the number to id in the course 
I 
i 
of the e.xperiment. These were reading, counting, hand1iriting, black-
i 
board writing, drawing on paper, foot drawing, finger atjd hand tapping, 
I 
leg tapping, stylus compression, walking, strolling, esJimating dis-
i 
I 






These movements were measured at three separate 
I 
session~ taken four 
I 
weeks apart. From the results it appears that there is no general 
I 
speed factor, though there are three fairly broad facto~s covering verbal 
I 
speed, drawing speed, and rhythmic speed. The average jintercorrela-
tion of ·all speed items was .05, which the authors take ~o show that 
it is very doubtful whether we can speak of a general s~eed factor. 
If.we consider the six correlations of speed in Tables 51 and 52, then 
I 
the average for the present experiment is found to be .~J and the 
average for the Biesheuvel and Pitt experiment is found ~o be .22. 
I 
I 
These are higher than the Allport and Vernon average, b~t they are 
still so low (considering that they cover a rather limit:ed number of 
speed functions) that they support the conclusion that ~t is unlikely 
that there is a general speed factor. But, Allport andl Vernon found, 
when the speed functions were grouped very ~high average] intercorrela-
' 
tions were found. Th · t 1 t · f b 1 d e average J.n ercorre a ion o veJ a spee was 
+.77; drawing speed was also +.77; and rhythmic speed ~as +.90. 
I 
Further analysis of the data enabled the authors to deteict three factors 
I 
which they identified as an areal (or expansive) factor,! a centrifugal 
factor, and a factor of emphasis in movement. Nine variable were 
i 
attributed to the areal factor. They were area of writ~, total area 
of figures, area of blackboard figures, slowness of dra~g, area of 
! 
foor squares, overestimation of angles, ratings on movem~nt during 
idleness (restlessness length of self-rating checks, an~ length of 
walking strides. The average correlation of each item ~th the sum of 
the other eight is +.51. The centrifugal factor was made up of over-
estimation of distance from body-..:i.th legs, overestimat~ln of distance 
from body with hands, extent of cubes, underestimation o~ weights, 
verbal speed, underestimation of distance towards body wh.th hands, and 
ratings of speech fluency. The av~e correlation of ~ach item with 
the sum of the other six is +.47. The third factor, th~t of emphasis, 
was made up of ratings of voice intensity, fewness of pa~allel lines 
drawn, ratings of movements during sp.eech, writing press~e, over-









forcefulness, overestimation of angles, pressure of resting hand, and 
. ! 
unoccupied space in drawing figures. The average corrJJ.ation of each 
x compotjent with the smn of the other twelve is .p.45. J this analysis, 
some speed measures are placed in a broad context of exrlressive style. 
Slowness of drawing is found to relate to the areal facJor, verbal 
' 
speed is found to relate to the centrifugal factor, and !,verbal slow-
! 
ness to the factor of emphasis. The other speed items jare not rele-
1 
vent to the expressive factors. Allport and Vernon sh~ that many of 
I 
I 
the speed measures correlate more highly with non-speed reasures than 
with each other. In short, they conclude, physical ca,egories of move-
ment are unsuitable models for the psychological study ol expression. 
This valuable study by Allport and Vernon is cJonfirmed in 
some of its details (no other study of such a broad and bformative ~ ,, 
scope has been conducted). Harrison (194J.), studying +• relation-
ship between maximum and voluntary rates of movement in i variety of 
tasks, found no indication of a general speed trait at efther preferred 
or maximal rates of behaviour. Pierson and Rasch (196ol) found that 
I 
subjects ranking high for reaction time and movement ti.1+ in one part 
of the body also tended to rank high for other parts. ~rm extension, 
I 
arm flexion, and overall body speed were measured. It ~s found that 
I 
I 
there is a general factor in reaction time and movement time and that 
there is a low, statistically significant relationship bltween reaction 
time and movement time. Pemberton (1952) did not find ~ decisive 
relationship between perceptual speed and temperament, a~ demanded by 
I 
the Haymans-Wiersma theory of temperament. But she f orined the impres-
1 
sion that those who scored high on the factor were unsys}ematic and 
reacted immediately to outside stimuli, liked variety an~ contrast, 
I 
often acted without considering the consequences, and had changeable 
- moods. If these impressions may be accepted as evidencl, then they 
confirm Wiersma 1 s (1906) contention that the temperamentll component 
of perceptual speed is freedom from inertia. The last lwo studies 
mentioned are too limited in scope to give any indicatiohs as to the 
generality of the speed factors which they represent. I 
I Adams (1935), in a more extensive study of speed in various 
activities/ •••••• 
activities ·(preferred and maximum tapping speed, card sorting, pre-
ferred and maximum handwriting speed, maximum cancellatlon speed and 
speed of arithmetic addition) found that each speed was reliable, but 
that there was no general speed factor. Rimoldi (1951) in a study of 
59 tests of tempo, ranging from simple motor skills to Jental activi-
ties, found that each, test was reliable, but that there las no general 
X factor of telI).po. '4 found nine speed factors: (a) Jarge movements 
of the trunk and limbs; (b) small movements; (c) verbJl speed and 
: 
speed of perception; (d) motor activity; (e) drawing .Jith the foot; 
I 
(f) metronome test; (g) reaction time; (h) performancJ with the hands; 
and (i) space and reasoning. Four second-order factorJ were extracted. 
i 
(ii) spe,d of perception; These were (i) speed of all motor activities; 
' 
{iii) speed of comiition; and (iv) reaction t:Un.e. : 
It is possible that factor (i) corresponds to ithe Biesheuvel 
I 
and Pitt factor of unstructured motor speed and that fadtor (iii) 
corresponds to the Biesheuvel and Pitt factor of flexib~lity. But 
these more extensive experiments caution one against toJ expansive a 
concept of primary-secondary functioning. It is clear rhat the fac-
tors entering into this concept must still be analysed tn considerable 
detail. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
All subjects who had completed two sessions o.:fi time judging 
in Experiment 2 were also asked to take tests of handwr"ting speed and 
speed of filling in crosses on squared paper, which are thought to be 
related to secondary functioning; and preferred and maximum tapping 
speed, which are thought to be measures of unstructured !motor speed. 
In the discussion of results, some doubt was e.x;pressed about the 
generality of these two factors. 
Three hypotheses were tested with these results. 
If/ 
(a) That secondary functioning is positively related to e:x:traver-
sion. 
(b) That secondary functioning is negatively related to time repro-
duced, since it has been identified (by Eysenck, 1957) with 
extra version. 
(c) That speed of linear movement in reproducing time is posi-
tively related to other measures of speed. 
The correlations were all in the expected directions, but 
none were significant. The null hypothesis has to be accepted in 
each case, but it is suggested that more protracted testing might pro-
duce significant results. .It is borne in mind that reactive inhibi-
tion takes some time to develop to the level when it will lead to dis-
crimination between extraverts and introverts. 
CHAPTER 11 
MANIFEST ANXIETY AND TIME JUDGEMENTS 
11.1 Introduction 
The argument in this chapter will fall under three ma.in 
divisions. Firstly, an attempt will be ma.de to show that drive 
variables affect time judgements. Secondly, by reference to the 
literature, the merits of treating Manifest Anxiety as a drive variable 
will be considered. Thirdly, the results of an experiment in which 
Ma.nif est Anxiety and time judgement are related will be discussed. 
11.2 Drive Variables and Time Judgement. 
The drive variable 11need-tension11 was studied in relationship 
to estimation of time by Rosenzweig and Koht (1935). It was argued 
by them that need-tension was greater when subjects were working at an 
insoluble problem presented to them as an intelligence test than when 
it was presented to them a~ a practice task. It was found that time 
estimates under the former conditions - when need-tension was presumably 
high - were lower than under the latter conditions. The authors 
explained this as an effect of wanting time to pass more slowly under 
test conditions and wanting time to pass more rapidly under practice 
conditions. These results have been questioned by Meade (1960), who 
found no difference between the time estimates of high and low need-
tension groups. He found that the first trial was always estimated 
longer than the second, and attributed the results of Rosezweig and 
~oht to neglect of this factor. Reference to the results obtained in 
the present experiment (Experiment 2) shows that this is not invariably 
so. First and second session verbal estimates of 8 seconds were 10.9 
seconds and 10.1 seconds, respectively. First and second session 
verbal estimates of 16 seconds were 19.7 and 20.2 seconds, respectively. 
In neither case is the difference significant. Of course, it is pos-
sible that in the judgement of much longer intervals, such as those 
used in the above experiments, there may be substantial increases from 
the first to the second session. But our results do make it clear 
that the statement by Meade that this is invariably so needs to be 
limited/ •••••• 
limited. Schonbach (1959) has tested and confirmed the hypothesis 
that, in a barrier situation, the greater the forae acting on the sub-
ject to reach a goal, the greater the estimation of the time spent 
within the barrier situation. This is very much the situation of the 
subjects in Rosenzweig and Koht 1s experiment. Those who were per-
forming the practice task and those who were performing the intelli-
gence test were both in barrier situations, since the task was insoluble. 
But in the latter case the force to reach to goal was presumably much 
greater. Schonbach went further and argued that the force acting on 
I'\ 
x a person in a barrier situation in an increasing function of the perso~s 
need for the goal and the relevance of his ideation with respect to the 
goal. In the main part of his experiment, Schonbach deprived subjects 
of food to increase their need, and insured relevant ideation by pro-
viding magazines and cookery books lavishly illustrated with food pie-
tures while the subjects were waiting. His conclusions may be regarded 
as an addition to, and an affirmation of, the conclusions of Rosenzweig 
and Koht. 
Closely related to the perception of time under motivation in 
a barrier situation is the perception of time as a function of perceived 
rate of progress towards a goal. Filer and Meals (1949) found that 
subjects motivated by an attractive reward to complete the task esti-
mated the task as taking a longer time than subjects without a definite 
goal. Meade (1959) found that subjects not motivated to complete the 
task perceived duration as unrelated to either rate of locomotion or 
to distance from the end of the task. The task used was a stylus 
maze. Subjects who were motivated to complete the task perceived dura-
tion as inversely related to rate of progress and distance from the 
goal. This result wa:s confirmed when a puzzle was used instead of ac 
stylus maze (Meade, 1960). If one interpreted rate of progress as 
the barrier in this task (low rate of progress corresponding to firm 
barrier, high rate of progress corresponding to weak barrier) then 
the results are in accord with those of Schonbach. The greater the 
rate of progress, the weaker the barrier, the lower the estimate of 
time. Hindle (1950) investigated time estimates as a function of the 
relative/ •••••••• 
1'14( 
relative clarity of the goal and of the distance travelled. During 
the latter part of the task, when it leads to a clearly defined goal, 
estimates of time spent increase more slowly relative to actual time 
spent than when there is no clear goal. This appe~rs at first sight 
to disagree with the result of Filer and Meals (1949) who found that 
there was greater overestimation among those approaching the goal. 
But there are important differences. In Hindle's experiment the 
variable was the clarity of the goal, in Filer and Meals' experiment 
the variable was the attractiveness of the goal. In the former case, 
the clarity of the goal was a weakening of the barrier. In the latter 
case, it is possible that the nearer the subject gets to an attractive 
goal, the stronger his fear that he will lose it. The barrier of 
fear may get stronger as the subject approaches a very attractive goal. 
N.E. Miller (1944) has shown in a number of illuminating studies that 
the motive increases in strength as the goal is approached. If we 
assume that fear of failure acts as a barrier, and that fear of failure 
is (at least in part) determined by the strength of the motive (Fear 
of failure = f (D) ), then the subject approaching an attractive goal 
may be compared to a person placed in a barrier situation which grows 
firmer as motivation rises. Another experiment of some relevance to 
these comments on perceived rate of progress in relation to perceived 
duration, is that of Langer and others (1961), who found that approach 
to danger produced overestimation. In their experiment, estimates 
were not conveyed verbally, but by the method of production which is, 
as we have seen, negatively correlated with verbal estimates. Sub-
jects were placed in a chair moving towards a fall, and were required 
to stop the chair, by pushing a button, when 5 seconds had passed. 
The average subject pushed the button too soon. This experiment is 
complicated by the simple fact that :· pushing the button may express 
the subject's desire to stop the movement, rather than his judgement 
of time. 
Estimation of length of a time interval may obey the same 
rule as estimation o~ si~e and brightness. An early experiment in 
this field found that children who were asked to adjust the. size of a 
disc of light to equal the sizes of coins and cardboard discs, made 
the circle of light too large when they were judging coins, but not 
when/. .. . . .. ~ . 11 • • • ~ • 
,,, 
when they were judging cardboard discs (Bruner and Goodman, 1947). 
It was also found that, the greater the value of the coin, the greater 
the degree of overestimation. Children from poor homes overestimated 
more than children from well-to-do homes. It may be remarked here that 
the same results have not always been obtained by other experimenters. 
Beams (1954) found that children estimated the sizes of foods they liked 
as relatively larger than those they disliked. Gilchrist and Nesberg 
(1952), working with adults, found that hungry and thirsty observers 
perceived pictures of food and drink as being relatively brighter than 
unrelated pictures. The estimates of brightness increased steadily in 
size until the observers had been eight hours without drinking. After 
being allowed to drink all they wanted, the level of brightness esti-
mated fell to the level found at the commencement of the experiment. 
These situations are very much like the baITier situation employed by 
Schonbach. The subjects are judging qualities of things they would 
like to have. In none of these situations is the judgement directed to 
an essential attribute of the thing judged, and in none of these situa-
tions is the judgement instrumental in securing release from the barrier 
situation. An experimenter who asks "How long (bright, heavy, bit) did 
it ~ to you11 will probably get different results from one who stresses 
"How long do you think it actually was. Be as accurate as you can. 11 
An experimenter who carries this stress further by rewarding accuracy 
will probably get rather different results from the free situation in 
which the perception (or judgement) carries no penalties or serves no 
essential instrumental purpose. 
Most of the work reviewed has been done with verbal estimates 
of time. We have shown in detail what common understanding clearly 
leads one to suspect: that verbal estimates are not good indicators of 
the time experience of the subjects. For this reason, the work revievred 
can be accepted as an indication of what may happen, but it cannot be 
accepted as conclusive in any sense. But, making do with what we have, 
what general principle, if any, can be derived? We may hazard the 
suggestion that when the attention of the subject is focussed on the 
time interval (time which no instrumental act can abbreviate) which he 
spends in a barrier situation, for example, estimation is likely to be 
high/ •••••••••• 
high. On the other hand, when the subject's attention is focussed 
entirely on a task, estimation of time is likely to be low. There must 
be, as Fraisse has remarked in a statement which has already been quoted, 
an activity which exactly satisfies the motivation preseht for the sub-
ject to be unaware of the passage of time. 
There is a difficulty that, where the subject is unaware of 
the flow of time, in the sense that he is unoppressed by it, or occupied 
by some task, he may still be relatively accurate in his time judge-
ments. One would expect that the more educated the subject is, the 
less subject he would be to errors of this kind. Time judgement of this 
kind is an abstract operation. Cohen and Mezey (1961) have observed 
rate of tapping, reproduction of time, verbal estimate of a signal, and 
verbal estimate of time more actively employed, under two conditions. 
The subjects were 24 doctors. Under the first condition, they were 
about to address a critical audience, and under the second condition, 
they were engaged in the normal routine of duty. Though the subjects 
reported subjective distortion of awareness of time, none of the measured 
variables was affected. This illustrates the difficulty that might be .. 
encountered among intelligent subjects. Another factor which might be 
of importance is the cognitive style predominating. These were discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
But, be~ring these difficulties in mind, the hypothesis is set 
up that where the subject's attention is directed to the judgement of 
the time interval (and not to some task occupying that interval), an 
increase in drive level will bring about an increase in the judged dura-
tion of that interval. 
11.3 Manifest Anxiety as a Drive Variable 
It has been stated quite emphatically by Janet Taylor that 
11the construction of the test (M.A.S.) was not aimed at developing a 
clinically useful test which would diagnose anxiety, but rather was 
designed solely to select Ss differing in general drive level 11 (1956, 
p. 303). The selection of subjects differing in general drive level is 
important in testing various aspects of Hull's (1943) system. Accord-
ing to Hull, the effect of an increase in drive level is to increase the 
excitatory/ •••••••• 
111 
excitatory potential, since drive and habit strength combine multipli-
catively. 
E=f (HxD). 
The total effective drive is, according to Hull, determined by 
both relevant and irrelevant drives present. Excitatory potential 
determines, to a large extent, the response strength. Therefore, an 
increase in drive should increase the strength of the response. 
R = f (E) 
where E is the value of excitatory potential after the inhibitory effects 
of oscillation 0 and threshold 1 have been subtracted from E. 
Another function of a rise in drive may be that several com;;. 
peting reaction potentials are raised above threshold. This might 
result in an increase in variability of ·response which will occur only 
in the early stages of an experiment in which one particular response 
is consistently reinforced, but throughout an experiment in which no 
particular response is reinforced. In Hull's behavioural system it 
is proposed that the range of behavioural oscillation is not affected 
by the level of habit strength, but other evidence suggests that 11the 
range of oscillation is a diminishing function of habit strength11 
(J.G. Taylor, 1949). J.G. Taylor proposes that oscillation is posi-
tively related to drive and that it remains unaffected by practice in 
a task in which there is no primary reinforcement; but that oscilla-
tion is reduced when primary reinforcement is introduced. 
How does all this apply to the experiments on time judgement? 
The first application is that an increase in drive might be expected to 
raise the level of the response, by increasing reaction potential. 
The second application is that an increase in drive can be expected to 
result in an increase in oscillation, or variability of response. 
Janet Taylor has stated that the anxiety scale which she has developed 
is a measure of drive. If this is true, then subjects who have high 
M.A.S. scores ought to be more variable in their responses and ought 
to have higher time reproduction scores. We may consider some of the 
evidence for accepting the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale as a measure 
of drive. 
There is some difference of opinion as to whether the Taylor 
M.A.S. Measures chronic drive or differences in emotional reaction. 
On the basis of electromyographic studie~, which show that high M.A.S. 
subjects/ •••••• 
'"' 
jects exhibit greater muscular tension, even at rest, Rossi (1959) has 
concluded that chronic drive is measured by the M.A.S. This was the 
original opinion of Taylor as well (1951), though nn no very clear 
grounds. On the basis of defensive conditioning experiments, Spence 
and others (1954) have advanced the view that high and low scorers may 
differ in readiness with which emotional response is aroused. 
A number of studies of eyelid conditioning tend to show that 
high M.A.s. scorers condition more rapidly than low scorers (Spence and 
Farber, 1954; Spence, Farber and Taylor, 1954; Spence and Taylor, 1951; 
Spence and Taylor, 1953). In these experiments extremely high and extre-
mely low scorers were contrasted. Hilgard, Jones and Kaplan (1951), 
. 
K using small groups of only t" subjects, found differences in eyelid condi-
tioning in the expected direction, but the correlations were insignificant. 
'!hey found differential conditioning to be negatively related to M.A.S. 
score, which is contrary to prediction from the Hullian theory. But 
Spence and Beecroft (1954) and Spence and Farber (1954), using rather 
larger groups, have found evidence which is in the ~redicted direction and 
is not in agreement with the results of Hilgard, Jones and Kaplan... '!hey 
found that excitatory potential aroused by the positive conditioned stimu-
lus during both simple and differential conditioning was greater for the 
high M.A.S. scorers. Furthermore, they found that high M.A.S. scorers 
showed greater discrimination between positive and negative stimuli. 
Bitterman and Holzman (1952) divided 37 university students 
into upper and lower 50% according to their scores on various anxiety 
indices derived from Rorschach data, 5~point rating, and performance 
under stress. They studied the rate of PGR conditioning in the two 
groups. 'Ihe PGR conditioned to shock more readily and extinguished less 
readily in the high anxiety group than in the low. '!his shows that 
anxiety rating on other indices tends to give the same results as rating 
on the M.A.s., thus strengthening our faith in the M.A.s. as a measure of 
drive. 
Learning of verbal and stylus mazes has also shown expected 
differences (in terms of Hullian learning theory) between lowr:and high 
M.A.S. scorers, according to Taylor and Spence (1952). Anxious subjects 
tend to show greater oscillation of response and take more trials in 
learning/ •••••••••• 
H1 
learning a verbal maze. Spence and Farber (1953) have shown the same 
effects on a stylus maze. It may becrlded that the study of stylus maze 
learning by Axelrod, Cowen and Heilizer (1956) has produced contradictory 
evidence. The data on verbal and stylus mazes, if one accepts them, seem 
to show that M.A.S. may be treated as a chronic difference in drive. 
The study by Spence and Farber (1953) shows that the difference between 
high and low M.A.S. scorers remains the same under three intensities of 
unconditioned stimulus in eyelid conditioning. This is interpreted as 
demonstrating that drive arousal does not depend on situation. Deese, 
Lazarus and Keenan (1953) found that low M.A.S. subjects performed worse 
in an avoidance conditioning experiment than in a non-avoidance condi-
tioning experiment, but that high M.A.S. subjects performed slJ.ghtly 
better. They explain the observed differences between high and l.Ow 
M.A.S. subjects in eyelid conditioning as due to the fall in performance 
by low M.A.S. scorers rather than a rise in performance by high M.A.S. 
scorers. 
It appears that high M.A.S. scorers are superior in paired 
learning of nonsense syllables to low scorers (Taylor and Chapiftan, 1955). 
This is thought to be because of the greater excitatory potential in a 
non-competitional response situation aroused in high M.A.5. scorers. 
Quite a different explanation of some learning effects might 
be made in terms of the finding by Voas (1956) that more intelligent sub-
jects tend to have lower M.A.S. scores. Where the subjects are drawn 
from a heterogeneous population subjects with high intelligence scores 
tend to concentrate in the lower 50% of the M.A.S. scores. This could 
account for the low verbal and stylus maze learning scores of high M.A.S. 
subjects in some experiments. Taylor st~tes, though, that this is not 
a danger when the population is relatively homogenous, and the experiment 
by Taylor and Chapman (1955) quoted above appears to affirm this. 
Eysenck (1957) has criticised the Taylor M.A.S. on the grounds 
that it includes two orthogonal dimensions, since it correlates with both 
neuroticism (+.77) and extraversion (-e35). He advances the argument 
that the superior conditionability of high M.A.S. scorers may be due to 
the presence of the extraversion dimension in their scores. Taylor and 
Rechtschaffen (1959) report a correlation of only -.188 in their sample, 
between/ •••••••••• 
J(. 
between the Guilford R scale and the Taylor M.A.s., which makes Eysenck's 
explanation rather improbable. Furthermore, in a reversed alphabet 
writing task, performance correlated negatively with M.A.S. score and 
not positively, as would be expected if extraversion played a significant 
pa.rt in determining performance (Taylor and Rechtschaffen, 1959). Extra-
version (low M.A.S.) would be associated with high reactive inP.ibition and 
low score, but introversion (high M.A.S.) would be associated with low 
reactive inhibition and high score, if Eysenck's objections were valid. 
These e,Xperiments are somewhat tangential. The main point appears to be 
that the correlation between M.P.I. extraversion and M.A.S. is not high 
enough to account for the effects produced by differences in M.A.S. scores. 
A factor analysis of the 50-item Taylor M.A.s. by O'Connor, 
Lorr, and Stafford (1956) has identified 5 factors: (a) chronic anxiety;, 
(b) physiologicai reactivity to emotional stimuli; (c) inner strain 
associated with sleep difficulty; (d) sense of personal inadequacy; and 
(e) motor tension. Taylor and Rechtscchaffen have replied to criticisms 
citing the test's multidimensionality with the argument that all the sub-
scale correlate negatively with performance and may be assumed to have 
drive properties. It may be pointed out here that a justification of the 
negative correlation between performance and drive is sought in the Yerkes-
Dodson (1908) law that an increase in drive in a complex task has a delet-
erious effect on performance. 
These arguments for treating manifest anxiety as a drive 
variable have all been derived from learning theory. No attempt has been 
made to evaluate score on the scale as a drive variable in perceptual-
motor tasks. One reason for this is, of course, that predictions based 
on a fairly well-developed theory may be made within the field of learning, 
and the Iowa school has been largely concerned with the exploration and 
confirmation of Hullian postulates. But there is no reason why M.A.S. 
score should not be used·in other situations. 
A review of the literature leaves onewith the impression that 
Spence, Taylor, Rechtschaffen and Farber seldom fail to confirm their 
hypotheses, using M.A.S. scores as drive variables. But there is a 
mixed voice from other experimenters. This is a puzzling and unfortunate 
situation./ •••••• 
situation. But there is no remedy except to set up hypotheses on the 
assumption that the Iowa School is right. These can then be proved or 
disproved, providing affirmation or infirmation of their views. 
11.4 Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis which will be set up is that M.A.S. score 
is positively related to time reproduced by linear movement. The first 
reason for this is that an increase in drive might be expected, in tenns 
of Hull's (1943) theory, to result in an increase in reaction potential 
and an increase in the strength of response. A second reason for this 
hypothesis may be couched in more general tenns. When the attention of 
the subject is focussed on the time interval and not on a task occupying 
that interval, an increase in drive might be expected to lead to an 
increased judgement of the duration of the interYal. 
The second hypothesis is that an increase in drive will lead 
to an increase in the variability of the response. Again, in te:rms of 
Hullian theory, oscillation of response (variability) is held to be an 
increasing function of drive. In an experiment such as ours, in which 
no particular response is reinforced, oscillation might be expected to 
continue at the same strength throughout the experiment, in tenns of the 
explanation put forward by J.G. Taylor (1949). 
11.5 Experiment 
11.5. 1 Subjects and Method 
The subjects used in this experiment were 38 of the subjects 
.2'1/ 
of Experiment 2 who had completed two sessions in which their time 
judgements were tested. Pull descriptions of the time judgement testing 
may be found in Chapter 3, Experiment 2. These subjects were also asked 
to fill in Taylor Manifest Anxiety questionnaires during their normal 
psychology laboratory periods. 
Very briefly, the subjects were 38 men and women first-year 
students of psychology. They attended two sessions in which their 
judgements of time were tested by free linear movement and verbal 
estimation/ ••••• 
tion. During a normal psychology laboratory session, some time before the 
time judgement experiments began, they were asked by their laboratory instru.c-
tor to fill in the Taylor Manifest Anxiety questionnaire, which consists of 50 
items phrased in such a way that the testee merely responds "yes" or "no". A 
copy of the scale is included in Appendix A. 
In addition, all 40 subjects participating in Experiment 3 filled 
in the Taylor Manifest Anxiety questionnaire in the presence of the experi-
menter at the end of the second time testing session, in which they had 
reproduced 8 seconds. The details of the time judging experiments are 
found in Chapter ;, Experiment 3. 
The subjects were 40 men and women drawn from various courses and 
various levels of seniority. Their time judgement was tested in four 
separate sessions by the methods of controlled linear movement and verbal 
estimation. 
Thus, the 38 subjects of Experiment 2 filled in the scale under 
group conditions and the 40 subjects of Experiment 3 filled in the scale 
under conditions of individual testing; but it is not expected that this 
affected results. 
11.5. 2 Results 
The results of Experiment 2 are tabled in Appendix B, Tables XLI 
and XLII. The results of Experiment 3 are tabled in Appendix B, Tables 
XLIII and XLIV. 
Product-moment correlations of Manifest Anxiety score and 
reproduced time, verbally estimated time, error in time judgement, and 
variability in time judgement were calculated and are shown below. 
TABLE 53 
!ime judgement correlates of Manifest Anxiety in Experiment 2. 
Signal Free linear Verbal Error in 
Error in 
movement reproduction estimate reproduction verbal estimate 
8 sec. -.20 -.11 +.14 -.07 
16 sec. -.23 -.10 +.21 -.04 
TABLE 53 (contd.) 
Signal Variability in Variability in reproduction verbal estimate 
8 sec. +.06 +.01 
16 sec. +.23 +.13 
None of the correlations listed above is s.tatistical 
null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between 
ly significant. The 
manifest I .... 
\ 
Manifest Anxiety and free Jincar movement reproduction of time signals, 
error in reproduction, variabiJity in reproduction, verbal estimate, 
error in verbal estimate, and variabiJity in verbal estimate must be 
accepted. Furthermore, the correlations between time judgement and 
Manifest ~nxiety are in the opposite direction to that expected. They 
are negative instead of positive. The correlations between variabiJity 
and Manifest Anxiety are in the expected direction. They are positive, 
but are so low~that they cannot be taken as reJiable evidence. 
Correlations between speed of movement, variabiJity in speed, 
and Manifest Anxiety were also calculated and are shown below. 
TABLE 51.,_ 
Correlations of speed, v ariabiµty in speed, end Manifest Anxiety in 
Experiment 2. 
Speed VariabiJity in speed 
-.os 
+ significant at 5% level of confidence 
Speed and variabiJity of speed are ?alculated from all responses 
in the first session. Since speed remains constant for all distances of 
movement and lengths of signal, each subject can be represented by one 
score for speed and variability in speed. 
The negative correlation between speed and Manifest Anxiety, 
though in an opposite direction to that predicted by the first hypothesis, 
is so cl..ose to Zero that it cannot be taken as indicative of a direction. 
The only significant correlate of Manifest Anxiety is variabiJity in 
speed. The correlation of +.39 is in the expected direction (in terms of 
the second hypothesis) and is significant at the 5% level. As we have 
already noted, all the correlations between variability scores and Mani-
fest Anxiety scores are in the expected direction, but this is the only 
significant correlation. 
The correlates of Manifest Anxiety in Experiment 3 were also 
calculated and are shown below. 
Table 55/ ••••••••• 
• 
TABLE 55 
Time judgement correlates of Manifest Anxiety in Experiment 3 
Signal Controlled l.m reproduction 
Verbal 
est. 
Error in Error in 








**significant at 1% 









The data in Table 55 support both hypotheses, though not 
conclusively. The correlation between time judgement and Manifest 
Anxiety is positive, as predicted, but only the correlation of +.49 
between Ma.nif est .Anxiety and verbal estimate is statistically signifi-
cant. And we have noted several times that verbal estimates are not, 
on the whole, informative. The correlation between variability and 
~ Manifest Anxiety is also positive, aSdema.nded by the second hypothesis, 
+.13 
+.33,* 
but only the correlation of +.33 between Manifest Anxiety and variability 
in the verbal estimate is statistically significant. 
It will be noticed that the correlations between verbal esti-
mate, reproduced time, and Manifest Anxiety reverse those obtained in 
Experiment 2, under conditions of free movement. A reference to Tables 
47 and 45 in the previous chapter, will show that the same reversal of 
correlation occurred when extraversion was studied in relation to time 
judgement. Free linear movement correlated +.21 and +.10 (at 8 and 16 
seconds, respectively) with extraversion. Controlled linear movement 
correlated -.20 and -.18 (at 8 and 16 seconds, respectively) with extra-
version. Unfortunately, in neither. the experiment with Manifest Anxiety, 
nor the experiment with extraversion, do the correlations achieve the 
level of significance required for us to draw conclusions from the 
reversal. 
ll.5.3 Discussion 
The ma.in peint of interest to us is the extent to which our 
hypotheses are supported. 
The first hypothesis, that the level of time judgement will 
correlate/ ••••••••••• 
-
correlate po~itively with Manifest Anxiety is supported by the results 
of the third experiment, but not by the results of the second. Bu'.t ill 
neither case are the correlations high enough to be more than indicative. 
The only significant correlation (.49, p('.,01) is that between verbal 
estimate of(l 16 seconds and Manifest Anxiety, but great reliance cannot 
be placed on any interpretation of the significance of verbal estimates. 
It seems best to accept the null hypothesis 1 that there is no relation-
ship between Manifest Anxiety and the reproduction of time by linear 
movement or by verbal estimation. 
The second hypothesis, that there is a positive relation be-
tween Manifest Anxiety and variability in performance, is supported by 
the fact that there are, throughout the two experiments, positive correla-
tions between all variability scores and Manifest Anxiety. The only two 
of these correlations (out of a total of 9) to reach sigri.ificance are 
~~11), 
X those between Manifest Anxiety and variability in speed~and Manifest 
Anxiety ~ and variability in verbal estimate of 16 seconds in Ex:peri-
ment 3 (+.33). Both of these correlations are significant at the 5% 
level. Because of these two significant correlations, it seems wise 
not to accept the null hypothesis, but at the same time we cannot too 
firmly assert that the hypothesis is confirmed. 
The positive correlation between anxiety score and variability 
is congruent with what is known about the effects of anxiety on behaviour, 
and also with what is knovm about the results of increasing drive strength 
in a situation in which no single response or strength of response is 
consistently reinf crced. 
When one examines the Taylor Manifest Anxiety questionnaire 
various items seem to explain the relationship of the scale to variability 
in motor performance without reference to drive. Consider:-
Q a. 
Q 34. 
I frequently notice my hand shakes when I try to do something. 
I have periods of such great restlessness that I cannot sit 
long in a chair. 
But these two items are not sufficient in a 50-item inventory 
to produce a positive correlation between variability in motor perfor-
ma.nee and the anxiety scale as a whole. 
To account/ •••••• 
To account for the variability in verbal performance attention 
may be drawn to the following item:-
Q 41. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job. 
But again, a single item can hardly account for the positive 
correlation between verbal estimate variability and the scale taken as 
a whole. It must be admitted, though, that the sca,le does contain some 
items which favour explanation of the observed phenomena without recourse 
to a drive variable. 
Attention may be drawn to the argument advanced by Taylor 
and Rechtschaffen (1959) in reply to criticism of the scale. They 
maintain that all the items reflect drive properties. By their argu-
ment, the hand tremor and the restlessness and the inability to keep the 
mind on the job reflect drive, It is logically a questionable prece-
dure to use hypotheses about the origin of predictor variables to 
explain the appearance of predicted variables. In other words, it is 
an unverified hypothesis, itself subject to verification, that agreement 
with the above items reflects drive only, or mainly drive, or even 
partly drive. But this hypothesis, without further verification, is 
used to explain results. The scale as a whole has been subjected to 
testing in learning experiments which do, at least, show that it has a 
certain construct validity. That is, the test as a whole may be inter-
preted as a measure of drive because it satisfies the requirements of 
such a measure in a theoretical network or system. 
Eysenck (1957) has criticised the experiments of the Iowa 
group on the grounds that it would be much simpler to manipulate a drive 
variable such as hunger or thirst. Franks (1957) has tested rate of 
eyeblink conditioning as a function of hunger and thirst (lS hour depriva-
tion), and found no difference between satiated and deprived subjects. 
This is an admirable technique for those who are able to persuade suffi-
cient numbers of subjects to deprive themselves of food and water for so 
long a period. And there is the added problem of the reliability of 
the subjects' reports on their deprivation. The truthfulness of the 
subject is, of course, always ·a problem in psychological experiments, but 
it is more likely to be found where the burden imposed is not too heavy. 
It also/ ••••••• 
It also appears that Manifest Anxiety measures chronic drive differences. 
level 
Subjects at high chronic driveAmay differ from subjects in whom an irre-
levant drive is aroused momentarily. In Hull's theory any irrelevant 
drive should have the effect of accelerating conditioning, and it is 
fair criticism to produce evidence that a particular irrelevant drive 
does not have that effect. But we must be clear that a chronic irrele-
vant drive, such as measured by Manifest Anxiety may operate in a different 
way to an ephemera.l drive. Furthermore, when the irrelevant drive 
becomes too strong, it may have a distracting effect. The subject, 
under strong drive, may no longer be interested in the experiment which 
is being performed. By shifting the whole area of the subject's 
interest, by focussing his attention on a new area, an irrelevant drive 
may retard learning. Instead of being an irrelevant drive, the drive 
may become ~ drive, and the other drives concomitant may become the 
irrelevant drives. In this way, a scale which measures drive disposi-
tion may have an advantage. 
There is an unsatisfactory ambiguity in the interpretation of 
x.. the results. We do not know whe~r we can at.tribute the positive correla-
tions between variability and Manifest Anxiety purely to the drive proper-
, 
ties measured • 
• 
Some reference to other literature should be made, to show 
that the results obtained here are not singular. Robertson (1958) 
found high-anxiety subjects to be more variable in their speed of turn-
ing a crank. Venables (1957) found neurotic drivers to be more incon-
·sistent. Taylor and Spence (1952) found greater variability of res-
ponse in learning a verbal maze to be associated with high anxiety score. 
These results are adduced merely to show that the correlations obtained 
between M.A.S. and variability in the present experiment are not excep-
tional. It appears that our first hypothesis must be rejected, but 
that our second hypothesis may be accepted with caution. There remains 
an ambiguity in interpretation of the results. The greater degree of 
error among anxious subjects (as indicated by positive though insignifi-
cant correlations between anxiety scores and error) is consistent with 
their greater variability of response. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Hypotheses were set up that (a) Taylor Manifest Anxiety scores 
(as measures of drive) would correlate positively with time judgement; 
and that (b) Taylor Manifest Anxiety scores (again as measures of drive) 
would correlate positively with variability of response. 
The time judgement scores drawn from two free linear movement 
reproduction sessions in Experiment 2 (38 subjects) and four controlled 
distance linear movement sessions in Experiment 3 (40 subjects) were used. 
Manifest Anxiety scores were correlated with linear movement reproduc-
tion time, error in reproduction time, variability in reproduction time, 
speed of linear movement in reproduction, variability of speed,i.erbal 
eatimate of duration of time signals, error in verbal estimate, and 
variability of verbal estimate. 
The relationship between Manifest Anxiety and time judgement; 
was inconsistent and not statistically significant. The null hypo-
thesis was accepted that there is no relationship between time judge-
ment and Manifest Anxiety. 
All correlations between variability of response and Manifest 
Anxiety were positive, and two were significant at 5%. These were the 
correlation between Manifest Anxiety and variability of speed of move-
ment (+.39) and between Manifest .Anxiety and variability of verbal esti-
x mate of 16 seconds in Experiment 3{tls)r.t was decided that these facts 
tentatively support hypothesis (b) that there is a positive correlation 
between Manifest Anxiety and variability of time judgement. 
The problem of deciding whether variability can properly be 
attributed to drive in general or to Manifest Anxiety score in particu-
lar was discussed, but no firm conclusion is possible. 
C H A P T E R 12 
ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION, TIME IlflAGERY AND TIME JUDGEMENT 
12. 1 Introduction 
.Some attempts have been made to relate both Achievement and 
preference for certain classes of time imagery to a "puritan pragmatic 
character syndrome" (Knapp, 1962) which finds expression in character-
istic ways of judging, among other things, time. This statement 
divides rather well into four questions. These are, the nature of 
x achievement motivation, the nature of the time ~aphor test, the 
relationship between/Achievement scores and metaphor scores, and the / n / 
relationship of both to time judgement. The evidence under each 
heading will be reviewed and considered below. 
12. 2 The nature of n Achievement 
Achievement motivation is thought to be a relatively stable 
result of the manner of ego involvement (Mcclelland and others, 1949) 
which is measured by its perceptual and expressive consequences. The 
perceptual effects of n Achievement, especially after failure, are 
similar to those produced by hunger, according to McClelland and others 
(1949). There is an increase in imagery associated with the particular 
need aroused. 
These perceptual consequences of n Achievement are demonstrated 
each time that protocols procured under neutral and under failure 
conditions are compared, since more themes mentioning mastery, failure, 
acts to overcome failure, statements of the need for mastery, press 
hostile to mastery, wishes for mastery by hero in story, anxiety over 
mastery of hero, and mastery images in the story appear (McClelland, 1953). 
There is some doubt about whether all these themes covary (1IcArthur, 1953), 
j as the hypothesis on which testing n Achievement is based,demands. 
McArthur has also produced evidence which seems to show that contrary to 
expectation subjects low on n Achievement show a high incidence of 
failure themes/ ••• 
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failure themes after experience of failure. But his method of 
selecting subjects low on n Achievement is open to dispute. Low n 
Achievers were those subjects whose college gr~des fell one full grade 
below the grade expected of them on the basis of their school performance. 
High n Achievers were those who did better than expectation. This.pro-
cedure leads us to examine the interesting problem of the relationship 
between achievement imagery and achievement behaviour. 
Kagan and Moss (1959), using 44 boys and 42 girls in the 
Fels research population, found that achievement fantasy is in fact an 
index of a tendency to actually seek achievement goals. Broverrnan and 
others (1960) argue that fantasy is a substitute for action, and that 
the measurement of n Achievement by use of imagery does not tell us 
about the achievement-directed behaviour of the individual. From a 
study of 37 adult males representing a wide range of age and socio-
economic position, they derive evidence that there is an inverse 
relationship between behavioural striving for advancement and fantasy 
measures of n Achievement. The finding in the original :McClelland 
and others (1949) paper that failure arouses achievement fantasy is 
not inconsistent with this. But French (1955) has found that performance 
is related to n Achievement, and that it is more closely related to n 
Achievement than to a change in test conditions (from a relaxed to a 
competitive situation). Even under relaxed conditions, the subject 
high in n Achievement tries to perform well. 
McClelland (1958) points out that measuring motivation by 
various methods very seldom produces agreement. When self-ratings, 
ratings by others, ratings of observation, and scores based on 
imaginative productions are correlated, significant intercorrelations 
are rarely obtained. Each of these measures is affected by a number 
of factors which does not enter into the others. Self-rating is 
affected by differences in candor and insight, r~tings of others are 
affected by projection, halo effects and lack of knowledge, observation 
of conduct often fails to reveal the private motivation of the observed 
subject, and imaginative productions have peculiar difficulties of 
interpretation. / ••• 
interpretation. To a varying degree all these measures are multi-
dimensional. Though they may overlap slightly, they have different 
central tendencies. McClelland argues that we must choose among 
these methods the one to suit our particular purpose; but we cannot 
regard them as interchangeable. 
Fortunately, for the present purpose, it is not necessary 
to identify achievement imagery with achievement behaviour. It is 
J,11 
sufficient for our purpose that the test chosen have relational 
fertility, and this criterion is satisfied by the n Achievement measure. 
An important issue is the reliability of the n Achievement 
assessments. Interscorer reliability appears to be about .87 (Feld 
x and Smit~, 1958), but repeat reliability appears to vary between .64 
(Morgan, 1953) and .03 to .56 (Birney, 1959). Birney attributes the 
wide range in reliability to the susceptibility of imaginative 
productions to setting. 
In spite of this difficulty, it was thought worth while to 
include a study of the relationship between n Achievement and time 
judgement because of the theoretical richness of the measure. A 
large bodypf experimental and conceptual study has grown round the 
concept of n Achievement. Any new experiment may thus draw on this 
background for interpretation. The fact that many meaningful relations 
have been found between the measure of n Achievement and other variables 
is taken by McClelland to be the surest indicator of its validity. 
12. 3 The Metaphor Test and Its Relation to n Achievement 
High n Achievement appears to be related to a preference 
for swift, directional metaphors (Knapp and Garbutt, 1958). Subjects 
were assessed for n Achievement by the McClelland (1953) technique and 
asked to rate 25 time metaphors on a 5-point scale of preference in 
such a way that 5 metaphors were assigned to each ranking on the scale. 
That made five categories of five metaphors each, in order of preference 
from one to five. A factor analysis of the results yielded three 
clusters, which were characterised as (a) dynamic-hasty, 
(b) naturalistic-passive / ••• 
(b) naturalistic-passive, and (c) humanistic. Cluster (a) was 
related to high n Achievement, and was further defined by the authors 
as relating to a "Newtonian sense of time11 • Clusters (b) and (c) 
were further defined as, respectively, oriental-mystical and classical 
mediterranean. Examples of dynamic-hasty metaphors are:-
a dashing waterfall 
a space ship in flight. 
Examples of naturalistic-passive metaphors of time are:-
a road leading over a hill 
a quiet, motionless ocean . ... 
Examples of humanistic metaphors are:-
a tedious song 
an old woman spinning. 
A full list of all the metaphors may be consulted in Appendix A. 
Knapp (1962)7 in a further study of attitudes to time and n 
Achievement, found two factors - the first identified as 11time servant-
master" which is characterised by emotional concern and harassment over 
management of time; and the second identified as obliviousness of time 
(at one pole) and efficient, unharassed management of time (at the other 
pole). High n Achievement, which was measured by the Tartan Test 
(Knapp, 1958) was positively related to the first factor. Low n 
Achievement was associated with the second factor. 
Though the relations between time imagery and attitudes 
towards time have not been experimentally studied, they both separately 
reveal relations with n Achievement. Knapp puts forward the hypothesis 
that these connotations of time are dynamically integrated in a 11puritan-
pragmatic character syndrome in which achievement motivation, acute time 
awareness, asceticism, interest in science and technology and the 
preferred usel:of repression as a defense are positively related". 
This is a far-reaching and interesting hypothesis. It was possible 
to break down one small aspect of it for experimental study in the 
present programme. The problem with which we are concerned here is 
the relationship between judgement of short intervals of time, time 
imagery, and / ••. 
imagery, and need Achievement. The conjecture that there might be a 
link between time imagery and judgement of time is not a systematic 
prediction. It is arrived at as a fairly probable hypothesis on the 
basis that (a) differences in attitude to time might result in 
differences in the accuracy with which time is abstracted from 
experience; and (b) differences in time imagery .. might reflect 
subjective differences in the flow of time experience. Statement 
(a), that time is an abstraction from experience, simply reiterates 
the fact that we do not perceive time intervals (above a certain length, 
according to Fraisse, 1957) in the same way that we perceive objects 
or colours, or space. There are special sensory receptors for all 
these, but there is no sensory receptor for time. Duration, or time, 
is an at~ribute of all phenomena, but it is not directly perceived. 
As Pavlov remarked, there is no special cortical analyser for time 
because all cortical analysers are capable pf analysing time. It 
is possible that persons with habitually different attitudes to time 
perform this abstraction rather differently. 
Hypotheses were set up for testing with the data made 
available by the experiments described in Chapter 3. These were:-
(a) Subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty metaphors are 
more accurate in their judgements of time. 
The reason for this hypothesis is that subjects who prefer 
dynamic-hasty metaphors of time may be more acutely aware of 
time and hence more accurate. This is a deduction which one 
might make from Knapp's concept of the "puritan-pragmatic 
character syndromeH. 
(b) Subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty metaphors have 
higher reproduction times than subjects with a preference for 
l:ess active metaphors of ~ime. 
The reason for setting up this hypothesis is that subjects 
with a preference for swift metaphors may be more aware of the flow 
of time, or may be more concerned about the passage of time. 
This consciousness of time might be associated with a heightened 
judgement of the amount of time consumed. 
In addition / ••• 
;/ 
In addition to these hypotheses about the relationship 
between time imagery and time judgement, further hypotheses about the 
relationship between n Achievement and time judgement were set up. 
But before we detail these additional hypotheses, the evidence that 
there is some relationship between n Achievement and time judgement 
ought to be considered. 
12. 4. Time Judgement and n Achievement 
High n Achievement has been found to relate to the tendency 
to recall past events as near to the present, and to anticipate future 
events (Knapp and Green, 1959). In one part of their experiment, 
subjects were asked to date six events in recent history. It was 
found that high n Achievement scorers tended to assign more recent 
dates to these events than low n Achievement subjects. In the 
second part of their experiment, subjects had to estimate the time 
taken by a moving point to reach a mark. High n Achievement was 
found· to be associated with an underestimation of this time. 
The authors maintain that the dynamic triad of aesthetic 
asceticism (measured in this experiment by the Tartan Test of Knapp 
(1958) j, anticipation of the future and recall of the past as close 
to the present is characteristically associated with puritanism, 
which they identify with high n Achievement. But puritanism is 
certainly not the only, and may not even be the most descriptive, 
label to apply to the high n Achiever. Studies have shown that social 
classes as a whole may differ inn Achievement (Douvan, 1956), but it 
may be dangerous to describe these subcultures in terms of puritanism. 
Another study by Knapp and Green (1961) shows that high n 
Achievement is associated with resistance to increasing judgement of a 
period of time which is presented on four successive occasions in a row. 
Subjects were asked to listen four times to a one-minute recording 
(played loudly, as the authors note) of Strauss' Blue Danube waltz. 
Those with high n Achievement scores resisted the impulse to increase their 
estimate of the duration of the fourth as compared to the first playing. 
The authors / ••• 
' The authors suggest that subjects with high n Achievement scores have 
greater ego-executive cohtrol than those with low scores, and are more 
resistant to the "special qualities of music as a distractive infl-uence". 
~erhaps another study of ego-involved motive - but this time 
level of aspiration - and the judgement of time may be included. It 
has been found that subjects with a less accurate level of aspiration 
in time-based tasks (who tend to be less accurate, that is, in their 
estimation of their rate of doing work), also tend to be less accurate 
in their estimate of the duration of one second (Baer, Wukasch and 
Goldstone, 1963). But, according to the same authors, underestimators 
and accurate ·estimators of the duration of one second do not differ 
from each other in time-based aspiration level. The significance of 
this finding is hard to appraise without a more exhaustive study of 
the role of level of aspiration in time judgewents under other 
conditions. As it is, no reason is advanced by the authors to 
explain the effect. 
These studies, limited as they are, do suggest the 
plausibility of setting up hypotheses about the relationship between 
n Achievement and time judgements. The hypotµeses set up for investi-
gation with our data were:-
(c) Accuracy in the judgement of time and n Achievement are 
positively related. 
'The reason for setting up this hypothesis is that n 
Achievement is, in Knapp's concept of the "puritan-pragmatic 
character syndrome", positively associated with harassment 
and concern over time. 
(d) High n Achievement and high time reproduction scores are 
positively related. 
~he first reason for setting up this hypothesis was outlined 
in a previous chapter, when it was shown that an increase in 
motive, when attention was focussed on the time interval, 
might be expected to lead to an increase in judgement of the 
length of the time interval. The second reason for setting 
up this / •.• 
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up this hypothesis is that high n Achievement is, as has 
been mentioned, positively associated with a preference 
for swift metaphors, which may in turn reflect an increase 
in the rate of flow of subjective time. 
Hypotheses 
The four hypotheses for testing will be stated together here 
for convenience. It must be pointed out that these hypotheses are not 
systematic predictions. They do not follow from some well-knit and 
carefully elaborated theory. They are merely conjectures about what 
the most probable relations are, after a oonsideration of such evidence 
as exists. If they test any unified concept at all, it is the concept 
of the puritan-pragmatic character syndrome, and then only one detail 
of that concept - the reference to "acute time awarenessn. But this 
is not a disadvantage, because the concept is extremely broad, and it 
would require a protracted experimental programme to study all its 
implications. The four hypotheses may now be stated. 
(a) Subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty time metaphors 
are more accurate in their judgements of time. 
(b) Subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty time metaphors 
have higher time reproduction scores than subjects with a 
preference for less active time metaphors. 
(c) Subjects who have high n Achievement scores are more accurate 
than subjects with low n Achievement scores. 
(d) .Subjects who have high n Achievement scores have higher time 
reproduction scores than subjects with low n Achievement scores. 
12. 6 Experiment 
12. 6. 1 Subjects and Method 
The subjects were forty of the men and women first-year 
students described in Experiment 2, who, during normal psychology 
laboratory sessions, completed the Metaphor Preference Sdale and 
produced imaginative protocols for n Achievement scoring; and all 
forty subjects/ •.. 
forty subjects described in Experiment 3, who completed the Metaphor 
Preference Scale only. 
The sample for the Metaphor Preference Scale consisted, therefore, 
of a total of eighty subjects, forty of whom reproduced time intervals by 
free-distance linear movements and verbal estimates, and forty of whom 
reproduced time intervals by controlled-distance linear movements and 
verbal estimates. 
The sample for studying the relationship between n Achievement 
and time judgement consisted only of forty subjects who reproduced time 
intervals by free linear azm movements and verbal estimates in Experiment 2. 
The method of testing time judgements by free linear movements has 
been described in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3). Briefly, subjects who repro-
duced time signals by the method of free linear azm movements moved for any 
distance preferred and at a preferred rate in reproducing the time signal, 
and made a verbal estimate immediately after reproduction. Subjects who 
reproduced time signals by the method of controlled linear azm movements 
were asked to move a prescribed distance at such a speed as to equalise 
the duration of the movement of reproduction and the length of the signal. 
Verbal estimates were made after reproduction. A difference in procedure 
between between the two experiments is that, in Experiment 2, a number of 
signals of different duration were reproduced in each session, but in 
Experiment 3, only one length of signal was reproduced by movements of 
different distances in each session. 
The forty free-movement subjects were tested for metaphor preference 
and time judgement in separate sessions. The forty controlled-movement sub-
jects were tested for metaphor preference and time judgement in the same 
session. Subjects were asked to rank metaphors in groups of five on a 
five-point scale of preference. The scale was scored for preference for swift, 
directional metaphors. The Metaphor Preference Scale is shown in Appendix A. 
Subjects were tested for n Achievement in the following way. 
During normal laboratory periods forty of the subjects tes.ted in Experiment 2 
wrote imaginative stories in response to three pictures: a) Two men in a 
workshop; (b) a boy with a book; and (c) a girl against the background 
of a fazm scene. The entire experiment was conducted by a postgraduate 
researcher and the protocols were independently scored according to 
McClelland's (1953) 
technique by I ••• 
technique by two postgraduate research students, working on a 
programme entirely divorced from the time judgement study. 
12. 6 2 Results 
The full Metaphor Preference scores obtained in·.Experiment 
2 are listed in Appendix B, Table LXIII. The Metaphor Preference 
scores obtained in Experiment 3 are listed in Appendix B, Tables 
XLIII and XLIV. 
Product-moment correlations of Metaphor Preference and time 
judgement variables were calculated and are shown below in Table 56. 
TABLE 56 
Product-moment correlations of Metaphor Preference and time judgement 
variables in Experiment 2. 
Signal Linear movement Verbal estimate Linear movement Verbal estimate 
re:eroduction error 
8 sec. +.01 +.05 -.13 +.12 
tl.6 sec. -.08 +.11 -.07 +.15 
The correlations in the table above are in several instances 
in the expected direction, but they are so low that we must accept the 
null hypothesis. We may point out, though, that there is a positive 
correlation between a preference for swift metaphors and verbal estimate 
of both 8 and 16 seconds, and a positive correlation between reproduction 
of 8 seconds and preference for swift metaphors. Linear movement error 
correlates in the expected negative direction with a preference for 
swift metaphors, but error in verbal estimate correlates positively 
with preference for swift metaphors. 
Metaphor Preference scores were also correlated with key-
pressing scores, which were available for 21 of the subjects. The 
correlation of +.27 is in the expected direction, but is based on such 
a small sample tbat it is not statistically significant. 
Correlations between speed of linear movement, variability in 
speed, and Metaphor Preference were also calculated, tp see wit.ether a 
preference for / ••• 
/llf 
preference for swift metaphors was correlated with swift action. 
The correlations are shown below. 
TABLE 57 
Product-moment correlations of speed of linear movement reproduction, 
variability in speed, and preference for swift metaphors in Experiment 2. 
Speed Variability in speed 
+.27 
The correlation of +.27 between speed of linear arm movement 
and preference for swift metaphors is not statistically significant, 
but it does seem to indicate a slight degree of positive association 
between time imagery and action. The correlation of +.07 between 
variability in speed and Metaphor Preference is so low that we accept 
the null hypothesis. It has been thought that subjects high on 
preference for swift metaphor.might display what Knapp.and Green called 
greater 11 ego-executive control" and hence lower variability. 
The correlations between Metaphor Preference and controlled 
linear movement reproductions were also calculated, and are shown 
below in the text. 
TABLE 58 
Product-moment correlations of Metaphor Preference and time judgement 
variables in Experiment 3. 
Signal Linear movement Verbal Reproduction Verbal Reproduction Verbal 
Reproduction Estimate Error error variabilit;2: variab 
8 sec. -.06 +.05 -.08 +.07 +.02 -.05 
16 sec -.08 -.29 -.08 +.06 +.03 -.03 
The first hypothesis, that time judgement and preference for 
swift metaphor are positively associated, is not supported by the 
correlations obtained, since they are largely negative. The exception 
is that verbal estimate correlates +.05 with Metaphor Preference. But 
the correlations are so low that the null hypothesis must be accepted 
in. each case. The second hypothesis, that error in time judgement is 
negatively associated/ ••• 
negatively associated with· a preference for swift metaphors, is 
supported by the negative correlations between linear movement 
reproduction error and metaphor preference, but is contradicted by 
the positive correlations between Metaphor Preference and error in 
verbal estimate. In Experiment 2 the correlations went the same 
way. But in both Experiment 2 and 3 all the correlations are so 
low that the best course is to accept the null hypothesis. 
Product-moment correlations of n Achievement scores and 
time judgement variables were also calculated. The full list of n 
Achievement scores and the associated time scores is given in Appendix 
B, Table LXIV. The correlations are shown below in the text. 
TABLE 59 
Product-moment correlations of n Achievement and time judgement 
variables in Experiment 2. 
Signal Linear movement Verbal Reproduction Verbal 
reproduction estimate error error 
8 seconds -.04 -.07 +.01 -.02 
16 seconds -.06 +.05 +.01 +.19 
The correlations are so low that the null hypothesis is 
accepted and the hypotheses about the relationship between time 
judgement and n Achievement are ~ejected. Not even the signs of 
the correlations are in the expected direction. Time judgement 
scores are po~itively rather than negatively associated with n 
Achievement, as was predicted; and error in time judgement is 
positively rather than negatively associated with n Achievement. 
But the signs are probably not indicative of anything where the 
correlations are so low. 
Key-pressing scores were available for a small number of 
subjects ( N=21). A calculation of the correlation between key-
pressing reproduction of 16 seconds and n Achievement yields a figure 
of +.20, which is in the direction (though also not statistically 
significant) predicted in the hypothesis set up for testing. 
Correlations between/ ••• 
Correlations between speed of movement in linear reproduction, 
variability in speed, and n Achievement were also calculated. It was 
thought that subjects with high n Achievement scores might be more 
energetic in their expressive movements, and that their acute awareness 
of time might find expression in swifter movements. It vra.s also thought 
that subjects with high n Achievement scores would have lower variability 
in speed scores, since they are supposed to exercise greater control. 
This is a very broad statement, and it has to be experimentally limited. 
The present experiment may be regarded: as, in some details, limiting 
the very broad concept of 11puritan-pragmatic 11 character advanced by 
Knapp. 
TABLE 60 
Product-moment correlations of speed of linear movement, variability 





The significant positive correlation between speed of 
linear arm movement in reproducing time signals and n Achievement is 
congruent with the positive correlation of +.27 between preference for 
swift metaphors and speed of linear arm movement, since preference for 
swift metaphors is in turn associated with high n Achievement. This 
seems to show that there may be a personality constellation in which n 
Achievement, swift and energetic movement, and dynamic time imagery are 
associated, and that time awareness or time judgement may be secondary 
to this. The finding that high n Achievement is significantly and 
positively correlated with variability in speed is one instance of the 
fact that Knapp's concept of greater 11 ego-executive 11 control is too broad 
to be useful. The correlation is the reverse of expectation. Varia-
bility in speed has already been found to be positively and significantly 
associated with Manifest Anxiety (+.39). It is possible, therefore, 
that the positive correlation in both instances is the result of drive. 
We have discussed Hull's (1943) postulate that an increase in drive 
brings about an increase in variability. If high n Achievement score 
does/ •••••••• 
x score does in fact reflect a higher drive Condition then this 
correlation is psychologically meanineful. Another interesting 
possibility is suggested. It has been shown that the correlation 
between speed and variability in speed of linear reproduction movement 
is +.25 (N=54). This correlation borders on signHicance at the 5% 
level. It may be that this positive correlation is explained by 
both speed and variability in speed being, partly, indicators of drive. 
12. 6. 3 Discussion: 1!etaphor Preference and Time Judgement 
The two hypotheses set up for testing are both u.nsupp9rted 
by the results, which favour the null hypothesis. The two hypotheses are:-
(a) That subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty time 
metaphors are more accurate in their judgements of time. 
(b) That subjects with a preference for dynamic-hasty time 
metaphors have high time reproduction scores. 
These results suggest that a considerable amount of experi-
mental evidence must be found to give Knapp's (1962) concept of the 
"puritan-pragmatic character syndrome" some substance. Furthermore, 
the obvious fact that "acute time awareness" is far too broad a concept 
to be meaningful or testable is brought into sharp focus. The fact 
that time imagery does not appear to be associated with the judgement 
of short intervals of time does not mean that there may not be long-term 
differences. Subjects who prefer time images of a certain kind may 
have different time perspectives from subjects who prefer time images 
of another kind. It is still possible that "acute time awareness" 
may be reflected in the way a person budgets or manages his time, 
rather than in his judgement of short intervals. Experience of any 
given interval of time is probably an extremely complex relationship 
among momentary, transitory conditions such as present physiological 
state (hot-cold, restless-relaxed, alert-tired, healthy-ill, etc.), 
present level of activity and absorption in activity, present motiva-
tional state, and among more enduring dispositions, such as images and 
attitudes referring to time, personality differences, differences in 
temperament, and long-tenn intentions. Some of these factors may be 
relevant to / ••• 
relevant to the way an individual locates himself in large time-
perspectives, to the coherence and structure of his view of the past 
I 
and the future; but other factors may be relevant to judgement of 
X short interval$. We ought certainly to distinguish very carefully 
among a number of different experiences of time, which probably have 
very little in common. 
Even in short intervals of time, ~ifferent facets of the 
experience may be isolated• Abe (1933) has distinguished between 
flow and structure, and has attempted to demonstrate their relationships. 
He asked subjects to represent their experience of time by means of 
drawings, and found that subjects portrayed the flow of time as 
hererogeneous when time intervals were experienced as long. Two 
structural effects found by him were, the dominance of the tenninals 
portrayed in experiencing the duration as a short duration, and also a 
tendency to incorporate the tenninals in the time-gestalt when the 
duration was experienced as a short duration. 
But it has not been shown that the structure of the individual!s 
impression of short time intervals is related to the structure of his 
conception of long time intervals. Nor has it been shown that individuals 
consistently experience time as long or short, fast-flowing or slow 
either when judging short intervals or in thinking about longer 
perspectives of time. 
With these distinctions in mind, we may accept the null hypo-
thesis for the relationship between the judgement of short intervals of 
time and swift metaphor preference. But we note that the problem of 
swift metaphor preference and its relation to the conception of longer 
time perspectives and time sbheduling may be well worth the study, if 
Knapps hypothesis of acute time awareness has any substance. 
12. 6. 4 Discussion: n Achievement and Time Judgement 
Both the hypotheses set up abput the relationship between 
n Achievement and Time Judgement are unsupported. The results favour 
the null hypothesis in both cases. 
The first / ••• 
The first hypothesis was that subjects with high n Achievement 
scores are more accurate in their time judgements than subjects with low 
n Achievement scores. The correlations o-0-tained between error by 
verbal estimate and n Achievement ( -.02; +.19) and between error by 
linear movement reproduction and n Achievement ( +.01; +.01) oppose 
this hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis was that subjects with high n Achievement 
scores tend to make higher time judgements than subjects with low n 
Achievement scores. The correlations obtained between verbal estimate 
and n Achievement ( -.07; +.05) and between linear movement reproduction 
and n Achievement ( -.04= -.06) are in the opposite direction to that 
expected, but are so low that they cannot be held to indicate anything. 
Again, we must emphasise the distinction made in the previous 
section. Though there is no support in our results for the hypothesis 
that acute ti.rile awareness is associated with the puritail pragmatic 
character syndrome, an acute time awareness may be expressed rather in 
conceptualisation of larger periods of time and in time scheduling. 
The greater the level of abstraction, the more possible it is that 
personality dispositions influence time experience. The subject with 
a high n Achievement score may, characteristically, be pressed for time, 
know what he is going to do at a certain hour a day or two ahead, and 
rationalise his time; but he does not appear to have a more accurate 
impression of shorter time intervals. To this extent our results do 
not lend any support to those of Knappand Green (1959) who found that 
subjects with high n Achievement scores tend to underestimate a short 
interval of time. 
But, though .the more deliberate hy~otheses framed at the 
commencement of the experiment failed to find support, an incidental 
observation of the relationships between speed of movement, variability 
in speed, and need Achievement found significant associations. It was 
found that n Achievement and speed of linear arm movement in reproducing 
time signals correlated significantly ( +.32; p(.05 ). And again, 
variability in speed of movement and n Achievement correlate significantly 
( +.34; / ••• 
.;',· 
(a) A preference for swift metaphors is positively associated 
with accuracy in time judgement. 
(b) A preference for swift metaphors is positively associated 
with high time judgement. 
In both cases, after a study of the evidence, the hypotheses 
were rejected and the null hypothesis was accepted. 
The relationship between n Achievement and time judgement was 
also studied, using the results of 40 subjects who reproduced time 
signals by free linear movement in Experiment 2. 
up for testing were:-
The hypotheses set 
(c) High n Achievement is positively associated with accuracy 
in time judgement. 
(d) High n Achievement is positively associated with high time 
judgement. 
In both cases, after a study of the evidence, the hypotheses 
were rejected and the null hypothesis was accepted. 
It was found that speed of linear ann movement in reproducing 
time signals is positively and significantly associated withnn 
Achievement. Variability in speed is also positively and significantly 
associated with n Achievement. It is concluded that the positive 
X. correlation between speed and n Achievement r1i.I consistent with 
Aronson's (1958) finding that high n Achievement is a~sociated with 
spatial extension and mobility in graphic expression. The significant 
positive correlation between variability and n Achievement confonns 
with the prediction that high motivation is associated with high 
variability (Hull, 1943). 
C H A P T E R 13 
CONCLUSIONS 
13. l A Reliable Method of Time Judgement 
Different methods of time judgement give different results. 
The method of verbal estimation reveals the accuracy with which the sub-
ject conceptualises time experience. The method of production reveals 
the accuracy with which a subject can convert a conceived duration into 
an acted duration. The method of reproduction reveals the accuracy 
with which a subject can convert a non-verbal, received duration into an 
acted duration. It is tempting to believe that there are three methods 
of time judgement, and that each of these methods reveals high internal 
consistency. In fact, different methods of reproduction do not relate 
more closely to each other than they do to the method of verbal estimation. 
Therefore, the logical distinctions which we make among broad categories of 
method do not correspond to psychological distinctions and may not have any 
psychological value. 
Different methods of time judgement tend to show different degrees 
of accuracy and reliability. It has been found, in the past, that verbal 
estimates are reliable but that reproductions of time are not. For this 
reason, results obtained by the method of reproduction cannot be related 
to persistent differences in personality or temperament. They may reveal 
quite ephemeral status in time judgement. But if we wish to discover 
individual differences in time experience, non-verbal methods, such as the 
methods of reproduction, have special advantages. They do not rely on 
differences in conception of time and they reveal much finer distinctions 
of judgement. Most studies of individual differences in time judgement 
have been confined to individual differences in verbal estimation of time. 
In view of the high reliability of verbal estimates, this is wise. But 
it means, since time judgements by different methods are very slightly 
related to each other, that our knowledge of individual differences in 
time judgement must remain very restricted by the use of one method only. 
When verbal estimates of time are taken, it is not known whether they 
reveal I ... 
reveal (a) accuracy of conceptualisation; (b) perception of the 
presented time interval; or (c) ability to relate a non-verbal 
experience of time to a symbolic, verbal process. There are too many 
variables which the experimenter does not control. A precaution which 
might be taken to eliminate most of the objections is to deal only in 
intra-individual ratios. By this method, a separate standard is set 
up for each individual based on his verbal estimates of a set of signals. 
All judgements in the experimental situation are then converted into 
ratios of the standard. This method is not very often adopted. 
Furthermore, if a subject is tested in different sessions, ~may 
radically alter his verbal estimates by checking his concept of clock 
time. This would alter his whole frame of references and invalidate 
the standard. 
The problem is to find a reliable non-verbal method of 
obtaining time judgements. A method based on the known reliability of 
speed of movements of the limbs was designed by Professor K. Danziger, 
of the University of Cape Town, and was found to be a very reliable way 
of obtaining time judgements by the method of reproduction. Another 
advantage of this method is that the standard deviation of scores 
obtained by using it is high, so that individuals differ very widely in 
their reproduction scores by this method. Inter-subject deviation is 
high, and intra-subject deviation is low. Both of these are desirable 
in studying individual differences. 
The first conclusion of the present study is that the method 
of reproduction of tim~ignals by either free or controlled linear movement 
is more reliable than the method of reproduction by key-pressing, .. and is of 
the same order of reliability as verbal estimation of time (average 
reliability coefficient +.71). The level of reliability is suitable 
for detecting individual differences. 
13.2 Relations Among Different Methods of Time Judgement. 
The relations among three different methods of time judgement 
have been examined in the preceding chapters. These are: 
(a) reproduction of time signals by key-pressing; (b) reproduction of 
time signals by horizontal linear arm movements of free and controlled 
distance / ••• 
distance; and (c) verbal estimation. Judgements obtained by the methods 
of key-pressing and linear ann movement do not relate more closely to each 
other than to verbal estimates. It would seem that each method of repro-
duction has special factors entering into it which must be considered. 
Judgement cannot be separated from the method of expression. An attempt 
was made, by using intra-individual ratios of scores, to show that a common 
core of time experience underlies each method. To put it in other words, 
changes in scores were correlated because, though subjects may have 
· different frames of reference for judgements according to each method, 
changes in judgement might occur at the same rate within each frame of 
reference when the time experience is altered. In concrete terms this 
means that a Subject A may reproduce a signal of 8 seconds' duration 
with a response lasting 12 seconds and Subject B may reproduce the same 
signal with a response lasting 15 seconds. But their verbal estimates 
are not made according to the same frame of reference. They may be 21 
seconds and 30 seconds (to take an example). In each case the verbal 
estimate is different from the reproduction time and does not bear the 
same relation to it. But, if the experience of time on which both verbal 
and reproduction time is altered, both may change proportionately. For 
example, if Subject A reproduces 16 seconds, in the second trial (the 
signal being held constant), then he might verbally estimate the signal 
as 28 seconds, increasing both his estimates by a third. If Subject B 
reproduces 10 seconds in the second trial (the signal being held constant), 
then he might verbally estimate the interval as 20 seconds, decreasing 
both his estimates by one third. Provided that changes in judgement by 
each method bear the same proportion to each other, they should reveal 
whether there is a c~mmon core of time experience on which they are all 
based. . But what justification have we for assuming that they do change 
at the same rate? Reference to Tablel''in the text shows that, irrespec-
tive of method, the average ratios of change in judgement as signal length 
is doubled are ve-ry similar (verbal estimate 1.8; key-pressing 1.9; 
linear movement 1.8). The method of ratios seems, therefore, to have a 
reasonable basis. But the findings were equivocal. Correlations of 
ratios were found to be statistically significant when the signal was 16 
seconds, but not when the signal was 8 seconds. This would lead us to 
conclude / ••• 
conclude, if we accept the result, that integration of judgements by 
different methods is greater at 16 seconds than at 8. This is understand-
able if we set up the hypothesis that, at 8 seconds, the individual is able 
to perceive the time signal as a unit without symbolic aid (this interval 
would correspond to the specious present, or the p~rceived present1, but 
that at 16 seconds the common factor underlying all methods is a conversion 
of the time experienced into symbolic units. 
Two main conclusions were drawn from the evidence. 
i. Methods of reproduction of time by key-pressing and by linear movement 
are not more closely related to each other than they are to verbal 
estimates. The commonly accepted idea that the classification of 
method of time judgement into verbal estimates, reproductions and 
production is psychologically significant does not seem to be true. 
This is a logical, not a psychological division of methods. 
ii. For all methods of time judgement, the relationship between time 
judged and length of signal may be satisfactorily fitted to Stevens' 
(1957) power law, 
sensation = k~ (where k is a constant; S is the stimulus; 
and n is the log. Sensation ratio/log. 
stimulus ratio). 
Different k values have to be substituted in the equation, but the 
power n is almost identical for all methods. 
13.3 Proprioceptive Time-Space Relations. 
Time judgements based on exteroceptively received stimuli are 
affected by the speed at which these stimuli move and by their spatial 
distribution. Brown (1931) showed that when a subject has to reproduce 
the duration of a stationary visual signal by adjusting the speed of a 
figure moving across a screen (so that the time taken for a figure to move 
across the screen is equal to time for which the light was previously 
inspected), he adjusts the speed so that the moving figure is visible for 
a longer time than the iight. Unfortunately he did not reverse the procedure 
and ask subjects to reproduce the duration of a moving figure by switching 
on a stationary light, but his results do suggest that movement reduces 
phenomenal / ••• 
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phenomenal time. The work of Piaget (1946) leads to the same conclusion. 
Piaget states that "while it is being experienced, a rapid or accelerated 
action brings about a contraction of time (by virtue of the inverse rela-
tion of time and speed)" (P~aget, 1946, p. 266) once the child has 
reached the stage at which· he can intuit transformations and is not 
dependent purely upon final results for his judgement of time. 
This would lead us to suspect that when the subject is required 
to reproduce time intervals by some action which requires extensive 
bodily movement, the duration of the reproduction should be affected by 
speed. In Experiment 2 subjects were asked to reproduce auditory signals 
by linear arm movements at a preferred speed, but in Experiment 3 subjects 
were compelled to alter the speed of their arm movements by experimentally 
varying the distance which had to be covered in reproducing each signal. 
In neither case was speed found to be correlated with time reproduced. 
The spatial effect on time judgement was also not found. When 
unequally spaced exteroceptive stimuli are presented, the impression which 
the subject receivel is that the stimuli separated by a larger distance 
are also separated by a larger time interval (the kappa and auto effects). 
But in Experiment 3 of the present study, subjects asked to reproduce 
time intervals by movements of varying distance were able to maintain con-
stanc1. Reproduction of a given time interval over larger or smaller 
distances did not effect the impression of time which the subject received. 
There is one effect which does seem to show that distance moved 
and time experience may be related. The verbal estimate of the auditory 
signal is more highly correlated with distance moved in reproducing that 
signal (average +.51) than with the time reproduced by the movement(average 
+.~3). To put it another way: the two time judgements are not as closely 
associated as time judgement by verbal estimate and the distance of the 
movement of reproduction. This effect is found consistently in Experiment 
2 and 3. It is reminiscent of the effect found by Jaensch (19~) : 
estimates of the extent of an arm movement are at least partly determined 
by the duration of that movement. Similarly, estimates of the duration 
of an arm movement may be at least partly determined by the extent of that 
movement. 
The / ••• 
The close relationship between psychological space and 
psychological time, which has been shown in discussion of the tau, 
kappa and auto effects, as well as in Piaget's studies of the confusion 
between "further" and "longer" in the time judgements of children, was 
also examined by Bergson in his treatise on "Time and Free Will" (1910). 
Bergson distinguishes between pure duration and time. The former is a 
qualitative change, but the latter is a spatial concept. Bergson 
states that "pure duration might well be nothing but a series of 
qualitative changes ••• ";but "when you attribute the least homoge-
neity to duration, you surreptitiously introduce space" (ibid., p. 104). 
Bergson enlarges on the difference between duration and measured time with 
the example of the cumulative psychological effect of a repeated sound. 
"We must admit that the sounds combined with one another and acted, not 
by their quantity as quantity, but by the quality whiqh~ .'.their quantity 
exhibited ••• If we assert that it was always the same sensation, the 
reason is that we are thinking, not of the sensation itself, but of the 
objective cause situated in space. We then set it out in space in its 
turn, and in place of an organism which develops, in place of changes 
which permeate one another, we perceive one and the same sensation 
stretching itself out lengthwise, so to speak, and setting itself out 
in juxtaposition without limit" (ibid., p. 106). If we follow 
Bergson's argument and repeat an example which has been used earlier 
(section 6.1.2.); the adult's ability to equate a duration spent looking 
at an amusing picture and a duration spent standing with his arms folded 
is the result of a geometrical externalisation of duration. He has 
converted duration into space (that is, time). 
The spatial representation of time perspectives and of short 
time intervals presents no difficulties to subjects in psychological 
experiments. Guilford (1924), Abe (1933), and Cohen, Hansel and 
Sylvester (1954) have asked subjects to represent time by means of 
spatial figures. This spatial representation of time, becoming 
increasingly detached from the first experiences which gave rise to it, 
"ends in a conception in which time is assimilated to a Euclidean type 
of space" (Fraisse, 1963, p. 283). 
In/ ••• 
In the experiments of the present study, subjects were able 
to reproduce time intervals by movements of varying length with 
reliabilities which are considerably higher than those reported in 
other experiments. Is this not, perhaps, because once the subject 
has converted duration into space he is able to fonn a stable image 
of that duration? He has externalised his experience in a fonn 
which is readily retained and repeated. 
J,ff 
The problem of the way in which duration and space are linked 
has not yet been mentioned. Bergson (ibid., p. 110) describes the 
relationship in the following manner: "There is a real space, 
without duration, in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously 
with our states of consciousness. There is a real duration, the 
heterogeneous moments of which penneate one another; each moment, 
however, can be brought into relation with a state of the external 
world which is contemporaneous with it, and can be separated from the 
other moments in consequence of this very process. The comparison 
of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical representation of 
duration derived from space. Duration thus assu.fllles the illusory form 
of a homogeneous medium, and the connecting link between these two terms, 
space and duration, is simultaneity, which might be defined as the 
intersection of time and space". 
The work of Piaget (1946) has shown that the concept of a 
uniform, homogeneous, and continuous time is an achievement of operational 
thought. At first, the child judges duration purely by results, or work 
accomplieped. When he becomes capable of introspection, he judges by 
his experience of duration (which varies with motivation and affect), 
but only at the stage of formal operational thought is time detached 
from duration. In the words of Bergson, "time, conceived under the 
fonn of an unbounded and homogeneous mediUlll, is nothing but the ghost 
of space haunting the reflective consciousness" (ibid., p.99). 
The hypothesis advanced here is that it is nothing but this 
"ghost of space" which makes the judgement of duration by movement in 
space so reliable (though inaccurate) compared to other methods. The 
subject / ••• 
subject fastens onto the image of space, which he uses throughout 
his life, in externalising his experience of duration. 
The less tentative conclusions about the time-space 
relations of linear ann movements are stated below. 
i. Time reproduced by free linear movement, and speed of free 
linear movements, are not significantly related. This is 
found when either raw scores (average correlation, regardless 
of direction,-.18), or intra-subject changes in scores (average 
correlation +.03) are correlated. 
ii. Time reproduced and distance of free linear movement in repro-
ducing time are significantly correlated. This applies both 
to raw scores and to changes in scores (average correlations 
are +.39 and +.46, respectively). This means that subjects who 
move further tend to move for a longer time (the alternative is 
that they might move faster and keep duration constant) and that, 
when a subject increases his distance of movement, he increases 
the time taken for the movement (the alternative is that he might 
increase his speed sufficiently to compensate). 
iii. Speed and distance of linear movement are positively related to 
each other, as might be expected. The alternative is that a sub-
ject might move faster, but for a shorter time, and so keep the 
distance constant. The positive correlation between distance 
and speed of movement is found among both raw scores (average 
correlation +. 78) aml ii&,.., i.&iio1.rioinal okansoa in aoG»H (a¥ol'A&f' 
eeP11ela•iea lu?i) and intra-individual changes in scores (average 
correlation +.71). 
iv. The correlation between distance of free linear a.rm movement and 
verbal estimate of the length of signal is greater than that between 
time reproduced by free linear arm movement and verbal estimate of 
the length of the signal (average coefficients are +.51 and +.33, 
respectively). This leads to the conclusion that time estimate 
and distance of movement are more closely associated than time 
estimate and duration of movement. Jaensch's (19~) conclusion 
that estimates of the spatial extent of a limb movement are 
partly / ••• 
partly determined by the time take for that movement may be true 
in the reverse as well: estimates of the duration of a movement 
are partly determined by the spatial extent of that movement. 
v. When the distance of the linear arm movement by which the subject 
reproduces time signals is experimentally varied, no significant 
differences in time judgements occur. This means that the subject 
can reproduce the same time interval by movements of varying speed 
and di.stance. 
vi. All linear movement reproductions, whether free- or controlled-
distance, differ significantly from key-pressing reproductions, 
but free- and controlled-distance linear movement reproductions 
do not differ from each other. This suggests that the method of 
linear movement requires a different adaptive timing system from 
key-pressing. 
13.4 Delayed Reproduction of Time Intervals. 
Delayed reproduction of time signals might seem to off er a 
sens.tive technique for measuring the strength of the trace of a time 
signal - and thus giving information about the immediate history of 
traces caused by stimulation. Satiation and inhibition theory seem to 
predict a rise in the strength of the trace - for a limited period - since 
both satiation and inhibition are thought to dissipate more rapidly than 
excitation. The classical Pct'S~tion theory also predicts an initial 
increase in the strength of the trace. This initial increase is more 
protracted than the effect reported by Irdhler (1923), who found an increase 
in the strength of the excitation process lasting approximately 3 seconds. 
Theory based on the assumption that recurrent circuits carry the 
trace would seem to predict that there is no loss over a short period of 
time, but an important modification of circuit theory has been introduced 
by Broadbent (1957), who suggests a circuit with a limited capacity for 
units of information to act as a vehicle for immediate memoryl If, in 
the time between input and rehearsal, the limits of the circuit are 
exceeded, information is lost. The amount of information lost varies 
with conditions, but it is generally not merely the amount by which input 
exceeds / ••• 
exceeds capacity. Presumably, with rehearsal there is a transfer to 
other circuits for more permanent storage. There is direct evidence 
that recent and older memories are stored at different loci (e.g. 
Penfield, 1959), so that this hypothesis is not untenable. The fading 
trace theory of memory bas been applied to explain effects obtained in 
time judgement. Frankenhaeuser (1959) bas explained the fact that 
past-time estimates obtained by her from subjects are lower than present-
time estimates, on the basis of a fading trace. Present-time estimates 
were measured in the following way: A subject is instructed to produce 
(say) 20 seconds by reading randomised digits at a rate of one digit per 
second. Randomised digits are used to prevent counting. Past-time 
I 
estimates are then given by the subject s verbal estimate of the time 
n 
produced. Frankenhaeuser explained the fact that past-time estimates 
are lower than present-time estimates by means of the fading trace theory, 
but overlookltlthe fact that two different methods of time judgement have 
been used for the comparison. It has been shown that different methods 
of time judgement have different means and standard deviations. But,euc.. 
if one accepts her result,it seems that the most appropriate model to 
explain it is Broadbent's (1957) recurrent circuit model. The time 
estimate must, in this. experiment, be based on a large number of units 
of information, in order to be correct. Probably, other cues are used 
in addition to the remembered digits for the assessment of time. These 
may be analogous to the work of attention proposed by Mach (quoted by 
James, 1890, p.635). A trace theory is more appropriate to reproduction 
of a continuous single stimulus. If this is so, then the data obtained 
by us suggest that there is no change in the strength of the trace over 
a period of 60 seconds, the upper limit of the observations in the 
experiment. 
The conclusion is stated formally below. 
Where the time interval to be judged is presented in the form of a con-
tinuous auditory signal, short delay has no effect on time judgement. 
This may be understood in terms of Broadbent's (1957) model to show that 
where the information stored is within the capacity of a recurrent system, 
no delay effects may be expected as long as the system is kept active. 
13. 5 Extraversion / ••• 
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13.5 Extraversion and Time Judgement. 
On the basis of work by Eysenck (1957) and Claridge (1960), 
using hysterics and dysthymics as criterion groups for, respectively, 
extraverts and introverts, it was predicted that extraversion would be 
negatively correlated with time judgements. The use of neurotics as 
criterion groups may be criticised on the grounds that, whereas extra-
version and neuroticism are orthogonal dimensions in nonnal samples (r= -.1), 
they correlate very highly in extreme populations (-.3 to -.4). In tenns 
of Eysenck's own strictures on other writers, a test should not be used 
if it does not isolate a dimension. Besides the fact that in these 
neurotic samples extraversion and neuroticism are not independent factors, 
there is the possibility that extraversion and neuroticism may interact 
in such a way as to rev.erse results. That this can happen is shown in 
an experiment by Wallach and Gahm (1960). They found that extraversion 
is normally associated with large drawings, and introversion with small 
drawings, b~t that these associations may be completely reversed when 
anxious introverts and extraverts are used. 
In support of Eysenck's work on neurotic populations there is 
the evidence of Lynn (1960), obtained with normal subjects, that extra-
version is associated with lower reproduction score. 
This would seem to settle the issue. But, there is a great 
deal of disagreement among various experimenters who have tested predic-
tions from Eysenck's Typological Postulate. Another difficulty is that 
we cannot speak of time judgement as though there is one absolute scale 
according to which all responses are made. 
Several interesting results were obtained and are described in 
detail in Chapter 9. None of the time judgements correlated significantly 
with extraversion. Furthermore, there was not complete consistency in 
the direction of the correlations. Reproduction by controlled linear 
movements correlated in the expected negative direction with extraversion, 
but all other time judgements (free linear ann movement, verbal estimate, 
key-pressing) correlated in a positive direction with extraversion, which 
contradicts expectations. 
One score / ••• 
21r 
One score which correlates significantly - and consistently -
with extraversion is error in reproduction of time by both free and con-
trolled linear movement. The correlation is negative. This seems to be 
psychologically meaningful. Ex:traverts, who tend to use the skeletal 
muscular system to a greater extent than introverts (if the questionnaires 
indicate anything) might be expected to be more accurate in a task 
requiring moto.r co-ordination. 
Consistent with this result is the finding, also in the present 
experiment, that extraversion is negatively correlated with variability in 
linear movement reproduction. Since variability has been found to 
correlate positively and significantly with error ( r = +.52 at 8 seconds 
and +.56 at 16 seconds), the results seem to provide a consistent pattern. 
Though the hypotheses based on the work of Eysenck are not 
confirmed, the picture which we get of extraverts as less variable and 
more accurate in their performance of a perceptual-motor task is 
psychologically meaningful. 
The conclusions of the present study are stated formally below. 
i. Eysenck's conclusion that level of time judgement is negatively 
related to extraversion is contradicted by positive (though statis-
tically insignificant) correlations between reproduction by key-
pressing and by free linear movement, and verbal estimation of time 
signals, and extraversion. But it is supported by the negative 
(though statistically insignificant) correlations between reproduc-
tion by con~rolled linear movement and extraversion. The results 
show that time judgements cannot be thought of as distinct from the 
method used to obtain them. 
Typological Postulate. 
On the whole, they do not favour his 
ii. Extraverts tend to be less variable in their performance than 
introverts. The correlation between extraversion ,and variability 
in speed of free linear movement is statistically significant (-.43; 
p<:.01). All other correlations between extraversion and variability 
scores are negative, though not statistically significant. 
iii. There is no difference between extraverts and introverts in the speed 
of linear arm movement, nor in the distance moved. Both of these 
were / ••• 
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were expected of extraverts (rather tentatively) on the basis of 
the finding that extraverts tend to be rather more expansive than 
introverts in graphic expression (Wallach and Gahm, 1960). 
iv. Extraverts are more accurate than introverts in their reproduction 
of time signals by both free- and controlled-distance linear ann 
movement. In Experiment 2 the correlations between extraversion 
and error are -.48 at 8 second signal and -.50 at 16 second signal, 
(both significant at less than 1%). · In Experiment 3 the 
correlations between extraversion and error are -.12 at 8 second 
signal and -.47 at 16 second signal. 
significant at less than 1%. 
The latter correlation is 
13.6 Secondary Functioning and Time Judgement. 
The view that a general factor of inhibition might affect 
speed of function in a large variety of activities is fundamental to 
Eysenck's concept of extraversion-introversion. The view that there 
are temperamental differences in speed of function in a large variety of 
activities - caused by mental inertia - is fundamental to the Heymans-
Wiersma concept of primary-secondary functioning. If we identify inhi-
bition with mental inertia, then Eysenck's tentative proposal (1953, 1957) 
that the two dimensions are to a large extent identical is not unreasonable. 
Using some of the tests of secondary functioning described by Biesheuvel 
and Pitts (1955), an attempt was made to see whether there is any corre-
lation between extraversion and secondary functioning. At the same time, 
an attempt was made to discover whether there is a relation between 
secondary functioning and time judgement. The argument is simply that 
if there is an overlap between extraversion and secondary functioning, 
then the predictions of the Typological Postulate might hold good for 
the relation between secondary functioning and time judgement. 
It was predicted that secondary functioners would have lower 
reproduction scores than primary functioners. 
The correlations between extraversion and measures of secondary 
functioning are in the expected direction, but not significant. The 
correlations between time judgement and measures of secondary functioning 
are also in the expected direction, but not significant. 
Since/ ••• 
Sin,ce the measures of speed used were very brief, and since 
the inertia, or inhibition, associated with secondary functioning might 
well take some time to develop to a detectable level, it is recognised 
that the fact that the correlations are in the expected direction, though 
statistically significant, invites further experimental study. 
The conclusion is stated below. 
i. The hypothesis that secondary functioning is related to extra-
version and to reproduction of time by linear movement is 
supported by the direction of the correlations. But none of 
the correlations are statistically significant. 
13.7 Manifest Anxiety and Time Judgement. 
With a considerable degree of success, Janet Taylor, Spence 
and Farber have shown that the Manifest Anxiety Scale has construct 
validity as a measure of drive. The evidence for and against this 
view is discussed in Chapter 11. Their experiments were designed 
very largely to test predictions from Hull's (1943) learning theory. 
If we accept that Manifest Anxiety does measure drive, several predic-
tions in connection with time judgements become possible. 
Evidence drawn from experiments on visual perception indicate 
that an increase in drive brings about an increase in judgements of size 
and brightness. In addition, evidence drawn from experiments on time 
judgement indicate that an increase in drive brings about an increase in 
the judgement of a ti.me interval, where attention is directed to the 
duration of the time interval and not to a task occupying that interval. 
In both types of experiment, the judgement is of an inessential attribute. 
It is not instrumental in securing a reward. This may be important in 
affecting the ease with which distortions are brought about. On these 
grounds, an increase in Manifest Anxiety Score, as an index of drive, 
should bring about an increase in judgement of the length of the time 
signal. Another effect which is likely to occur (in tenns of Hull's 
theory) is that variability of response is increased by heightened drive:. 
But results show~ that the relationship between Manifest 
Anxiety and time judgements Vy various methods is inconsistent and not 
statistically / ••• 
statistically significant. The null hypothesis is accepted that there 
is no relationship between time judgement and Manifest Anxiety. 
On the other hand, all correlations between Manifest Anxiety 
and variability in response are in the expected (positive) direction, 
and two of these correlations are significant at the 5% level of confi-
dence. These are the correlation between Manifest Anxiety and variabi-
lity of speed of movement (+.39) and between Manifest .Anxiety and 
variability of verbal estimate of 16 seconds (+.33). It is concluded 
that Manifest Anxiety is related to variability in perfo:nnance. 
The conclusions are formally stated below. 
i. There is no relationship between Manifest Anxiety and time 
judgement by any of the methods in the experiments described. 
ii. Manifest Anxiety seems to be positively related to variability 
of response. All correlations between Manifest Anxiety and 
measure of variability are positive, and two of them are statis-
tically significant. These are: (a) between Manifest Anxiety 
and variability in speed of free linear movement (r = +.39; p~.05); 
and (b) between Manifest Anxiety and variability in verbal estimate 
of 16 seconds ( r = +.33; p<:'..05). 
13.8 n Achievement and Time Judgement. 
Knapp (1962) has described a "puritan-pragmatic character 
syndrome in which achievement motivation, acute time awareness, asceticism, 
interest in science and technology, and the preferred use of repression as 
a defense are positively related". There is some evidence that high n 
Achievement is related to underestimatioh of time separating events from 
the present (Knapp and Green, 1959), but there is not a great deal of 
evidence to substantiate the view that time awareness is significantly 
related to n Achievement. Nor can we be sure exactly what kind of 
time awareness is implied. Knapp and Garbutt (1958) do refer to the 
association between n Achievement and a "Newtonian sense of time", but 
much remains to be done to define the time awareness involved. Does 
it refer to tight scheduling and long-tenn planning, or to accuracy in 
the judgement of short time intervals? With the data available it was 
possible to test the second possi;·bili ty. 
Among / ••• 
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Among the problems studied were: (a) what is the relation 
between n Achievement and the time judgement score by various methods; 
(b) what is the relation between n Achievement and accuracy of time 
judgement; and (c) what is the relation between n Achievement and 
speed of linear ann movement as an expressive characteristic? The 
null bypothesis.~d to be accepted for both (a) and (b), but it was 
concluded that n Achievement is positively and significantly associa-
ted with speed of linear ann movement ( r ::: +. 32; p <. 05). High n 
Achievers appear to be·.more energetic in their expressive behaviour. 
This is in agreement with the finding of Aronson (1958) that n Achievement 
can be measured by spatial extension and mobility in graphic expression. 
An incidental observation, which agrees very well with the prediction 
that variability is associated with drive, is that variability in 
speed of linear ann movement is also significantly and positively 
associated with n Achievement. (r = +.34; p<(,.05). 
The conclusions are fonnally stated below. 
i. n Achievement is not related to the judgement of time by any of 
the methods described. 
ii. n Achievement is significantly related to speed of free linear 
ann movement in reproducing time signals. This confirms Aronson's 
(1958) discovery that n Achievement is related to spatial extension 
and mobi~in graphic expression. 
iii. n Achievement is significantly related to variability in speed of 
movement. This may be expected in tenns of the prediction that 
ascillation of response is positively related to strength of motive. 
13.9 Metaphor Preference and Time Judgement. 
A relation has been found between a preference for swift, 
directional metaphors, and n Achievement (Knapp and Garbutt, 1958). 
Although there is no direct evidence, it is possible that a preference 
for swift metaphors of time reflects, or is related to, other aspects of 
ti.me awareness. For this reason, the time judgement data at our disposal 
were related to metaphor preference scores. Several problems were 
studied. These were: (a) the relationship between a preference for 
swift metaphors and time judgement; (b) the relationship between a 
preference / ••• 
preference for swift metaphors and speed of linear ann movement, as 
an expressive characteristic. 
None of the correlations is significant. The highest 
correlation (+.27) is between speed of linear arm movement and a 
preference for swift, directional metaphors of time. This corre -
lation does seem to show that a preference for swift images may: have 
other expressive correlates. 
The conclusions are formally stated below: 
i. Metaphor Preference is not related to time judgement by any 
of the methods described. 
ii. The relationship between a preference for swift, directional 
metaphors and speed of linear ann movement approaches statistical 
significance (r = +.27) and may indicate that there is a general 
expressive preference guiding imagery and gesture. 
13. 10 8uggestions for Further Research. 
13.10. 1 Primary and Secondary Illusions. 
The distinction between primary perception and perceptual 
activity which has been made by Piaget (quoted by Flavell, 1963, p.p. 
234 - 236) might fonn a valuable guide in studying some temporal illusions. 
Primary perception usually depends ~n isolated centrations. It is percep-
tion relatively unaffected by operational thought. Such field effects, 
or primary illusions, as the MU.ller-Lyer, are the result of primary 
perception. Perceptual activity, on the other hand, tends to reduce 
the magnitude of the field effects which occur in primary perceptioh. 
Perceptual activity is characterised by decentration, spatial and temporal 
transports of elements during comparisons, active reconfiguration, 
memories and other processes which merge with the operations of 
intelligence. Though perceptual activity reduces the primary illusions 
produced by primary perception, it is the source of secondary illusions, 
such as overconstancy in the visual judgement of size. Thus, primary 
illusions tend to decrease with age and secondary illusions tend to increase. 
There are several illusions in the judgement of time which might 
be .studied / ••• 
be studied genetically to detennine whether they are primary illusions 
(fil'd effects) or the result of perceptual activity. The kappa effect 
(Cohen and others, 1955) has been explained by appealing to the subject's 
experience of moving bodies. This is clearly a perceptual activity and 
not a primary perception. The tau effect (Helson and King, 1931) has 
also been explained as a result of the experience of movement, and the 
suto effect (Suto, 1952) has been explained as an effect which is 
dependent on visual experience. Genetic studies to detennine whether 
these effects increase or decrease with age and experience would help 
to make clear whether these explanations are likely to be true. 
The effect of velocity on the judgement of time might also 
be the result of perceptual activity rather than of primary perception. 
Piaget has shown that the ability to compare different velocities occurs 
only after the operational stage of development has been reached. We 
might, therefore, find the young child impervious to velocity effects 
on time judgement. An experimental difficulty would be to secure 
comparisons of duration from young children, since judgements of duration 
are usually based on the results of action, as we have seen in an earlier 
section (6.1.2). The young child will base his judgement of duration 
on the spatial position of the figure, or on the amount of work accomplished. 
13.10. 2 Cogn.itive Variables and Time Judgement. 
If the distinction between perceived time intervals of a 
duration up to a maximum of about 5 seconds (Fraisse, 1963, p.92) and 
longer, conceived time intervals which require an operation of intelligence 
for their reconstruction and judgement is valid, then children should be 
found to judge short intervals relatively inaccurately. Genetic studies 
have used longer intervals ranging from 14 seconds to 117 seconds 
(Axel, 1924; Gilliland and Humphries, 1943) and have shown, as expected, 
that children are much more variable and inaccurate in their estimations 
of time. But these studies do not enable one to compare judgements of 
perceived and conceived time intervals. But research by Orsini (quoted 
by Fraisse, 1963, p. 238) has at least answered the question of whether 
7-year-old children are capable of judging an interval of ,o seconds as 
well as / ••• 
well as adults. She found that after a training period of three weeks 
the judgements of the children were as accurate as those of adults 
before training. From this it appears that the experience rather than 
the capacity is lacking. 
Adults as well as children may be affected to different degrees 
by the nature of the task, and the evidence seems to show that the ability 
to overcome errors in judgement which are a direct result of the nature of 
the task may be related to the growth of operational thought. Both 
children and adults experience the same illusions (that time seems longer 
when we are labouring up a hill or doing a boring task or waiting for 
something to happen), but adults can usually correct the illusion on the 
basis of a variety of criteria, whereas children are dominated by one 
particular aspect of the situation in forming their judgement. Axel (1924) 
found that children are much more susceptible to the effects of qualitative 
differences in forming time judgements than adults are. The contrast 
between filled and unfilled time intervals is more important in 
influencing time judgement at 9 years of age than at 14 years of age. 
At both ages, verbal estimates of empty time intervals are higher than 
estimates of intervals spent at some task, but the difference is much 
smaller at 14 than at 9 ;years of age. At the age of 9 years an empty 
interval of 20 seconds is judged 4.4. times as lon~s the same time 
interval spent doing mental arithmetic. At 14 years the ratio is 2.3. 
At 9 years the task of writing I's is judged 2.5 times as long as the 
task of doing mental arithmetic; but at 14 the ratio is 1.4. The 
growth of formal operational thought may explain the decreasing effect 
of qualitative differences on time judgement. 
The relationship between cognitive variables and ability to 
overcome qualitative differences in making a time estimate might be a 
field worth exploring. Even at the adult level, the differences may 
be very great. To take an example, the intra-subject ratio of time 
judgement by linear movement and time judgement by key-pressing may 
vary from nearly 7 to almost 1. Subjects who are able to judge equally 
well by the two methods have a ratio approximating 1. They are able 
to overcome the large qualitative differences between the two methods of 
judgement. The relation/ ••• 
The relation between an active-passive cognitive style and 
time judgement has been demonstrated by Loehlin (1959). Active subjects 
4f 
appeared to be less subject to time illusions - such~errors in comparison 
of intervals filled with accelerating or decelerating auditory pulse. 
Spivack and others (1959) have shown that relative delay in telling the 
experimentef'when a period of time has elapsed is positively related to 
intelligence. These are somewhat fragmentary findings, but they do 
suggest that cognitive variables and time judgement might be related. 
But the work of Gardner and others (1960) on the relationship of 
four methods of cognitive control to perceptual tasks might be .profitably 
pursued in the field of time judgement. The first method of cognitive 
controll' is that of levelling versus sharpening, which may be defined as 
the readiness of the subject to accurately judge a change in stimulus. 
The second cognitive style is field articulation, or the degree of field 
dependence versus independence. It may be defined as the selectiveness 
of the subject in actively directing his attention to significant features 
of the field. The field-dependent subject, in comparison with the field-
independent subject, shows little selectivity. The thind method of 
cognitive control is scanning control, or the degree of deployment of 
attention of which the subject is capable. The fourth cognitive control 
is the ability to tolerate unrealistic experiences. 
The relationship between these methods of cognitive control 
and time judgement might be studied. 
13.10. 3 Individual Differences in Integration of Time Judgements. 
Considerable differences exist in the degree to which. individuals 
are able to integrate their time judgements. This problem exists both 
where qualitatively different time intervallmust be judged by the same 
method and where an identical time interval is judged by different methods. 
Since the former problem was rather more extensively dealt with in the 
preceding section than the latter problem, the present section will be 
largely confined to a discussion of the latter. In the fonner case, the 
problem is the extent to which subjects are able to reduce different 
afferent stimuli to a common denominator. In the latter, the problem is 
the extent to which subjects are able to make different efferent impulses 
equivalent/ ••• 
equivalent, according to some objective criteria by which the resultant 
behaviours are judged. 
We may study the extent to which the different actions yield 
judgements which are objectively equal, or we may attempt to measure 
differences in the extent to which different judgements, though not 
equal, are functionally related. We may differentiate between subjects 
who are able to give the same judgement by different methods, and those 
who are less able; or we m~y accept that judgements by different methods 
are different, but maintain that they form (to an extent which differs 
from individual to individual) a system. In the fomer case, if a 
subject verbally estimates an interval as 8 seconds, then his judgements 
are referred to as integrated if he reproduces it as 8 seconds. In other 
words, integration is defined by equal time judgements, when the method 
is changed. This is perhaps the ideal case. But we may accept that 
judgements which are objectively unequal (8 seconds by verbal estiination, 
5 seconds by reproduction, for example) may be subjectively equivalent, 
and may be related, provided that they change at some uniform rate in 
relation to each other. If that occurs, then we can say that the time 
judgements of the person fonn a system. Obviously, the case in which 
all methods yield the same objectively equal time judgement is the paragon, 
the pure and ideal example ~f systematic relationship. But even where 
methods yield objectively ·unequal time judgements they may form a tightly 
integrated system, preserving uniform rates of change in relationship to 
each other. The rate of change of time judgements by each method may be 
sampled by asking the subject to judge a number of time intervals of 
varying length and determining the averate ratio of increase of the 
judgement in relation to a fixed ratio of increase of the stimulus 
(see Chapter 5). 
The extent to which the subject's judgements of time by 
different methods form a system is likely to vary with age, which brings 
about a growing systematisation of the subject's cognitive operations. 
In addition, the extent of this systematisation at any given age may be 
related to other cognitive variables. 
To the extent that the subject achieves a state of cognitive 
equilibrium I . .. 
equilibrium, such functional relations could be expected to occur. A 
state of equilibrium is described by Piaget (quoted by Flavell, 1963, 
pp. 242 - 244) by means of the dimensions of field of application, mobility, 
permanence and stability. The field .of application of a psychological 
state of equilibrium will vary from a single centration (such as on the 
final position of the moving figures when the preoperational child is 
asked to judge durations) to considera,tion of the relations between 
order of stopping and starting, velocity, or other facts which might be 
relevent. The more developed the system, the wider the range of 
application. The mobility of the system increases as the actions are 
internalised, since representation is more mobile than overt behaviour. 
The pennanence and stability of the system in equilibrium are define~ 
by the resistance of that system to changes of state as input changes. 
On the one hand, perceptual equilibri~ have low permanence (are unstable) 
and may be altered by changes in the field; but on the other, the 
relations in cognitive systems retain their structure even when the 
momentary stimulus-input is altered. , As an example of this, one might 
take the extended impression of time which the subject· has when he is 
' bored, or the contracted impression which he has when he is interested. 
If he bases his time judgements on the,se affective states alone, then he 
is likely to vary considerably. But cognitive systems, once developed, 
are not so easily upset. The subject may look (to take the simplest 
case) at his watch and assure himself that the two periods are identical. 
He may use other cues, such as counting, thythmic breathing, the feeling 
of muscular strain, changes in light, the position of the sun, to correct 
conclusions based on less stable systems. 
It is our contention here that the extent to which subjects 
fail to integrate their time judgements is at least partly determined 
by their failure to use more stable cognitive systems. The converse is 
that the extent to which subjects do integrate their judgements is at 
least partly determined by the extent to which they use more stable 
cognitive systems. The more the subject's judgements are affected by 
qualitative differences in the period judged or the method of judging, 
the less / ••• 
the less the extent to which he corrects his judgements by using 
rational clues. 
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 show that time judgements 
by different methods are more closely related to each other when a 
longer (16 second) interval is judged than when a shorter (8 second) 
interval is judged. It was suggested, in the Chapter in which this 
was considered (Chapter 5), that one factor underlying the closer 
integration of judgements of the longer time interval might be that 
the longer interval must be judged by a process which demands more 
consideration, a greater use of symbols, whereas the shorter period 
may be directly perceived. In other words, where the interval is 
longer, the greater integration depends on the greater systematisation 
of cognitive systems. Where the interval is shorter, the lower 
integration reflects the lack of use of the more integrated cognitive 
systems. 
An extended study of the degree of integration of judgements 
of shorter or longer intervals might help to strengthen the distinction 
(or prove it invalid) between perceived and conceived time. 
An extensive study of the relationship between cognitive 
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BRIEF PERSONALITY INVENTOR1 
r.:.A=cTE OR CODE: ooeooseoe•o•ooeol!lt•C16•.••••••••000010• SEX: ,• .o 0 & • • • 0 •.• ·-------
The following ~rief personality inventory has been used a 
great deal for ~aking rapid assessm0nts of certain aspects of persona-
lity. It is now olanned to subject it to further statistical analysis. 
Please answer the following questions frankly by putting a 
ring around either YE:3 or NO for each ouestion. It is imDortant that 
you - sh::rnld not leave ot1t anv questions; so ,'."Jlease decide in each case 
whethc:;r on the whole the ansv.rer s'hould 1Je YES or NO in your case. 
1. Do vou have dizzy turns? 
2. Do you get palpitations or thumpinp; in your heart? 
3. Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences? 
L
1
•• Do you consi.der yourself rather a nervous •1erson? 
5. Are your feelings easily hurt? 
6. Are you subject to attacks .of shaking or trembling? 
7. Are an irritable nerson? ' J. 
[~. Do you vmrry over possible misfortunes?· 
9. Do vou have night:nares? 






















11 ~ Did ··you ever get short of bre.::th without having done .. heavy~ 
vvo-rk? YES NO 
12. Do yo.u---suff er f.r.om 1 nerves·; ? YES NO 
13. · Are- you. troubled by aches and pai:::ls? YES NC 
.L:4.,.. . .Do· you get·,,·nervous .. i:n. places . .sucb c..s lj_fts, trains or tunnels..(- YES NO 
15. D.o .. ~rou.lack ·self-conficlsnce? 
16.... ..Are you. troubled. with .. fee.lings of inferiority? 
17-. Do~~rou vre·fer action to planning_.for action? 
l[t_,. Are- you-·hqppiest··t1hen. you.,get .. involved in some project· that 
calls-f.or rapid action? 
19..... Do. ·yo.u usually take the· initiative .in ;--riakin.g .new friends·? 
20 .... ,~l,re.. you inc.b;:D-ed .. t.o he quick and sure in vour actions? 
.21 •. Would. you rate .yourself as .s lively individual? 
22. Wo.uld you be very ungap9y if you were prevented fro:-n making 


















.1\JA~-iE or CODE 
• &, • • o • o o • c c e • • • • • o • • • • • it • o o • e • .a ~ c • o • • • t 
It is psychologically.interesting to investigate the effect-
i venes,s of metaphors. _ Th.ere are certain meta;Jhors \rvhich have a uni.,. 
versal appeal for everyone' others .. -which. appeal to _s6t!1_E'. people. but no_;t 
to all, and finally those which appeal to ha~dly anyone. 
Below are listed 25 meta:Jhors which a poet or a writer might 
use to symbolize his sense of tiil1~. --- Please read through this list and 
then indicate before e~ch metaohor how an0rooriate it is in evoking a 
satisfactory image of time. 
First select the five metaDhors that seem to vou most appronriat 
. - ' . . --· •• .L 
as images of time and before each olace the nlLnber ;;1' 1 • Then 'f:'lidc out 
the next most a;_)propriatc:: :IJ.Gtap_hors and before them place the number 11 2i 1 • 
Continue th.is process until you have placed the nun1ber ;i5n before what a.re 



























Asse,ssr1ent ------ }ktaohor 
A larp.e revolving whee L 
A whirligig. 
A road leading over a hill. 
Dudding leaves. 
An old ;nan with a staff. 
A bird in flight. 
A fast --moving shuttle. 
A Kinding spool. 
A speeding train. 
A quiet, ~otionless_ ocean. 
A burning candle. 
A ,stairway le(1_ding upward. 
A da~3hing waterfall. 
A snace shi~ in flig1t. 
Wind~driven sand. 
An old wo~an spinning. 
Drifting clouds. 
Harching feet. 
A vast exoanse of sky. 
The Rock of Gibraltar. 
A fleeing thief. 
A devourinp: .-nonster. 
1\. tedious sonE:. 
A string of beads. 
A gallo-)inc: horseman. 
• <i ' • • I ' • ~ 
26·.· · · ·r ·am rriore' ·sensitive than most other people. TRUE FALSE 
27. I .frequently firid·myself worrying about something. TRUE FALSE 
28. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. TRUE FALSE 
29. I am usually calm and not easily upset, TRUE FALSE 
30.. I cry easily. TRUE FALSE 
31. I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all the time TRUE FALSE 
32. I am happy most of the time. TRUE F.t..LSE 
33. It makes me nervous to have to wait. TRUE FALSE 
' 
34. I have periods of such great restlessness that I cannot sit long 
in a chair. TRUE FALSE 
35. Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to get to sleep. TRUE FALSE 
36. I ha,ve sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high 
that I could not overcome them. TRUE FALSE 
37. I must 8dmit that I have at times been worried beyond reeson over 
something that really did not matter 
38. I hc:ve very few fears comDared to my friends. 
39. I h2ve been afraid of t~1ings or people that I know could not i"mrt 
me. 
40. I certainly feel useless at times, 
41. I find it hard to keep my mind on a. task or job. 
42, I am unusually self-conscious. 
43. I am inclined to take things hard. 
44. I am a hi€h-strung person. 
45. Life is a strain for me much of the time. 
46, At time I think I am no good at all. 
47. I am certainly lacking in self-confidence. 
48. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces. 
49. I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty. 















BIOGRAPHICAL· INVENTORY I 
Name or Code , .•• , . .- ~ •••• , ••••.•••.•••••••••••••.•••••••• Sex ...........•..... 
The following inventory.is being investigated for research purposes •. 
Please indicate, to the best of your ability, which of the following state-
ments. apply in your case and which do not. Put a ring around the word TRUE if you 
feel tha.t, on the whole, the statement app1 :Les to you; put a ring around the word 






















I do not tire quickly. 
I am troubled by attacks of nausea. 
I believe I am no more nervous than most others. 
I have very few headaches, 
I work under a great deal of tension. 
I cannot keep my mind on one thing. 
I worry over money, 
I frequently notice my hand shakes.when I try to d-, something. 
I blush no more often than others. 
I have diarrhoea once a month or more. 
I worry ouite a bit over possible misfortunes. 
I practically never blush. 
I am often afraid that I am gqing to blush, 
I have nightmares every few nights, 
My hands and feet are usually warm enough, 
I sweat very easily even on cool days. 
Sometimes when embarrased, I break out in a sweat which annoys me 
greatly, 
I hardly ever notice my heart pounding and I am seldom short of 
breath, 
I feel hungry almost all the time. 
I am very seldom troubled by constipation. 
I have a great deal of stomach trouble. 
I have had periods in which I lost sleep over worry. 
My sleep is fitful and disturbed. 
I dream frequently about things that are best kept to myself. 
I am easily embarrassed. 


























13. Are your daydreams frequently about things that can never come 
true? Yes No 
14. Are you inclined to keep in the background on social occasions ? Yes No 
15. Are you inclined to ponder over your past ? Yes No 
16. Is it difficult to " lose yourself " even at a lively party ? Yes No 
17. Do you ever feel " just miserable " for no good reason at all ? .• Yes No 
18. Are you inclined to be overconscientious ? Yes No 
19. Do you often find that you have made up your mind too late ? Yes No 
20. Do you like to mix socially with people ? Yes ? No 
21. Have you often lost sleep over your worries ? Yes ? No 
22. Are you inclined to limit your acquaintances to a select few ? .. Yes No 
23. Are you often troubled· about feelings of guilt ? .. Yes No 
24. Do you ever take your work as if it were a matter of life or death ? Yes No 
25. Are your feelings rather easily hurt ? Yes No 
26. Do you like to have many social engagements ? .. Yes No 
27. Would you rate yourself as a tense or "highly-strung" indi-
vidual? Yes No 
28. Do you generally prefer to take the lead in group activities ? .. Yes No 
29. Do you often experience periods of loneliness ? .. Yes ? No 
30. Are you inclined to be shy in the presence of the opposite sex ? Yes No 
31. Do you like to indulge in a reverie (daydreaming) ? Yes No 
32. Do you nearly always have a " ready answer " for remarks dir-
ected at you ? Yes No 
33· Do you spend much time in thinking over good times you have 
had in the past ? Yes No 
34· Would you rate yourself as a happy-go-lucky individual? Yes No 
35· Have you often felt listless and tired for no good reason ? Yes No 
36. Are you inclined to keep quiet when out in a social group ? Yes No 
37· After a critical moment is over, do you usually think of something 
you should have done but failed to do ? .. Yes No 
38. Can you usually let yourself go and have a hilariously good time 
at a gay party ~ .. Yes ? No 
39· Do ,ideas run through your head so that you· cannot sleep ? Yes No 
40. Dq you like work that requires considerable attention ? Yes No 
41.' Have you ever been bothered by having a useless thought come 
into your mind repeatedly ? Yes No 
42. Are you inclined to take your work casually, that is as a matter 
of course? .. Yes No 
43· Are you touchy on various subjects ? Yes No 
44· Do other people regard you as a lively individual ? Yes No 
45· Do you. often feel disgruntled ? .. Yes No 
46. Would you rate yourself as a talkative individual? Yes No 
47. Do you have periods of such great restlessness that you cannot 
sit long in a chair ? Yes No 
48. Do you like to play pranks upon others ? Yes No 
Published by University of London hess Ltd., and printed in Great Britain by Chigwell Preu Ltd., Buekhurst Hill, Essex. 
MAUDSLEY PERSONALITY INVENTORY 
(Copyright © 1959 by H. J. Eysenek), 
NAME ...................................................... CHRISTIAN NAMES ............................. : ........................................ .. 
AGE.................. SEX.............................. OCCUPATION .................................................................................. .. 
N- E- ?-
Instructions 
Here are some questions regarding the way you behave, feel and act. After each question 
there is a" Yes,"'' a"?" and a" No". 
Try and decide whether " Yes " or " No " represents your usual way of acting or feeling ; 
then put a circle round the "Yes" or " No." If you find it absolutely impossible to decide, 
put a circle round the " ? '', but do not use this answer except very occasionally. Work 
quickly, and don't spend too much time over any question ; we want your first reaction, not a 
long drawn-out thought process I The whole questionnaire shouldn't take more than a few 
minutes. Be sure not to omit any questions. Now go ahead, work quickly, and remember to 
answer every question. There are no right or wrong answers, and this isn't a test of intelligence 
or ability, but simply a measure of the way you behave. 
x. Are you happiest when you get involved in some project that 
calls for rapid action ? 
2. Do you sometimes feel happy, sometimes depressed, without 
any apparent reason ? • 
3. Does your mind often wander while you are trying to 
concentrate ? 
4. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends ? 
5. Are you inclined to be quick and sure in your actions ? 
6. Are you frequently " lost in thought " even when supposed to be 
taking part in a conversation ? 
7. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes 
very sluggish ? 
8. Would you rate yourself as a lively individual ? 
9. Would you be very unhappy if you were prevented from making 
numerous social contacts ? 
10. Are you inclined to be moody ? 
11. Do you have frequent ups and downs in ~ood, either with or 
without apparent cause ? .. 

















I. Maudsley Personality Inventory 
2. Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale 
3. Metaphor Preference Test 




Average first and second sessioo tree linear movement reproduction of 
time signals (N = 31). All scores are seconds • .. 
0.2 Sec S~nal 2.0 See S~nal .:2. Z Sec s~nal 
lst 2nd lst· . 2nd 1st 2nd 
Session Session Session Session Session Session 
0.5 sec o.B sec c.6 sec o.8 sec 0.9 sec 0.7 sec 
0.7 o.6 1.0 i.o 2.0 l.8 
o.6 1.0 1.3 1.2 o.6 1.9 
o.s 0.7 1.5 l.3 2.5 l.S 
0.3 0.4 1.5 0.5 l.S l.5 
o.6 o.s 1.4 l.l 2.5 .2.e 
o.s 1.3 2.0 l.9 2.5 2.8 
0.9 0.7 1.9 2.2 2.2 3.7 
o.6 0.7 1.8 l.4 3.1 2.8 
l.2 i .• o 2.3 2.0 3.5 3.7 
0.9 0.9 2.5 l.9 3.s l.9 
l.3 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.7 
1.4 1.3 2.2 1.2 4.0 4.0 
o.s 0.9 2~1 1.4 3.3 3.8 
o.s i-.o 1.0 2.2 2.7 3.1 
l.O o.a l.8 1.6 2.3 2.5 
0.9 o.s 1.6 2.5 3.0 2.7 
o.s o.6 2.1 . 1.6 .3·3 3.2 
l.O 1.2 2.0 l.S 3.1 3.9 
o.s 0.5 1.4 1.1 3.1 3.2 
l.l i.o 2.7 1.4 2.4 2.0 
2.4 1.6 3.3 4.4 6.5 8.0 
l.8 1.0 2.8 2.0 6.o 3.1 
l.l 1.5 2.5 3.1 3.s 4.1 
o.s 0.7 3.4 l.O 3.7 2 .. 3 
1.3 o.s 3.2 2.1 4.0 5.0 
0.9 o.s 2.2 2.3 4.4 3.6 
o.s 0.7 2.2 l.8 3.a 3.0 
1.5 i.o 2.6 2.0 3.5 3.J 
0.9 o.6 2.7 2.7 3.8 4.3 
TOl'AL 
MEAN 
STD. DEV.* 0.2'-2 
* STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE I (Continued) 
EXPERJMENT 1 
Averaee i'il~at and second session free linear movement reproduction of 
time signals (N = .31) ~ All scores are seconds. 
lt•J pee S:!enal 6 •·l Sec SiP.nal 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
Session Session Session Session 
'. '. 
0•9 sec 1.4 seo 1.4 sec 1.3 sec 
1.3 1.2 1.9 2.a 
2.6 1.9 2.3 2.0 
2.1 2.3 4.2 2.9 
3.2 1.5 .3.0 2.9 
3.5 4.2 5.0 4.5 
3.5 3.6 3.s 1 ... 7 
3.5 3.6 4 •. 9 5.5 
.2 .. 6 3.3 4.q 4.8 
3.5 4.S 6.4 4.9 
3.2 2.8 5.4 2.8 
3.2 3.0 3.6 3.5 
4.4 3.5 5.0 4.s . 
4.4 4.7 6.2 6.7 
4.7 3.6 5.3 4.l 
.3.8 4.0 s.o 5.1 
2.·5 3.3 4.7 5.2 
3.1 3.s 5.9 6.3 
3.3 4.2 5.0 4.6 
3.s 3.6 5.:1 3.,9 
4.9 .3.4 4.7 3.5 
s.6 8.1 13.2 10.0 
8.4 .3·9 12.6 4.0 
4.6 3.5 7.0 6.8 
6.S 7.5 6.2 4.6 
4.5 4.0 6.4 5.7 
' I 4.5 5.2 6.0 4.1+ 
l 
I l 4.4 3.2 6.5 5.3 • ;I, 
5.3 3.9 6.1 4.2 
; 
4.9 4.5 6.1 5.8 
7.8 6.7 7,.5 5.9 
12$:~ sec 11$.2 sec!171.1 sec !liJ·2 sec 
·!i;.l!i; ~.s1 .. L 2~62 ~.6J 
STD. DEV."' ·1.171~ i.523 t 2.1~q 1~622 
* STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE ll 
EXPIBlMENr l 
Average f'irst and second session speed of free linear movement in repro-
duc:it\g t:tme signals (N = 31).. All' scores are inches per second. 
Q•2 Sec Signal 2.0 Sec s:y,maJ. 
lst 2nd lst 




s.o 4.7 lJ.3 
8.6 15.0 15.0 
21.7 19.0 17.7 
7.5 10.0 s.o 
3.3 2.5 2.7 
15.0 16.2 15.0 
7.5 4.6 5.0 
3.3 4.3 7.9 
5.0 s.6 6.7 
7.5 9.0 5.2 
10 .• 0 JJ+.4 6.8 
9.2 9~0 7,.5 
7.1 13.l 5.5 
17.5 14.4 16.7 
37.5 20.0 30.0 
s.o 8.7 7.2 
4.4 6.2 2.5 
5.0 6.7 4.s . 
10.0 s.3 s.o 
22.5 42.0 20.0 
17.3 12.0 14.l 
6.3 5.6 6.7 
.ll.l 6.o 10.7 
.ll.8 5.3 14.4 
7.5 ll.O 5.0 
4.6 s.7 4.7 
s.7 7.5 6.4 
5.0 4.3 5.5 
6.o s.o 4.2 
6.7 io.o J+el 
27.5 16.7 21.1 
;2s.1 .· ... 3~1.s I, 302.li 
· u:~s · ·! · 9.72 10~58 
:z.66' .. s.~ l 6.JJ 









































































I J~.2 ' . Jl&·.Q 
" 1 ·11;1~ ... . u;Zl • 
! s.s~. . 9.£2, 
TABLE II (Continued) 
EXPERJMENT l 
Average 1'irst and second session .speed of free linear movcment in rcprc>-
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T AB LE Ill 
Average first arid ;second session free linear .movement ?'eproduetion 





* .sec = seconds 
§ ... O Second . S:ifmal 
·1st · · 2nd. 
Session Session ....,..... . 
1·~z·~··· · :;.&: ..
L~ 2.ud c . . :a '. lt90. 
J.6.0.Second.S~ 
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Average tirst and second ,session speed or .free linear movement in 
reproducing 8 and 16 seconds (ll = 56) • All ,scares are inches per 
second.. · 
8 Seconcl .... sy;naJ.. l6 Second Syrpal 
I• I 
lst 2nd lst 2nd 
Session Session Session Session 
-~ i~ 
.. 
i~ .... /;,~ ,,,~ 4.6 $ c* ·7.6 .s c• 4!1 ~s· c• ,a.o s~c* 
ll.~7 6.8 ll.5 8~6 
s.3 ll-.3 l0.3 8~1 
7.~J. 7~1 7.2 6.,4 
l.3.2 13.1 13.'9 12.5 
6~.5 2'!3 S~l 4.1. 
7.5 9.,2 7~7 s •. 6 
5~l 4.e 4,.3 ~-3 
9.6 7.s 5.3 s.2 
5.7 9.~,5 5.,9 7.6 
16 .• l 22.7 16.3 .21 .. 4 
JH9 4~.6 4.6 4.5 
5~7 3.6 s~i 3•.7 
l3a4 9.8 13·7 io.7 . •, 
6.7 3 •. l. 7~.l 7 .. 9 
13~0 18~2 11.9 23.3 
e .• 1 6 •. '9 9~3 7.5 
6 .. 3 8~6 s .. s 9.0 
4.6 4•,7 4·:3 4.9 
2.·7 40 ~ .•. 2 3 •. 4 i9:: 
12.0 16.o 15,~2 14.8 
7.6 8.:7 7.,,6 7.9 
10.·s 15 •. 2 32 •. 7 13.1 
36~2 50~4 38 .• l .·52 •. 9 
6 .. 3 5 •. 7 :5 .• ,6 l.4 
7.6 14.:3 l0.7 l;.'7 
9.2 7.,.7 8 .• ~9 9 •. 1 
.5~4 11.3 7.,4 10.9 
25.3 31.3 2il.,2 . 'J7 •. 9 
2.·s 6ff.4 7 .• :i 5._4 
s~.o J.;l 3.0 .3,..5 
3.,1 3.,7 2 •. 6 .3~.4 
5 •. 2 5~.9 .4.4 5.9 
l0 •. 3 ll.,1· 3.6 ;.,5 
6.3 a •. 5 6 .• l s •. 5 
8.3 4.1 7,.2 4 •. 3 
2.9 ·2;4 .l.:6 1.,6 
'9.'A i;.:2 .10.'6 9•:8 
7.6 5.,1 1.:1 5-.4 
3.? ·5~J2: 4·5 5",0 ~" 
7.8 6.,l 6-2 7 ?, .. , •J 
io.o 25,,,Q 9.9 26 •. J.,, 
· a~'1 1 .. :6 '7,/J 7 . 7 
is;1 15.7 u.4 :35.o 
3."4 t::~ 4 •. 7 4.a 6."6 6.,.). 1 •. 4 
3.4 3 .. ,1. 4•.9 3 .• 1 
7.1 7·:3 7•,4' s.,0 
8.5 b •.. 2 7 •. 9 '7,0 
7.4 10.0 ll.5 s.s 
6.3 5.",3 5.'l 4,.4 
U~5 s •. 7 9.A s.,4 
9.8 ll.1+ 9 .. ,5 7.s 
3.:9 6.3 12.2 1+·.)+ 
3~5 3·!+ 2 .• -6 2.0 s.q 6.1 6.'o 6.? ., 
TGrAL 
MEAN 
!li67.l . .529.3. lL.7'5.9 t;Ll. .• O. 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
I s.~lt -·~·lt.2 .l .. s •. ~o.· 2.:z1 
~' ·2·52 '. . 'J./J.O .· ~ I 2•82. 2~·21 





First and second session verbal estimate and key-pressing reproduction of 
8 seconds and J.O seconds (N;:: 32). Scores a.re seconds. 
Ke:.v••oress:£1s Vcrbf:J: Estimate 
S Seconds 16 Seconds 8 Seconds 16 Seconds 
1st 2nd lst 2nd 1st 2nd 1s·i;. .2.nd. 
Ses- Ses- Ses- Ses• Ses- Ses- Ses- Ses-
sion a ion sion ~ sion sion · sion sion - - - - -
9.2 7;3 17.2 15. ·7~0 7.0 13.0 is;o 
a.3 7" • o 15.0 ]);, . . a.o 9.0 14.0 16.o 
7.7 7.7 16.3 11. . s.o s.o 16.o 15.0 
a.2 7.0 16.0 14· • 14.0 io.o 25.0 2l.O 
B .. 5 7.2 1.6.o 16.3 a.o 6.o 16.o 12.0 
7.4 7.0 l.4.4 14·3 6.o 7.0 13.0 15.0 
S.l 6.s ;µ..s 16.o 9.0 s.o 15.0 17.0 
7.3 7.7 17.2 15.3 s.o 7.0 17.0 n.o · 
7.0 6k .. u..2 14.7 s.o s.o ia.o 17.0 
7.4 s.s 15.9 16.6 12.0 u.o 25.0 . 23.0 
6.9 6.9 U..7 12.3 . s.o a.o 15.0 15.0 
a.4 s.5 1.6.6 lD.7 12.0 15.0 20.0 2s.o 
7.2 7.7 i5.5 16.o 6.o 6.o 12 .. 0 12.0 
a.3 6.7 l.4.6 15.0 4.0 6.o 10.0 12.0 
7.1 6.Ji. 16.s 15.9 :u. .. o 17.0 24.0 35.0 
7.s 7.3 17.s 15.9 15.0 n.o 35.0 20.0 
e.6 7.4 J.6.2 16.o 15.0 13.0 24.0 28.0 
a.o 6.7 17.9 17.0 a.o 7.0 1a.o 16.0 
ll.4 8.9 19.4 17.? 7.0 6.o 11.0 11.0 
7.6 6.6 lS.2 1;5.6 7.0 s.o u.o 15.0 
6.l 4.5 ll.8 ll.3 7.0 :ho 20.0 7.0 
a.; s.5 u.o 16.2 .24.0 J.S.o 25.0 34.0 
s.7 9.2 l.5.6 15.3 u.o s.o 20.0 20.0 
6.7 7.0 .9.7 13.0 7.0 6.o. lO.O 11.0 
7.0 6.1+ 14.2 l'>.7 10.0 7.0 19.0 16.o 
a.3 9.5 13.9 ia.1 10.0 25.0 13.0 50,0 
6.5 7.6 15.$ J.4.5 ·15.0 s.o 30.0 14.0 
7.2 7.0 16.1 14.5 6.o 6.o 12.0 11.0 
8.6 8.6 14.'l 18.8 .33.0 21.0 52.0 54.0 
6.3 6.7 13.6 13.5 s.o 8.0· u.o 13.0 






Average lnt and 2nd session reproduction of S seconds and 3rd and 
4th session reproduction or 16 seconds~ by controlled linear move. 
ment (N = 40). All scores are seconds. 
$YmeJ: s.,o Secon.ds SWia.l 16.o Seconds 
·1st 2nd' ·3rd 4th'. 
Ses~ion 
~
Session ·Session Se~siou 
. . . . . . . , ....... ~ . . . 
6.8 8~9 J.5.8 15.7 
JJ.+,.2 13.5 21.6 18.7 
Jl.7 J..l.l J.6.5 14•1 
7.3 9.6 J2.3 J.4..2 
6,1 J;0•5 l7.~ J.S.2· 
s,7 7.7 17.3 J.7•2 • > 
7.1 J.0.7 l~9 • .3 lS~7 
9.s ll•O l4.9 12.9· 
7•3 7•6 J.5•6 ).6,9 
12.l J.Jt..6 9.9 JJ..a 
7.5 14.3 ;>2.7 J..$.4· 
4~2 3.4 21•9 J.6,6 
12.l ll.3 ?2.5 ?..2.8 
:5.l 7.4 19.7 ).7,0· 
9.0 10•5 . l3i9 22.;9 
13.7 J.7.4 16.3 l7.7 
s.1 7•9 15.S J~.7 
7•7 7•7 15-.3 15•1 
8.7 l0-.3 J.0.9 J.6.o 
7,~7 7•7 . 16~4 16.9 
J..4•4 )..2.5 ).0•5 J.o.s 
9.8 J.O.O l.8,3 19.a 
G.1 7~1 18.1 J.J+.4 
J.J.;,;O J.3•2 2;.6 32.3 
18.0 lR.5 22.8 26 •. l 
s.o s.7 25•7 J.6.s 
:u.9 9.9 J.5.6 12.2 
6.4 10.5 13.9 J.5.7 
13.s ,20 .. 9 17.9 l6.4 
.J.O,l ll•7 15.;7 17.2 
3,e 4.3 .1$.8 16.2. 
9.,5 s.7 13.6 12.3 
6.S 8•5 :i.3.9 12.9 
s.o 10.4 25.7 16.8 
7.s a.s J..2.3 14.2 
s.o Bti.1 is.a 15·7 
7.7 7.7 '25.6 31.0 
s.o s.7 15. 7 ..... . 17.2 
a.1 7.7 i5-6 - . J.6•9 
6.,8 a.s 12.s 14 •. 2 
361.•5 4C/l.8 '690~0 . '675~6., 
9.04· 10~20 ·17;2;· 16.s9j 
2.93 
.. 
3~40 I 4.22 4.ij ...... ' _-. 
TABLE VII 
Average 1st and 2nd session reproduction of 8 seconds, and 3rd and 
4th session .reproduction of 16 seconds, by .free llnea.r movement 











































































































































·750~2 · · · 702~e·! 
... "lS.75 ...... 17~57 
5.68 .· ·4.69 
TABLE VIII 
E..XPERIMENT 2 
Immediate and delayed reproduction of 1 second by free linear arm 
movement (N = 77). !£: scores are seconds. Delay is in seconds. 
0 
limn.* Del&** :rmn..• 
0.9 1.1 o.s 
0.9 o.6 0.4 
0.9 0.9 l.l 
2 .. 0 loO 0.9 
o.6 0.9 0.5 
0.9 l.3 l.O 
1.3 1.5 o.5 
o.4 o.6 o.s 
1.l 1.2 o.s 
0.5 0.5 1.4 






Thm.* Delay** Imm.* 
1,5 1.7· 1.0 
o.s 1.2 · l.O 
1.5 0.7 l.l 
o.6 0.5 l.2 
0.9 o.s 0.9 
0.9 1.2 i.3 
2.3 2.1 i.o 
0.5 1.3 1.4 
0.5 o.6 1.0 
1.9 2.2 0.5 





GRAND TOfAL 76.0 
MEAN ·0.99 
STD.DEV./> .3564 
* limn. = limn.ediate Reproduction 
** 0 Delay= 0 Seconds Delay 
fJ STD.D11'V. = STANDARD DEVIN.rICN 
5 10 
Del&** Imm* • De~** Imm..* 
o.s 1.0 1.2 
. 1.0 o.s o.s 
0.7 o~6 l .. l 
o.a 1.,1 o.6 
1.2 1.0 l•O 
1.1 l.O 1.4 
0.7 o.s 0.7 
0.7 0.9 1.6 
1.0 1.2 o.s 
1.1 l.Ji. l.l 
o.s 1.3 1.2 
.30 0 
Delaz** Imm.* Dela;z** 
·1.1 l~O i.o· 
1.5 1.1 l.O 
0.9 0.9 1.4 




























linmediate and delayed reproduction of 2 seconds by free linear arm 
movement (N = 77). ~.ll scores are seconds., Deley .is in seconds. 
0 5 10 
Tu:rm. * Dnl.a~* L1ll!l. * fula~** Imm.* Dela;y:** .Jlnm. * 
1.6 l.S l.9 l.5 1.8 1.9 2.0 
2.0 1.8 1.5 1.9 0.7 1~6 1 .. 3 
2.3 2.0 1.8 l.l 2.2 2.3 2.5 
3.0 2.9 1.8 l.6 2.8 1.4 2.0 
2.5 1.3 1.9 1.6 2.6 2.1 1.8 
1.7 1.6 1.9 l.3 2 .. 5 2.0 1.2 
2.6 2 ') t4 2.1 1 .. 2 l.3 1.2 2.5 
1.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 i.7 1.5 1.5 
1.7 1.7 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.6 . 2.4 
1.5 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 
2.0 2.0 1.0 1.2 2.1 1.7 2.0 
















































































_M2 • .01z. 
.7423 
* Jmm. = limn.ediate Reproduction 
** 0 Delay = 0 Seconds Delay 




































Immediate and delayed reproduction of 4 seconds by free linear arm 
mov€.11.ent (N = 77). All scores arc seconds. Delay is in seconds. 
0 5 
Jnm.• Dela;y;** Imm.* Delaz0 
4.5 3.,6 3.7 3.3 
3.3 3.5 3,2 4.,,3 
3 .. 2 2 .. 5 2 .. 3 1.9 
5.3 3~7 2.8 3,.1 
2.3 2 .. 4 l t: "';; 1.5 
3.2 1.,.3 2.,,3 3.0 
3.7 2.9 2.2 1.6 
5.1 3,.9 3.7 2.9 
3.6 ') 4 ..)• 4.3 1.7 
.3.0 2.6 4.7 4.3 
3.5 3.7 l.3 1 .. 3 




Imm.* 1nrn!! neiaz"'* 
3.2 2.6 3.4 
6.o 4.2 4.5 
1.8. 3.4 2.5 
3.4 1.4 1.2 
4.s 3.7 3.2 
3.5 2.0. 1.8 
7.1 3.9 3.3 
3.8 4.{J 3.8 
2.1+ 4.1 2.5 
5.1 3.9 4 .. 7 











* Imm. •. = Jimnecliatc Reproduction 
** 0 Delay = 0 Seconds Delay 
.f> STD. lEV. = STANDA.W D~ :VL'\TION 
10 





3.5 3 .. 3 
3 .. 1 2.5 
2.9 3.3 
3 .. 1 2 .. 5 
2.5 2.~o 
















































Immediate and dela,yed reproduction ·of S seconds by'frcc linear arm 
movement (N = 77),. All 1scores are seconds. Delay .is in .seconds. 
0 ·.5 Jiim.• Imm .. • ,Del.0(!•• 
6.1 · 7 .. 2 ·.s.7 
5 6 ' . 4.5 s.1 
5.1 6.1 .5.4 
10.7 6.o 5.8 
7.5 3.7 1.3 
·7.7 6.3 3.9 
;s.7 3.3 .3•5 
·7.3 7.;3 6.5 
5.2 6~2 3.5 
11-.6 ?.6 '? .s 





Jlmn..• .Dela.z• -· ' . Dela.~* .. 7.5 1 •. 5 7 2· ·s.s · • 
9.5 ·7.4 7.0 a.a 
6.l .3.3 ·.5.4 4.3 
s.2 7~4 l.l 1.6 
ll.S 6.4 s.s 6.1 
6.s 7.7 4.1 2.0 
s.3 s.s 5.5 7.5 
7.0 ·6.2 14.4 7.3 
5 •. 5 4~3 6,2 5.5 
10.3 .io.o 7.3 8.9 









srn .• DEV .• ¢ ,· 3.µ5 
* Imm. ·= .linmediate Reproduction 
** 0 Deley == 0 Seconds De~ 





6 ... 5 6.5 
7.1 5.7 


















































7 •. 5 
Ji.II 
TAB 1 E XIII 
EXPElUMENT 2 
Average verbal estimates of 1 second., and error in verbal estimate 
of 1 second., ma.de after free linear movement (N = 77). f\JJ. scores 
are seconds. . 
Est:tma.te Error F..st:imate Error 
2 sec. 1 sec. 2sec. 1 sec. 
l 0 1 0 
l 0 2 l 
2 1 l. 0 
2 1 1 ·o 
3 2 J. 0 
2 J. 1 0 
2 l 1 0 
l 0 3 ·2 
l ·o 2 l 
2 'l 3 2 
1 0 6' 5 
l 0 2 .J. 
l 0 2 1 
l ' 0 l .Q 
2 1 l 0 
2 1 l. 0 
2 l 2 .l 
2 l 2 1 
l 0 2 1 
4 3 2 1 
l 0 2 l 
2 l .2 l 
2 l l 0 
1 0 l 0 
2 l 2 l 
1 0 l 0 
l 0 4 3 
1 0 1 0 
2 1 2 l 
1 0 2 l 
2 l 3· 2 
2 l l 0 
2 J.. l 0 
2 ·1 .l 0 
2 l l 0 




Tal'AL l.33 sec. 56 sec~ 
NEAN l.73 0.7 
STANDARD DEVIATION .$6 .69 
T AB.LE XIV' 
I:JCPiliIMENT 2 
Average verbal estimates of 2 seconds, and error in verbal esti.r.iatc 
of 2 Gcconds~ made after free l:i.near movement (N = 77). All score~ 
a.re seconds. 
Estimate Error .LiSt:imate Error 
3 sec. 1 sec. 3 sec. 1 sec. 
2 0 2 0 
3 l 2 0 
3 1 3 1 
3 1 4 2 
4 2 3 1 
3 1 3 l 
6 4 2 0 
3 1 .3 1 
2 0 2 0 
3 1 3 1 
2 0 5 3 
3 1 18 16 
3 1 4 2 
3 1 3 1 
3 l 3 l 
3 1 2 0 
2 0 3 1 
3 1 3 l 
1 l 3 l 
6 4 3 l 
2 0 .3 l 
3 1 4 2 
3 1 2 0 
3 1 .2 0 
2 0 3 1 
2 0 2 0 
2 0 4 2 
.2 0 8 6 
2 0 J. 1 
3 .l 3 1 
3 1 2 0 
3 1 7 5 
4 2 2 0 
4 2 2 0 
5 3 3 1 
6 4 2 0 
3 1 3 1 
4 2 
Tor AL 250 100 
MEAU ''3~25 1~3 
STANDAHD DEVIll.T ION . 2.07 .. 2.05 
TAB LL i'JJ 
Avera.::;e verbal est:imate of 4 seconds, and error in verbal esti."rl.ate of 
4 seconds, m.M.e after free lincnr movC!Il.ent (II = 77). fiJ; __ scorcs are 
seconds. 
Estimate ;:rror :..st:imatc Error 
4 sec. O sec. 5 sec. 1 sec. 
4 0 5 l 
4 0 6 2 
6 2 4 0 
5 1 5 1 
8 I+ 3 1 
5 1 l+ 0 
8 4 6 2 
5 1 h 0 
4 0 5 1 
6 2 7 3 
4 0 40 36 
6 2 8 4 
'.3 
. 1 5 1 
3 1 5 l 
6 2 4 0 
5 1 4 0 
7 3 5 1 
4 0 6 2 
3 1 7 3 
ll 7 7 3 
3 1 4 0 
5 1 4. 0 
6 2 3 1 
4 0 5 l 
5 1 5 1 
3 l 4 0 
3 l 15 ll 
5 l 3 1 
3 1 5 l 
; l 3 l 
6 2 9 5 
5 l 3 l 
6 2 3 1 
7 3 6 2 
$ 4 4 0 




TO'r.lL ~33 153 
l:L:AN 5.62 1.90 
STANDARD .iJi;.;VL\TICU 4.43 4.28 
T.A B LE XVI 
EXPERJMENT . .2 
Average verbal estimate of 8 seconds, and error in verbal estjma.te o.f 
8 seconds, made after free linear movement (N = 77),. All scores are 
seconds. 
l:st:i.mate J<.:rror Estimate Error 
7 .. sec. l sec. 10 sec. 2 sec. 
7 l 8 0 
7 .l 8 o· 
14 6 B 0 
8 0 10 2 
11.i. 6 7 1 
10 2 7 l 
.20 12 13 5 
10 2 7 ,l 
,3 0 10 2 
13 5 l2 4 
,g 0 60 52 
10 .2 14 6 
6 2 10 2 
7 1 10 .2 
.ll 3 7 1 
8 0 7 l 
ll 3 10 2 
7 1 8 0 
6 2 14 6 
21 13 a 0 
7 ·l 11 3 
9 l 9 1 
13 .5 6 2 
lO 2 8 0 
9 l 8 0 
6 2. .7 l 
6 .2 27 . 19 
9 l 5 3 
6 2 .10 2 
12 4 17 9 
10 2 .20 12 
8 0 6 2 
.10 2 ; 3 
12 4 1J.. 3 
15 7 s 0 




TrJf AL 809 268 
MEAN ·10.51 3.5 
STANDARD DJ!VIATION 6.94 6~50 
TABLE XVII 
Average verbal estimates of 16 seconds, and error in verbal esti1na.te 
of 16 seconds, made after linear movement (N = 77). · .!Lil scores are 
seconds~ 
bsti.mate brr or Estimate &ror 
16 sec. 0 sec. l4 sec. 2 sec. 
l.l 5 15 1 
15 1 14 2 
26 10 16 0 
17 l 20 4 
20 4 9 7 
20 4 13 3 
35 19 18 2 
lS 2 30 1.4 
15 1 19 3 
22 6 25 9 
15 1 $0 64 
22 6 24 B 
10 6 18 2 
13 3 20 4 
20 4 14 2 
18 2 19 3 
16 0 19 3 
15 1 13 3 
11 5 2$ 12 
1+1+ 28 20 4 
14 2 35 19 
·18 2 15 l 
23 7 ]2 4 
17 1 15 1 
20 ~- 23 7 
12 h l5 1 
l4 2 55 39 
22 6 12 4 
11 5 17 1 
20 4 33 17 
23 7 40 2.4 
22 6 14 2 
27 ll 11 5 
20 4 20 4 
35 19 16 0 




Till AL 1,575 . 1{17 
MBAU ·20.1.,5 6.5 




Distance of free linoar ll.I'l!l. movement .in f :ir st se.sslon rep...'l"Cduction 




Sl'D.. DEV" * 
. l Second 
,5:i&U;al .{Continuedl 






















15 ~ 18 
8 6 
6 5 


















* STD. DEV. = STANDARD DEVIATlOlJ 
\ ,. 
2 seconds 
~:ijmal .. '(Continued.) 
'· 13 ·inches · '3 'inclie;; 









































































Distance of free linear arm movement Jn. first session reproduction 
Qf 4 seconds and 8 seconds (N = 77) • All scores are inches. 
TOl'AL 
MEAN 




















































































• STD. mv. =STAN.DA.RD IEVIATION 
$ Seconds 
S~aJ. C Continuedl 











































. EXPERlMEMT 2 
Distance of free linear ann movement in first session reproduction 

























































































Speed of free linear arm movement in reproducing l.O second in the first 
session (N = 77). All scores are inches per secon;;ct. 
Tor AL 
MEAN 
srn. DEV. * 
Delav (:in ~condsJ 
0 5 10 15 . 20 
l 
7.27 7.50 J2.50 6.oo 15.83 
5.00 3.00 10.00 s.57 4.29 
ll.ll 4.29 5.45 l0.00 10.00 
;.oo s.75 l.67 29.00 6:25 
ll.ll 4.17 20.00 6.25 7.06 
a.46 5.45 7.14 14.29 6.67 
14.00 4.29 4.29 2.00 . 9.05 
6.67 ll.43 32.50 2.50 5.38 
6.67 J2.00 10.00 5.71 s.oo 
6.oo s.45 I 8.18 s.oo 4.ffJ· 
3.85 7.50 5.00 4.'29 10.00 
85.14 73.83 JJ.6.73 93.61 83.62 
·7. 740 ,, 6. 71.2. ·10~6121· ·s~510 I ·7;602· · 
·2.9f?{/ 2.872 I 8.353 7.282 I 3.292 
GRAND TC/!AL 620.18 
MEAN ·s.054 
STANDARD DEVIATION . 5.355 













103.99 '63.26 .. 
9.454 j· ·5.751 
5.632 1.423. 
T A B L E xx.III 
EXFERlMENT 2 
Speed of free linear arm movement in reproducing 2. O seconds in the first 
session (N = 77). All scores are inches per second. 




.0 '3 . .. 
7.22 7"33 









4 .. 00 6!>50 
. 
92 .. 19 Sli;60 
·s.3s1I ·1 .• us 
3.434 · ·2"960 I· 





2 .. 86 28.26 
n .. 90 a.24 
13.00 s.57 
5 .. 83 3.33 
39.33 2,73 
io.oo 6.36 
4 .. 55 6.oo 
5.00 4.38 


























, ... . .. 
22.50 B.54 















Speed of freo linear arm movement in reproducing J+.0 $ecands in the first 
session (N= 77),. · !Y-1 scores a.re inches per second. 
TGrAL 
MEAN 
























Detp.y (in seconds,l 
l:O 1'5 20 
8.00 8.65 15.Sl 
5.83 s.B9 s.24 
4.44 10.45 7.30 
3.14 29.r:f/ a.3s 
lh.67 6.15 4.20 
10.00 6.92 5.61 
10.61 2.92 7.56 
39.20 5.00 6.41 . 
7.50 13.08 8.75 
6,.74 8.9'.3 4.39 































STANDARD DEVIATION 5.474 
* STD. DEV• = Sl'ANDARD DEVHTION 
. Jfl. 
TAB LE .XXV 
EXFBRJlIBNT 2 
Speed of free. linear arm movement in reproducing a.o seconds in the .t'irst 
session ( N = 77 ). All scores are inches per second. 
De~.1in secondsl 
0 5 10 "111 20 ~o 60 
.. . . 
4.20 9.57 8.06 9.17 16.22 io.oo e.54 
4;5s 3.86 6.31 l0.19 10.30 7.95 7.3a 
J.i .• 67 3.52 4.56 ;.39 6.'.35 s.14 .3.so 
5~07 s.69 2.75 25.32 8.28 18.13 6.28 
s.69 16.15 12.05 8.00 2.93 3.44 l0.71 
7.14 4.~ 7.63 s.21 5.20 13.50 ll.53 
l3.2l 5.71 10.$3 2.77 9.43 5.33 9.79 
.6.00 10.46 36.17 ;.oo 7.5s 6.5$ 3.93 
'6.4S 13.43 "8.97 ll.54 6.98 14.55 3.50 
.7.;o . 6.67 6.34 7.95 .3.70 3.37 5.28 
5.14 13.04 7.56 3.(f{ 7.78 7.12 5.93 
TOI'AL 79 .• 68 92~97 lll.23 96.61 s4.75 98.ll I 76~67' 
.7.~ s.452 io.ll2 ·a.7© 7.705 8.919 6,r{C . 
• $'TD., DEV~ '* "'2.77f. '4.122 · a.600 5.et/3 3.436 4.49e 2.716 
GRAND TC'!:AL . . 
MEAN 
SXANDARD' DEVIATION .. 5.(f'/0 
. 
* STD. !G'V. = STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE XXVI 
Speed of i'.ree linear arm movement in reproducing 16.0 seconds in the first . . 
session (N == 77). 1Ul scores are inches per second • .. 
--- I Delav (in seconds) 
TCTl'AL 
MEAN 
srn. mv. * 
0 2 lO . 
3.60 5.34 9.29 
4.12 4.12 5.8:3 
u.51 4.36 4.35 
5.26 5.86 4.16 
10.27 l6.2S 15.22 . 
7.19 4.62 7.62 
13.91 5+15 12.72 
1.29 l0.94 38.06 
B.Cf/ :J.66 8.ll 
7.69 7.09 5.65 
4.28 u.89 10.71 
163.19 89.31 121.72 
7.563 s .. u9 ll.065 . 
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s.93 ll.54 . 
7.69 4.38 
11.42 5.71 
4.75 s.70 . 
ll.03 9.40 











Reproduction of tim.e signals by key-pressing in the first session 
(N = 43). All scores are second~!' 
l Second 2 Seconds It. Seconds 8 Secon:l.s 16 Seconds 
1.3 2.7 5.7 . s.a 15.6 
l.9 1.5 4.4 9.2 17.2 
1.5 2.3 5.2 B.3 15.0 
0.7 2.0 3.5 7.4 14.9 
1.4 1 •. .5 4.0 7.3 16.3 
0.7 1.2 3.1 s.2 l6.o 
l.2 2.1 3.9 s.5 16.o 
l.O 2.3 5 .. 0 s.4 17.1 
0.5 1.1 2.3 4.9 13.4 
0.9 1.9 Jh3 7.4 14.4 
o.s 2.3 4.3 a.1 · 14.5 
0.8 2.1 1.,,.3 7.3 17.2 
l.l 2.1 5.0 7.0 14.2 
1.1 1.8 4.2 7.4. 15.9 
·1.0. 1.7 3.9 6.9 J.6. 7 
1.0 2.1 4 .. 0 a.4 16.6 
0.9 2.2 . 3.5 7.2. 15.5 
1.2 2.0 3.6 s.3. 14.6 
l.O 2.0 3.2 7.1 16.s 
1.4 2.3 5.2 6.5. l3i0 
0.7. 2.0 3.9 7.s. 17.S 
1.2 2.1 4.4 8.6 J.6.2 
l.1 2.2 . 3.7 7.4. 16.-3 
1.1 1.5 3.7 s.1. 15.0 
l,8 2.5 3.7 s.o 17.9 
l.3 2.2 h.7 S.5 · 11.·o 
l.O 2.5 5.2 6.s 15.0 
2.5 3.7 7.a ll.4 19.4 
0.7. 1.9 4.6 7.6. 18.-2 
o.s 2.1 3.4 6.l u.s 
l.6. 3.7 "],. 7 s.7 · 15.6 
1.0 1.5 4.1 6.7 9.7 
1.2 3.4 5.2 e.o 17.7 
0.9 l.5 2.6 7.0 J.4.2 
l.3 3.5 4.4 s.3 13.9 
1.2 2.2 3.7 6.5 15.s 
0.9 2.7 3.s 7.5 16.3 
1.4 1.8 4.2 7.2 16.l 
l.3 2.3 4.3 8.6 J.h..7 
1.4 3.2 4.2 8.6 17.2 
l.O 2.4 3.7 6.3 13.6 
l.7 2.4 4.3 7.8 15.5 
1.5 2.2 8 • .5 11.7 . 21.~. 
TCJrAL 49.l. 94.7 lSli.-4 335.a 671.4 
MEAN 1.14 2.20 4.29 7.s1· 15.61" 
STD. DEV.* 0.361 .592 '. l.095 ·1~179 . 2.066 
, . . . . . 
* STD. DfJV. = STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE XXVIII 2.ff 
EXP.ERJMENT 2 
Intra-indiYidual ratios of performance in the second session divided by 
performance in the first session., .in judging 16 seconds. The .ratios 
are (a) speed of i'reo linear movement; (b) time reproduced by free 
linear movement; (c) distance of .free linear movement; and (d) verbal. 
estimate (N = 56). 
S;eeed 2 R,el?roduction_& Distance 2 Estimate 2 
Speed l Reprod.Uction 1 Distance l Estimate J. 
> 1.95 1.03 .2.00 l.18 
.7.5 .77 .58 l.07 
.79 .• 93 .73 .94 
.s9 .• 82 .73 l.lO 
.90 .73 .66 .75 
.5J. .99 .51 J..00 
l.12 .• 94 1.05 l.00 
1.24 .. .84 1.05 .77 
1.54 .7s 1.20 .ao 
l.30 1.09 1.43 l.15 
l.32 .81 1.07 .s5 
.97 1 .• 01 .98 .7s 
.72 ..• 68 .49 .50 
.7e i.02 .so l.00 
l.11 ,.94 1.05 1.02 
1.96 l.22 2.39 1.00 
.Sl~ l.00 .Sl 1.00 
l.55 l.23 l.91 l.04 
i.13 1,.32 1.49 l.00 
.al. 1.19 .96 l.40 
.97 l.08 l.05 i.oo 
l.03 .• Sl .84 .71 
i.03 ,.36 .37 .55 
l.39 ,.52 .72 .81 
.so •• 66 .1.,.4 .65 
l.47 .• 73 l.Cf/ 1.00 
1.03 .• 79 .Bl .1.00 
i.47 ,.91 1.33 .71 
l.34 l.Cfl 1.24 1.12 
.76 l.48 1.26 .95 
1.17 .• 67 .79 i.·57 
l.JJ. .• 61 .Sl .75 
1.14 .• eo .rJ.. .86 
4.29 ..• 24 l.02 .$9 
i.39 l.00 i.39 1.23 
.60 .• 76 .45 .39 
.98 _.$6 .84 .73 
.92 .• 60. .56 .76 
.76 .• 76 .5s .19 
1.12 i.33 l.49 .94 
l.1$ ,.95 .1.12 .95 
2.67 l.75 4.67 .86 
.98 .• 87 .84 .79 
3.o6 l.43 4,35 J.85 
1.00 .$3 .er/ .• 50 
l.2l .69 .84 1.00 
.63 i.33 .$5 .m 
1.09 .58 ,63 .61 
.93 .83 .77 .73 
.76 1.17 .89 .93 
.76 .95 ~72 .71 
.89 .58 .51 .50 
.83 .93 .77 l.J.4 
.36 i.70 .61 .91 
.76 1.13 .86 .95 
ltll ·12 ' .§'j ·~ T<JrAL 62.l~ 21.s2 · 2i:tsts 21·22· MEAN ·.1.1~ . o.22tj. ·~8 
STD. DEVIATION • : . .2910 .j6§3 • 6 4 .Lij 
• STD. DEVIATION = STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE XXIX it&. 
EXPERD-lENT 2 
Intra-individual ratios of performance in the second session divided by 
perfonnance in the first session, in judging 8 seconds., The ratios are 
(a) speed of free linear movementJ (b) tfule reproduced by free linear 
movement; (c) distance of free li"'lear movement; a.nd (d) verbal esti-
mate (N ::: 56). 
,SB2cd 2 Re12roduction 2 Distence 2 Est.ima.tc 2 
Speed 1 Heproductj.on l .Oist.."l..."l.Ce 1 :Wtimate 1 
1.66 .75 1.24 l.00 
.5s l.l5 .67 l.12 
1.30 l.02 1.32 l.00 
1.00 .74 ,74 .71 
.99 .79 .. 79 ,eo 
.36 .1.13 .69 .50 
1.23 1.31 1~61 i.oo 
.93 .87 .81 .69 
.s2 l.05 l.04 .e:t 
1.67 l.(J'/ l.79 l.00 
1.40 1.15 1.62 .e1 
.94 1,,18 l.ll .rn 
,63 .71 .45 ,36 
•. 73 1.37 1.00 i.oo 
.47 .99 ,)./) 1.09 
i.39 .96 1.33 .. 86 
.86 ,89 .76 .$9 
1,35 l.00 1.46 .92 
11103 l •. 19 1.23 .so 
l.45 l.09 1.58 l.67 
2,.33 .99 1.31 1.00 
1.15 .54 .62 .67 
111140 ,45 ,6$ .67 
i.39 . .53 .74 .8'3 
.$9 .94 .84 .eo 
L89 .68 1.29 1.37 
.85 l.18 i.oo l.50 
2~09 .• so l.67 .eo 
1#24 l.05 l.30 .7s 
2.30 l.17 ·2.69 .89 
.63 .92 .5s .so 
l .. 2l .61 .74 .60 
1.13 .68 .84 .85 
1.0$ .82 .as .71 
1.35 i.03 l.38 l.14 
.49 .69 .34 .23 
.82 i.oo .82 2.00 
l.40 .64 .89 .63 
.,6$ .69 .47 .60 
l.40 .56 .7s .70 
.78 .91 .71 .90 
2.50 i.53 3.82 .86 
.93 l.r.:tl 1.00 .so 
.et/ .~ .76 3.12 
1.20 l.ll 1.33 .64 
1.04 l.35 .77 .77 
l.00 .93 .93 .ss 
l.03 .86 .ss .~ 
.• 73 .9s .57 .ss 
L36 1.06 l.JJ1- i.04 
.85 .77 .65 .so 
• 75 l.CQ .76 . .70 
1.16 l.38 1.61 1.33 
1.59 .57 .91 .so 
.97 .10 .6S .81 
l.O!J: 2.ll .. 2.12 1!2Q 
·TCY.rAL 6J.,2l .2J·~ 60.21 ,22.10 
MEAN l.lJ 0.22 l.!08 . 0!2.J 
STD. llEVIATION * o.Jifr o.;1 o.5s o.g. F. 
* STD. DEVIATION= STANDARD DEVIATION 
-2'/'1 
T A B L E .XXX 
Judgement of a seconds by the methodo of (n) free linear a.rm movement; 
(b) controlled-0.istance li.'1e<lr unn movement; (c) stationary grip; and 
(d) verbal estimate (N = 40). All .scores are seconds. 
Verbal 
Free Controlled ~tati,onB.r:r Estimate 
7.:>.. soc. 9.5.sec. s.2 sec. ·17 sec. 
13.8 10.l. 8.5 ll 
8.9 7.3 s.o ll 
7.6 liu4· s.o l2 
24.0 12.1. 7.7 15 
9.7 10.1 .. 7.1 s 
s.s 9.e. s.4 . 15 
9.1 l.l.9. s.o . 13 
ll.2 13.7. l0.4 14 
a.1 a.o s.5 35 ~ 
18.h 18.0. 9.5 18 
ll.7 s.7. 9.9 7 
6.,8 7.7. 7.0 12 
B.5 7.5 7.9 l2 
9.9 7.7. 5.0 9 
11.0 9.0. ll.2 l2 
s.s 7.J.:. e.1 10 
7. ,,,. s.7 7.0 ll 
7.8 s.1. 7.5 ll 
13.6 ll.O. B.3 . ll 
7.h .4.s. 6.2 s 
6.l .5.l. 6.9 7 
9.5 S.l. 6.5 4 
10.9. 12.1. 7.6 ll 
12.0 12.1 5.3 a 
a.s 7.1. 6.7 15 
9.9 6.l, S.l 10 
10.3 :u..2 .. 10.4 21 
ll.3 9.s 7.5 9 
12.6 8.0. 7.4 3 
3.6 3.s ~.5 - 4 s.1 u.7. 10.0 15 
10.6 7.3 6.2 12 
10.6 l.l+.2. 10.7 4 
s.9 7.0 s.6 7 
17 • .3 12.1:, 6.9 5 
lJ+,.B 13.8. 9.2 2 
10.6 6.8 a.s 6 
8.l;. s.o 7.,7 J..5 
9.6 9.7 9.7 3 
TOTAL 413~5 . 382~& 
. ' .. ·319~1 ·" . '·431 . '• 
HEAN 10 .. 34 9.57 7.98 ·10.77. 
STANDARD DEV.* 2.713 3. 018 l.509 5~85' 
* STANDARD DEV. = STANDARD DEVIATIOU 
J.'/f 
Judgement of l6 secorns by the met.hods of (a) tree linear arm JnOV'ement; 
~b) controlledi-distance linear arm mcwementJ (c) stationary grip, and 
d) verbal estimate (N = 4U). All scores a.re seconds .• 
Verb::U. 
El:!!. S~tiona.r..v CS?.!!WYlled Es1fcpiate 
18.6 s,,c. l.4.l sec. 1,5.8 sec. 18 sec. 
16.J~ JJ.5 21.6 37 
17.0 14.5 18.2 19 
16.9 14.8 16.3 l3 
26.2 ]J.6 19.3 Z"/ 
18.9 13.8 18.8 8 
J.6.2 17.9 JJ.9 J.6 
17., 13.5 u..9 l2 
18.3 lJ.l 25.6 9 
JJ.6 ]J.8 22.s 10 
25.2 15.5 Z'/.2 34 
20.6 17.5 l.6.9 l2 
14.4 15.5 l5.8 J.6 
lB.9 17.8 12.3 14 
J.4..2 6.5 JS.6 2l 
29.9 19.l 21.5 ';!} 
J.6.J 16.l u..o 17 
J.4..4 13.9 10.9 9 
15.7 J.6.l J.6.l 10 
22.9 J.4.6 17.3 7 
l0.4 l.5.8 l2.0 l5 
12.2 13.7 10.5 14 
19.8 J.Z.5 13.9 l8 
19.0 JJ • .3 J.6.4 lJ 
36.7 12.6 21.9 15 
ll.6 12.5 JJ.6 10 
19.2 15.l 15.3 10 
22.2 20.9 22.7 J.6 
19.8 15.0 16.5 11+ 
2l •. o l2.l 19.7 9 
8.2 u.3 9.9 s 
l.6.o 17.7 15.6 24 
lS.6 16.l 17.9 J.6 
23.0 15.2 22.5 9 
14.l J.6.o J.6.6 9 
34.5 J.J+..6 17.5 17 
20.6 14.0 25 .. 6 l.6 
18.S 14.2 17.5 15 
J.6.6 17.7 15.7 20 
16.o J.6.6 J.8.3 18 
TOTAL 750.2 592.1 694.4 618 
MEAN 18.?5 14.80 :7.36 15.45 
~'TJ..1. llEV:_ lTIOlJ * 5 .. 681 2.398 4. 069 7.05 




(a) Average time reproduced by free linear am movement; (b) distance 
moved in reproducing time; (c) speed of linear am. movement, and 
{d) verbal estimate in response to a signal of 8 seconds. {N::= U)). 
Reproduced Verbal 
Time Distance Speed Estimate 
(Secondsl J {inches) (ins.Lsec. l (Second.5) 
7.2 sec. 30 ins. 4 ins./sec. ·a sec. 
13.8 60 4 ins./sec. 25 
s.9 50 6 ll 
7.6 20 3 6 
24.0 170 7 15 
9.7 40 4 4 
8.8 60 7 10 
9.1 90 10 6 
ll.l 60 . . 5 4 
8.1 20 2 1+ 
18.4 230 12 22 
ll.7 30 3 6 
6.8 70 10 10 
8.5 20 2 10 
9.9 llO 11 . 12 
u.o 130 l2 13 
8.8 30 3 .28 
7.4 60 8 7 
7.8 40 5 7 
13.6 50 4 7 
7.1,,. 30 4 13 
6.1 70 ll 7 
9.5 60 6 10 
l0.9 30 3 8 
l2.0 60 5 9 
s.s 50 6 7 
9.9 70 7 6 
10.3 30 3 11 
u.3 40 4 8 
12.6 30 2 5 
3.6 50 11+ 3 
8.l 30 4 10 
10.6 30 3 12 
l0.6 70 7 5 
s.9 10 1 4 
17.3 50 3 8 
14.8 40 3 12 
l0.6 60 6 10 
8.4 50 6 10 
9.6 20 2 9 
TDrAL k23.5 2,250 222 382 
liEAlt l0.59 56.25 56i5 9.6 





(a) Average time reproduced by free linear a.rm movement; (b) distance 
moved in reproducing time; (c) speed of linear a.rm movement; and ,, . 
(d) verbal estimate in response to a signal of 16 seconds. (N = 40). 
Ire produced Verbal. 
Time Distance Speed Estimate 
(In Sccondsj :(:i.nche.sl ins. sec. ~Seconds) 
18.6 sec. ~- SO :ins. .4 ins. sec. 17 sec. 
16.4 70 4 30 
17.0 120 7 l.9 
16.9 40 .2 1.3 
26.2 230 9 28 
18.9 40 2 7 
16.2 90 6 17 
17.3 190 ll 14 
18.3 no 6 8 
13.6 30 2 10 . 
25.2 330 l 32 
20.6. 50 2 12 
J.4.4 220 15 20 
18.9 .. 70 4 2l 
14.2 .150 11 17 
29.9 240 e 25 
16.3 : so 5 35 
J.4.4 80 6 13 
15.7 
. 
70 4 J3 . 
22.9 . so 3 l3 
l0.4 40 4 16 
' 
12.2 140 .ll 11 
19.S 120 6 25 . 
60 3 15 19.0 
36.7 '190 5 30 
ll.6 . 70 6 10 
19.2 100 5 15 
22.2 50 2 19 
19.8 70 4 32 
21.0 50 2 8 
s.2 60 7 6 
16.o 50 3 24 
1s.6 40 2 16 
23.0 130 6 .J2 
14.l 20 1 12 
34.5 llO 3 J.6 
20.6 
- 60 3 2l 
18.8 J.00 5 17 
16.6 120 7 20 
16.o 40 2 l6 
Tar AL 750.5 3"990 199 '6$5 .-
MEAN is.75 99.75 4.78 17~125 
STD. DEV.* 5.68 .. 66.U 3.00 6.97 
• STD. DEV. = STAUD.1\RD JEVIATIOJ.'i 
TABLE XXXIV 
EXP.ERI.MEMr 3 
Jntra-individual ratios of performance in.second session over performance 
in first session in j4ing 8 seconds : ratios of {a) time reproduced by 
:free linear movement; b) distance moved.in reproducing timeJ {c) speed 
of free linear movement; and (d) verbal estimate (N= 40). 
ReEroduction 2 Distance 2 S12eed 2 Estimate 2 
Reproduction l Distance l Speed 1 hst:lmate l 
9 11 l2 10 
10 ·10 10 10 
a ·6 7 12 
ll ·10 9 10 
l4 13 9 10 
9 ·10 11 8 
12 l2 10 10 
15 ·28 18 14 
l2 10 8 10 
lJ ·15 11 8 
ll ·n 10 l2 
9 ll l2 10 
11 "10 9 10 
l4 16 11 15 
ll 'll 10 15 
13 9 7 9 
10 ·13 13 10 
9 11+ J.6 lJ 
ll 12 11 13 
12 ·14 ll 13 
13 ·JJ+ ll l2 
13 ·11 s 10 
10 ·10 10 8 
l2 14 12 10 
10 9 9 ll 
l.'.,. ·.J.2 9 l2 
9 10 ll 20 
9 B 9 14 
10 ·J2 12 10 
19 25 13 17 
10 •J.2 l2 l2 
14 ·10 7 5 
19 10 5 19 
ll 15 14 ll 
10 ·12 l2 20 
l2 13 11 26 
10 8 a 13 
8 11 l4 10 
J.4 ll 8 7 
l2 11 ll. l2 
TOTAL JJ:,3 4S4 421 '. '481''' 
MEAN · ·u.;6· 11.1 . 10~5 ·12.0 
STAN:JARD DEVIATIOl'\I ' 2.49· 3.90 2.47 3.91 
'. .. ' 
TABLE XXXV 
EmiliENI' J 
Intra-individual ratios o.f performance in fourth session over perform.a.nee 
in third sesoion in judging 16 seconds : ratios of (a) time reproduced by 
free linear movement; {b) distence moved in reproducing time; (c) speed 
or free linear movement; and (d) verbal estimate (N = 40}. 
Re;eroduction /;J: Distance !l: S~ed !J; Estimate !J: 
Heproduction 3 Distance 3 Speed 3 Estimate 3 
10 10 9 ll 
7 7 10 9 
12 10 8 10 
6 8 14 ll 
lO 9 9 s 
14 10 7 10 
9 s 9 8 
11 12 ll 15 
10 8 e 10 
ll 17 17 15 
l2 12 10 l2 
12 16 l3 ll 
10 8 8 10 
21 33 J.6 14 
l2 15 12 13 
20 16 8 30 
12 9 7 ll 
10 15 15 12 
10 ll ll ll 
14 ll 8 12 
ll 12 ll ll 
ll 13 l2 9 
Q 8 9 8 . 
l;) 15 10 15 
10 10 10 10 
13 2l J.6 20 
9 7 8 10 
10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 
15 17 ll 9 
9 $' 9 7 
8 6 7 6 
10 10 10 ll 
ll 10 9 ll 
10 10 10 10 
10 8 8 $ 
ll 11 10 6 
ll 12 11 11 
s 8 10 9 
ll 12 10 ll 
Tro'AL 445 463 .•. 4ll 445 
MEAN ·11~1· · ·n.6 10.3 11.1· 
STANDARD IBVIATION , 2.85 4.73 2.43 3,,97 
TABLE XXXVI 
EXIBRJlfilIT 2 
Judgement of 16 seconds by the methods of (a) reproduction by free linear 
arm movement; (b) reproduction by key-pressing, and. (c) verbal estimate 
(N "" 43). AJJ. scores a...""'C seconds. · . · 
Key-pressing Linear movement 
Verbal Estimate Re:eroduction Re;eroduction 
l4 Seconds 15.6 Seconds ll.1 Seconds 
13 17.2 ll.4 
l4 15.0' ll.9 
24 14.9 43.3 
J.6 16.3 14.6 
25 16.o 15.3 
16 16.0 13.1 
2l 17.1 8.5 
l6 13.4 5.5 
13 14.4 · 11.6 
15 J.4,.5 4.3 
17 17.2 10.4 
18 14.2 14.0 
25 15.9 12.0 
15 11+.7 io.s 
20 16.6 12.5 
12 15.5 13.8 
10 JJ,..6 10.5 
24 16.8 18.0 
25 JJ.O 10.0 
35 17.8. 16.l 
24 16.2 J.3.7 
17 15.0 16.3 
17 15.2 14.5 
18 17.9 9.0 
20 15.0 16.6 
11 19.1} 12.2 
l4 2s.2 14.7 
20 11.8 10.4 
25 ll.ci 29.0 
20 15.6 10.5 
10 9.7 9.6 
17 ·17.7 19.6 
19 l4.2 9.1 
13 13.9 0.7 
30 1,5.S 12.0 
19 16.3 6.S 
.12 16.l llu5 
52 14.7 15.6 
9 17.2 16.o 
l4 13.6 14.0 
35 15.5 16.1 
25 21.4 J.4.9 
TGrAL 829' 671.h 534.5 
MEAN ·19.28 15.61 12.430 
STANDARD DEVIATION ·7~909· 2.o66 3~958 
. . ... 
TABLE XXXVII 
EXPERJ:t.!LUT 2 
Intra-individual ratios of judgement of 16 seconds in the second session 
divided by judgc.mcnt of 16 ceconds in tho f'irst session, using tho 
methods af (a.) reproduction by free linear arm movement; (b) repx-oduc-
tion by key-prcs~ing; end (c) vorbal est:imato (N = 31) .• 
Key-pressing ti* t2 L. 1• t t 2 Verbal - :inear ·.ovamen ti tl 
.90 l .. 15 .1.03 
.97 l.JJ+. ·.77 
.72 .94 .93 
.90 .a4 .82 
1.02 .75 .78 
~99 1.15 1.09 
' 
1.10 1.13 .81 
i89 .64 l.Ol 
l.04 .~4 i.oo 
1.04 .92 l.23 
.SJ.i. l..00 l.32 
i.-01 1.40 1.19 . 
1.03 1.00 i.oo 
1~03 i.20 .81 . . 
.95 l.46 .79 
•89 .57 .91 
,99 1.17 l.(f/ 
•95 .89 l.48 
.91 1.00 .24 
.86 1.(17 1.00 
.96 .35 .76 
1.47 1.36 .86 
.98 1.00 1.33 
1.34 1.10 i.75 
.96 .84 .fY/ 
1.30 3.s4 l.43 
.92 .47 .83 
.90 .91 .83 
l.28 l .. 04 l.17 
.99 .93 ,95 
eSS .64 .ss 
TCJrAL .'.21!01 J2.8!± 20.72 
MEAN ... 1.QOm l.Og* . 0.221 
STANDARD DEVIATION .12fr3 .5 ~2 .2s;2 
* t2 -= tl 
TABLE XXXIX 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Judgement of B seconds by the methods of (a.) verbal estimate; (b) repro-
duction by key-pressing; and (c) reproduction by £ree linear arm movement 
(N = 43). ~ scores <ll:"e oec~, 
Free 
Verbal Estimate ,Ke;y,:::Eress¥i£; Lln.em:- Movement 
7.0 seconds 9.2 seconds . s.3 seconds 
7.0 .s.3 ' . 6.o 
8.0 7.3 6.1 
J..4.0 8.2 7.0 
8.0 s.5 . 5.7 
9.0 8.4 5.7 
6.o 7.4 s.a 
9.0 s.1 1.3 
a.o 7.3 3.9 
8.0 7.0 6.2 
· l2.0 7.4 6.5 
8.0 6.9 5.7 
12.0 S.4 . 6.9 
6.0 7.2 7.3 
4.0 .8.3 . 5.9 
14.0 .7.1 6.o 
15.0 7.8 s.9 
15.0 s.6 ' 7.9 
s.o s.o 4.7 
7.0 :1..1 •• 4 3.3· 
r1.o 7.6 7.4 
r1.o 6.1 6.4 
24.0 .. 8.5 7.5 
ll.O .8.7 io.o 
7.0 6.7 5.5 
r1.o .7.0 4.3 
io.o s.3 l.6 
15.0 6.5 6.1 
6.o 7.2 s.2 
33.0 8.6 8.4 
a.o 6.3 7.s 
15.0 JJ..7 5.9 
'(.O .8.8 6.9 
10.0 .7.4 7.1 
~.o 8.4 5.7 
6.o 4.9 5.4 
ll.O 6.5 5.3 
10.0 7.4 4.0 
9.0 . 8.1 7.8 . 
io.o 6.8 7.4 
6.o s.o 8.8 
10.0 7.5 2.0 
7.0 s.6 7.1 
TOl'AL 433.0 336.3 265.7· 
MEAN ·10.07· 7~82 6.1..8 
STAN DARO IlEVIATION 5.,23· 1.18 1.93 
TABLE XL 
EXP~ .RJMENT 2 
Intra-individual ratios of judgement of $ seconds in the second session 
divided by judgement of 8 seconds in the first session, usjng the 
methods of (a) reproduction by free linear arm movement; (b) reproduc-
tion by key-pressing; and ( c) verbal estimate (N = 31)., 

































TetrAL 30.ss , 30.33 
MEAN .965 .948 
STANDA!"W DEVIATION .3450 .:1249 
* t2 = jucigem.ent of S second$ in second session 
ti judgement of a seconds in first session 






































(a) Extra version; (b) Manifest Anxiety; (c) Variability* .in judgement 
of 8 seconds; <lnd (d) variability in speed of lliear nnn movement .L1. 
free reproduction of tirr..e (N = 54). * Variability = .!'X2 .-. ~{X)2 
N 
I 
Variability Variability Variability 


































































































































































l' 'J .f!fl . 
' .60 
* STD.mW. = STANDARD DEVIl\TION 
1.m. Verbal 
Reproduction Estimate linear 
8.0 sec. 8.0 sec. Maveman.t 
4.93 o.oo 0.33 
.3.54 s.75 1.05 
i.23 0.75 i.34 
4.53 s.75 o.s5 
1.51 2.00 0.63 
.50 l.00 o.S] 
0.96 9.00 1.20 
3.35 12.75 0.59 
l.45 5.00 i.50 
0.35 0.75 l.57 
3.BS 2.75 4.95 
3.35 10.75 o.sa 
1.31 3s.75 0.71 
3.86 1.00 0.45 
0.14 26.75 o~so 
17.U 9.00 2.52 
0.95 0.75 l.67 
1.71 2.75 1.62 
1.09 8.75 0.77 
6.60 22.00 o.fJl 
0.29 o.oo '3• \fl 
4.15 2.75 2.13 
8.02 6.75 3.16 
6.87 2.7.5 2.24 
2.69 ia.oo 2.12 
0.75 lS.00 1.19 
1.69 34.2.5 1.31 
i.59 so.75 1.76 
6.26 9.00 1.77 
1.73 8.00 1.09 
6.15 0.75 s.94 
7.24 1.4.00 2.71 
l.15 0.75 1.48 
32.u 100.00 1.39 
5.01 26.75 2.20 
s.27 38.00 1.05 
3.s5 ioo.oo o.82 
Z/.93 io.oo 0.53 
1.29 2.75 1.50 
4.35 2.'15 0.45 
2.26 2.75 1.62 
.21 100.00 5.51 
4.$9 31.00 0.61 
54.91 20.75 1.17 
3.15 2 .. 75 0.87 
0.91 10.75 o.az 
3.19 2 .. 75 1.83 
1.06 9.00 2.38 
4.39 3.00 o.Sl 
2.95 100.00 2.39 
2.37 2.75 1.45 
.89 l.00 3.67 
e.53 J+..00 1.78 
8.52 9.00 o.so 
292.'57 I QL.7.50 <Jl.?Q 
. 5.J a I 17.">5 1.70 




*Variability in judgement of 16 seconds by the method of (a) free linear 



















J.6 • 65 













































.21.i .• Ok.. 
Variability 
Verbal Estmat e 
16.o sec. 























































2 .. 00 
. . : . . 2~1{14.25 
. 




JndividuD.l differences in time judgement of S seconds in 




r t I t 
Short Ex:traversion Scale Scores. 
U>r..g Extravcrsion Scale Scores• (M. P •I.) 
2. Manifest Anxiety., 
3 • (a.) Men:.ory for correct serial position of a list of n~n­
sense syllables. 
(b) Memory for content of a list or nonsense syllables. 
4. Metaphor Pre.f erence. 
5. Verbal estimate (average of first session). 
6. Controlled linear movement l"eproduction (average of first 
session). 
7. Free linear movement reproduct:Lon (average of first session). 
s. Variability in verbal estimate.* 
9. Variability in controlled linear movement reproduction.* 
10. Error in verbal estimate. 
ll. Error in controlled linear movement .reproduction. 
J2. Reproduction by sta.tionctry grip (average of first session). 
* Variability = sum of squares of first session scores 
.. 





























































































































L.. 5 6 
{a). {b} Seconds Seconds 
2 7 i6 l6 7.s 
7 9 15 15 s.1 
2 5 39 15 12.S· 
5 ' 6 l4 ,15 .9.5 
I+ ' 7 20 12 15. 0 
3 ,, . 6 33 . 6 '6. 9 
4 9 26 '15 il.7 
4 : , 6 is : 4 ; s.1 
2 ' ' .3 .24 . ,13 12.2 
0 .. ' 9 . . 35 17 ·.9.,6 
•. 5 ' . 6 . •7 .35 .6.4 
6 , . 7 . 32· . • :u a. 7 
3 < 5 .8 4 J2 ' 7,. 9 
3 . 4 ll . 5 i5.5 
l f 7 ·7 . l4 i3.5 
6 . s .J16 • u i2.3 
2 4 .'.30 ~ 8 il.8 
.1 I 10 35 \ , 4 i3e8 
4 , 7 39 ,J.O 6.,3 
5 ' 8 34 .. l2 ) .5 
2 , 1.., .36 : · 1 · 13.s 
13 . l.3 .10 i .1 ·.s.6 
0 " 6 . 19 , ll . 6.7 
0 • 3 33 • 7 :9.S 
o . 4 22 . u 10.s 
3 . ,_ 6 23 : 5 ·.4.0 
l 4 '18 , 2 .l.4.o 
6 : 8 20 .11 10.0 
4 8 26 8 '9.4 
3 : 6 19 . 10 ·.5~ 5 
4 . 9 25 ··is ia.3 
3. 8 20 : 9 :7.6 
3 ' .5 0 " 5 J2. 7 
4 . s 23 . 3 ' · s.1 
5 . 9 19 a io.2 
4 ' 9 17 : 7 . 7.2 
2' : 6 27 . 35 
1 
s.4 \ 
s 9 32 . 7 : 5.l . 
3 ~ 8 24 . 4 .3•9 \ 
s . 9 26 : u · : 7 .4 \ 
' 1·-----------+---------1----'-----+----~-·-· ---*--·--~ .. 
TOTAL 2.56 .l,030 616 'JJi;9 • 273 . 926 . 4o6 . . 386.6. 
-----------i.-----.+----------~-------~----.r-------1 
M&tu~ 6~4 ·25~7 .. 15.4· 3.7· '6.8 . ·23.2 • J.0~1· ·9~96 
srn. 
DEV.* . J •. 39 
., ... I • 
7.94 .5.51' . '.2;48·. ·2~13 ?·25 j .5-73. 
. ~. 
*STD.DEV. - STANDARD 1EVIATION 
111 
· 7 · B 9 10 · ll l2 . " 
Seconds Seconds Seconds· Seconds Seconds Seconds 
~ • • • f; , ~ . . . .. •. 
7,.2 8 2.Cf) a 0.2 a.2. 
13.s 7 1.05 7 5.8 a.5. 
8.9 0 17.12 7 0.9 s.o. 
7.6 7 s.28 7 0.4 a.a. 
24.0 6 72.84 ·, 4 16.o 7.7, 
9.7 0 4.95· 2 1.7 7.1. 
s.a $ 34.79· 7 o.e 8.l.-
9.1 3 4.53 4 l.l a.o. 
ll.l 2 JJ.74 5 3.1 10.4. 
s.1 8 ' 16.37 9 0.1 s.5. 
18.4 5 3.23 3 10.4 9.5. 
l..1..7 3 3.21 · 3 3.7 9.9 
6.8 7 17.lO 4 l.2 7.0. 
a.5 3 156.91 3 0.5 7.9. 
9.9 7 10.Sl 6 1.9 5.0 
11.0 l 21.7.3 3 .3.0 u.2. 
a.a 3. 17.S9. 0 o.s s.1. 
7.4 .. 6 :w.33 .4 o.6 7.0. 
7.s 5 16.75 2 0.2 7.5, 
JJ,6 4 13.45 4 5.6 a.3. 
7.4 3 65.89 l o.6 6 ·9. .. 
6.l 4 24.52 l i.9 6.9. 
9.5 2 9.14 3 l.5 6 •. 5, 
10.9 5 9.;3 l 2.9 7.6. 
. 12.o 5 18.65 3 4.0 5.3. s.a l 4.23 3 o.a 6.7. 
9.9 2. 36.(Jl 6 1.9 s.1. 
10.3 7 19.37 3 2.3 10.4· 
u.3 3 15.83 0 3.3 7.5. 
'12.6 2 2.56 2 4.6 7.4. 
3.6 l 34.96 10 4.4 4.5. 
B.l 6 2.63 1 0.1 10.0· 
10.6 5 28.70 3 2.6 6.2· 
10.6 3 7.13 5 2.6 10.7 · 
s.9 3 21.o6 0 0.9 8.6' 
17.3 3 11.03 l. 9.3 6.9. 
14.8 6 89.U 27 6.8 9.2. 
l0.6 3 2.71 l 2.6 s.a 
8.4 2 12.45 4 0.4 7.7 
9.6 .5 3.60 3 1.6 9.7 . 
,, 
TGrAL U3~5' ·15s· - "'. '895.64 · 1 170 llJ.1 '. ·319.1 · 
MEAN ·10.34 . ·3~9 ' 22.4· ·4.2. . . ·2~82 ·7.9E 
. 
2.72 ·2.51 28.91 4.39 3.17 J' ·1.51 
* STD.mv. = STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE . XLIV 
Individual differences in time judgement of 16 seconds in 
Expe?"'.lment 3. (N = 40). 
Vari.a.bl.es listed :-
.. 
l. (a) Short Extraversion Scale Scores. 
(b} Ieng Extraversion ScaJ.e Scores. (M.P.I.) 
2. Manifest Anxiety. 
3. Metaphor Preference. 
4. Verbal estimate (average of third session). 
5. Controlled linear movement reproduction (average of third 
session). 
6. Free linear movement reproduction (average of third ses-
sion). · . · 
7. Variability in verbal estimate.* 
s. Variability· in controlled linear movement reproduction."' 
9. Error :in verbal estimate. 
10. Error in controlled linear movement reproduction. 
ll. Reproduction by stationary grip (average af third session). 










< LA24 --- _" 
. . 1 2 ... ·~ 4 tj -(a) .(b) . ' ,Second.s Seconds 
. . ' . 
8 , 34 6 35 18 15.S 
8 30 19 20 YI 21.6 
' • 2 25 2l 39 19 lS .• 2 • .• lO .. , 3a 15 20 13 16.3 
10 38 29 ' 39 19.3 27 
6 • 1~0 6 •· 19 8 18.8 
2 34 J.6 14 16 13.9 
4 ' 24 12 24 l2 +4·9 . 
4 14 12 7· • 9 . ' 25.6 
' ' 0 6 20 27 10 22.s 
6 ' l4 24 34 27<j2 25 
10 ' ·2; lS 29 12 16.9' 
lO 39 86 ll 16 i5.s 
' " ·4 34 24 .s l4 12.3 
8 
'• 
26' ll 20 21. i5.6 
10 34 28 ll 29 .Zi .• 5 . 
.30 l2 25 17 14.0 .lO 
4 lS 15 
: 
.32 .. 9 10.9 
10 41+ 6 30 10 i6~l 
' 2 20 22 22 15 l.2.o 
2 
' 
10 21 . 32 14' lO.$ 
•6 28 15 .18 .18 +3·9 
6 18 16 16 13 16.4 
2 
. 
24 JS 30 l5 .?J..9 . 
6 2S .10 20 10 )J.6" 
8 30 19 39 lO lS.3 
s . 31 16 17 . J.6 22.7 
.10 30 20 33 .·· 14 16.5. 
10 30 13 . 23 9 . +,9.1 1 
10 30 J.6 21.,, 5 9.9 
6 " 27 24 25 24 15.6 
10 .35 13 34 16 17,.9 
'" 0 26 6 3.5 9 2295 
-6 • 28 7 17 9 .i6.6 
' 10 33 , 8 0 17 17·5 
s ., 24 17 18 .16 ~5.6 
lO 41 : 25 :13 15 :1.7.5 .. ' 
.10 26 10 15 20 ~ 15.7 
6 ,25 13 l4 18 :~s.3 
' 
~64 l,000 631· 922 618' 694.4' 


















20 6 .. ' 































~~· .... , .... ····· ,'""··~· .. ~· ........ ·····~ 
* S'l'D.DEV •. == STAMDARD DEVIATION 
'T A a 1 E . XLIV ( c~tJ. ' 
TOrA.L 
' . 
































































































































































































• . ' 
• . 
40 .... " 
.5.5 .. 
2.1 ,; 


























12 • .5 
u~s 









15 .. ~ 
J.7 ... ? 
6,..5 
19.1 
.16 .. 1 
JJ~9 


























TAB LE XLV 
EX..l:ERIHEl·Tr 2 
J:ntr~-individual ratios of delayed linear arm mavcm.ent reproduction of 
1 occond divided by immcdia.to linear am movement reproduction of. 1 
second. (N = 77). DelQ.y in ncconds. 




0 Jj 10 ·15 
. . 
1.22 1.00 l.20 1.54 
0.67 2.50 1.60 O.f!"/ 
1.00 o.64 1.$3 o.7s 
c.50 o.s9 0.55 0.91 
l.33 2.40 l,00 l.00 
1.44 l.10 1 .. 40 1.00 
1.15 l.40 0.f!f/ 0.77 
1.50 o.87 1.73 2.00 . 
1.09 1.25 o.67 0.50 
1.00 0.79 0.79 0.62 
1.00 0.89 0.92 0.70 . 
:::~90 j 13.73 12.61' ·j 10.77 -
--~ 
1,.JJP I 0.979 ll'082_ I i.248. I 









































J.rJ.tra,....individua.l ratios of dulayed linear a.zm movement l'cproduction oi' 
2 seconds di'tt'ided by immediate linca;t' arm mqvement .reproduction of 2 
seconds (N::::: 77). .Delay in seconds. 
Del& ,._. {in s~conds.J. 
T<JrAL 
MEAN 





o •. Er/ o.89 
" 
0.97 0 .. $4 















2 .. 29 l.08 
~ 
l.05 l.00 















0,985 .. ·0~989. 
' 








































o.66 2.37 . 
o .. 68 1.00 




. ·0~945., · ·1~39s~ 
, ·0~1~03. ·0.695~ 
... 'l, 
TAB LE XLVII 
Intr::.i,..individuaI ratios of dela;y-ed linear am movement reproduction of 
J.i, seconds divided. by immediate linear arm movement reproduction o1' 4 
second$ (N = 77). Delay in secoms. 


































1 .. oe 1.00 
1011190' .·1·10,46. 
0.991· I 0.951 
.J.603 1· ·.2888 
73.00 
·0.959 
STAMDA.RD DEVMT ION 0.26· 



































.19311 · . .44031 
. ~ " 
TABLE XLVill 
lntr~individual ratios of delayed linear a.rra Illovement reproducrtion of 
8 seconds div;ided by immediate linear a;r.m. movem~t reproduction o£ 8 
seconds (N= 77)• Delay in seconds. 
T<YrAL 
MEAN 






































·.~. 'in .seconcisl 10' ' ·15· '20 
. 
' . . 
0.91 0.91 0,99 
' • ' 
1.00 .l.Sl o .. 54 
• .. . . 
o.so l.ll 0.90 
1 
o.s5 l.13 0~54 
i~:µ • o.;3 0e'79 
" 1.16 • l.22 1.18· '· 
1.00 ' 0.60 . l.o6 
' o •. ?S . o •. 79 ' 0~89 
' 0.63 ' 0~3$ ' o.7a 
. 0•87 . ·0.56 . 0•97 
o.rn '.1.2; '· 1.·00 
.. '• -·'-- . ~ 
·9.9g·' ·9.;96. ·9.72· 
~ ·-
·o.9r1r ·0~905. 0.004· 
e . ' 








l.45 1·59 ~· '. 
0.69 2.00 
0.49 :t~lS 
! .l.36 o.e4 .. 
o •. 51 1 .. 33 


















.Intra-individual ratios ot. deleyed linear arm m.avemE.n t reproduction of 
16 seconds divided by inD:n.edia.te linear ann. movement reproduction of 16 




Dela;r 'in secondsl 
0 5 10" 1'1 
~ . . . 
20 
o.86 1.54 l.24 i.u l.ll 
0.$4 0.$9 o.ss 1.25 0.91 
1.49 0.60 0.77 0.95 0.98 
o.87 1.14 0.93 0.96 1.16 
1.70 0.93 1.01 l.16 1.00 
i.33 0.99 o.so l.Ol o.82 
i 14 -·· i.oo 1.50 0.58 l.o6 
l.(f/ o.82 0.72 0.61 :1:_.01 
l.04 o.so 0.60 0.73 0.94 
• 
l.37 0.99 1.u o.67 10.83 
l.05 0.67 0.92 1.21 1.13 
J.2;76 io.37· 10~45· 10.24' 10;95~. 
'·1~160 
.. ·o;91i.3 · 0.950 ·0;931· 






















u;s5 1 l3.6B 
' . 'l~(J'/7, , ·1;21.i4. 
.. '. ;3673 "' ;148~ 
Totals for ratios at all five si.f.Jl§ll lengths 
TGrAL 56.10 52.63 54.78 52.31 56.39 55.01 68.26 
MEAN i.;020 0.957 0;996. 0.951 i;025· 1.000 r.21.i1· 
STD.DEV.* .21 ... 37 .• ~822 .33Cf/ .J678 .33s5 ~4368 .5401 
* STD.DEV .. = STANDARD DEVIATIOO 
TABLE L 
.EXPERJl.fi!NT . 2 
' . ' 
Propartion of error ( e:ror ) in·• reproducing l second by• free lmear · 
(signal) . . . . 
movement. (N c;::: 77). 
TOl'AL 
MEAN 
STANDARD DEVIATION • 
.. Q.o}_?..;E 
0 l). ' 
' 
.1 .2 
• 4 • o 
.l .3 
.o .2 
• 1 .2 
.3 .1 


















































-:\0 • 60 
• 
.l . .o . 
.s· .o .. 
.1 I .4 . 
.5 ' .2 . . 
.2 I :.7 
' 
.3 . .3 
" 1 • 











Proportion pf error_ -~=~~~ in reproducing 2 seconds by free 
linear movemm t. (N = 77) • 
. ' De~~'in secondsl 
0 ' lj lO 15 20 qo 
0.10 .25 .05 .20 .50 .90 
.10 .05 .20 .30 .so .05 . 
.oo .45 .15 .25 .20 .65 . 
.45 .20 .30 .1; .15 .30 . 
• 35 .20 .05 .15 .oo .25 ' 
' 
.20 .35 .oo .40 .10 .30 
' • I 
.10 .40 .40 .40 .65 .15 
' 
.05 .05 .25 .45 .40 .35 
,. . . 
.15 ~35 .20 .45 .25 .60 
' . 
' . 
.35 .05 .10 .25 .50 .05 . . 
.oo .4-0 .15 .20 .30 .15 . . 
TOTAL i.as· - 2.75 ·1;s5 '·3.20 ·3~55 3.75 
M&\N 0.17· 0.25 J ·0.17 0.29 0.32 0.34 
sr.\NDARD JEVIATION O.l4 0.14 o.u ·0.11 0.19 0.26 
GRAND TCJrAL 19.00 
MEAN ·o.26 


















EXPElUMENI' . 2 
P.roport:Lon-of err(ir ~==~}in rel?rotlue:tng4 seconds by linear 












.. n ··5 
.. 
\ . ' 
;10 •18 
•12 •00 . ,. 
~3S i2S 
,, . 




,og .... ·•25 
I . 
•2S ,;60 . 
;03 ,;28 . 

























































































Proportion af error ~=~~ in reproducing 8 seconds by linear 













.• 32 .56 
.40 .02 






Dalav 'in secondsl 
10 15 20 
.22 .25 .06 
.19 .34 .08 
.29 .ll .59 
.J.4 .01 .oo 
.09 .so .20 
.• 26 .02 .04 
.• 25 .. u .10 
.u .,52 .22 
.• 64 .• 68 .L,6 
.• ll .45 .25 
.49 .06 .12 
I 
3.09 I 3.36 2.20 
0~28' ·0~30· 0.20 
o.16 0.22 0.17 
21.425 
o.2s 

































TAB LE LIV 
EXPERil~'T 2 
.Proportion ot . error ~=~~5_ .j,n ~eproducing 16 seconds by linear 






be~.{ in secon.qsl 
0 •. .. 5 ' ·10 
. ,.. . 15· ·.20 
"31 • ia - *J.2 •l2 .J.9 
-~29 +47 .25 •37 ~D4 
.26. •66 i.32 .iOl :-24 
•17 ;,27 •22 ;)4 ~00 
,,09 .:73 •14 c02 .35 
re04n •35 •.34 ~Cl; "'28 
.-28 5$ .•. • 06 .·JJ+ .~JJ. 
.J.o .27 .39 .$0 •26 
.26 ·49 •• 54 .$9 .45 
.19 .l2 .16 •#7 ~34 
.• 05 .77. .56 •13 • 06 
GRAND T·C1rAL Zl.-. 2S 
.MEAN 0.-28· 
STANDARD DEVIATION ·ofra 
~o . 60 











!ntra-:individuaJ. ratios of speed of linear movement in delayed 
reproduction of 1 second divided by speed of linen.r movement in 
immediate reproduction of l second. (N = 77). 
Delay (in secondsl 
0 5 J.O i5 20 30 60 
' 1.27 .61 0.93 l.00 1.25 .58 .50 
0.60 
. ·, .92 0.75 1.25 .. 98 .so 1.15 
0.91 0.59 l.09 .82 l.20 .90 .86 . 
1.52 .26 0.77 i.31 .92 .70 .55 
l.ll .52 l.4:3 i.oo .S5 .75 .18 
l.09 1.06 ,.45 l.55 2.00 l.14 .61 
' 
0.9J~ .72 .86 .52 1.39 .43 . /13: 
,. 
.67 043 0.$9 i.31 .91 .50 i.oo 
' 
0.73 1. r::r/ l.33 1.00 2.50 1.09 l.U 
1.00 o.ss .95 .50 .43 .56 .89 
0.96 0.15 .50 .86 .et/ .58 .71 
. 
·9.83. . io.o;· · ·9;7s 10.94 .. 12.68' ·s.47· 7.79·. Tar AL 
.. 
0/170 ' 0.914 0,,889 0.995 0.894 1~153. 0.708 :MEAN 




S'i.'AMDARD DEVIATIOU ·0.3701 
TAB LE LVI 
EXPZR1lztrr · 2 
Intra-individual ratios o:f .speed of linear movement in deleyed 
reproduction of 2 seconds divided by speed of linear movemmt in 
immediate reproduction of 2 seconds. (n == 77). 
Delaz !in seconds) 
0 5 10 15 20 30 
.77 l.CJ'/ l.00 .92 1.13 1.15 
.89 .88 .52 l.16 .94 1.12 
2.68 .89 .76 .73 .79 l.26 
1.17 1.43 .73 3.14 .so 1.14 
.99 ,.77 1.93 .99 i.40 ·l.25 
1.22 1.67 2.03 .49 1.49 1.08 
l.ll .35 i.os .76 l.26 .54 
1.26 .77 1.22 .82 .S2 ·1.16 
.79 1.27 l.05 1.02 l;.28 .94 
.s1 l.ll .65 .60 .44 ' .7s 
.s9 .so .59 .97 le09 .63 
'l'C,?.\L 12;5s · f ·1c~71 · · · JJ.;56'. lJ.~60' ' ll.14 11.05 



























.TABLE . LVll 
EXPERTI~N.r 2 
Intra:-:i.ndiVidual ratios of speed of linear movement in delayed 
reproduction of 4 seconds diV'.ided by speed o:r linear .movement jJ1 
immediate reproduction of 4 seconds. (N = 77}., · 
' . . ~' ~ ( ' 
., 
.D~ 'in seconds} 0 '5 10' ·1~ - ·20 '10 
.26 l.CJ'/ l.01 .5s .. .1.37 .84 
.so 1.42 .93 .43 .. 40 .48 
• 
1.17 .77 .97 1.02 1.13 1 •. 20 
.$7 2.l3 i.06 1.54 1.21 l.12 
·' 
l.20 .96 l.S2 .73. i.20 .,82 
• .. 
.93 66 ... i.15 .76. i.•)6 .so 
• • 
.99 .61 1.40 .99 ' .• 91 .78 
• t 
l.18 1.24 .96 l.4l 1.06 .96 
1 ; • . .. 
' l.97 i.26 .S9 1.31, 1.24 l .•. 64 
,. I 
2.ll J:.69 .91 .67 .;51 •. 99 
! !r . . 
.64 ·~93 .$2.· .94· • 86 1.16 . 
·• , . 
















... 5130 ... '•4)91' .. ;2751 . ".35ti2 
·, 




so .• 68 
·1.okS 
. ·.3912 
* STD. DEV. = STANDARD DEVIATION 
· 1·"~" · · · ,,on& · · · ..• "4aa:.··7 ,,''+VJ'i.. ~ . •"-Q70 
' .. " "· ~. • .. ~ ·. "· 
T .. A B L E . . L'VIll. 
EXPERIMENr 2 
!ntra-.indiV'idua.l rat:Loo of speed at linear movement in delayed 
Zteproduetion of $ seconds divided by speed· of linear movement in 
imnicdiatc .;reproduction of 8 seconds,, (N = 77.)'fa 
Dela;[ ~in· se,cori~l 
0 5 .10 J.5 .. 20 30 . 
.92 1.43 a94 ~86· i.;2 1•03 
·83 <.g'/ i.os ;.52 l•.40 ,i79 
' 
~9$ .61 .92 ,62 1•04 li.52 
~72 1~90 .86 2,16 1•40 ;/j7 
"' 
j96 1.71 le45 l;.00 i,21 .92 
i.10 i.06 i.u i.05 1~78 1;;32 
J 
.9s •72 i.16. .62 .li133 ,~72 
~66 1.09 i94 1.71 1•06 l.09 
'· 
1102 .,97 .,75 l•7if • li28 i ... sa 
i.19 lel3 1.4$ •91. •4.5 •77 















10156 .. ·12.44· u,54" 
·: ·9~0 ·J ·. ~·l'.31 . ·1•049 
12i21 13~5~· J :Ui2o .. J 9~od 
· i.,u· · · ·1_.23s · ·. i.01s ·J 'B2S ··J 
·GRAN'D TQr AL 
MEAN 
STANDARD .DEVIATION' 
'* STD. DEV. 1= Sl'ANDARD UE.'VlATION 







1.ntra-individu.a.l r11tios of speed of linear movement in dolAyed 
reproduction of 16 seconds divided by speed of linear movement in 
immediate :t_'eproduction o£ 16 seconds.. .(N = 77) .• 
Del:2l {in seconds) 
0 5 10.'. 15 20 30 
!182 l~OS .84 .65 4.34 .oo 
:,53 1.12 1.18 .69 .97 .67 
litOO l,02 .m 1.-21 .92 .91. 
l.01 l.49 l.J~ l.12 .93 .40 . . ' 1.01 l.('fl 1..25 .96 1.29 .. 99 
l.\59 i.-31 i.·15 ~92 1~:37 1;17 
l.34 .58 11103 l.32 1.23 l.00 
1.28 l,.12 1.06 1.59 .99 1.05 - . ' 
l.24 ,.99 .79 l.21 l.22 1.027 
~99 1~01 •9'.3 ~63 .-5a l;OO 
•. 91 .78 l.13 1.19 .96 .89 
. 
TGrAL U•BO lJ .• :57 11~71' u.:49 ·14.:so 10."23 
MEAN i:w3 i.·052 l i.·065 1~~01:.5 i.·345 ~930 
STD.DEV.* .2702' .2Z12 j .-13511- .-·2893 ~91101 ;224.5 
•• ,. ••• .I • • , ~ .. , 
GRAND TOTAL 81.64 
' MEAN ·1.b60. 
' . 
STANDARD DEVIA'l'ION . .• 4669 
.~al scores for till. 2 s;is,nnl le1~hs 
' 
TOl'AL 57,,.11.: 57.24 57.67 5.5.51 64.05 51.74 
MEAN l.038 1.0U' 1.049 1.009 i.165 .941· 
.. 
STD.DEV.* ~3702. ..• 3586 .3146. .4661 ·.5885 .2869 
1 : 





















Individual. dii'f erences .in the judgement .of' 8 seconds by the methOds 





Extraversion (short scale y. 
Hanifest f\:nxiety. 
Free linear movement reproduction of S seconds (total of 
4 trials over two sensions). 
Verbal estimate of $ seconds (total of 4 trials over t"t10 
sessions). 
Error in free linear movement reproduction of B seconds 
(t.otal error in 4 trials over two sessions) .. 
Error in verbal estJ.mate of S seconds (total error in 4 





























































__1,_ 2.. ~ec 
8 12 25.7 
8 13 25.6 
10 ll 26.3 
J2 27.s 
8 39 20.9 
8 22.0 
8 J2 21.0 
8 10 26.5 
6 25 24.7 
12 21 24.6 
2 e.o 
10 19.1 
s l2 ll.4 




10 28 28.l 
10 22 26.2 
a 27.2 
0 23 28.2 
0 l4 18.3 
4 1l+ 18.4 
io· 2l 16.7 
6 14 16.5 
4 13 26.7 
12 8 32.3 
6 8 31.9 
10 22.s 
6 31 15.-l 
4 28 22.1 
4 15.2 
10 16 29.9 
12 20 28.l 
8 36 31.9 
12 8 33.0 
4 15 33.3 




2 22 5.8 
8 11 27.8 
8 32.5 
8 15 31.1 
8 12 27.s 
6 19 26.7 
12 35.2 
4 9 25.3 
12 24 24.3 
12 17 23.4 
6 25 s.2 
6 28.l 
lO 15 20.8 
400 6?g 1.101.0 
7.6 1'7.87 21.i..1 
1.19 '"'.60 6.8'> 
* STD.DEV. = STAfIDARD DEVIATION 
111 
__A_s iec •. ~e ~ e 6 SI - c. 
28 - 6.3 - 4· 
37 - 6.4 + 5 31 - 5.7 - l 49 - 4.2 ' + 17 36 - u.1 + 4 38' - io.o' + 6 
38 .. n.o + 6 
45 - 5.5 + 13 
30 ... 7.3 - 2 27 - .7.4 - 5 39 ... 2J;t.O + 44 
33 -'12.9 + l 25 - 20.6 - 7· 
.26 ... 13.2 - 6 ll6 - o.s + 84 
30 ... 17.0 ... 2 
35 - 7.7 +· 3 
49 .... 3.9 + 17 
39 .. 5.8 + 7 
44 - 4.8 + l2 
24 ·- 3.B - $ 19 - 13.7 - 1.3 31 - '13.6 - 1 23 - 15.3 - 9 40 - 15.5 + 8 
52 - 5.3 + 20 61 + 0.3 + 29 
74 - 0.1 + 42 38 - 9.2 + 6 
40 - 16.9 + 8 27 - 9.9 - 5 28 - 16.8 ·- 4 31 - 2.1 - l 
52 - 3.9 ~i- 20 
43 - 0.1 + 11 
48 - 9.0 + l6 
.120 - a.7 + 88 
36 - 1.8 + 4 
37 + 0.9 + 5 
31 - 3.5 - l 
37 - 14.4 + 5 
46 - 26.2 ..!.. u f 
45 - 4.2 + 13 
37 + 0.5 + 5 
31 - 0.9 -· l 
33 - 4.2 + J. 
27 - 5.3 - 5 105 + 3.2 + 73 
34 - 6.7 + 2 
79 - 7.7 + 1+7 
29 - 8.6 - 3 18 - 23.s - 14 
50 - 3.9 + 18 
26 - ll.2 - 6 
2.2L.7' L.56.8 I ?P:. .0.1 
LJ.6 8.5 I L •. 5 




Individual differences in the judgement of 16 seconds by the . 
. methods of (a). free linear movement and (b) verbal estimate. 
(N = 54}. 
Variables listed : ... 
• 
l, Free linear movanent reproduction or 16 seconds (total 
of 1.+ trials aver two sessions). 
• 
2. Verbal estimate of l6 seconds (total 0£ 4 trials over , 
two sessions). 
' 3. Speed of f'ree linear movement in reproduc.ing time sig-. 
nals (average of first session speed). . . , 
< 
4. Error in free linear movement reproduction of 16 
seconds (total error in 4 trials over two sessions). . 
5. Error in verbal estimate of 16 seconds { totaJ. error m. 









































































































































































L. 5. 5 77. 8 
13 .1-8 ~l.i..15 
























































8. j;() , 
5. 'i1 
'*· 5 
- l4.3sec ... 10 sec 
- 25.2 



























... 3; .. 2 
- 20.1 
































































- 3 + 6 
- 9 +142 





18.6 I 23.0 
13.05 l 30.25 



































33 I 71 ~ 
34 ~ 56 
36 46 





























































































(maximum (personal . ' 
. SEeed2 ·a~ed) · 



























































Uetaphor Preference scores and timo judgement variables! (N = 40) .. 







Metaphor Pref ercnce score (high scare denotes preference tor 
swift iootaphors of tme). 
Linear movemmt reproduction of 8 seconds (first session). 
Llncar movement reproduction of 16 seconds (first session). 
Verbal. est:imate of 8 seconds (first session). 
Verbal estimate o.f l6 seconds (.first session). 
Error in linear moveman:c reproduction o.f' 8 seconds (fil·st 
session). · 
Error .:in llnear movement reproduction of 16 seconds (i'irst 
session). 
Error in verbal estimate of 8 seconds (first session). 
Error in verbal estimate or 16 seconds (first session) .. 
Reproclu.ction of 16 secoms by key-pressing (first session). 
Average individual speed of l:inear m<>Vemcnt reproduction of 
time in tl:e first session. 
Intra-subject variability of speed of linear movement repro-
duction of time in the first session. 
T _A B L E I.XIII 
EXPERJMEN.r 2 
l 2 3 4 5 6 
Seconds Seconds Seconds Seconds Seconds 
.. 
26 6.9 11.1 7 16 1.1 
ll 6.o ll~9 7 15 2.0 2a 6.l U..6 B 17 1.9 
2 5.7 8.5 10 22 2.3 
13 2.3 4.3 ll 20 6.7 
15 3.5 6.8 ll 16 4.5 
34 6.5 u.7 7 15 1.5 
22 3.5 s.2 6 ll 4.5 
25 5.7 l0.8 10 l7 2.3 
l 6.o 16.9 9 22 2.0 
40 2.9 7.4 l2 20 5.1 
34 3.9 16.l 15 35 0.9 
34 7.9 13·7 18 25 0.1 
13 4.0 16.3 5 l8 4.0 
18 J.a e.o lO 14 4•2 
28 7.5 13.9 10 16 0.5 
2l 7.4 16.6 10 .20 o.6 
5 3.8 17.8 l2 25 o.e 
33 6.2 ll.9 30 so 1.8 
19 4.3 a.s l4 24 3.7 
15 6.l 12.0 14 2$ 1.9 
l3 2.8 2.3 5 ll .3.2 
22 5.7 13.l 8 l.5 2.3 
lS 4.8 13.0 s 15 3.2 
17 4.3 9.1 10 19 3.7 
l4 7.2 15.2 13 22 o.s 
l6 7.1 18.6 10 2.3 0.9 
23 5.9 14.9 20 40 2.1 
20 7.s 14.1 2l M. 0.2 
2l 3.4 15.6 27 55 0.4 
18 6.4 10.4 13 lS 1.6 
28 2.7 a.o .5 17 5.3 
0 3.9 10.4 8 1$ 4.1 
26 8.3 11.4 7 ll 0.3 
2 a.s 19.0 24 .30 0.5 
33 4.1 7.0 8 .22 3.9 
29 4.7 12.9 6 14 3.3 
36 6.5 l2.5 7 l1+ . .l.5 
7 2.0 6.s s 20 6.o 
17 7.s 14.0 10 17 0.2 
TOTAL 797 22:/.9 ·475.6 454 901 I 97.9 
·19.9 . r.. 7 ;). ll.9 u.3 t 22.5 I ·2.4 




* S'l'D. .DEV• = STANDARD DEVIATIOO 
T A B L E I.XIII ( it1-if J. ) --------
10. 
7 G 9 (N= 21) ll l2 
Seconds Se co~ Seconds Seconds InchesLSec. Inches/Sec -- • 
4.9 l 0 15.6 4.7 2.34 
4.1 l l 15.0 12.2 l.05 
l.4 0 2 16.3 10.8 1.34 
7.5 2 . 6 . 17.l . 4.0· 0.57 
11.7 3 4 - 14.5 .. n.9· 4.95 
9.2 3 . 0 . ., . 4.9· 0.71 
4.3 l ' l . l0.6· 0.77 
1.e 2 I 5 ' lJ.4' 0.45 
5.2 2 l . 14.7 . 4.5 0.77 
0.9 1 . 6 . s.9· 3.16 
s.6 4 4 ' • s.9· l.00 
O.l 7 . 19 ' 17.8 s.2- 1~31 
2.3 lO 9 . 16.2 2s.o· 1.76 
0.3 :3 2 l,5.0 . 7.6 l.30 
s.o 2 ' 2 . . 3.6 1·09 
2.1 2 0 . 3.7· o.e4 
o.6 2 4 15.0 15.l 0.95 
l.S 4 . 9 . 9.1· l.05 
4.l 22 64 .. 6,.6' 0.82 
7.2 6 . 8. 4 7.2 1.38 
4.0 6 • l2 15.s . 3.B· 0.61 
13.7 3 . 5 . 5.1· .3.67 
2.9 0 I 1 • 16.0 7.1· 1.50 
3.0 0 . l . . 7.0· 1.20 
6.9 2 3 . 14.2 9.1 1.62 
o.s .5 . 6 . . 4.,3 0.59 
2.6 2 ' 7 . 6.3· 1.59 
l.l 12 . 24 . 21.4 9.5· 2.39 
1.9 13 . 28 . 6.6· o.so 
0.4 19 39 .. 14.7 s.2· 2.3a 
. 5.6 5 2 ll.8 7.0· 1.39 
a.o 3 l . 5.9· o.so 
5.6 0 . 2 . 17.2 ' 5.0· o.ss 
4.6 l 5 . 17.2 . 4.6· 0.33 
3.0 16 l4 . n.o . 4.6· 2.20 
9.0 0 ' 6 . 7.6· 2.12 
3.l 2 2 . 7.9· 1.45 
3.5 1 • 2 . l..l.3' s.94 
9.0 0 ' 4 . 26.3 . 9.9· 2.46 
2.0 2 l. . 13.6 . 6.3' o.si . . . . 
: . , 312· ·.· t ·326.4 : I .. 65.34 182.$ .. 167 321.0, 
4~6 ·4~2· I 7~s· . "15.5 I B.O ·1 l.63 - ,. -MEAN 
STD. DEV .. * . ·3~317 5.292/ ll.70 . ' 2.102. f 4.254 I l.490 
* STD. DEV. =STANDARD DEVIATION 
TABLE 
n Achievement scores and time judgement variables. (N = 40). 
Variables listed a.re : ... 
l, n Achievement score~ 
.2-, Reproduction of 8 seconds by linear movement {first session). 
3. Reproduction of 16 seconds by llnear movement (first session). 
4. Verbal estimate of 8 seconds (first session). 
:5,. Verbal estlniate of 16 seconds (first ocssion)., 
6, Error in reproduction of 8 seconds by linear .movemmt (first 
session). 
7 • Error in reproduction of 16 seconds by linear movement (first 
session.) 
s. Lrror ;;in verbal estimate of 8 seconds (first session) • 
. 9. E;rror in verbal est:ima.te of· 16 seconds (first session). 
10. Reproduction of 16 seconds by key-pressing (.first se$sion). 
ll. Average indiv:i.dual speed of linear movement reproduction. of 
time in the first session. 
12. Intraro:individuaJ. variability in speed af linear movement 






1 2 3 
Seconds Secondo 
, • 
0.3 .a.9 l31o3 
1.7 5.5 ll-.5 
3.3 .5 .. 5 JJ.,119 
2.3 5.9 11.,6 
0.3 2.5 6 .. 8 
2.:3 4.,s .3i.7 
:3.7 6.5 12.0 
4.3 7.0 l3i.S 
4.0 5.3 9.s 
2.0 3.7 7.,4 
4.7 6.3 18.,0 
3.7 7 .. 1 l4115 
1.3 4.7 l2.2 
l.7 7.8 JA..7 
i.o a.5 17!18 
3.0 20.1 io.5 
3.7 3.0 6.8 
1.3 10.s 14,.3 
0.7 7.1 ,14.5 
5.3 :s .. 2 12.9 
3.0 a.ti. 13w3 
2.0 6.5 ll;rl 
3~3 5.3 u,.9 
2.0 5-.5 :is.2 
o.o 6~9 u.7 
.l.O 6.5 14.0 
0.3 3.4 10.5 
3.7 7.5 16i9 
3.7 4.,4 20.0 
,J.3 S-4 16.1 
0.3 7.4 J.6.3 
2.0 4.3 s.o 
l.7 6.2 13.9 
1.3 s.s 19.0 
,2.0 7.7 ll.9 
2.7 Jh5 s.a 
1.3 4.8 9.1 
.1.0 6.2 l2.o 
0.7 7 .4 lS,,.3 
l.3 5.1 16.o 
' 
87.2. 25l.l ·502;0 ,, 
·.2~18 6.3 12.5 ,. ; ,. 
' 
1 ·1;349 l.844· .. s;406 
* filD. mv. = STANDARD DEVIATION 
111 
4 5 6 
Seconds Seconds Secondo 
io.o 24.0 0.9 
9:.5 20.0 2 .. 5 
7.5 J..S,,.o 2,.5 
6.5 13.0 2.1 
l0.5 16,.0 5.5 
a.; 14.0 3,.2 
12.0 23.0 1 ... 5 
6.o 12.o 1.0 
6.5 ll.O 47 
12.0 20.0 4~3 
u.o Z{.O 1.7 
.ll.O 18.0 0.9 
8.5 9.0 3.3 
7.5 13.0 0.2 
14.5 25.0 0.5 
10.5 18.0 2.1 
20.5 20~0 5.0 
ll.O 15.0 2.s 
7.5 15.0 0.9 
6.5 '· ' 14.0 2.8 
ll.o 20.0 0.4 
s.o .16.o 1.5 
9.5 is.a 2~7 
5.0 22.0 2 .. 5 
a.5 15.0 l .. l 
9.0 18:.o 1 .. 5 
9.0 14.0 4 .. 6 
13.0 22.0 0.5 
u.o 20.0 3~6 
17.5 :35.0 0,.4 
21.'5 18.0 o.6 
·10.0 J.4,.0 3,.7 
10.5 J.6.o 1.s 
9.5 30.0 0.5 
19.0 20.0 0.3 
7.0 24.0 3i.5 
10.0 19.0 3.2 
10.5 28.o l.,S 
9.5 23.0 o.6 
9.5 12.0 2.9 
~ 
406.o· I 71~.o e4.1 I ' I 
10~1 
' , , '18.6 . ' 2.1 . 































































































































2 ~ 14,.6 
6 
I 4 . 
19 ' 17,.8 ' 
2 I 15.0 2 




12 15 .. 8 
7 
4 17.2 . 
182~0 ·j 32s~7 
4.5 15.6 
4.000. 7.912 












































. 334;3 '5S.OO 
, . , ·s.4 l . . 1.5 
5.292 ( 0.728 
